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International initiatives, such as the Nagoya Protocol to the United Nations Convention 
on Biological Diversity (the Protocol), have created (or are creating) “access and benefit 
sharing” rights which seek to ensure that genetic resources and traditional knowledge 
associated with such genetic resources (“TKAGR”) cannot be used without the consent 
of rights holders. These initiatives (including the Protocol) are unclear on how far non-
consensual “use” extends to man-made downstream derivatives of the products of 
genetic expression. It also gives no guidance as to the degree to which control over 
TKAGR should extend throughout the drug discovery process. This work demonstrates 
how such TKAGR entering into a drug discovery process will be diluted with other 
information, used as an inspiration for further research, or for the development of 
research tools which may, in turn, lead to further discoveries and highlights how useful 
drugs may be very distal from the original inspiration provided by the TKAGR. This 
work also examines the causal link between an original piece of TKAGR and remote 
“downstream” uses of that information within drug discovery. It identifies 
“serendipitous” discoveries of unexpected second uses as a potential point at which the 
causation in law link to distal use may potentially be broken. This thesis examines the 
high level normative justifications for these rights, and in particular uses 
consequentialist/utilitarian, contribution/desert claims and distributive justice (Rawlsian 
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“The heedless exploitation of nature and the careless use of resources 
already threaten our inheritors with a world physically and spiritually 
impoverished” 
Declaration of the 14
th
 Biennial Wilderness Conference (1975) 
 
“Knowledge itself is power” 
Francis Bacon, Meditationes Sacrae (1597) 
 
1.1 Overview of the aim and scope of this work 
The aim of this work is to examine the balance between respect for the justifications of 
rights holders and the liberty of the broader world in relation to a new-born, or at least 
newly evolving, intellectual property right. Its aim is to determine where, if at all, any 
justifiable limit can be drawn to the downstream scope of positive rights of indigenous 
peoples to traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources when that 
knowledge is used within the search for new pharmaceutically-active compounds (or 
new uses for such compounds) within drug discovery research. 
Such positive rights have been created (or are in the course of being created) as part of 
an international drive to preserve biodiversity and indigenous culture by creating control 
over access to, and utilisation of, genetic resources and the traditional knowledge which 
is associated with such resources. 
The concept of controlling the use of genetic resources may initially appear to be 
relatively straightforward. Taking a plant cutting, propagating it, and growing it 
indisputably looks like the accessing and using of that plant. However, examination of 
the concept of a genetic resource rapidly reveals that, with the advent of 
biotechnological tools for manipulating the genome, any assumption of simplicity is 
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misplaced – and we are led to question whether “genetic information” such as a 
nucleotide sequence (or even the natural epigenetic modification of a genome) can be 
considered a genetic resource. Yet further complexities are encountered when 
considering whether the biochemical products of genetic expression such as enzyme 
proteins and the products of enzymatic reactions (or even man-made chemical 
derivatives thereof) are to be included within the subject matter to be controlled.  
Such problems of definition are further amplified when we come to consider “traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources”. This type of knowledge can take many 
forms and be held in many ways – of particular interest in the present study is 
knowledge of how a particular genetic resource can be used to influence a human 
disease state. However, due to the inherent malleability, mixability and easily 
reproduced nature of information, such traditional knowledge is perhaps harder even to 
define and delimit than “genetic resources”. This is particularly true when one looks at 
the fate such knowledge within the process of drug discovery.  Unfortunately, the 
provisions of the extant (and proposed) international instruments relating to the 
protection of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge are unclear with 
regard to this downstream scope.  
Stimulated by these uncertainties, the core of this work is the examination of the 
justifiable downstream scope of a positive right in traditional knowledge associated with 
genetic resources in the light of a substantial empirical examination of the drug 
discovery process. This empirical examination highlights how any piece of information 
(including traditional knowledge) entering into a drug discovery process is subject to 
significant mixing with other information leading to its dilution/attenuation. Such a 
piece of information may serve as the inspiration for further discoveries (alone, or 
mixed in with other information) and those discoveries may themselves serve as further 
stimulus for new research directions, or be used as part of more iterative development 
work.  However it is used, the information will enter into a series of complex and 
overlapping discovery pathways, including “dead-ends” and feedback loops. In many 
cases any useful downstream discovery will (though always causally linked in fact to 
the original information) appear particularly distal or remote from the information 
which served as the original stimulus to the work.  
This complex epistemic dilution throws up a significant challenge: should we consider 
any downstream use (for example the development of a new drug) as constituting the 
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use of the original inspiring piece of traditional knowledge, no matter how greatly that 
information has been diluted. 
The question is an important one – the efficient and non-wasteful exploitation behaviour 
and investment decisions of all parties affected by a right rely upon an informed and 
reliable appreciation of a right’s scope.   
There is, of course, one potentially simple answer to this problem of epistemic dilution 
– why do we not just say that all downstream uses which are caused in fact by the 
original inspiration provided by the traditional knowledge constitute use of that original 
knowledge? Such an approach would certainly save us looking into the complex causal 
continuum between inspiration and outcome to determine a point at which to limit the 
right to control downstream use. However, the problem with such a simplistic approach 
is that it ignores the interests of immediately affected third parties, in particular, and of 
the broader world in general. As will be discussed in this work, determination of a 
justifiable legal scope of a right requires a determination of causation in law, as opposed 
to a mere determination of causation in fact. That justifiable scope is dependent upon 
the reason(s) for the existence of the right – reasoning which must balance competing 
interests.    
Established intellectual property law does not commonly consider such questions of 
scope as ones of causation as such, instead relying on judgments of imitativeness and 
non-imitativeness. Inherent within such considerations of imitativeness is the concept of 
conflicting “contribution” - intellectual property rights do not exist in vacuo in that one 
always has to consider conflicting claims between those seeking to assert the right and 
those properly seeking to avoid it.  
In the present case, what a simple causation in fact test arguably ignores is a recognition 
of the contribution made by those pharmaceutical researchers who are developing (or 
have developed) the new information in which the original inspiration is being 
“diluted”.  This conflict between the contributions of the indigenous peoples who have 
discovered the traditional knowledge which has inspired the work and those 
downstream researchers who have built upon that inspiration is at the heart of the 
current work.  
Looking at the question of downstream scope through the lens of competing 
contributions we might argue that the scope should end where the accretion of 
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downstream contributions somehow “outweighs” the contribution made by the 
indigenous “originators”. However, we are still presented with the question of where 
such a “tipping point” of competing contributions should be arrived upon.  
Comparing conflicting contributions is inherently difficult – it is not easy to “measure” 
a single contribution, nor summate a number of contributions. Indeed, the current work 
shows that when you empirically examine the drug discovery process you find that there 
are few easily determined points at which one might obviously argue that such a tipping 
point has been reached and that chain of causation in law could be broken. Perhaps what 
we require is some sense of a “step change” in the nature of the competing 
contributions. Of course, we do not have necessarily to reinvent the wheel here. We 
might ask whether any guidance can be taken from other intellectual property rights that 
have been forced to wrestle with questions of scope within the field of drug discovery. 
Naturally, the field of patent law is the most obvious choice. 
It should be stressed at the outset that the subject matter of established patent law is a 
distinctly different creature from that of envisaged positive rights in traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources. Accordingly, direct comparison between 
patent law and control over traditional knowledge is potentially misleading, and needs 
to be treated with caution. However, patent law and the processes of drug discovery 
have had a long interaction, particularly with regard to questions of “downstream” 
scope. Provided that the distinct differences of patent law are borne in mind, the history 
of this interaction may act as a source of putative concepts to be considered in the 
context of the scope of traditional knowledge in the present problem.  
One of the chief aspects of the interaction between patent law and drug development has 
been the recurrent question of whether a claim to one therapeutic use of a drug should 
extend the discovery of a second therapeutic (or other) use.  
With such questions in mind (and in the light of this work’s empirical analysis of the 
flow of information through the topography of drug discovery processes) the current 
work posits that “serendipitous” discoveries of a new use of the subject of the 
traditional knowledge (what might be termed within patent law as the uncovering of an 
unexpected “second use”) might act as a putative point at which one might consider 
there to be a break in the causation in law link between the original stimulus and the 
useful outcome. Crucially, this is a point at which the competing contributions between 
5 
 
the indigenous peoples on the one hand, and pharmaceutical researchers on the other, is 
brought to a head. Here, one is forced to ask why the indigenous “discovery” of one 
therapeutic use should prevent third party exploitation of a second, entirely unforeseen, 
use. As will be seen in this work, this is a question which takes us to the heart of what 
contribution means in this context.  
As already stressed, although an understanding of existing types of intellectual property 
right may act as a source of inspiration for our thinking, the different nature of 
traditional knowledge means that the guidance found in those other rights can take us 
only so far. As such, in addressing normative problems in this area we are pushed back 
to first principles – we need to ask: What are the underlying philosophical reasons for 
the existence of these rights? As will be seen, such justifications fall into two camps – 
those justifications based upon consequentialist goals and deontological justifications 
based on concepts of duty. Both are considered in depth in this work. Accordingly, this 
work looks to apply the philosophical “tool-box” of reasons for the existence of 
property rights in intangible concepts to the question of competing claims in relation to 
serendipitously discovered new uses and attempts to arrive at a synthesis of the results 
obtained from the application of each justification. 
The reader should be warned from the outset that this is not an area in which it is easy to 
arrive at definitive conclusions. Indeed, the author identifies the key contributions of 
this work to be the recognition and analysis of a number of significant complexities and 
difficulties which should inform the investigations of future workers in this field. These 
complexities and difficulties are both empirical and theoretical. They are as follows: 
1) The complexity of the passage of traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources through the topology of the drug discovery process and the difficulty 
of identifying clear points within the movement of such information at which 
limits of control may be investigated;  
2) The complexity of the epistemic dilution of the idea held within a piece of 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resource through the drug 
discovery process and the complexity of competing contributions which sit upon 




3) The difficulty in the application of contribution-based reward justifications for 
the control of information in the light of a complicated plurality of types and 
sources of competing contributions and to specific examples of contribution and 
of competing contributions; 
4) The complexity in determining the true nature of serendipity, and second uses in 
the light of the nature of traditional knowledge; and 
5) The potential complexities wrought by the existence of a right to control 
information which has no temporal limitation.   
 
• • • 
The remainder of this chapter is intended to give further introductory background to the 
problem considered in this work, to outline the analytical approaches taken to address 
that problem, and to provide a guide to the structure of this work. 
 
1.2 Claims of misappropriation of traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources 
Many compounds that have pharmacological effects in humans are derived from 
eukaryotic organisms (such as plants, animals, fungi) and bacteria. In some cases these 
compounds have been honed by hundreds of millions of years of evolution to have 
exquisite selectivity and potency in biological systems – indeed, some of these 
compounds are amongst the most toxic substances know.
1
 In some organisms 
(particularly plants and fungi), they are used for defence against predators, whereas in 
predator organisms they are more often used as tools in the hunt for prey. In yet others 
                                                          
 
1
 For example the LD50 dose in humans of botulinum toxin from the bacterium Clostridium botulinum  
(the “botox” of botox cosmetic treatments) has been estimated to be 1.3–2.1 ng/kg by intravenous or 
intramuscular injection and 10–13 ng/kg when inhaled. Stephen S Arnon, R Schechter, TV Inglesby, DA 
Henderson, JG Bartlett, MS Ascher, E Eitzen , AD Fine, J Hauer , M Layton, S Lillibridge, MT 
Osterholm, T O'Toole, G Parker, TM Perl, PK Russell, DL Swerdlow, and K Tonat, “Botulinum Toxin as 
a Biological Weapon: Medical and Public Health Management"(2001) 285 (8) Journal of the American 




they are used in the drive to reproduce.
2
 In some cases the biological effect produced by 
evolution has been harnessed by man to provide beneficial therapeutic effects and many 
currently approved drugs have their origin in plants and fungi 
3, 4
 or animal venoms. 
5
 
Often the Western understanding that a particular organism contained a compound of 
potential therapeutic benefit arose out of the knowledge of folk-healers or traditional 
medicine systems.
6,7,8,9
  In many historical cases, those Western ethnobotanists and 
scientists accessing and using traditional knowledge have treated this knowledge as a 
non-rivalrous and non-excludable “public good” and have treated the originators of this 
knowledge to be undeserving of recognition or reward for its subsequent use and 
similarly undeserving of any degree of control over the use of the information.10  
More lately, the interface between indigenous knowledge and Western pharmacology 
has become an area of high emotions, polemics and political activism.11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 
                                                          
 
2
 Gadi VP Reddy and Angel Guerrero, “Interactions of insect pheromones and plant semiochemicals” 
(2004) 9(5) Trends in Plant Science 253 
 
3
 Paul A Cox, “The ethnobotanical approach to drug discovery: strengths and limitations” in Derek J 
Chadwick and Joan Marsh (eds), Ethnobotany and the Search for New Drugs (John Wiley & Sons 1994) 
(Ciba Foundation Symp 185) 25, 27 
 
4
 Norman R Farnsworth, “The role of ethnopharmacology in drug development” in Bioactive compounds 
from Plants (John Wiley & Sons 1994) (Ciba Foundation Symp 154) 2 
 
5
 Glenn F King (ed), Venoms to Drugs: Venom as a Source for the Development of Human Therapeutics 
(Royal Society of Chemistry, Abingdon, 2014) 
 
6
 Londa Schiebinger,  Plants and Empire, Colonial Bioprospecting in the Atlantic World  (Harvard 
University Press 2004) 
 
7
 Bill Laws, Fifty Plants that Changed the Course of History (David & Charles 2010) 
 
8
 Michael J Balick and Paul A Cox, Plants, People, and Culture: The Science of Ethnobotany (Scientific 
American Library 1997)  
 
9
 CM Cotton, Ethnobotany:  Principles and Applications  (John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, 1996), 234 
 
10
 Philip Schuler, “Biopiracy and Commercialization of Ethnobotanical Knowledge” in J Michael Finger 
& Philip Schuler (eds) Poor People’s Knowledge (World Bank and OUP 2004) 
 
11
 Graham Dutfield, Intellectual Property Rights, Biogenetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge 
(Earthscan Publications, London and Sterling, VA  2004) 
 
12
 Mary Riley (ed), Indigenous Intellectual Property Rights, Legal Obstacles and Innovative Solutions 
(Altamira Press 2004) 
 
13
 Daniel Wüger, “Prevention of Misappropriation of  Intangible Cultural Heritage through Intellectual 






 uses the term biopiracy to include all aspects of the control by Western 
commercial interests of biological resources and biodiversity 
19
 However, it is generally 
more common for biopiracy to be used to describe a narrower set of circumstances, 
namely the particular situation where a genetic resource (and information relating to that 
genetic resource) obtained from indigenous peoples is used scientifically, or 
commercially, without their consent and/or without those indigenous peoples having 




This history of claimed misappropriation eventually led to a movement to secure legal 
mechanisms by which indigenous peoples would gain control over genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge such that misappropriation could no longer occur.
22
 
However, as will be discussed further in this work, the particular nature of traditional 
knowledge is such that its protection is not easily achieved through the use of what 
might be termed “established” intellectual property rights (such as copyright, patents, 
utility models, trade secrets, trade marks, plant variety protection, or geographical 
indications), or through the law of confidence.
23
 Attempts to protect traditional 





 Chidi Oguamanam, International Law and Indigenous Knowledge: Intellectual Property, Plant 
Biodiversity, and Traditional Medicine (University of Toronto Press, Toronto ON 2006) 
 
15
 Graham Dutfield,  “Protecting the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: Can Prior Informed Consent Help?” in 
Rachel Wynberg, Doris Schroeder and Roger Chenells (eds) Indigenous Peoples, Consent and Benefit 
Sharing: Lessons from the San-Hoodia Case (Springer, Dordrecht 2009) 53 
 
16
 SS Latha, “Biopiracy and protection of traditional medicine in India” (2009) 31(9) EIPR 465 
 
17
 Daniel F Robinson, Confronting Biopiracy: Challenges, Cases and International Debates (Earthscan 
Publications London and Stirling, VA 2012) 
 
18
 Vandana Shiva,  Biopiracy: the Plunder of Nature and Knowledge (South End Press, New York, NY & 
Boston, MA 1997) 
 
19
 Shiva (n 18), 3  
 
20
 Dutfield “Protecting the Rights of Indigenous Peoples” (n 15), 55 
 
21
 Robinson (n 17), 14 
 
22
 Rosemary J Coombe, “The Recognition of Indigenous Peoples' and Community Traditional Knowledge 
in International Law” (2002) 14 St Thomas L Rev 275 
  
23
 Dutfield Intellectual Property Rights, Biogenetic Resources and Traditional Knowledge (n 11), 101 
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knowledge relating to genetic resources, (and traditional knowledge and cultural 
expression more widely) have therefore focused on the creation of a set of sui generis 
rights which, independent of currently-established intellectual property rights, would 
ensure that such genetic resources and related knowledge could only be controlled by 
those originally holding the information. 
The drive to prevent “misappropriation” of genetic resources and related traditional 
knowledge has taken place, with differing rates of progress, in a number of international 
fora. The key fora are: 
a) The World Trade Organisation (“WTO”);  
b) The United Nations (“UN”); and 
c) The World Intellectual Property Organisation (“WIPO”) 
The nature of the rights established under the current (and proposed) international 
solutions to countering misappropriation of genetic resources and traditional knowledge 
are set out in Chapter 2 of this work and a “family tree” of these approaches is set in 
Figure 2.1 of that chapter.  
Most developed amongst these international approaches is the October 2010 Nagoya 
Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits 
Arising from their Utilization (ABS) to the Convention on Biological Diversity (the 
“Protocol”) which will be discussed in depth in Chapter 2. 
1.3 The problem of downstream use 
1.3.1 The dilution of knowledge within drug discovery 
The development “trails” within drug development are often long and complicated, and 
the original contribution from biological source or traditional knowledge is often 
overestimated. 
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A piece of traditional knowledge can take many such routes within the drug discovery 
process – there are many pathways and feedback loops, the original information may be 
admixed to a greater body of existing information regarding the clinical problem, and 
there may be further admixture to the original information of discoveries derived from it 
and subsequent admixture to other “parallel” information which is not derived from it. 
In such a way, the original information is “diluted” or “attenuated”. Here we 
immediately see the conflict between the original contribution of the indigenous peoples 
and contribution provided by those performing the research which lies at the heart of the 
current work – the dilution of knowledge throughout the drug discovery process is 
arguably accompanied by a concomitant dilution in contribution.  
Chapter 4 of this work will look at the topography of the drug discovery research 
process in greater depth. However, for introductory purposes, Figure 1.1 shows a much-
simplified schematic showing some of the potential steps that a genetic resource/piece 
of traditional knowledge may take within a drug discovery process. 
Figure 1.1 Simplified schematic of path taken by a piece of traditional knowledge 
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For simplicity, this flow diagram suggests that the steps are fairly linear. However, the 
“real life” drug discovery trail for a particular drug or family of drugs will rarely show 
such linearity.  It is, of course, entirely possible that the scientific (and commercial) 
benefits of using a particular piece of original knowledge may be relatively “proximal” 
to that original knowledge and the history of the science of pharmacology is full of the 
use of relatively simple plant extracts or compounds directly purified from such extracts 
to give a therapeutic benefit.
25
 
However, the extraction and testing a biochemical constituent of a genetic resource is, 
within modern drug discovery, far more usually merely the beginning, rather than the 
end, of a process of finding a safe and efficacious drug. 
26, 27
  
Evolution through natural selection can be improved upon in the search for a better 
drug, but such work has the additional advantage for those sponsoring the work of 
generating intellectual property “space” relative to their competitors’ efforts. Indeed, 
much research into chemical derivatives is also undertaken in the search for so-called 
“me-too” (or, perhaps less pejoratively, “follow-on”) compounds which allow a 
competitor to enter a market without infringement of earlier patents covering the field 
(but which can also yield truly enhanced pharmacological chemical entities).
28
  Such 
modification of compounds is but one element of the drug discovery process. The 
finding of a new pharmacologically active compound within a genetic resource may 
uncover an as yet unknown biological mechanism within humans (or at least previously 
unknown ways of affecting known systems) which can give rise to further lines of 
research, both in terms of new chemical entities and new therapeutic benefits.  
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Given the pharmaceutical industry’s striving not only to improve on an original, but to 
seek out clear intellectual property space, it is highly likely that the scientific (and 
commercial) benefits of using a piece of original traditional knowledge related to a 
genetic resource will be significantly distal to a complex process of mixing and dilution 
of the original information. 
1.3.2 Where should the right end? 
The core purpose of the Protocol is to provide a set of binding mechanisms for 
implementing the access and fair and equitable benefits sharing (“ABS”) objectives of 
the CBD. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, it does this by creating what are essentially 
rights of veto over certain genetic resources and over specific traditional knowledge 
which relates to those genetic resources. However, when one looks at the real-world 
complexity of drug discovery research and the provisions of the Protocol we see a 
potential problem. 
It might be argued that much of the rhetoric in the argument for creating positive rights 
in traditional knowledge seems to take an uncomplicated view of the role of traditional 
knowledge in pharmaceutical discovery/development and tends, in particular, not to 
mention the more “distal” and “remote” research activities. It also tends to assume that 
all downstream uses of a piece of traditional knowledge relating to a genetic resource, 
or another piece of traditional knowledge which relates to a therapeutic solution, are 
derived in a simple, linear, fashion from the original piece of knowledge. As we have 
seen, this is not necessarily the case.  
As will be seen in detail in Chapter 2 of this work, the way in which certain articles of 
the Protocol came to be drafted (and certain definitions came to be defined and 
incorporated into those articles) would appear to leave a degree of uncertainty over the 
scope of protection offered by the Protocol in relation to the downstream use of 
biochemical constituents of genetic resources.
29
  
These uncertainties stimulated the author to ask the following question (which is the 
core of the current work):  
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Given the potential dilution of the original traditional knowledge associated with a 
genetic resource, is it justifiable to allow the “owner” of the original knowledge to 
possess an absolute veto on all downstream activity or are other solutions more 
supportable? 
Or reframed: 
i) Does a broad, apparently unending, scope of veto on use constitute 
fair/justifiable protection for the holders of traditional knowledge regarding the 
therapeutic efficacy of genetic resources, even where the “non-consensual” use, 
is extremely distal to the original knowledge?; and 
 
ii) If such a scope is unfair/unjustifiable, can we gain any certainty as to where the 
scope should end (which may be interpreted as an activity not constituting 
access/use)? 
Although the question was stimulated by the uncertainty of the Protocol in this regard, 
(and may inform our understanding of the correct interpretation of the Protocol), it is a 
more fundamental normative question whose solution (if there is one) is more broadly 
applicable to the protection which should be afforded to indigenous peoples, whichever 
method of creating positive rights is promulgated within a jurisdiction (and indeed 
whatever solution is arrived at by WIPO or the WTO).  
It should be immediately noted that the key focus of this work is deliberately upon the 
right to veto downstream use, as opposed to a right merely to share in the fruits of a 
third party’s existing, or intended, commercial exploitation. A right to veto is a 
significantly stronger right than a mere right to share benefits of exploitation in that it 
allows the right holder to choose whether the subject matter is exploited, how it is 
exploited, by whom and on what terms. A right to share in proceeds of exploitation 
which is not supported with a right to veto is a lesser right. Accordingly, questions of 
the justification and scope of the stronger veto rights fall first to consideration. As will 
be seen, however, the appropriateness of a mere compensation model relative to 
downstream vetoes and questions of determination of compensation based upon 




1.4 How should we seek to address this problem of “scope”? 
Although the downstream use question set out above is relatively simple to formulate, it 
is one which is harder to answer.  
The current work addresses the overall question by essentially asking two related, and 
intertwined, questions:  
a) How can one delineate the boundary of a right to control traditional 
knowledge? and  
b) What are the philosophical justifications for a veto right in traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources?  
The work adopts two parallel analytical approaches to these questions:  
a) analogical reasoning which: 
i) treats the involvement of a piece of traditional knowledge associated with 
a genetic resource within the a drug discovery process as a flow of 
information (a chain of causation) during which the original concept 
becomes diluted through the contribution of others; and (alongside that 
approach); 
ii) seeks to determine what justifiable parallels (if any) can be drawn with 
relevant existing categories of intellectual property rights, particularly in 
relation to the identification of putative boundaries and the handling of 
competing contributions;  
and  
b) the application of a “tool-box” of philosophical justifications for property in 
intangible concepts to putative boundaries to the right.  
Each of these questions, and analytical approaches, will be dealt with in turn.  
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1.4.1 Boundary/”crux” point delineation 
As will be dealt with in more detail in Chapter 3, trying to create exclusivity in an 
intangible (such as knowledge) is inherently wrought with problems. Ideas are by their 
nature non-exclusionary and non-rivalrous and exclusivity in ideas can be only be 
created through the imposition of what Bentham styled the “head of law”. 
30
  If one is 
(through a positive legal mechanism) to carve-out or delineate an area which is to be 
excluded from the use of others, one needs to be able with reasonable certainty to 
identify the point at which third-party use is to be prevented. However, whereas the 
“core” of an idea may seem easy to articulate, problems begin to arise when one seeks 
to determine the “edges” of a concept (edges which are crucial to delineating an 
exclusionary boundary).  
The uncertainty of such delineation is related to the nature of the type of information 
that one seeks to protect. Problems of delineation of both “backward-looking” 
(subsistence) and “forward-looking” (infringement) boundaries are (as will be discussed 
in Chapter 3) arguably more acute in relation to “raw” ideas, than when dealing with 
(relatively) more concrete expressions of such ideas. Traditional knowledge which tells 
us of the therapeutic benefit of a particular genetic resource is, arguably, information in 
its “rawest” form. 
In the current problem, the issues concerning boundary delineation are compounded by 
the complexity of the mechanisms by which a piece of traditional knowledge can be 
used within the field of drug discovery.  It is this mix of the inherent breadth of the 
nature of traditional knowledge, teamed with the plurality and complexity of potential 
downstream uses, which makes the determination of justifiable limits to positive rights 
to control its use a thorny problem. 
Thorny as it may be, if we are to get anywhere with finding a justifiable limit we need 
to identify some putative boundaries which can be taken on for further analysis.  As will 
be discussed below, this work uses two approaches to seek such putative boundaries. 
The first is to identify parallels with concepts of breaks in chains of causation and to 
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apply such concepts, where applicable, by analogy. The second seeks to identify 
potentially relevant concepts which have been used by within the analysis of other 
intellectual property rights and to apply such concepts, where applicable, by analogy.  It 
should be immediately noted that both approaches are used in parallel and inform one 
another. 
1.4.2 Philosophical justifications for a veto right 
Attempts to delineate the putative edges of a right are crucial precursors to questions of 
scope and without such examination one is in danger of dealing merely in broad generic 
terms. However, such enquiries cannot, of themselves, answer the question of what is a 
justifiable limit to a particular right to exclude others from an activity. A determination 
of such justifiable limits can, by definition, only come from the application of the 
philosophical grounds for excluding others from an activity to a particular situation. 
As will be further discussed in Chapter 3, there is a rich body of higher-level 
philosophical principles (consequentialist, deontological, and those not so easily 
categorised) which have been used to for excluding third party use of what might be 
called “intellectual products” and thereby justifying the existence of intellectual 
property rights in the light of opposing justifications for the preservation of a “commons 
of ideas”. The present study will seek to identify and summarise these justifications and 
apply them to the question of the proper scope of positive protection over uses of 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources. However, simple rehearsal of 
the underlying opposing justifications is likely to provide only broad generic principles 
as to the limit of these rights. Where one is faced with a continuum or “grey-scale” of 
putative “infringements” (i.e. non-consensual uses), such a broad examination is 
unlikely, of itself, to provide more focussed guidance as to whether certain forms of 
distal activity should constitute non-consensual use. 
The power and usefulness of a philosophical position within a legal context comes from 
the ability to apply it to “real world” situations. Indeed, for Underkuffler: 
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 “the adoption of a theoretical dimension – means nothing without knowing to 
what this theory is to be applied” 
31
 [emphasis from original]  
In the present case the “what” to which we are seeking to apply a theoretical dimension 
– i.e. our philosophical “tool kit” -is the putative boundary delineation to the right 
identified through analogical reasoning. 
1.4.3 Analogical Reasoning: Causation, dilution and the topography of the drug 
discovery process. 
Intellectual property rights are often analogised as creating exclusivity “over” a “field” 
of activity. The mental image conjured up is perhaps one of a 2D “area”, or perhaps 
even a 3D “space”. Such images can help us visualise a problem and they certainly 
assist in the drawing of 2- or 3-dimensional Euler diagrams. In this analogy, questions 
of scope are visualised as the determination of the (sometimes fuzzy) “edges” of the 
area or space. However, analogies are simply that, and we need always to be aware of 
their limitations. What is used as a mental aid should not circumscribe our ways of 
thinking.   
An outstanding feature of the present case is the sense of a “flow” of information 
(traditional knowledge) through a series of pathways where one piece of knowledge 
stimulates a further downstream use. It is the nature of that information at any point in 
the pathway (and the use to which it is put) which provides the path-dependency with 
the original inspiring knowledge. In such a case, perhaps a more productive analogy is 
with a causal chain rather than with an excluded “area” with “edges”. It is to this type of 
analogical reasoning that we will now turn. 
We are concerned in this work with the question of whether a particular use is 
consensual or not. This would appear, on the face of it, to have a relatively straight-
forward binary outcome - consent is either granted or consent is not granted. In fact, the 
granting of consent, or otherwise, has many complexities – does the person giving (or 
denying) consent have the authority to grant/deny it? Is the consent (or denial) clear? Is 
the consent/denial contingent upon something else? These complexities are important 
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(and given the way traditional knowledge may be held by indigenous groups could be 
particularly problematic in relation the granting of consent to use of such knowledge). 
There is, however, a further question – is the consent properly required? In our present 
case we can ask: is the downstream use of a piece of knowledge within a drug discovery 
programme such that consent is required?   
Our first approach may be to say that this question has a simple answer based upon a 
simple causation analysis: Did the use in question in fact derive from the original piece 
of information? If so, consent is required.  
If we look (broadly) at the application of a causation in fact (or sine qua non) test to the 
situation in which a new drug has been developed on the basis of a piece of traditional 
knowledge associated with a genetic resource, we would find that but for the original 
piece of traditional knowledge one would never have arrived at the final drug in the way 
in which it was arrived at. Of course, one may have eventually arrived at that drug by 
other (path-independent) means (for example through random screening), but possibly 
less simply, quickly, or cheaply as by the path-dependent means. However, the path-
independent means does not concern us in this respect – it is, by definition, not 
dependent in fact upon the original information.  
Now if causation in fact alone is sufficient to create liability, we might successfully 
argue that any downstream use, no matter how distal or remote (and no matter how 
changed, diluted and widely dissipated the original “inspiration” has become) can be 
subject to a veto from the original holder of the information. 
Within the philosophy of scientific discovery there is a long tradition of recognition that 
new discoveries are based upon the work of those which have gone before. Newton’s 
quote that: 
 “If I have seen further it is by standing on the sholders [sic] of Giants”
32
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 but was clearly derived (somewhat ironically, and perhaps 
deliberately) from the earlier statement “nanos gigantum humeris insidentes” (dwarves 





 acknowledges that all scientific discoveries have to be causally 
dependent in fact upon the work that has gone before, he stresses that such causality is 
merely backward looking once a discovery has been made - if one is within a chain of 
discovery it does not, of itself, render the last step in the discovery trite or obvious, nor 
take us unerringly to the final conclusion before that discovery is made. 
Is a strict causation in fact test correct in our present instance? Such “but for” tests for 
causation give only a stark binary outcomes, lack subtlety and could be taken to absurd 
extremes - there is a sine qua non link between a wrong turning taken by Leopold Lojka 
in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 and the detonation of a nuclear device over Nagasaki 31 




Other problems with a sine qua non test arise where one considers that causal chains are 
not only long, but that one event will be the “result” of the interaction of a large variety 
of distinct efferent events or preconditions – a particular situation is often the outcome 
of multiple equilibria of causes. Following a Baconian
37
 empirical approach, much 
scientific experimentation will seek to control as many efferent factors as possible so as 
to isolate the causative factor of interest. However, such control is impossible where 
performing an ex post facto analysis of the historic causes of an event. In addition, 
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multiple efferent events cause particular problems where there is duplicative causation 
(two efferent factors each of which was sufficient alone to cause an event) or pre-
emptive causation (when an intervening factor brings forward an event which would 
have happened anyway due to a prior, but delayed-action, cause).    
The limitations of “but for” tests in relation to determination of legal responsibility has 
given rise to much serious scholarship
38
  Simply put, a “pure” sine qua non test 
encounters extreme difficulty when applied to legal problems. Hart and Honoré 
39
 argue 
the merits of a bifurcated analysis in which an initial causation in fact test is subject to a 
second stage (causation in law) analysis which examines whether there is any reason 
which precludes treating a cause as a cause (or an intervening event as an intervening 
event) for policy purposes.  
There are parallels in our present problem with the problems of remoteness seen in other 
torts.  There is a rich tradition within the law more generally of using ideas of causation 
to examine remoteness and, although much of the focus of that analysis has been in 
relation to the law of negligence, it is certainly not limited to that tort.
40
 However, the 
vast majority of the examination relates to the remoteness of loss whereas the 
remoteness in the current problem might be better described as remoteness of “gain” or 
advantage.  
Although Hart and Honoré acknowledge that causation may be applied to questions of 
gain
41
 they use the example of gains leading to reduction in a claimant’s loss, rather 
than the enrichment of the defendant. However, remoteness of “gain” has been 
examined within the context of the assessment of the quantum of an account of profits 
where the contribution that the infringement made to overall enrichment of the infringer 
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is called to be determined.
42, 43, 44, 45 
There is, however, no reason to limit our analytical 
“tool box” to causation principles considered within issues of apportionment alone.  
If there is to be a difference in outcome between a strict causation in fact analysis and 
causation in law analysis on a particular set of facts, that difference must reflect the 
justifications which underpin the right which the putative claimant is seeking to assert.  
As stated above, the problem is that justifications will often take the form of very broad 
principles and without specific examples of “remoteness” with which to test those 
principles the guidance they supply may seem very abstract and hard to apply. 
Accordingly, a useful causation in law analysis requires an understanding of the 
appropriate types of “intervening event” which could break a chain of causation in law.  
As stated above, in our present problem, the pharmaceutical development process is 
complex. Accordingly, determination of potential “chain breaking” types of 
interventions (or combinations of interventions) requires an empirical understanding of 
the processes by which drugs are discovered. 
The present work will (in Chapter 4) therefore seek to understand the topography of 
pharmaceutical discovery and development process from the perspective of the journey 
of a piece of traditional knowledge through that process. It will seek to identify whether 
there are points in that process which, due to a notable feature in the nature of the 
mixing of the information at that point, may arguably stand in the way of a chain of 
causation in law. For consistency of terminology these putative “chain breaking” 
interventions in causation in law will be termed “crux points” in the drug discovery 
process.  
In parallel, and where necessary (and as discussed below), caveated guidance will be 
sought from approaches that have been taken within patent law when it has looked at 
the scope of patent rights within the drug discovery process.  
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1.4.4 Analogical reasoning: Guidance from established intellectual property rights  
Questions of “distal”/”remote” use are not alien to the field of intellectual property and 
the approaches used in examining the problem of remoteness/distality in other 
intellectual property rights may be assistance. However, before we can “read across” 
from the experience gained with more established intellectual property rights, or seek to 
apply other intellectual property approaches by analogy, we need to recognise how the 
subject matter of a positive right in traditional knowledge is similar to (and different 
from) that of those established rights.  
Traditional knowledge (being information) is fundamentally similar to the subject 
matter of a patent (ideas). However the trans-generational nature of traditional 
knowledge and the historical nature of its discovery render it inappropriate for patent 
protection.  
Patents (and other registered intellectual property rights) create so-called “monopoly” 
rights which can be enforced against a third party, even where ideas developed by the 
infringing third party have not originated from the patentee.
46
  The infringer may have 
generated the idea entirely independently of, and without any knowledge of, the patent 
and yet still infringe.
47
 Patents allow what Attas
48
 calls a “path-independent extension of 
the right in the idea”. Patent claim interpretation, even the purposive interpretation 
required under the European Patent Convention
49
 and English law,
50
 is inherently 
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dependent on path-dependent infringement and any guidance that can be taken from 
patent law needs to be very carefully considered with this fundamental difference in 
mind.  
In contrast, the Protocol positive rights in traditional knowledge (and current WIPO 
proposals) envisage that the idea informing the infringing use will have originated from 
the protected traditional knowledge. The extension of the right in the mis-used 
information is “path-dependent”. Of course it cannot really be otherwise; use of entirely 
independently-arrived upon information cannot ever be a misuse of the traditional 
information. In this respect, at least, positive rights in traditional knowledge arguably 
more closely resemble a copyright, or a right in confidential information, both of which 
require a path-dependent infringement/breach of right. Despite this passing similarity, 
crucially copyright laws are not usually perceived as protecting ideas as such.
51
  
Equitable rights to prevent a breach of confidence (or to be compensated for such a 
breach) do allow for the protection of information as such, but differ significantly from 
Protocol/WIPO-proposed positive rights in traditional knowledge in that they require an 
inequitable breach of confidence on the part of the defendant.
52
  Crucially, this 
requirement is absent in respect of the Protocol positive rights (within Article 7 and 
Article 5(5); and WIPO-proposed positive rights). 
53
 
In any event, although there may exist some situations in which traditional knowledge is 
held by a narrow group of individuals who are bound by a mutual obligation of 
confidence (and where disclosure to a third party could be said to be in breach of such 
an obligation), there will be other (perhaps many other) situations in which the relevant 
information is held more broadly within an indigenous group (or groups) and/or has 
long been passed to third parties. Here the information could never possess the requisite 
quality of confidence for the application of an equitable right based on breach of 
confidence. It should be noted that limitation of protection to only that information 
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which could be argued to be “confidential” would severely curtail the quantity of 
indigenous knowledge that could ever be eligible for protection and would place 
considerable evidential burdens upon those seeking to control its dissemination.  
Given these fundamental differences, it is argued in this work that no direct guidance 
can be taken from these existing intellectual property rights.  
However, notwithstanding, the identified differences between the subject matter for 
patent protection and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, there is a 
long history of interface between patent law and the drug discovery process – notably in 
relation to competing contribution. Provided that the differences are appreciated, the 
considerations of patent law with respect to questions of scope within drug discovery 
may serve as a source of analogous concepts for consideration when examining 
downstream limits to the right to control traditional knowledge. 
1.4.5 Application of high level justifications to determined “crux points” 
Both analogical approaches discussed above are, of course, merely tools for locating 
putative boundary delimitations to test against high-level philosophical justifications for 
control over intangibles. 
It should be immediately noted that the aim of the study is not to reconcile the 
fundamental differences between the conflicting high-level justifications. The author 
seeks to be deliberately agnostic as to the merits of the competing philosophies at the 
highest level (for example the overarching validity of utilitarianism versus 
deontological justifications). The aim is to apply the justifications as “tools” for 
determining the correct scope of the veto rights in traditional knowledge associated with 
genetic resources. In doing so, the validity of the justification as applied to the subject 
matter will be critically examined on a case by case basis. However, it is intended that 
application of the key (and indeed radically different) high-level justifications will 
illuminate different facets of the putative veto right. 
Whilst acknowledging the significant differences in approach between the diverse 
philosophical positions, the work will seek to arrive at a synthesis of the outcomes 




1.5 Overview of the structure of this work 
The first exercise within this work (set out in Chapter 2) is to determine what the 
provisions of the Protocol appear to say in respect of the scope of a positive right in 
traditional knowledge associated with a genetic resource. As will be seen, the outcome 
of that analysis is that the downstream scope of such a right within the Protocol is 
unclear. As has been discussed above, the determination of what the Protocol says in 
this regard should not, of itself, impact on the outcome of the justificatory analysis 
based on first principles. However, notwithstanding that, an examination of the 
provisions of the Protocol is highly instructive as it serves to introduce some key 
concepts of downstream use that will be engaged with later in this work. Crucial here is 
the disconnect between the concept of a genetic resource per se and that of traditional 
knowledge associated with that genetic resource.  
Before the high level justifications for rights in traditional knowledge can be brought to 
bear upon putative boundary limitations (the “crux points” discussed above) we must 
establish broadly what theoretical arguments have been used to justify the protection of 
knowledge and how such arguments can be applied more particularly to the protection 
of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources. This is achieved in Chapter 
3 of this work.  
As discussed above if we look to treat the involvement of traditional knowledge 
associated with a genetic resource with the drug discovery process as a flow of 
information and a process of dilution of the original contribution, we need to understand 
the types of flows of information we might see – we need a sense of the topography of 
the drug discovery process. Accordingly, an empirical study of this process is set out in 
Chapter 4 of this work. 
Within that study (and reflecting on analogies with patent law) the serendipitous 
discovery of second medical and other uses is identified as a potential point at which 
there is an arguable step change in the dilution of the original contribution.  As a result, 
the empirical study is further focussed upon four case studies from the history of drug 
discovery in which “serendipitous” discoveries were made: 
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a) The identification of an anti-coagulant effect of acetylsalicylic acid (aspirin) a 
downstream derivative of the original compound (salicin) found in the genetic 
resource; 
b) The identification of a local anaesthetic effect of cocaine (a compound directly 
found in the genetic resource but known to have psychoactive effects); 
c) The discovery of the dye mauveine whilst attempting to synthesise quinine; and 
d) The discovery of anti-tumour effects of the vinca alkaloids (directly found in the 
genetic resource but believed to have anti-diabetes effects). 
 
Having identified serendipitous discoveries as a putative step change in contribution 
dilution, it is at this point that the two parallel streams of the study come together. In 
Chapter 5 the key philosophical justifications for veto rights in traditional knowledge 
associated genetic resources identified in Chapter 3 are applied to the serendipitously 
discovery “crux point”  identified in Chapter 4. 
It was anticipated that each high-level justification could provide a variety of different 
answers to the question of scope in relation to the identified crux point. Accordingly the 
next step in the study (in Chapter 6) is to determine to what extent (if at all) the answers 
provided through the application of high-level justifications to the identified crux point 
can be synthesised/reconciled. 
Part of this analysis brings us to the question of what a “serendipitous” discovery 
actually is and how one can be defined in practice. There is particular focus (within the 
latter part of Chapter 6) on what a serendipitous discovery means where the “second” 
therapeutic use is in fact derived from a common physiological process as is the first 
use. The finding of that, and the other analyses, are brought together and summarised in 









Benignius leges interpraetandae sunt, quo voluntas earum conservetur  
“Laws should be interpreted in a liberal sense so that their intention may be 
preserved.” 
Digest of Justinian I, iii, xviii (529 CE) 




As explained in Chapter 1 of this work, the question of whether (in the light of the 
potential dilution of the original traditional knowledge related to a genetic resource 
within the drug discovery process) it is justifiable to allow the “owner” of the original 
knowledge to possess an absolute veto on all downstream activity was originally 
stimulated by the uncertainty of the Protocol in this regard. It was also explained that 
the answer to this normative question of competing contributions between indigenous 
peoples and pharmaceutical researchers could only lie in the application of high-level 
philosophical doctrines to the problem, notwithstanding the actual provisions of the 
Protocol (or indeed of any future WIPO or WTO treaty in this regard).  
The aim of the current chapter is, therefore, to explore those provisions of the Protocol 
which create sui generis rights in traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources (and the related provisions relating to the protection of genetic resources 
alone) and determine whether the veto rights apparently set out in the Protocol can be 
interpreted as extending to all path-dependent downstream uses arising out of such 
original traditional knowledge. 
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Before this analysis is undertaken this chapter will introduce the key international 
approaches taken to address claims misappropriation of genetic resources and related 
traditional knowledge with a particular focus on the Protocol.  
Figure 2.1 “Family Tree” of international approaches to anti-misappropriation rights. 
 
Key: TKAGR: Traditional Knowledge Associated Genetic Resources 
UNDRIP: UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
 
2.2 International “solutions” to claims of misappropriation  
As alluded to in the introductory chapter, the drive to address claims of 
misappropriation of genetic resources and related traditional knowledge has taken place, 
with differing rates of progress, in a number of international fora. The key fora are: 
d) The World Trade Organisation (“WTO”);  
e) The United Nations (“UN”); and 
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These international tracks are summarised in Figure 2.1 as a “family tree” of 
international approaches to anti-misappropriation rights.
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2.2.1 The WTO Route 
The “early” (pre-2012) history of progress within the WTO has been described in some 
detail by Kiene
55
 and it is not the intention of this work to revisit the developments 
under the WTO in any detail. Negotiation has centred on redrafting of Article 27.3(b) of 
The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Agreement (“TRIPs”). Article 
27.3(b) TRIPs allows signatory countries to exclude from patentability: 
“plants and animals other than micro-organisms, and essentially biological 
processes for the production of plants or animals other than non-biological and 
microbiological processes”.  
Of course, this provision also allows other signatories to allow patents for such 
processes.  
At the time of signature the whole concept of patenting life forms was (and still is)
56
 
controversial, and a requirement that the provisions of the subparagraph be reviewed 
was built in to the subparagraph from the outset.
57
 Of course, if one were seeking to 
ensure that the protection of traditional knowledge was incorporated into TRIPs this 
review provision could be seen as an opening. Indeed the interface between Art 27.3(b) 
and the 1993 United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (“CBD”) (see below) 
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was identified in Paragraph 19 of the 2001 Doha Declaration
58
 and it was agreed that 
the work of the TRIPs Council should consider the protection of traditional knowledge 
and folklore in the review of TRIPs. Many WTO members in the global South consider 
that the discouragement of “biopiracy” should be a key part of any new TRIPs 
provision. However, the majority of current proposals
59
 concern a “defensive” 
protection through a requirement that patentees disclose the origin of traditional 
knowledge/genetic resources in their application, rather than development of a positive 
right. It would be fair to say that progress on amendment to 27.3(b) within the WTO as 
it relates, not only to prevention of misappropriation of traditional knowledge and 
genetic resources, but also to the question of patenting of life forms has been glacial.
60
 
The momentum in the development of positive anti-misappropriation rights has been 
more effectively taken forward within the ambit of the United Nations (and to a lesser 
extent) within WIPO. 
2.2.2 The United Nations Route 
The United Nations has addressed the question of rights in traditional knowledge 
through two distinct tracks. In September 2007 the General Assembly on the United 




Although UNDRIP broadly addresses the rights of indigenous people, there are three 
articles (11, 24 and 31) of specific relevance to the question of traditional knowledge 
(and related genetic resources):   
Article 11 states: 
"Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their cultural 
traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop 
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the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological 
and historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and 
performing arts and literature." 
"States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms, which may include 
restitution, developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect to 
their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their free, 
prior and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs." 
[emphasis added] 
Article 24 states: 
"Indigenous peoples have the right to their traditional medicines and to maintain 
their health practices, including the conservation of their vital medicinal plants, 
animals and minerals..." 
Article 31 states: 
"Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their 
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as 
well as the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including 
human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of 
fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games 
and visual and performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control, 
protect and develop their intellectual property over such cultural heritage, 
traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions." [emphasis added] 
"In conjunction with indigenous peoples, States shall take effective measures to 
recognize and protect the exercise of these rights." 
Additionally, Article 38 provides that States shall take appropriate measures, including 
legislation, to achieve the ends of UNDRIP. However, although it is a legally binding 
declaration, UNDRIP gives no specific detail on how these broad ends should be 
achieved. 
In contrast, substantial advances have been made through the United Nations’ 
environmental mechanism. On June 5 1992 the United Nations CBD was opened for 
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signature. It came into force on 29 December 1993, having been ratified by 194 
members of the United Nations.
62
 The CBD is, first and foremost, a convention which 
looks to protect the biodiversity of the planet,
63
 ensuring sustainable use and fair and 
equitable sharing of the exploitation of biodiversity. Towards that final end, Article 8(j) 
of the CBD requires that each contracting party shall “as far as possible and as 
appropriate”:  
“Subject to its national legislation, respect, preserve and maintain knowledge, 
innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities embodying 
traditional lifestyles relevant for the conservation and sustainable use of biological 
diversity and promote their wider application with the approval and involvement 
of the holders of such knowledge, innovations and practices and encourage the 
equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of such knowledge, 
innovations and practices” 
64
 
In 2002, the sixth CBD Conference of Parties agreed a set of guidelines (the “Bonn 
Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the 
Benefits Arising out of their Utilization”
65
 – hereafter the Bonn Guidelines) with the 
aim of providing guidance to legislators in implementing Article 8(j) of the CBD. The 
Bonn Guidelines were entirely voluntary 
66
 and expressly did not seek to amend parties’ 
obligations under the CBD
67
 or further create or assign rights.
68
 However, the sixth 
CBD Conference of Parties did explain that it considered these guidelines:  
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“are a useful first step of an evolutionary process in the implementation of 




This “evolutionary” progress reached a landmark with the adoption in October 2010 of 
the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization (ABS) to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity (the “Protocol”). As at September 2015, the Protocol has 92 
signatories, 65 of which have ratified the Protocol.
70




The key aim of the Protocol is to provide a set of binding mechanisms for implementing 
the access and fair and equitable benefits sharing (“ABS”) objectives of the CBD. 
However, the Protocol is its deliberately limited scope. It (and the Bonn Guidelines 
before it) originates from the CBD and accordingly its absolute focus is on the 
misappropriation of genetic resources, and the misuse of traditional knowledge which is 
related to a particular genetic resource, rather than attempting to create a broader 
positive right in traditional knowledge per se. As we will see, the protection of 
traditional knowledge more broadly has been taken up within the agenda of WIPO. 
Broadly speaking, the Protocol looks to apply two obligations (access subject only to 
prior informed consent and use subject to benefit sharing) to the users of two separate, 
but closely related, resources (genetic resources and traditional knowledge associated 
with genetic resources). The key operative provisions are summarised in Table 1.1. 
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Table 2.1 Key elements of the Nagoya Protocol articles giving rise to positive rights   
Article “Right holder” Subject 
matter 
 
Controlled activity Condition 






fair and equitable 
sharing upon 
mutually agreed terms 




utilization fair and equitable 
sharing based on 
mutually agreed terms 







utilization fair and equitable 
sharing upon 
mutually agreed terms 
6(1) Party genetic 
resources 
access for utilization prior informed 
consent 




access prior informed 
consent 
or “approval and 
involvement” 
 
7 “indigenous and 
local communities” 





and establishment of 
mutually agreed terms 
 
In relation to access to genetic resources Article 6(1) states: 
“In the exercise of sovereign rights over natural resources, and subject to domestic 
access and benefit-sharing legislation or regulatory requirements, access to 
genetic resources for their utilization shall be subject to the prior informed consent 
of the Party providing such resources that is the country of origin of such 
resources or a Party that has acquired the genetic resources in accordance with the 




And Article 6(2) states: 
“In accordance with domestic law, each Party shall take measures, as appropriate, 
with the aim of ensuring that the prior informed consent or approval and 
involvement of indigenous and local communities is obtained for access to genetic 
resources where they have the established right to grant access to such resources.” 
In relation to the sharing of benefits arising out of use of genetic resources Article 5(1) 
states: 
“In accordance with Article 15, paragraphs 3 and 7 of the Convention, benefits 
arising from the utilization of genetic resources as well as subsequent applications 
and commercialization shall be shared in a fair and equitable way with the Party 
providing such resources that is the country of origin of such resources or a Party 
that has acquired the genetic resources in accordance with the Convention. Such 
sharing shall be upon mutually agreed terms.”  
And Article 5(2) states: 
“Each Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures, as 
appropriate, with the aim of ensuring that benefits arising from the utilization of 
genetic resources that are held by indigenous and local communities, in 
accordance with domestic legislation regarding the established rights of these 
indigenous and local communities over these genetic resources, are shared in a 
fair and equitable way with the communities concerned, based on mutually agreed 
terms.” 
With regard to “access” to traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources 
Article 7 states: 
“In accordance with domestic law, each Party shall take measures, as appropriate, 
with the aim of ensuring that traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources that is held by indigenous and local communities is accessed with the 
prior and informed consent or approval and involvement of these indigenous and 
local communities, and that mutually agreed terms have been established.” 
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With regard to sharing the benefits arising out of the use of traditional knowledge 
associated Article 5(5) states: 
“Each Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures, as 
appropriate, in order that the benefits arising from the utilization of traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources are shared in a fair and equitable 
way with indigenous and local communities holding such knowledge. Such 
sharing shall be upon mutually agreed terms.” 
Neither Article 6 nor 7 is drafted in what one might consider to be a “classic” way to 
create a positive intellectual property right. However, the key element to any positive 
intellectual property right is that certain identified activities are prohibited without the 
consent of the right holder (or put another way the right holder has a right to veto 
certain activities of third-parties) and it is (usually
73
) for the right holder alone to 
determine under what circumstances the consent will be given (or the veto on use will 
be lifted). Taking that approach, Article 6(1) by requiring prior informed consent from a 
Party (meaning here a nation state) clearly creates a positive (veto) right over that 
access.  
However, the position of Articles 6(2) and Article 7, relating to indigenous peoples 
rather than nation state Parties, is somewhat less clear. Article 6(2) either requires prior 
informed consent from indigenous and local communities holding the knowledge or 
“approval and involvement” from those indigenous and local communities which have 
the “established right to grant access to such resources”. Article 7 either requires prior 
informed consent from indigenous and local communities holding the knowledge or 
“approval and involvement” from those indigenous and local communities with, in 
either case, a further requirement that “mutually agreed terms” should be established.  
In neither Article 6(2), nor Article 7, is it clear how, if at all, such “approval and 
involvement” is materially different from “prior informed consent”. Morgera et al.
74
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suggest that whereas the term “approval and involvement” is derived from Article 8(j) 
of the CBD, the “prior informed consent” language seen in both articles is derived 
instead from Article 11 of UNDRIP. They further suggest that the use of “approval and 
involvement” as an alternative to “prior informed consent” may reflect the reluctance of 
some parties to fully endorse within the Protocol a human rights (i.e. UNDRIP) standard 
of indigenous control over resources. They further suggest that such reluctance may 
stem from governmental sensitivities regarding the grant of rights to indigenous 
communities and that the alternative “consent” versus “approval” language provides for 
flexibility in implementation. Savaresi
75
 also identifies the different sources of 
language, but suggests that (if a difference does in effect exist) Parties’ overriding 
obligations to respect the primacy of human rights law should, in any event, seek to 
follow the UNDRIP-derived approach.
76
  
Whilst acknowledging the different origins of each phrase, it seems difficult to 
realistically argue that the operative effect of “consent” should be any different from 
“approval” considering the overall context of the Protocol.
 77,78
 This is particularly true 
of Article 7 where both “approval” and “consent” are both allied to a further 
requirement that access should be subject to “mutually agreed terms”.  
Whatever degree of consent is required, we need also to understand the nature of the 
activity which is subject to that control. In both Articles 6(2) and 7 this activity is the 
accessing of the subject matter of the right. The question of whether this “access” 
means a first-time physical apprehension, continued physical apprehension, first-time 
conceptual apprehension or continued conceptual apprehension is moot, and will be 
dealt with in detail further in this chapter. 
                                                          
 
75  
Annalisa Savaresi, “The International Human Rights Law Implications of the  Protocol” in Elisa 
Morgera, Matthias Buck, and Elsa Tsioumani (eds) The 2010  Protocol on Access and Benefit-sharing in 
Perspective: Implications for International Law and Implementation Challenges (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden 2012) 53, 70 
 
76
 It is worth noting here that it is questionable whether UNDRIP does in fact provide support for an 
injunctive remedy rather than merely compensatory relief (see Chapter 3 of the current work). 
 
77
 Morgera Unravelling the  Protocol (n 74), 153 
 
78




Assuming that Articles 6(2) and 7 do create a positive veto right, we see that broadly 
they work in tandem to control access to a genetic resource and to the traditional 
knowledge which will give that genetic resource value or enhanced value. We should 
note, however, that both contain a (different) qualification. In Article 6(2) control 
(approval or consent) is limited to those indigenous and local communities which “have 
the established right to grant access to such resources”. The Article 7 right is 
significantly less qualified, requiring merely that relevant traditional knowledge is 
“held” by indigenous and local communities.  
Articles 5(1), 5(2) and 5(5) of the Protocol are perhaps less clear in creating positive 
(veto) rights. They require that the benefits arising out of use should be shared in a “fair 
and equitable” way and that such sharing should be on “mutually agreed terms”. A 
requirement for “fair and equitable” sharing arguably does not, of itself, create an 
unambiguous veto right – one might imagine that a third party user of a resource may 
simply continue to use the resource without hindrance, provided that a “fair and 
equitable” share is provided to the right holder. One might further imagine that this fair 
and equitable share could be determined ex post facto by a binding determination 
(whether by a court, tribunal, binding mediator or arbitrator). In many ways, such an 
approach would mirror the compulsory licensing regimes seen in numerous intellectual 
property systems.
79
 Crucially, however, such an approach would not, of itself, allow for 
an absolute veto on use.  
However, the requirement that benefit sharing is on mutually agreed terms is difficult to 
interpret in the light of the “fair and equitable” requirement. What if the mutual 
agreement is not on “fair and equitable” terms, is the agreement rescindable/voidable? 
Who is to say what is fair and equitable? More importantly, with regard to consent, it 
would on the face of the language in Article 5 appear that, even if the terms of the 
potential agreement are perfectly “fair and equitable”, the party having the right to 
impose sharing (indigenous people or Party as appropriate) must have a right to refuse 
to agree – if this were not the case it could not be a truly free, mutual agreement. If this 
is correct, the right to refuse to agree (even on what would appear to an external 
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observer to be objectively fair terms) should be seen as a right to refuse consent (that is 
a veto right) similar to that (more clearly and expressly) set out in Articles 6(2) and 7.  
We need to note that Article 5(2) – dealing with control over genetic resources- contains 
a similar qualification as is seen in Article 6(2), in that its provisions only apply to 
 “genetic resources that are held by indigenous and local communities in 
accordance with domestic legislation regarding the established rights of these 
indigenous and local communities over these genetic resources”.  
Mirroring the position seen with Article 7, Article 5(5) – dealing with traditional 
knowledge relating to genetic resources – is much less qualified requiring only that the 
knowledge is “held” by the relevant indigenous or local community. 
2.2.3 The WIPO Routes 
 
The WIPO Intergovernmental Committee on Intellectual Property and Genetic 
Resources, Traditional Knowledge and Folklore (“GRTKF”) is currently working on 
text-based negotiations to establish an international legal instrument which will seek to 
protect of traditional knowledge, traditional cultural expressions and genetic 
resources.
80
 Although there may eventually be a single treaty document, traditional 
knowledge, traditional cultural expressions and genetic resources are being treated as 
three separate negotiating strands, each with their own GRTKF sub-committee. 
Compared to the advancement of the Protocol under the CBD, historic progress has 
been slow - the current draft documents within each stream contain many (often 
contradictory) proposals which reflect the (often contradictory) aims of the negotiating 
parties.
81,82,83 
The current rate of progress under WIPO continues to be sluggish; indeed 
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the 2014 WIPO General Assembly failed to come to a decision on the 2015 work 
program of the IGC.
84
 
The current WIPO drafts do not create a formal mechanism for enforcing the positive 
rights in genetic resources per se, such as those created under the CBD. The focus of the 
current working papers on genetic resources considered by the GRTKF committee are 
focussed on defensive rights only – predominantly a requirement for disclosure of origin 
of genetic resources and associated traditional knowledge in patent applications.
85
  
In contrast to this relatively conservative approach, the GRTKF has taken two distinct 
strands in relation to traditional knowledge: 
a) A Positive Right -The development of a sui generis right in traditional 
knowledge; 
 and 
b) A Defensive Right - Requirement that the grant of any other intellectual property 
rights involving traditional knowledge should require mandatory disclosure of 
traditional knowledge holders and the country of origin, as well as evidence of 
compliance with prior informed consent and benefit-sharing requirements.
86
 
In contrast to the Protocol, what is proposed here is a positive right in traditional 
knowledge in general, not just in traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources (although, of course, there is no reason why such knowledge will not be 
caught in the broader right). The current GRTKF drafts contain a wide number of 
potential options. However, all current draft options give the holders of traditional 
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2.3 The positive protection provisions of the Protocol  
As has been discussed in above, Articles 5, 6 and 7 of the Protocol purport to create 
rights to control access to, and utilization of, genetic resources and particular traditional 
knowledge associated with a genetic resource. The subject matter, controlled activity 
and conditions for use were summarised in Table 2.1  
As can be seen in that table, the condition being placed upon the “controlled activity” 
varies according to the controlled activity being regulated. Where the controlled activity 
is “access” to the relevant subject matter the condition is prior informed consent (or 
“approval and involvement”). Where the controlled activity is “utilization” of the 
relevant subject matter, the condition is “fair and equitable sharing based on mutually 
agreed terms”. Article 6(1) is different in this regard in that the controlled activity is 
“access for utilization” and under Article 5(1) the benefits arising out of “subsequent 
applications and commercialization” are to be subject to fair and equitable sharing based 
on mutually agreed terms. 
However, as we will see, the particular provisions in relation to the scope of protection 
given to “traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources” cannot be read in 
isolation from the broader provisions of the Protocol. Clearly our first point for 
understanding the scope of these provisions of the Protocol is to understand what is 
meant by the key terms “access”, “genetic resources” and “utilization”. 
2.4 What does “access” to a genetic resource mean? 
Notwithstanding the importance of the term, access is not defined within the CBD or the 
Protocol.  
In relation to a physical resource, it is clear that accessing that resource means taking 
physical possession of the resource. An ethnobiologist being given plant samples by a 
group of indigenous peoples (or a government department) is clearly “accessing” those 
samples. However, is a geneticist who is later given that plant by the ethnobiologist 
(and goes on to extract DNA from it) equally “accessing” that material? 
“Access” could conceivably mean the first-time physical apprehension of a physical 
resource or the continued physical apprehension of a physical resource. Whether access 
refers to the first accessing or to a continued/ongoing access is important. If it is the 
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latter one could see access as extending beyond mere physical access within the 
jurisdiction in which the genetic resources are held, to a broader concept of legal access. 
This being a permission for the continued holding of a genetic resources that would be 
otherwise be prohibited.
88
 The debate on this point is far from settled and has been the 
subject of some polemic debate. 
89, 90
  
Although, one dictionary definition of the verb “access”:  
“the action of going or coming to or into, coming into the presence of or into 
contact with”
91
    
gives a strong emphasis on the first movement toward something, it is certainly not 
inconceivable to see the word within the context of the Protocol as meaning a series of 
different “accessings”, with each accessing occurring each time something new is done 
to the resource.   
Tvedt and Fauchald
92
 report that during the negotiation of the Protocol there were 
“considerable divergences” regarding the meaning of “access to genetic resources” and 
the legal definition of when such access would actually be said to occur. The view of 
many “user” countries was that genetic resources are accessed when a biological sample 
crosses a national boundary. The view of “provider” countries was that access occurs 
when biological material is used – regardless of whether it crosses a national boundary. 
Tvedt and Fauchald state that: 
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“Between these views, there is a gap in practical effects for the implementation 
of ABS. To establish a functional system for implementing the [Protocol], 
countries will need to agree on when access happens.” 
93
 
In their document “Access and Benefit Sharing, Introduction and Context (July 
2010)”
94
(published before the completion of the negotiation of the Protocol) the UK 
Department for the Environment Food and Rural Affairs succinctly summed up the 
view of those inclined to a broader interpretation of “access”: 
 “Acquisition of genetic resources means the act of actually physically obtaining 
the material. It does not imply permission to use it. By contrast, “access to genetic 
resources” means the permission to physically obtain and subsequently to use the 
genetic resources. This implies a positive and physical action to the genetic 
resources, going beyond, for instance, simply observing them (e.g. the passive, 
aesthetic, pleasure derived from looking at cut flowers or ecotourists visiting 
rainforests). [emphasis added] 
We have to recognise that if this broader interpretation of access, encompassing 
subsequent activity, is not correct then the requirement for consent/approval for degree 
of control provided by the rights holders would arguably be restricted solely to the very 
first occasion upon which the subject matter of the rights in question were acquired. At 
first sight this may seem unduly limited. However, one has to appreciate that the 
Protocol does, within Article 5, contain other provisions ensuring that the “utilization” 
of the resource is subject to mutually agreed terms (which as previously argued creates 
its own veto). This narrow interpretation is arguably also consistent with the overriding 
objective of the Protocol set out at Article 1: 
“The objective of this Protocol is the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits 
arising from the utilization of genetic resources, including by appropriate access 
to genetic resources and by appropriate transfer of relevant technologies, taking 
into account all rights over those resources and to technologies, and by 
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appropriate funding, thereby contributing to the conservation of biological 
diversity and the sustainable use of its components.” [emphasis added]  
Indeed, if anything, Article 1 could be said to envisage “access” as something of a 
narrower subset of broader “utilization” rather than being required to be co-terminous 
with it.  
However, even if we do take a broader interpretation - wherein Article 6 envisages a 
positive right controlling some sort of ongoing legal access - we are left with the 
question: what is it access to? Does it relate only to use of genetic material containing 
DNA, the DNA alone, or does it envisage something yet further, such as “access” to 
other chemical compounds found in organism - for example a plant-derived, 
therapeutically-active ligand? To address that question we need to look to the meaning 
of “genetic resources” 
2.5 The meaning of “genetic resources” 
The concept of “genetic resources” is clearly at the heart of the Protocol. It is the subject 
matter which is “utilized”, “accessed” and “accessed for utilization”. Given the 
importance of the term, the definition provided within the Protocol is surprisingly brief. 
Indeed, the definition of “genetic resources” is taken in its entirety from the definition 
provided in Article 2 of the CBD. Correa
95
 reports that during negotiation of the CBD 
there was little discussion of the meaning of “genetic resources” and due to time 
pressures a “lowest common denominator” definition, legally ambiguous, but 
acceptable to the majority, was decided upon. That definition is as follows: 
“Genetic resources" means genetic material of actual or potential value.” 
where: 
“Genetic material" means any material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin 
containing functional units of heredity.”
96
 
                                                          
 
95
 Carlos M Correa “Implications for BioTrade of the  Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the 
Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization” (2012) paper prepared for the 
BioTrade Initiative on UNCTAD (UNCTAD/DITC/TED/2011/9) 
 
96




The first point to note is that the definition of “genetic resources” is not coterminous 
with that of “genetic material” but is “genetic material of actual or potential value”. It is 
not entirely clear what this limitation to actual or potential value achieves. One might 
ask what is meant by “value” and further ask: “actual or potential value” to whom? 
However one answers these questions, it is arguable that the definition is flexible 




The term “functional units of heredity” is not defined in either the Protocol or the CBD 
itself.  However, on the face of it a functional unit of heredity would seem to refer to a 
gene; the Merrion Webster dictionary
98
 defines a gene as: 
“a specific sequence of nucleotides in DNA or RNA that is located usually on a 
chromosome and that is the functional unit of inheritance controlling the 
transmission and expression of one or more traits by specifying the structure of a 
particular polypeptide and especially a protein or controlling the function of other 
genetic material” [emphasis added] 
In its very narrowest sense, “material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin 
containing functional units of heredity” could refer solely to DNA
99
 extracted from the 
cells of an organism (this being the a part of the original organism which contains 
functional hereditary units) whether that DNA encodes for the entire genome of the 
organism, or encodes for only a sub-set of genes of interest.  
However, one might argue that the term “material” could more broadly refer to an entire 
organism (or any part of an organism) which contains “functional units of heredity”. If 
this were the case “genetic material” of an organism would include any element of the 
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organism which would enable it to be propagated – which in a plant would include 
either a cutting or a seed or a spore. Such a definition of “genetic material” would also 
appear to be broad enough to encompass those (unusual) eukaryotic cells such as 
platelets (thrombocytes) and mature red blood cells (erythrocytes) which although they 
lack nuclear DNA, possess (as do all eukaryotic cells)
100
 mitochondrial DNA (clearly a 
functional unit of heredity, if only of the mitochondrion itself).  
Although not expressly clear on which interpretation of “genetic material” is correct, the 
CBD does, somewhat confusingly, provide a separate definition of "Biological 
resources" which:  
“includes genetic resources, organisms or parts thereof, populations, or any other 




This separate definition of “biological resource” which includes “genetic resources” 
within a broader definition, alongside separate mention of “organisms or parts thereof” 
would seem to suggest that the narrower (DNA-only) interpretation of “genetic 
resources” is correct. There otherwise seems little additional work for a broader (part of 
organism) definition of “genetic material” to do (other than to distinguish parts of 
organisms which do not contain units of heredity such as structural proteins, although 
this is a small subset of part of organisms).  
This narrow interpretation is supported by Correa
102
 who notes that it is consistent with 
the prevailing thinking in the in the early 90’s (when the CBD was agreed) that 
manipulation of large or small sections of DNA would be the crucial element in 
exploitation of genetic resources. 
What is the impact of a narrower (DNA-only) interpretation of “genetic resources”? 
One can immediately see that any “use” of DNA alone will be radically different to use 
of a “part of an organism containing units of heredity”. 
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2.6 Products of genetic expression 
Genes (the CBD’s “functional units of heredity”) are the way in which an organism 
encodes the instructions for making the molecules which make up the structural 
components of cell and tissues, and the molecules which regulate and catalyse reactions 
within the cells. For all (non-viral) organisms, when a particular gene is expressed the 
relevant portion of DNA within a chromosome is “transcripted” into a strand of 
messenger RNA
103
 (“mRNA”) in which the sequence of base pairs in the DNA is 
reflected in the sequence of base pairs in the mRNA. That strand of mRNA itself serves 
as a template for the synthesis of a polypeptide chain in which the order of the amino 
acids making up that chain is itself determined by the sequence of nucleic acid bases 
within the mRNA. In this way the nucleic acid base sequence in the mRNA is 
“translated” into the amino acid sequence. That polypeptide chain is subjected to post-
translational modification which “folds” the chain into a functional protein. Where this 
protein is an enzyme it will (subject to regulatory messages) catalyse the conversion of 
other biochemicals within the cell.
104
 In this way the (non-DNA) biochemical 
components of an organism are an expression of the genetic material of the cell, even if 
they are not themselves functional units of heredity.  
The question of whether “non-DNA” biological components of an organism fall within 
the scope of “genetic resources” for the purpose of the Protocol is an important one. If 
they did not, potentially important substances found within an organism – including the 
biologically-active ligands which have biological effects in other organisms (such as 
prokaryotic and eukaryotic toxins) would arguably be excluded from the access and 
benefit sharing provisions of the Protocol. 
If one takes a narrow interpretation of “genetic resources” to include only the DNA of 
an organism then one might argue that “use” of that DNA will, of necessity, include 
only those techniques in which that piece of DNA itself is manipulated. These might 
include taking the entire genome of an organism (that could be expressed in its entirety 
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through nuclear transfer cloning) or a sub-set of genes of interest which can be spliced 
into the genome of another organism. Such a sub-set of genes could be used to provide 
the recipient (genetically modified) plant, animal, fungus or microorganism with a 
beneficial advantage (e.g. drought, pest, or herbicide resistance) or to stimulate the 
recipient organism to synthesise a particular molecule (which molecule itself may be 
used to provide a therapeutic benefit). Although these are undoubtedly powerful and 
commercially important techniques, they do not include “use” which takes a product of 
genetic expression (such as a protein or a metabolite produced through enzyme 
catalysis) as a starting point.  
The fear that such products of genetic expression would be excluded from the access 
and benefit sharing provisions of the Protocol was a major driving force for the 
negotiators for the “provider” countries at the negotiations of what would become the 
Protocol. 
105,106,107 ,108
 Aubertin & Filoche
109
 report that provider country negotiators 
argued that:  
“the creation of wealth (and thus of benefits which may be shared) does not take 
place as result of the use of DNA, or the genes themselves, but (in 89% of cases 
according to the megadiverse group of countries) as a result of research and 
development regarding biochemical components (which include not only natural 
molecules, but also synthetic products which copy a natural molecule, medicines 
and so on).” 
and that:  
“a Protocol dealing only with the use of genetic resources in the strict sense of the 
term, and not derivatives, would therefore be meaningless”. 
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 reports that the result of the negotiation was the addition to the Protocol of the 
concepts of “utilization”, “biotechnology” and “derivative” which were not present in 
the CBD and states that it was “the common understanding among all Parties was that 
the definition of “Utilization of genetic resources” held the key to determining whether 
the scope covered derivatives or not”. 
Greiber et al. also report that: 
“Late in the protocol negotiations, it became clear that many of the contentious 
technical issues could be solved if there were a clear understanding of the concept 
of utilization. ...the Parties included Subparagraph (c) defining the term 
“utilization of genetic resources”. This definition helps to provide legal certainty 
through specific indicators that make a clear test for determining when the 
Nagoya Protocol governs a particular activity and when it triggers the obligation 
to share benefits.” 
111
  
It is to the definition of “utilization of genetic resources” that we must now turn. As will 
be seen, some of the confidence in the clarity of the definition shown in the last quote is 
optimistic.  
2.6 What does “utilization of genetic resources” mean? 
Throughout the Protocol genetic resources is used in tandem with the term “utilization”. 
Article 3 of the Protocol which deals with scope adds little and merely states: 
“This Protocol shall apply to genetic resources within the scope of Article 15 of the 
Convention and to the benefits arising from the utilization of such resources. This 
Protocol shall also apply to traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources 
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Article 5(1) refers to the sharing of benefits “arising from the utilization of genetic 
resources as well as subsequent applications and commercialization”, Article 5(2) refers 
to benefits arising from the “utilization of genetic resources” and Article 6(1) refers to 
access to genetic resources for their “utilization”. So what does “utilization” mean here?  
The relevant definitions are provided in Article 2 of the Protocol:  
(b) “Utilization of genetic resources” means to conduct research and 
development on the genetic and/or biochemical composition of genetic 
resources, including through the application of biotechnology as defined in 
Article 2 of the Convention;  
(d) “Biotechnology” as defined in Article 2 of the Convention means any 
technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or 
derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use. 
(e) “Derivative” means a naturally occurring biochemical compound resulting 
from the genetic expression or metabolism of biological or genetic resources, 
even if it does not contain functional units of heredity. 
Our starting point for analysis is the term “research and development on the genetic 
and/or biochemical composition of genetic resources”.  
Research and development on the “genetic composition of genetic resources” would 
seem relatively clear – meaning analysis of the DNA sequences found within the 
particular genetic resource. What, though, does research and development on the 
biochemical composition of genetic resources mean? 
As we have seen above, the definition of “genetic resources”/“genetic material” in the  
Protocol (via Article 2 of the CBD) is rather scant. As is also highlighted above, the 
“material...containing functional units of heredity” within the definition of “genetic 
resources” can possibly be interpreted in two ways:  
a) functional units of heredity alone; or 
b) more broadly as “material” of the organism in question which contains 
“functional units of heredity”. 
51 
 
If one assumes for the moment that the first (functional units of heredity alone) 
interpretation is correct, this leaves us with a difficult question over the meaning of 
research and development on the biochemical composition of genetic 
material/resources. If we reasonably assume that “genetic composition” means the 
nucleotide sequence within a strand of DNA, then we are left looking for other 
biochemical elements of the DNA strand(s) which may be the subject for investigation.  
Within eukaryotic organisms nuclear DNA is wrapped around structural proteins called 
histones to form a composite material with DNA (which is called chromatin). These 
structures (together with non-histone chromosomal proteins) are used to assist the 
organised coiling of DNA within a chromosome, protecting it, ensuring it fits within the 
nucleus and regulating gene expression.
113
 Modification of histones, together with 
DNA-methylation, are mechanisms for bringing about long-lasting heritable (so-called 
“epigenetic”) changes to the way in which the genome of an organism is expressed 
which are separate from modification of the nucleotide sequence.
114
 Studies of 
chromatin structure and epigenetics would arguably meet the narrow definition of non-
nucleotide sequence research on units of heredity. However, (although they are 
important areas for study in their own right) in the light of broader concerns over the 
scope of “utilization of genetic resources”, it would seem perverse to give research and 
development on the biochemical composition of genetic resources such a narrow 
interpretation.
115
   
In contrast, if we interpret “genetic material” to not be limited to DNA with or without 
histones (the functional units of heredity), but more broadly include that “material of 
plant, animal, microbial or other origin” which contains the “functional units of 
heredity” (that is any part of an organism which contains genetic material), it would 
logically follow that research and development on the biochemical composition of 
genetic resources would appear to mean research on the biochemical composition of 
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such “material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing functional units of 
heredity”. Since the DNA nucleotide sequence element of the resource would appear to 
be dealt with by the first part (genetic composition) of the definition, the reference to 
“biochemical composition” could arguably mean all those other biochemical elements 
present in the material, created through genetic expression. This interpretation seems by 
far the more realistic - even though the narrow interpretation of “genetic resources” (as 
is discussed above) would seem to be the correct one when looking at the CBD alone. 
Examining the meaning of research and development on genetic resources, Correa 
follows a similar line of reasoning: 
 
“...Interestingly, this definition [of utilization] alludes to research and 
development on the ‘biochemical composition’ of genetic resources, that is, the 
arrangement of the chemistry of the compounds of living tissues and the processes 
in a living organism, and not to research and development on biochemical 
compounds as such. It may be understood, however, that any study of a 
‘biochemical composition’ may include that of the individual components.” 
116
 
Such a broad interpretation is supported by the Report of the Meeting of the Group of 
Legal and Technical Experts (“GLTE”) on Concepts, Terms, Working Definitions and 
Sectoral Approaches.
117
 Kamau et al.
.118
 state: 
“The Protocol does not contain a list of kinds of R&D as was envisaged in prior 
deliberation. 
119,120
 Those lists can however still be used as indications. The one 
resulting from the Group of Legal and Technical Experts on Concepts, Terms, 
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Working Definitions and Sectoral Approaches contained a non-exhaustive list 
consisting of the following activities: 
 
- Genetic modification 
 
- Biosynthesis (use of genetic material as a ‘factory’ to produce organic 
compounds) 
 
- Breeding and selection 
 




- Characterisation and evaluation 
 
- Sequencing genes or genomes 
 
- Production of compounds naturally occurring in genetic material 
(extraction of metabolites, synthesis of DNA segments and production of 
copies) 
 
It is of high importance that R&D on the biochemical composition of the genetic 
resource is covered. This means that, for instance, drugs based on the extraction 
of chemicals from biological resources are subject to benefit sharing.” 
 
Kamau et al. go on to state that: 
 
“The provider states were successful concerning the extension of benefit sharing 
to benefits from biochemical compounds resulting from genetic expression or 
metabolism of biological or genetic resources. Biochemicals that do not contain 
hereditary traits clearly do not fall under the term ‘genetic resource’; they are 
hence not subject to sovereign rights of provider states and, more specifically, to 
the PIC requirement. They can however – and were now indeed – be captured by 




                                                          
 
121




The list set out in the GLTE Report is instructive. Although most are equally consistent 
with a DNA-only interpretation of “genetic resources” the suggestion of “Propagation 
and cultivation of the genetic resource in the form received” is clearly more consistent 
with a broader “part of organism” interpretation, as this would include propagation of 
seeds, spores or cuttings of plants. 
 
2.8 The Meaning of “Biotechnology” and “Derivatives” 
As stated above, in the light of the context of the Protocol, a reading of “conduct 
research and development on the biochemical composition of genetic resources” to 
include non-DNA biochemicals appears to be the interpretation which avoids outcomes 
which seem counter to the overall spirit of the Protocol.  
However, Morgera et al.122 suggest that “biochemical composition of genetic resources” 
in Article 2(c) does not in fact clarify the object of the utilisation “self-evidently” but go 
on to state that the combined reading of Article 2(c) with the other “new” definitions 
provided in the Protocol “in particular that of derivatives” leads to the conclusion that 
utilization of genetic resources includes research on the products of genetic expression.   
The current work argues just the contrary, in that the definition of “Derivatives” falls far 
short of providing clarity. (Although as will be explained, since that lack of clarity is 
found in a non-limiting example it arguably does not actually serve to effectively limit 
the scope of the definition of “utilization of genetic resources”.)  
If one performs a simple “de-nesting” of the nested definitions found within “utilization 
of genetic resources” one arrives at the following: 
“Utilization of genetic resources” means to conduct research and development on 
the genetic and/or biochemical composition of genetic resources, including 
through the application of [any technological application that uses biological 
systems, living organisms, or [naturally occurring biochemical compounds 
resulting from the genetic expression or metabolism of biological or genetic 
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resources, (even if they do not contain functional units of heredity)] thereof, to 
make or modify products or processes for specific use]].”   
(NB. The square brackets show the nesting of the definitions) 
The complexity, and lack of clarity, is obvious. 
“Biotechnology” is provided as a (non-limiting) example of one of the means by which 
to conduct research and development on the genetic and/or biochemical composition 
genetic resources; that is it is described as a mechanism or tool. The general 
understanding of biotechnology is broad and such technology has a long history. 
Dutfield 
123
 identifies three “generations” of biotechnology: 
a) traditional technologies such as brewing and bread making (in which yeasts are 
used to effect chemical transformations); 
b) microbial fermentation (including tissue culture and modern plant and animal 
breeding); and 
c) technologies dependent upon the transference of DNA from one organism to 
another to develop transgenic organisms.  
   
Peters takes a similar broad approach, again highlighting the genesis of biotechnology 
in prehistoric plant and animal breeding, in the use of yeast in bread making and 
brewing and the use of bacteria to make yoghurts and cheeses. She distils the meaning 
as follows: 
“In its purest form, the term “biotechnology” refers to the use of living organisms 
or their products to enhance human health or the human environment” 
124
 
Notwithstanding the different means used, one of the recurring similarities of all types 
of biotechnology is the production of a final “product” whether that be a disease-
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resistant crop, a monoclonal antibody, an antibiotic or a stilton cheese. This focus on 
products is, of course, reflected in the definition originally provided in the CBD: 
“A technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or 




If we assume, for the moment, that the original CBD definition of genetic material 
intended to capture DNA alone, we can see that the definition of “Biotechnology” was 
entirely consistent with that narrow interpretation. It would be consistent the use of 
transgenic whole organisms (“living organisms”) whose genome has been modified by 
the insertion of particular genes to manufacture a particular proteins (or downstream 
products from those proteins where those proteins are enzymes). It would certainly 
include (but not be limited to) the application of “In vitro nucleic acid techniques, 
including recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and direct injection of nucleic acid 
into cells or organelles.”
126
 
However, if we assume that “genetic material” should be read as (also) meaning “parts 
of organisms which contain functional units of heredity” then in terms of “conducting 
research and development on the genetic composition” such an interpretation would be 
consistent with techniques which do not specifically seek to move DNA through in vitro 
nucleic acid techniques, but which attempt the “Fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic 
family, that overcome natural physiological reproductive or recombination barriers and 
that are not techniques used in traditional breeding and selection.”
127
 Such techniques 
could include the production of monoclonal antibodies through the creation of 
hybridoma cell lines made by fusing B-lymphocytes with a myeloma cell line.
128,129,130 
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In both the examples above, one might argue that the “Biotechnology” is being used to 
exploit the genetic composition of the “genetic resource” rather than being part of the 
research and development on the (non-chromatin) biochemical composition of the 
“genetic resource”.  
If this is correct, how then might these “biotechnology” applications be used in the 
research and development of the biochemical of the genetic resource? As we have seen, 
the understanding of biotechnology extends beyond what the Cartagena Protocol on 
Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity calls “Modern Biotechnology”
131
 
(essentially in vitro nucleic acid techniques and cell fusion techniques) and the 
definition within the CBD is certainly not so limited.
132
 Such research into the 
biochemical composition of genetic resource would certainly include the use of cell and 
tissue cultures using unmodified organisms to assist in the making of greater amount of 
the substance in question.  
In practice, however, there is no split in the use of biotechnology techniques as between 
genetic and biochemical composition - all biotechnology techniques are available for 
research on the (non-DNA) biochemical composition of a resource, notably the use of 
genetically modified bacteria or eukaryotic cell lines to produce sufficient quantity of a 
substance for analysis and study. One might imagine here the production of human 
interferon through the use of transgenic bacteria. 
133
 
To conclude, the un-amended definition of “Biotechnology” in the CBD is entirely 
consistent with a broad interpretation of “genetic resources” to mean “parts of an 
organism containing functional units of heredity” and “biochemical composition of 
genetic resource” to include the non-DNA products of genetic expression. It is, 
however, equally consistent with a narrower chromatin-only interpretation of “genetic 
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resource” or a chromatin-only interpretation of “research and development on the 
biochemical composition of the genetic resource”. 
2.8.1 Does the new definition of “Derivative” assist? 
As we have seen the Protocol introduces a definition of “Derivative”: 
“a naturally occurring biochemical compound resulting from the genetic 
expression or metabolism of biological or genetic resources, even if it does not 
contain functional units of heredity.”
134
 
In itself, the definition of “Derivative” is clear. Had it been inserted as an expansion of 
the definition of “genetic material” at Article 2 of the CBD it would have 
unambiguously expanded the that term to include any protein (such as an enzyme) 
produced through genetic expression or any naturally occurring compound produced 
through enzyme catalysed metabolism within the organism in question. This is not, 
however, how the phrase is used
135
 - indeed it is not used as a capitalised defined term 
anywhere within the Protocol. Instead it is arguably used as what appears to be a 
clarificatory example of the term “Biotechnology”.  
As we will see, the way in which “Derivative” entered into the Protocol is complex. 
However, if we understand the mention of “derivatives” within the Article 2 CBD (and 
Article 2 Protocol) definition of Biotechnology as being a reference to “Derivative” as a 
defined term within Article 2(e) of the Protocol, then its effect is (arguably) to amend 
the definition of Biochemistry to the following: 
“any technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or 
[naturally occurring biochemical compounds resulting from the genetic expression 
or metabolism of biological or genetic resources, (even if they do not contain 
functional units of heredity)] thereof, to make or modify products or processes for 
specific use]” 
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There are a number of ways in which one can read this substitution and none is entirely 
satisfactory. If one pays heed to the “thereof” then it seems to refer to the use an 
application which uses naturally occurring biochemical compounds from biological 
systems or living organisms to make or modify products or processes for specific use. If 
one treats the “thereof” as being vestigial (having been left behind during rushed 
negotiation) it seems to refer to the use of an application which uses naturally occurring 
biochemical compounds to make or modify products or processes for specific use. 
In both cases, what seems to be described is the use of a “naturally occurring 
biochemical compound resulting from the genetic expression or metabolism of 
biological or genetic resources” within a technical application used in research upon 
genetic resources. This interpretation is somewhat confused - as we saw above, the 
underlying constant of Biotechnology is that it is a process for producing product and 
this requirement is still present within the definition. However, putting that requirement 
to one side for the moment, we crucially need to recognise that the application of a 
“naturally occurring biochemical compound” is a description of the actor upon a 
subject, rather than a description of the subject itself.  
If this was the intention of the negotiators of the Protocol then the definition of 
“Derivative”, and where it is inserted works relatively clearly. There are, indeed, very 
many such “naturally occurring biochemical compounds resulting from the genetic 
expression or metabolism of biological or genetic resources” which are used in the 
conduct of research upon the “genetic and/or biochemical composition of genetic 
resources”. There does not appear to be a requirement that the genetic resources from 
which the tool is taken has to be the same genetic resource upon which the tool is being 
used. As such, the definition would include the use of DNA probes taken from other 
organisms, dyes and stains derived from plants, animals, fungi and microbes, inhibitors 
of intracellular metabolism, and ligands at intracellular or extracellular receptors. Nor is 
there, of course, any restriction on using a tool obtained from one organism (“genetic 
resource”) upon the biochemical composition of the same genetic resource – one might 
imagine here the use of tetrodotoxin obtained from the puffer fish to examine voltage-
gated sodium channels in the same species of puffer fish.
136
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Although the definition of “derivative” clearly works in this (limited) way, it hardly 
seems a necessary clarification, given that the use of such compounds have long been a 
mainstay of biological research techniques.
137
 In addition, such an explanation hardly 
seems “in character” given the other, rather sparse, definitions provided within the CBD 
and Protocol.  We also have the remaining problem that the application using the 
“naturally occurring biochemical compound” should directly produce a product (á la a 
Biotechnology application) which is clearly not the case with all biological research 
tools. So why is this expanded definition of “Derivative” found where it is?  
Morgera et al.138 report that developing nations sought during the negotiation of the 
Protocol to ensure that the Protocol included specific reference to derivatives, arguing 
that this is where the main interest of modern biological research lies. In contrast, some 
developed nations sought to ensure that the provisions of the Protocol merely applied to 
functional units of heredity (i.e. DNA).
139
 Morgera et al. further state that as a result of 
this impasse, the term “derivative” did not find its way into the operative terms of the 
Protocol but it was understood that by way of compromise
140
 the term “utilization of 
genetic resources” would include the “notion” of derivatives.  
As we have seen, the word “derivative” was already present in the existing (1992) CBD 
definition of “Biotechnology", namely:  
“any technological application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or 
derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes for specific use” 
[emphasis added].  





 See Chapter 4 
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What appears to be referred to here is derivatives of biological systems or living 
organisms (which have most likely been created through modification of the genetic 
material within them), rather than to the biochemicals produced through translation of 
genes into proteins. Notwithstanding that (very) distinctly different use, the presence of 
the word “derivative” at that position appears to have acted as an easily negotiated route 
for insertion of the new definition of “Derivative” without having to negotiate a new 
definition of “Biotechnology”. Of course, taking that route has actually left us with the 
rather limited effect of “Derivative” as a non-limiting example of a tool to be used on 
genetic resources (and a strange hangover requirement to directly produce a product or 
process as would be the case with a Biotechnology application). The result is certainly 
difficult to untangle. Morgera et al. 141  understandably refer to this approach as 
“puzzling”. However, they then go on to state that the relevance of the definition of 
“Derivative” to the interpretation of “utilization of genetic resources” can be argued on 
two grounds: 
a) ““utilization” implicitly refers also to research and development through the 
application of biotechnology on derivatives” [emphasis added]; and 
 
b) “The definition of “utilization” makes reference to the “biochemical 
composition of genetic resources” which arguably relates to the reference to 
compounds in the definition of “derivatives” as it is only the latter that provides 




With regard to point b) Morgera et al. appear to suggest that the term “biochemical 
composition of genetic resources” is unclear. As discussed above, this author believes 
one can interpret that term clearly when one broadly interprets “genetic material” to 
include the cells of an organism which contain “functional units of heredity”. However, 
even assuming uncertainty in this regard, given that “Derivative” is used as an example 
of a tool (“Biotechnology”) used to act upon the subject of “biochemical composition of 
genetic resources” it is hard to see how one can easily use the reference to “biochemical 
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compound” in the definition of Derivative to guide us as to the overall meaning of 
“biochemical composition of genetic resources”.  
This use of “derivative” as somehow clarificatory of, or integrated within, “genetic 
resources”, notwithstanding rules of interpretation is prevalent. Vogel et al.
143
 are 
highly critical of this approach: 
“Despite the introduction of ‘derivative’ in Article 2 (e), ‘derivative’ is not 
incorporated into Article 3 which defines the scope. Nevertheless, many delegates 
and scholars are not disheartened. They have inferred ‘derivative’ in the phrase 
‘utilisation of such sources’. Unfortunately for the advocates, such an inference is 
not obvious and would morph ‘utilisation of such sources’ into a “panchrestron”, 
Garrett Hardin’s neologism for something that signifies everything and therefore 
means nothing” 144 
Morgera et al.’s point a) is (at first sight, at least) stronger. They suggest that if your 
understanding of “biotechnology” is a narrow one, meaning merely the use of 
organisms to make products following manipulation of their genetic material, then such 
an understanding would not be entirely consistent with research on the products of 
genetic expression found within a genetic resource. They suggest that expanding the 
meaning of biotechnology to include the use of “Derivatives” (as newly defined) is 
consistent with “biotechnology” meaning a broader range of activities and, in particular, 
including research on the products of genetic expression found in a genetic resource.  
At first blush, this may seem a reasonable interpretation. Indeed, as we have seen the 
original definition of “Biotechnology” in Article 2 of the CBD (without the expansion 
of the term “derivative”) appears to refer only to the use of biological systems or living 
organisms (which have most likely been created through modification of the genetic 
material within them) to make products. However, although that interpretation is 
certainly consistent with a narrower understanding of biotechnology, as was discussed 
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above, the use of those “narrow” techniques are still entirely consistent with a broad 
interpretation of “genetic resources” and a broad interpretation of “research and 
development on the genetic or biochemical composition”.  
In addition, the inclusion of the new definition of “Derivatives” within the definition of 
“Biotechnology” is consistent with a broad understanding of the term biotechnology and 
with research on the products of genetic expression found within the cells of a genetic 
resource. However, if this were the aim of the inclusion of a specific definition of 
“Derivative” term, it seems a relatively imprecise way of achieving the end, and we are 
still left with the problem of reconciling the need for the application to directly produce 
or modify a product or process.  
Although concluding that the operative effect of the new definition of “derivative” is to 
further clarify that research and development on “naturally occurring biochemical 
compounds resulting from genetic expression or cellular metabolism and not containing 
DNA” can fall within “utilization of genetic resources”, Morgera et al. are 
(unsurprisingly) concerned that “the unfortunate drafting may raise doubts in 




To conclude this section, we might broadly conclude that the new definition of 
“Derivative” though in itself clear is poorly placed within the definitions provided 
within the CBD and the Protocol. As part of the definition of “genetic material” or 
“genetic resource” it would have provided welcome clarification. As part of the 
definition of “Biotechnology” (which is itself merely a non-limiting example of 
research and development) perhaps all we can really say with regard to the use of the 
term “Derivative” is that it is at least not-inconsistent with the definition of 
“biochemical composition of genetic resources” including naturally occurring products 
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2.9 “Isolated” derivatives 
Morgera et al. raise the problem of what they refer to as an “isolated derivative”, that is 
a derivative “acquired and utilised without physical access to genetic resources, such as 
those isolated from their natural environment and available ex situ.”146 Although they 
argue that such compounds fall within the scope of “utilization of genetic resources” 
they are concerned that there may be variations in national legislation implementing this 
aspect of the Protocol. 
This author sees no realistic difficulty in interpreting “research and development on the 
genetic and/or biochemical composition of genetic resources” as encompassing work on 
such an isolated derivative. The mere fact that a naturally occurring compound has been 
isolated from its genetic resource source makes it no less a constituent part of 
biochemical composition and in vitro (or indeed in silico) study of it no less study of the 
biochemical composition of genetic resource source. Correa is in agreement: 
“ ... A ‘biochemical compound’ is any chemical compound naturally occurring in 
living organisms. It may be used without separation from the biological resource 
to which it belongs (e.g. dried plants) or isolated and even synthesized. Currently 
available techniques allow researchers to precisely detect, isolate and structurally 
characterize bioactive natural compounds. ‘Naturally occurring’ may be 
interpreted in this context as meaning that a biochemical compound is the result of 
processes at the cellular level, unaltered by human intervention, that have taken 
place in vivo or in vitro. This would include, hence, compounds obtained at 




In contrast Greiber et al. state: 
 
“The definition of “utilization” however, refers to research and development on 
the biochemical composition of genetic resources. This linkage between 
biochemical compounds and genetic resources has led to some different 
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interpretations, especially as to whether biochemicals must be accessed 
simultaneously with access to genetic resources. Therefore, there is no consensus 
on the situation of “isolated derivatives” (e.g., an extract from a plant stored in a 




Some of this confusion would appear to derive from an unnecessary conflation of the 
idea of “access” with that of “utilisation”. 
 
2.10 The problem of “Chemical Derivatives” 
The analysis provided above would appear to strongly suggest that research and 
development on the naturally occurring biochemical compounds resulting from genetic 
expression or cellular metabolism of a genetic resource falls within the scope of 
“utilization of genetic resources” for the purposes of the benefit sharing provisions of 
Article 5 of the Protocol.  
However, as is shown in Figure 1.1 (and discussed in detail in Chapter 3) the 
identification and isolation of such a compound (though often of great importance) is 
often merely the beginning of a research and development trail aimed at the production 
of chemicals, which though based upon the original compound, are chemically modified 
such as to enhance their biological efficacy and bioavailability and reduce their side-
effect profile relative to the original compound. Within the field of biochemistry such 




One might suggest that in the light of the long-standing use of the term “derivative” 
within the field of biochemistry that the use of the term “derivative” within the Protocol 
is unfortunate and potentially confusing.
150
 Notwithstanding this potential confusion, we 
need to be absolutely clear; the reference to “Derivative” within the Protocol is not a 
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reference to man-made chemical derivatives, but (as we have seen) has a very specific 
given meaning in the Protocol, being: 
 
“a naturally occurring biochemical compound resulting from the genetic 
expression or metabolism of biological or genetic resources, even if it does not 
contain functional units of heredity.”
151
 
By definition then, the meaning of the phrase “naturally occurring” excludes any man-
made, non-naturally chemical derivatives. However, we should not be confused into 
believing that this limitation could assist us in the broader question of whether chemical 
derivatives fall within the scope of Article 5.  The operative effect of the term 
“Derivative” has been examined above, and as this term is used within Article 2 of the 
Protocol (as a non-limiting example of “Biochemistry”) it would not operate to extend 
the scope of the meaning of research and development on genetic resources. Crucially, 
however, neither would its limited scope (of itself) operate to limit the scope of meaning 
of research and development on genetic resources to research and development upon 




The answer to this question of interpretation (if there is one) has to lie in the definition 
of “utilization of genetic resources” and particularly the phrase “research and 
development on the biochemical composition of genetic resources”.  
 
Assuming “biochemical composition of genetic resources” to mean the products of 
genetic expression, we can be reasonably confident that the following broad classes of 
substances created by the metabolism of a genetic resource would fall within the 
provisions of Article 5: 
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a) a naturally occurring RNA strand produced directly from the transcription of the 
DNA of the organism; 
 
b) a naturally occurring protein produced from the transcription/translation of  the 
DNA of the organism; 
 
c) glycosylated protein (such as a functional enzyme) produced from the 
metabolism of the protein produced in (b) above; and 
 
d) biochemical compound (“X”) whose synthesis was catalysed by the enzyme in 
(c) above. 
 
However, a chemical derivative of the biochemical “X” above is not a member of the 
set of endogenous compounds which are naturally produced within a cell by genetic 
expression – it would not be part of the “biochemical composition” of the genetic 
resource.  
Could, however, the production of a chemical derivative of “X” (called hereafter “X-
A”) be considered to be part of the “research and development” on X. As we see in 
more detail in Chapter 4 of this work, the use of chemical derivatives of an endogenous 
biochemical can be used to enhance our understanding of the interaction between X and 
the intra- or extra-cellular target through which X has a biological effect. Is this 
sufficient to constitute research on the original substance? 
Correa states: 
“There is no universally accepted definition of ‘research and development’. The 
concept, as used for statistical purposes, includes basic and applied research as 
well as ‘experimental development’ understood as ‘systematic work, drawing on 
existing knowledge gained from research and/or practical experience, that is 
directed to producing new materials, products or devices, to installing new 
processes, systems and services, or to improving substantially those already 
produced or installed’. The ordinary meaning of the concept seems to more 




This set of definitions seems to leave little doubt that the Protocol does cover the 
utilization of genetic resources as such, as well as of their ‘derivatives’, 





In support, Correa cites this statement made by the Union for Ethical BioTrade: 
 
“[T]he  Protocol now clearly encompasses research and development to identify 
new bioactive compounds and natural ingredients for food, supplement and 
cosmetics products…Research on the properties of extracts and molecules from 
plants, for example, and their development and commercialization as ingredients 
in pharmaceuticals, cosmetics or nutraceuticals would thus now be distinctly 




However, Correa is less certain that chemical derivatives “downstream” of the original 
biochemical compounds originating in an organism would be covered within the 
definition of “utilization of genetic resources”. He states: 
 
“It has been argued that developing countries failed to achieve the inclusion of 
derivatives in the  Protocol. In accordance with one commentator,  
 
“developing countries were keen to ensure that biochemical derivatives 
of genetic resources were included in the scope, since these are used 
commercially as much as genetic resources (e.g. for screening medically 
active compounds to develop new drugs). In the end, derivatives were 
not included in the scope, but they were defined as biochemicals, which 
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This interpretation, however, seems to be based on a concept of ‘derivatives’ 
broader than that adopted by the  Protocol. In fact, the definition of ‘derivative’ 
in the Protocol is narrow, as it only encompasses ‘a naturally occurring 
biochemical compound’. ‘Derivative’ is often understood more broadly as 
including products based on or elaborated with such biochemical compounds... 
 
...This means that while the benefit sharing obligations under the Protocol 
clearly apply in relation to naturally occurring biochemical compounds, the 
extent to which it would apply to downstream products derived, in turn, 
from such compounds is less clear. However, the benefit sharing obligation 
could apply in cases where a product (e.g. for cosmetic use) contains 







 are in agreement with Correa that “research and development” on 
biochemicals produced within the genetic resource falls within the definition of 
“utilization of the genetic resource”. However, with regard to downstream derivatives 
they appear somewhat more certain than Correa and state (at page 59): 
“...the issue of derivatives was also sidelined [in the final text]. Derivatives are 
defined in Article 2e as “a naturally occurring biochemical compound resulting 
from the genetic expression or metabolism of biological or genetic resources, 
even if it does not contain functional units of heredity.” However, no further 
mention is made of them. This definition was probably kept for political reasons, 
but it can be assumed that it will have little effect, since the Protocol contains no 
obligations in this respect. By presenting derivatives as nothing more than a 
biochemical compound from a living organism, claims relating to synthetic 
molecules with a structure similar to a natural substance fall outside the 
scope of the Protocol. It would therefore appear that a natural molecule 
which has been synthesized and altered does not fall within the scope of the 
Protocol, even if it was “inspired” by nature.” [emphasis added] 
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As discussed above, the Group of Legal and Technical Experts on Concepts, Terms, 
Working Definitions and Sectoral Approaches
158
 arrived at a non-exhaustive list of 
“typical uses” of genetic resources. Amongst that long list there was one use that could 
arguably be construed as encompassing a chemical derivative namely:   
“Use of genetic material as a "factory" to produce organic compounds, such as: 
Active compounds for pharmaceutical production”  
However, since the list of organic compounds to be manufactured concludes with 
“Other naturally occurring compounds” it would appear that the active compounds 
envisaged are naturally occurring rather than man-made derivatives.  Overall the uses 
are entirely focussed on work on naturally occurring substances. A similar approach is 
taken in respect of a discussion on the meaning of “derivatives”. Although an 
opportunity was there for the drafters of the Protocol to specifically identify chemical 
derivatives of the biochemical composition of genetic resources the opportunity was not 
taken. 
Overall, one has to conclude that the question of whether “utilization” includes work on 
human-made chemical derivatives of naturally occurring biochemicals remains entirely 
unclear. 
2.11 Genetic “Information” 
The discussion above demonstrates that there remain significant uncertainties over what 
constitutes “research and development” on “genetic resources”. However, one clear 
constant in the discussion on “utilisation” set out above is that the research is done upon 
DNA or biochemicals which have physically originated from the genetic resource itself. 
What if, however, the subject for research and development did not physically originate 
from the genetic resource itself but was independently synthesised using information 
gained from the original genetic resource? Such a situation could arise where one had 
synthesised DNA on the basis of the nucleotide structure (“synthetic DNA”) or 
synthesised an exact chemical copy of the endogenous biochemical found within the 
genetic resource (“a biomimetic”). 
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Extending control over genetic information could radically change the scope and nature 
of access and benefit sharing provisions of the Protocol, and each of these two situations 
will be dealt with in turn. Having addressed these situations we will examine whether 
using the concepts of “genetic information” gives further guidance in relation to the 
scope of Article 6 and Article 5(1) and (2) of the Protocol in relation to manmade 
chemical derivatives of the products of genetic expression.  
2.11.1 Genetic Information 1: Is synthetic DNA covered within the definition of 
“genetic resources”? 
 
Until relatively recently, the most common technique for generating DNA strands was 
to generate so-called complementary DNA (“cDNA”). Here DNA is synthesized from a 
messenger RNA (mRNA) template obtained from a cell. The mRNA template is itself 
generated by transcription from DNA genes of the original organism. As such there is 
an arguable chain of causation from the original genetic material to the cDNA, via the 





Another technique used alongside cDNA is polymerase chain reaction (“PCR”). PCR 
allows the amplification of a small DNA template called a DNA oligonucleotide or 
DNA primer. The template has, to date, been obtained from an organism and there is, 





However, new technology allows a DNA strand to be created de novo – without the 
need for a primer or template. Oligonucleotide strands are built from a digital database of 
the required base pair sequences and annealed together to make longer DNA strands. 
Once generated, these synthetic DNA molecules can work like those created from a 
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Although this technology may enable to production of de novo human-designed genes 
which do not appear in nature, much work will focus on the synthesis of (or adaptations 
of) known genes that currently exist in nature. However, to synthetically replicate a 
naturally-occurring functional DNA strand or gene, knowledge of the nucleotide 
sequence of that DNA strand or gene will be required. That nucleotide sequence will 
have been generated by research on the original organism. Certainly without the 
information on the base pair sequence of the original DNA the synthetic copy would be 
very unlikely to replicate the specific functionality of the original.  
 
Can use of a naturally originating nucleotide sequence from a genetic database be 
considered to be “accessing” or “utilising” genetic material even if there is no physical 
access to genetic material? 
2.11.1.1 “Accessing”  
It is worth looking again at the definition of genetic resources at Article 2 of CBD (and 
Art 2 of the  Protocol) namely that: "Genetic resources" means genetic material of 
actual or potential value, where "Genetic material" means any material of plant, 
animal, microbial or other origin containing functional units of heredity. Clearly 
synthetic DNA contains functional units of heredity (indeed self-replicating organisms 
containing synthetic DNA have been produced
162
). However, is it of plant, animal, 
microbial or other origin?  
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The Oxford English Dictionary defines “origin” as meaning: 
 
“1. The act of fact of arising or springing from something; derivation; rise; 
beginning of existence in reference to its source or cause. 
 2. That from which anything arises, springs or is derived.” 
163
 
Arguably the beginning of existence of a copy synthetic strand of DNA in reference to 
its source or cause is the original genetic sequence - in the sense that “but for” the 
existence of the original-naturally occurring genetic sequence the synthetic copy in that 
form could not exist. However, although the information originates from the original 
organism does the material originate from that organism? This is far from clear.  
Du Plessis (a negotiator at the Nagoya summit on behalf of Namibia)
164
 has stated that:  
“DNA sequences are information, written in chemicals and that using such 
information without PIC and benefit sharing is tantamount to theft a, in the same 
way that copying CDs would be.”  
However, Du Plessis gives no explanation as to how the wording of the Protocol achieves 
this aim. Morgera et al. 
165
 address the question of access to/utilization of genetic 
information as part of a broader concern for the impact of “bioinformatics” on the Protocol.  
They conclude that the Protocol is unclear with regard to the question of whether genetic 
information falls within the definition of “Genetic Resources” and indeed that the Protocol 
was conceived without consideration of bioinformatics, but that this is an area which needs 
to be determined if the Protocol is not to become obsolete within “a few years’ time.” 
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“functional” [units of heredity] could refer to both the genetic structure per se and to 
the information encapsulated in the DNA sequence that can be screened and 
transferred electronically and become functional in a new digital form. In that light, it 
has been argued that the biological origin rather than the biological form of the 
information matters for falling under the definition of the utilisation of genetic 
resources.” 
This focus on functionality may appear at first sight to be a reasonable purposive 
interpretation of the definition of genetic materials. It is, of course, the functionality of 
the “functional units of heredity” which gives purpose and potential value to the genetic 
component of genetic material. If such a purposive approach were not taken, it would 
allow a party to reproduce the functionality of a naturally-occurring gene by producing 
a synthetic DNA copy of it and thereby take the benefit/functionality of that gene whilst 
avoiding the access provisions of the Protocol.   However, in considering this question 
of functionality we need to be careful of oversimplification – only a small fraction 
(1.5% in humans) of eukaryotic DNA directly codes for proteins (in the form of 
“exons”),
167
 the remainder takes the form of intragenic DNA (“introns”) (non-coding 
DNA which sits within a gene) and intergenic DNA, non-coding DNA which sits 
between genes. Although sometimes given the name “junk DNA”, it is increasingly 
clear that non-coding DNA (in combination with histones) plays a role in chromosome 
structure, gene expression, and epigenetic heredity.
168
  
Some intergenic DNA codes for RNA which is not translated into proteins, but has a 
structural role (e.g. ribosomal RNA) or regulatory function (miniRNA) within the cell. 
Other non-coding DNA contains “pseudo-genes” – fossil genes which have lost their 
ability to be expressed or non-expressed viral genes, telomeres (which protect against 
chromosomal degradation during cell division) and “conserved” non-coding sequences 
which show a high degree of evolutionary conservation and may be involved in gene 
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  The ENCODE consortium have recently reported that “The vast majority 
(80.4%) of the human genome participates in at least one biochemical RNA and/or 
chromatin associated event in at least one cell type”,
170
 although with further research 
this figure may go higher.  
In the light of this, limiting the definition of “functional units of heredity” merely to 
expressed genes (entrons) seems overly narrow. However, bringing non-coding DNA 
within the ambit of the access/utilisation requirements of the Protocol may present its 
own, significant, difficulties. For example, in relation to highly conserved non-coding 
sequences, these sequences may have been preserved across aeons and taxonomic 
groupings – just because the original sequence was determined from a sample taken 
from a liana from a megadiverse nation, does not mean that the same sequence could 
not have been equally determined from a yeast, a mouse, or an elephant. We need to 
ask: In what way is the code from the liana unique or special such that a right to control 
access is justifiable?  
The same (difficult) question can also be raised in relation to those expressed portions 
of DNA which are wholly or closely conserved - “75% of our expressed genetic make-
up is the same as a pumpkin - 57% the same as a cabbage”.
171
 Why should a particular 
nation (or indigenous group) have a right to control “access” to a nucleotide sequence 
which has been determined from an organism (say a liana) which was found within a 
certain nation state (say Ecuador) when it could have as easily been determined from a 
yeast in Burton-on-Trent?  
If the nucleotide sequence is entirely conserved across taxonomic groups then what 
would happen if the “accessor” of the nucleotide sequence argued in their defence that 
the sequence information actually used by them had originated not from the Ecuadorian 
liana but from the defendant’s independent determination from the genome of the 
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Burtonian yeast? In this case would control over the sequence reside in the party which 
controls the resource from which the nucleotide sequence information was first 
determined – akin to a path-independent monopoly right to the sequence? Or is there an 
originality requirement (akin to copyright) where independent (non-path dependent) 
determination of the sequence constitutes a defence to “infringement”? It would seem 
extraordinary within the overall context if the Protocol had created the first path-
independent right, so the latter path independent approach appears more feasible. 
However with “copy-rights” there is often a continuum of complexity and a middle 
ground - what if the defendant (although truly independently sequencing the nucleotide 
sequence) had been in some way directed toward that gene by an understanding of 
functionality of sequence by work done on the liana? What if the nucleotide sequence 
were not entirely conserved across species – how similar would the “copied” sequence 
need to be considered an “accessing” of the original sequence, or would it in some way 
rely upon Tvedt and Shei’s “functionality” and how does one determine or compare 
such “functionalities”?   
Although this is something of an extreme (though plausible) example, in practice claims 
over a right to control access are more likely to focus on a situation where the 
nucleotide sequence (or sequences) encodes for something which is distinctive to the 
organism from which the sequence was determined. One might imagine here that our 
Ecuadorian liana contains entrons which encode for an enzyme which catalyses the 
synthesis of a compound which is found to have anti-cancer properties. Where those 
entrons are only to be found in that particular species of liana, then unique control to 
access may arguably be more easily justified. Of course, it may be that the sequences 
encoding for the production of that particular anti-cancer compound are found within a 
genus of liana (or that a family of very closely related compounds is found in that 
family). We might ask, does control over access extend to the entirety of the genus or to 
the entirety of the class of compounds? What degree of distinctiveness over other 
sequences and compounds is required?  
All these questions very much highlight the problem which arises when rights over 
access are decoupled from a physical causal link to a genetic entity (such as an actual 
organism) and attached (only) to an informational causal link. It is clear that the 
Protocol contains no guidance as to how these questions should be answered and 
appeals to concepts of “functionality” raise as more questions and uncertainties than 
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they answer. As will be seen below, this problem of loss of a physical causal link also 
applies in relation to synthetic biomimetics. 
No doubt as studies on the regulatory and other roles of non-coding DNA proceed, it 
may be that the interaction between non-coding regions of DNA and coding DNA (and 
with histones) becomes better understood. These findings may then be argued to be an 
important part of the information concerning the functionality of the “functional units of 
heredity” and subject to access requirements.  Again some of the interactions may be 
found to be common across taxonomic groups and the question of why such generic 
interplays should be controlled will arise. The same problem will likely arise in relation 
to findings in epigenetics.  
Again, where the interaction between non-coding DNA and coding-DNA is unique to a 
species, unique control to access over that interaction may be more easily justified. One 
should note here that the genetic control over the degree to which a particular gene or 
set of genes is expressed can be a crucial aspect of an organism. One example is the 
cinchona tree. Different strains of cinchona produce different quantities of quinine (and 
related alkaloids) a fact which has been responsible for significant examples of 
industrial espionage, geopolitics, and military strategy. 
172, 173 
2.11.1.2 “Utilization” 
Beyond the question of “access”, the synthetic DNA “problem” also gives rise to 
questions concerning benefit sharing under Article 5 of the Protocol.  
As we have seen above, the definition of “utilization of genetic resources” at Article 2 
of the Protocol means to conduct research and development on the genetic and/or 
biochemical composition of genetic resources. So does the use of a nucleotide sequence 
determined from an endogenous gene to generate a synthetic DNA strand constitute 
“research” on the composition of original genetic resource and so pull that strand of 
synthetic DNA within the benefit-sharing provisions of Articles 5 regardless of the 
physical origin of the DNA molecule(s)? We saw in relation to the question of 
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“accessing” a genetic resource that making the leap from considering the resource to be 
an informational resource (rather than merely a physical resource) required an appeal to 
the purpose of the access requirements, something which could be assisted by reference 
to the “functionality” of the functional unit of heredity.
174 , 175
  One might sensibly argue 
that such interpretative strategies are not required where one is looking at research and 
development upon a genetic resources – research and development is inherently more 
about information than is the concept of access. However, although we may not have 
the question of what functionalities are required (and how we compare competing 
functionalities) we still have the significant questions over entitlement,  “originality” 
and “substantive copying” with regard to sequences which are conserved across 
taxonomic groups – all concepts to which the Protocol gives no guidance.  
As with the question of access, it is again difficult to limit this definition of “research” 
to that (entronic) DNA which is expressed as a protein alone without taking account of 
intragenic and extragenic non-coding DNA and epigenetics. 
2.11.2 Genetic Information 2: Are “biomimetics” covered within the definition of 
“utilization of genetic resources”? 
 
Let us assume that a compound of potential interest (“X”) has been isolated from the 
Ecuadorian liana discussed above. As has been discussed in detail above, it is likely that 
“utilization of a genetic resource” would encompass research and development on 
compound X (if not, perhaps, a downstream chemical derivative of compound X). Part 
of that research would almost certainly be to characterise the chemical structure of that 
compound through analytical chemistry. Once the structure of X is characterised it can 
be set out in a structural formula.  
 
That information could be taken by a synthetic chemist whose task is to perform a de 
novo synthesis of X. If that task is successful, the synthetic chemist would have created 
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a compound – termed here X
S
 - which though an exact copy (“biomimetic”) of X was 
not physically derived from the Ecuadorian liana - the only connection between X
S
 and 
X which is physically derived from the Ecuadorian liana (termed here X
O
) is a link of 
information – the knowledge of the structure of X, which knowledge has been derived 
from study of the genetic resource. 
 
If we take the approach of those which believe that the term “Derivative” expands the 
meaning of “genetic resource”, we might ask whether biomimetics are actually “a 
naturally occurring biochemical compound resulting from the genetic expression or 
metabolism of biological or genetic resources”? Clearly, in one narrow sense they are 
not, in that they have not physically been produced by the genetic expression or 
metabolism of the particular organism in question. However, where X
S
 is (as is entirely 
possible) chemically indistinguishable from X
O
, one might argue that it has still resulted
 
(in a broader causal sense) from genetic expression or metabolism of biological or 
genetic resources; our knowledge of its structure would not exist but for the genetic 
expression or metabolism of biological or genetic resources.   
 
If one places no importance on the term “Derivative” (other than merely to serve to 
define the tool by which the research and development is conducted) then one is forced 
back to looking at the definition of “utilization” more broadly. As has been argued 
above, utilization is likely to encompass research on the products of genetic expression 










. Also as above, it was the knowledge of the structure of X
O
 that allowed us to 
synthesise X
S
 in the first place. Excluding X
S
 from control would seem here like a 
relatively easy way to avoid the provisions of the Protocol, given that the compound 
differs only in that it was made in a laboratory “de novo”, as opposed to being extracted 
from the organism.  
 
However, just as was the case for synthetic DNA, we encounter a dilemma. Where one 
severs the direct physical causal link between the genetic resource and X
O
, the causal 
route to X
S
 has to pass through an indirect information stage. In the case of synthetic 
DNA we looked at the position where a conserved entronic gene sequence found in an 
Ecuadorian liana could have equally been found in our Burton-on-Trent yeast. What if 
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we apply that example to the product (our compound X) of the gene sequence? Here X
O
 
can be as equally found in the liana as in the yeast.
176
 In this sense there is nothing 
special about the genetic resources of the liana - other than that X was discovered in the 
liana first.  
 
A control over utilisation of the information concerning the structure X - such that 
control could be exercised over the use of X
S
 would here be based upon “firstness”– 
again not a concept apparently envisaged (or legislated for) within Articles 6 and 5(1) 
and (2) of the Protocol. 
 
2.12 Genetic expression and downstream derivatives 
Does the concept of “genetic information” discussed above give us any further guidance 
in relation to the question of whether the scope of Article 6 and Article 5(1) and (2) of 
the Protocol encompasses manmade chemical derivatives of the products of genetic 
expression?  
 
If a genetic resource (which can incorporate the products of expression of the genes 
within the resource) can be interpreted not only as a physical resource but as an 
informational resource, might one argue that if the informational causal chain can 





)) it could also extend to an X-A downstream chemical 






As we saw above, it is unclear on a doctrinal analysis of the Protocol whether it clearly 
covers downstream chemical derivatives. As with our biomimetic, once one moves into 
an informational (rather than physical) causal chain the potential causal reach becomes 
greater.  One might very successfully argue that it was the knowledge of the existence 
of compound X (found within the Ecuadorian liana) which led to the synthesis of X-A 
(or indeed of X-B or any other combination). However, allocating a right to control 
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downstream use of information where that compound could have equally been found 
expressed by the genome of an organism in a different taxonomic group comes to rely 
on an idea of firstness and “copying”. These are certainly difficult concepts to deal with 
in relation to a genetic resource per se – in a sense the right in information only comes 
into existence once the scientific information (nucleotide sequence or biochemical 
structure) has been “harvested” by someone from the genetic resource – it is difficult to 
envisage how such a right in the information can exist in the genetic resource in an 
inchoate form before such discovery.   
Although reliance upon an informational causal link is problematic with regard to 
genetic resources per se (and was perhaps not fully envisaged by the formulators of the 
Protocol), the move from a physical causal link to an informational causal link is the 
key element of the protections given in Articles 7 and 5(5) of the Protocol.  It is possible 
therefore that the scope of protection offered by these provisions will be more flexible 
than the protections offered by Article 6 and 5(1) and (2), (and quite clearly some 
informational link was entirely intended by the formulators of the Protocol) and it is to 
these positive protections that we will now turn.  
2.13 The right to control “access” to traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources under Article 7 
As we have seen, Article 7 of the Protocol requires “the prior and informed consent or 
approval and involvement of these indigenous and local communities, and that mutually 
agreed terms have been established” before traditional knowledge associated with a 
genetic resource can be “accessed”. As with the access right under Article 6, it is 
difficult to see this requirement for prior consent/approval as creating anything other 
than a positive right, although the right is not formulated as one might a classical 
intellectual property right. Again, however, we are left with the question of what 
“access” means in this context. The Protocol itself gives us no guidance.  
When we examined the meaning of “access” as it relates to genetic resources per se we 
saw that access could mean merely the first physical access of the resource or, as was 
argued by the provider countries, a broader concept of ongoing “access” wherein new 
permissions were required for new “accessings” of the resource. Similar arguments can 
apply in relation to the Article 7 right although taking into account the markedly 
different subject matter.  
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Traditional knowledge can be very broadly defined. In relation to potentially useful 
genetic resources it is perhaps best described as the knowledge (however held, 
whosoever held by, and however widely) that tells us that any type of genetic resource 
may be useful and the ways it can used and prepared to give that usefulness. Of course, 
the usefulness of a genetic resource (and the information associated with it) may not 
relate to a therapeutic benefit - one might imagine here a plant that has particular 
drought-, pest- or disease- resistance. Similarly there is an entire body of traditional 
knowledge which is not limited to useful organisms. Within this body is sub-set of 
traditional knowledge with relates to therapeutic benefits (or purported benefits) which 
are not linked to genetic resources (these might include therapies related to variants of 
acupuncture or cupping or body modification (such as tattoos), or variants of body 
manipulations such as reflexology, osteopathy and chiropractic). There will also be 
traditional knowledge which relates to neither therapeutic benefits nor genetic resource 
per se – this will include traditional cultural expression and other knowledge such as 
presence of mineral and water resources, animal migration and climate patterns The 
relationship between these types of traditional knowledge is summarised in the Euler 
diagram in Figure 2.2. 
Of course, it is the intersection between the sub-sets of therapeutic traditional 
knowledge and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources which is likely 
to be that of most interest to those seeking to develop “novel” pharmaceutical ligands. 
However, we need to note that the very nature of traditional knowledge held within 
indigenous groups means that these many of these sub-sets are, in practice, artificial and 
would likely not correspond to how the indigenous peoples, themselves, perceive such 
knowledge. The knowledge may have unclear edges and overlaps within a particular 
customary activity – for example where a plant (or mixture of plants) is used to induce 
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Notwithstanding these classifications, crucially (and obviously) traditional knowledge is 
not a physical resource but an informational one and this changes the very nature of 
how it can be accessed. Access in the form of mere physical acquisition cannot apply - 
although traditional knowledge can be recorded in physical form, is certainly not limited 
to it. The “acquisition” here is instead conceptual and the acquiring of the concept could 
certainly be argued to be access to the information. However, does this mean that it is 
only the first acquisition of the concept from the holders of the information which is the 
“accessing” event? One might imagine here that an ethnobiologist obtains the first 
disclosure from a particular indigenous group in Ecuador of the anti-tumour effects of 
ground-up liana seeds. It is hard to argue that such an event is other than an “accessing” 
for the purpose of Article 7. However, what about the case where our ethnobiologist 
publishes her findings and a third-party uses them to find the appropriate liana for anti-
cancer research purposes – is the initial reading the accessing or the acting upon that 
reading to source the liana?  
Given the overall purpose of the Protocol (and the access provisions of Article 6) it 
would seem perverse to limit access to the very first accessing event - a “one-off” event, 
a single dipping into the “well” of indigenous information, after which all further use of 
the information is permitted. Indeed, given the overall context of the Protocol, it would 
seem more consistent that each new user should require consent to access and that for 
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each user continued “access” to a piece of traditional knowledge relating to a genetic 
resource requires continual ongoing consent from the holders of the traditional 
knowledge for use of the knowledge. If this were not the case the provisions of Article 7 
would be limited and easily evaded. 
However, where one creates a requirement for ongoing consent to “access” in relation to 
something as intangible as an idea, the potential is there for the scope of control to be 
very broad indeed. Does the reference to prior informed consent here mean that that 
consent must encompass the all continued usage of (alternatively put as continued 
“access” to) the information and that any new use of the information, howsoever 
remote, requires permission? 
When examining the meaning of “access” as it applied to “genetic resources” under 
Article 6 we saw that (provided there was physical causal link between the source of the 
subject matter being controlled and access) the scope of control was relatively easily 
determined (subject to questions over chemical derivatives). However, we also saw that 
with extension of control into synthetic DNA and biomimetics there was a decoupling 
from physical causation to an informational causal link which was dependent upon 
detailed knowledge of a particular nucleotide sequence or chemical structure. We also 
saw that where the physical causal link became decoupled we came to rely more on 
questions of “firstness” and “discovery” or “originality” to identify the party who 
should have control. 
At this point we need to be clear that the Protocol has no requirement that the 
indigenous peoples have to have any understanding of the biological mechanism by 
which the organism to which they are referring has its effect. Indeed, any such 
requirement would render the provisions of Article 7 essentially useless. One might 
imagine a situation in which an indigenous people mistakenly believed a therapeutic 
benefit was derived from a fruit, whereas in fact the effect was created by a mould 
growing within the fruit of which they were unaware. It is hard to imagine that such a 
mistaken belief would render the indigenous group’s Article 7 right of control over the 
information as in some way invalidated by this error. However, as we shall see later in 
this work (see Chapter 5) there may be an impact on the scope of control where the 
“errors” are of a different nature.   
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In relation to a right to control access under Article 7 there appears to be no requirement 
that a piece of traditional knowledge should be connected to a specific physical sample 
of genetic resource – indeed such a requirement would be overly restrictive, and would 
(again) clearly lead to the Article 7 right being easily evaded.  
Article 7 also contains no express requirement for the information to be used in any 
particular way. There is no requirement within Article 7 (unlike Article 6(1)) that the 
genetic resource to which a piece of traditional knowledge is associated should 
simultaneously be “utilised” as seems to be the case Article 6 (1). If this were the case 
then one successfully might argue that the scope of Article 7 would be curtailed by the 
definition of “utilisation of genetic resources” (whatever that actually means).  
However, in the absence of such an express link there seems little basis to assume that 
Article 7 is so restricted. Therefore, traditional knowledge associated with a genetic 
resource can realistically only mean information which relates to the characteristics and 
properties of a “genetic resource” more generally.  Genetic resource here, of course, 
means material of plant, animal, microbial or other origin containing functional units of 
heredity which is of actual or potential value. Presumably, any information relating to a 
particular plant, animal, microbe or other organism (presumably also covering fungi) 
containing functional units of heredity will be covered. 
2.14 The right to benefit-sharing under Article 5(5) 
Article 5(5) of the Protocol states that: 
“Each Party shall take legislative, administrative or policy measures, as 
appropriate, in order that the benefits arising from the utilization of traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources are shared in a fair and equitable 
way with indigenous and local communities holding such knowledge. Such 
sharing shall be upon mutually agreed terms.” 
As discussed in relation to the sharing of benefits under Articles 5(1) and (2), although 
the requirement for fair and equitable sharing of benefits does not, of itself, create a 
right to control use, the requirement that such sharing should be on mutually agreed 
terms arguably creates such right.  
The key term in relation to understanding the scope of such a right is clearly “utilization 
of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources”. Unlike utilization of 
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genetic resources, this term is not expressly defined within the Protocol or the CBD. As 
with “access” to traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources under Article 
7, it is clear that such use does not have to relate to a specific physical sample of a 
genetic resource. 
Morgera et al. 
178
  suggest that “utilization of traditional knowledge associated with 
genetic resources” needs to be understood “by combining different elements of the 
Protocol” and that the term can be “interpreted along similar lines to the definition of 
utilization of genetic resources”. 
However, as we have seen in the analysis above, the meaning of “utilization of genetic 
resources” (and also “access to genetic resources”) is far from clear, particularly where 
the purported causal link is informational rather than physical. We should also note that 
although there is no doubt that the provisions of Article 7 and Article 5(5) should work 
together with Article 6 and Article 5(1) and (2) where appropriate, the meaning of  
“utilization of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources” does not seem 
to be expressly linked to, or restricted by, the definition of “utilization of genetic 
resources” nor is there are requirement that “utilization of genetic resources” should 
occur alongside the “utilization of traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources” (although there will, of course, be many occasions when both will happen 
concurrently).  
What Morgera et al. actually go on to imply is something distinctly different from (and 
broader than) “utilisation of genetic resources”, suggesting that the traditional 
knowledge should:  
“serve as lead information for the utilisation of genetic resources, it can be 




Here Morgera et al. reflect the view of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Inter-Sessional 
Working Group on Article 8(J) and Related Provisions of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity who state that: 
                                                          
 
178
 Morgera, Unravelling the  Protocol (n 74), 74 
 
179




“In essence, traditional knowledge that sparks the process or provides the lead to 
the properties of a genetic resource although it may not be reflected in the end-
product remains associated to that product.” 180 
 
And those of the Group of Technical and Legal Experts on Traditional Knowledge 
Associated with Genetic Resources in the Context of the International Regime on 
Access and Benefit-Sharing who state: 
“...traditional knowledge often provides the lead to genetic resources with potential 
properties, even if the traditional knowledge does not match the end product.  Thus 
it should nevertheless be covered by the International Regime.  Although the 
traditional knowledge used for the final product may not match the body of 
traditional knowledge, traditional knowledge adds value to genetic resources by 
providing a massive increase of efficiency in identifying genetic resources with 
potential properties. Traditional knowledge can therefore be considered as an 
indicator of the potential properties of a genetic resource. At the same time, it was 
noted by some that traditional knowledge does not always provide useful leads to 
genetic resources.”181 
The work of these UNEP
182
 expert groups was not incorporated as clarification into the 
operative provisions of the Protocol.  However, what they seem to envisage is 
something which is decidedly broader than utilisation of genetic resources per se. If this 
position was incorporated into our understanding of the Article 5(5) right, it would 
allow the right to encompass a situation where a piece of traditional knowledge serves 
as a “lead” (or inspiration) to research workers to investigate the properties of the 
genetic resource to which the traditional knowledge relates – essentially giving a reason 
to look at this particular resource in a particular way, rather than others. The position 
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also acknowledges that the information could attach itself to a downstream product that 
did not necessarily “match” or “reflect” the original traditional knowledge. This broader 
understanding of “utilisation of traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources” would appear to be consistent with the overall context of the Protocol and of 
Article 8(j) of the CBD. However we cannot determine from these positions whether the 
scope of Article 5(5) should extend to all downstream products, in all circumstances.  
 
2.15 Scope of Article 5(5) and Article 7: Conclusion  
What seems to be missing from the “positive” rights in relation to “traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources” under the Protocol is any principle or 
guidance for determining a balance which combines fair protection for the traditional 
knowledge/genetic resources rights holders with a reasonable degree of legal certainty 
for third parties. Where such knowledge serves as a research “lead” for further 
development, the Protocol itself gives no clear guidance as to how far that knowledge 
can have a “reach through effect” into new scientific discoveries or at what stage would 
a researcher be considered free of the traditional knowledge right. 
2.16 Further conclusions – types of information 
Beyond the determination of the scope of the provisions of the Protocol, a more 
fundamental point which is highlighted by this analysis is the disconnect between the 
concept of a genetic resource per se and that of traditional knowledge associated with 
that genetic resource.  
This disconnect might appear relatively obvious on initial examination if one equates a 
genetic resource only with its physical embodiment. However, when examining the 
meaning of “genetic resource” we see that there is an argument that it extends beyond 
the mere physical embodiment of the resource to include a concept of genetic 
information which incorporates DNA sequences and even epigenetic code. If such 
genetic information is excluded from being considered a “genetic resource” there would 





 It is also argued in this chapter that a biochemical produced by the 
expression of the genome of a genetic resource should also be considered a component 
of a genetic resource (although the coverage of downstream chemical derivatives of 
such a component is less clear).  
What is clear however is that, although traditional knowledge associated with a genetic 
resource is a species of information, it is of an unrelated type to the informational 
component of a genetic resource. Traditional knowledge associated with a genetic 
resource (though it may serve as a gateway to their study) is not related to DNA or 
epigenetics. Accordingly, arguments which are applied to extend the definition of a 
genetic resource cannot properly be used to extend the definition of traditional 
knowledge associated with a genetic resource. Equally, however, the definition of a 
genetic resource does not delimit the meaning or scope of traditional knowledge 
associated with a genetic resource and, in principle, the downstream scope of a right to 
control such traditional knowledge cannot be curtailed by considerations which would 
apply in relation to genetic “information”. In this respect the traditional knowledge 
associated with a genetic resource is a broader (and far less proscribed) concept than the 
informational component within the genetic resource. 
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Chapter 3  
The justification for positive rights in traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
“Because the rule of law exists, and above all 
because it encourages and protects acts of innovation 
... we in the modern world expect that tomorrow will 
be better than today. Our view of the universe is 
essentially optimistic because of the marriage 
between law and innovation. Law gives the 
individual the confidence to explore, to risk, to 
adventure into the unknown, in the knowledge that 
he as an inventor, will be protected by society.” 
  
James Burke, The Day the Universe Changed (1985) 
“Central to the ideology of IPRs is the fallacy that 
people are creative only if they can make profits and 
guarantee them through IPR protection.”  
  
  
Vandana Shiva, Biopiracy -The Plunder of Nature and Knowledge (1997) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
As was stated in Chapter 1, to understand the justifiable scope of a positive right to 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources we need to examine the 
theoretical underpinnings for the existence of rights to control the use of ideas (and their 
expression) in general, and then apply those theories to the case for the existence of a 
positive right in traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources in particular. 
This chapter will follow that approach.  
The first step, however, is to identify the special difficulties which the protection of 
intangible concepts present as these problems very much underlie the ways in which the 
theoretical underpinnings are brought into practical effect. 
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3.2 The “problem” of intangibles 
The power and value an intellectual property right resides in its ability to limit the 
freedom of those who do not own the right to engage in certain activities. The degree to 
which it does this, and the exact activities which are curtailed, will depend on the exact 
nature of the right. However, at their heart all intellectual property rights confront a 
problem: they are an attempt through positive law, and the enforcement of that positive 
law, to create exclusivity in intangible goods which would otherwise be inherently 
difficult to control. 184 
A purely tangible object is (usually) relatively easily defined –its physical limits 
circumscribe the boundary of the thing itself. Similarly, use of a purely tangible object 
is rivalrous (or subtractable) 
185, 186 
– use by one person cannot help but deprive others 
of that particular use of the object (or subtract that use from the use of others). Its use 
can also (in theory, if not necessarily always in practice, and often subject to 
considerable cost) be excluded through physical possession or physical control of 
access. As such, exclusivity in that tangible thing is relatively easily achieved. 
However, this is not the case for ideas, or for the varied ways in which an idea may be 
expressed.  
The field of epistemology - what an idea is or how we can classify, or be certain of, 
knowledge has been the subject of philosophical discourse for millennia.
187
 For present 
purposes, however, we need to acknowledge that knowledge and ideas, and their 
expression, are at heart merely information. In distinct contrast to tangible objects, the 
use of information is non-rivalrous – my use of a piece of information cannot deprive 
another (or indeed many millions of others) from identical use of that information. 
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Similarly, in contrast to tangible objects, information is physically unexcludable - it is 
easily copied, disseminated, adapted, mixed with other information and the mixed 
information can be further copied, disseminated, adapted and mixed, ad infinitum. 
188
   
However you seek to classify it, whether as an idea, an instruction, a concept, an 
algorithm, a behaviour, or a meme,
189
 once the intellectual product of a mind is first 
conveyed out of the mind of its author its ready amenability to imitation and adaptation 
allows it take on a “life of its own”, entirely independent of its author. In the absence of 
a legal mechanism to constrain downstream use by others, the original author cannot but 
lose control over their intellectual product. As was (more poetically) stated by Jefferson: 
“If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive 
property, it is the action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual 
may exclusively possess as long as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is 
divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every one, and the receiver cannot 
dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one possesses the 
less, because every other possesses the whole of it. He who receives an idea from 
me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper 
at mine, receives light without darkening me...” 
190
 
However, the problems with controlling the use of intellectual products do not end with 
the non-rivalrous and non-excludable nature of their use. Unlike a purely tangible 
object, there is also the significant problem of defining an intangible.  If I am seeking to 
assert control over information through a legal mechanism, my first task is to 
understand what the information is – that is how the intangible is defined. Given the 
inherent malleability and adaptability of information, it is important that I understand 
the “boundaries” of what is to be protected. However, the boundaries I need to consider 
are “multi-dimensional”.  The first, and perhaps most obvious dimension, relates to my 
understanding of the point at which the initial information has become so changed, or is 
so different, that it no longer represents, or is a part of, that which was originally 
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conceived. Attas has referred to this as the problem of “individuation”
191
 of ideas which 
he divides into three areas:  
a) the problem of distinguishing between an idea in its first expression and the 
many secondary expressions it might stimulate;  
b) the problem of distinguishing between a general and more abstract idea and the 
specific details that are required to put it into practice; and  
c) the problem of extension of protection of an idea to cover the same idea which 
has been independently conceived.   
We might for current purposes call these the “forward-looking” boundaries of the 
intangible.   
The second dimension relates to my understanding the boundaries between what I have 
conceived (and seek to protect) and the field of the ideas/information of others which 
have gone before me. Attas has called this the problem of “origination”
192
 and identifies 
the difficulty of considering a newly minted concept as being in some way separate 
from the multitude of previously existing concepts which have acted as the back drop 
and or stimulation for the concept under consideration. Gibson uses the term 
“origination” to describe the process of identifying and individuating the creator of a 
work, the origin of a work and the “presumption of a finite, concluded and indeed 
lifeless material form”. 
193
  For current purposes we might call these the “backward-
looking” boundaries of the intangible.  
It is worth noting here that Gibson coins a useful term within this context. As we will 
see, philosophical justifications for the existence of rights to control ideas often require 
some degree of “contribution” by the author in the form of originality, inventiveness 
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and/or novelty – that is a sense in which the subject matter of protection is not imitative 
of something else. Gibson describes this state as “in-imitativeness”.
194
  
From an epistemological stand-point, we can see the very close links between 
individuation and origination. Indeed, all forms of established intellectual property right 
have grappled, and continue to grapple, with both boundary dimensions. Determination 
of the forward-looking (individuation) boundaries is most commonly couched in the 
language of infringement – does a third party use of the protected intangible fall within 
the scope of the protected intangible? In contrast, the backward-looking (origination) 
boundaries are most commonly encountered when looking at questions of validity or 
subsistence – is the intellectual product sufficiently different from the intellectual 
products that have gone before to warrant protection? In most cases there will be a 
complex interplay between both boundary dimensions. When defendants argue that 
their (allegedly infringing) use of a purportedly protected intellectual product is a mere 
repetition of that which was understood before the conception of the asserted 
intellectual product, putative rights holders can find themselves navigating with 




Given the inherent nature of information, both types of boundaries are rarely distinct. 
With regard to the backward-looking boundary there will very likely be a continuum 
between that which went before and that which is sought to be protected, and with 
regard to the forward-looking boundary, a continuum between that which is sought to 
be protected and that which is adapted by others from that information. The question of 
where to draw a definitional line within these continua goes to the very heart of the 
existence of the right in the intangible. 
Sometimes a party seeking exclusive use of information will seek to define a piece of 
information by reference to a tangible product which is created out of that information. 
This may seem to give a reassuring foothold, but it is in some cases erroneous and care 
must be taken – although the tangible product may be one embodiment of a broader 
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piece of information, it may not represent the entirety of the information, or indeed all 
the potential embodiments which could flow from the information.  
That said, the degrees of uncertainty along the forward-looking and backward-looking 
dimensions will vary as between the types of intellectual product to be protected - the 
protection of “pure” ideas per se being subject to the greatest degree of uncertainty and 
the protection of the more concrete expressions of an idea being subject to less 
uncertainty. The narrower the embodiment of the idea then, by definition, the less 
uncertainty will surround its definition in both dimensions. Accordingly, where a party 
chooses only to protect a narrow embodiment of an idea, they will likely encounter 
fewer problems with asserting validity and infringement. The choice between the 
certainty (and potential lesser commercial reward) provided by asserting a narrow 
embodiment and the potentially greater commercial gains (but increased uncertainty) 
through assertion of a broader embodiment is a perennial difficulty for intellectual 
property owners (and, indeed, their advisors). 
However, why should we be concerned if the boundaries of that which I am seeking to 
assert control over are indefinable? What mischief comes from my “woolly” 
boundaries?  
Of course, my control over a piece of information inherently requires others to curtail 
their utilisation of that information. If I assume, as a general point, that it is correct that 
I should only prevent others from an activity with some justification, then it would seem 
right that the boundary of my control should only extend to that which is supported by 
that justification (whatever that justification may be). Any control that extends beyond 
this is, by definition, unjustifiable.  
Any such analysis is, of course, based on an assumption that it is in some sense 
improper to place limitations on others, but is otherwise focussed upon the argument of 
the person asserting the right. We need to be aware that such assertions of right are 
rarely made into a justificatory “vacuum”. Hohfeld
196,197
 highlighted the correlative 
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nature of rights versus duties – granting a right to one has the correlative effect of 




“Since legal duties are hard things for people to have - since they constrain 
conduct and in that sense limit freedom - we should expect the realm of duties to 
be the testing ground for claims of right. The realm of duties - the propositions 
about duty that a given claim of right entails - is where we should expect the 
problems with the right (if there are any) to surface.” 
Whether one sees questions of what duties should be borne by others as some sort of 
background into which rights are asserted, or as direct opposing arguments for the 
existence of a right, or whether one perceives the imposition of a right as in some way 
curtailing inherent rights of others, the question of the justification for the existence or 
scope of a right might be considered as a “justificatory equation”. Such an equation 
would pit the justification(s) for the existence of the right on one side of the equation 
against justification(s) for the non-existence of the right on the other side of the 
equation. However, this is not in any way a “zero sum” arithmetic equation. We need to 
immediately note that the scope of a particular right may be supported by more than one 
(and potentially many) justifications. Further, not all such justifications may be of equal 
validity or merit and differing justifications may give rise to differing justifiable limits. 
Altogether, it is unlikely that the “set” of scopes supported by these varied justifications 
will be co-terminous. Similarly, it could be unlikely that the opposing justifications 
would create a co-terminous set of counter-scopes, or indeed that each counter-
argument would be fully aligned with each “pro” argument. 
However, as will be seen, problems of non-alignment are usually addressed by the 
narrower, specific, arguments for the existence of a right being countered by broader, 
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3.3 The “problem” of knowledge   
Assuming for the moment that control should be limited by justification, is there an 
argument that the position is particularly acute in respect of the control of knowledge? 
Is knowledge in some way special? There is a long tradition that a restriction on the use 
of ideas per se cannot be justified at all, a tradition in part captured in the medieval, 
rhyming aphorism:  
Scientia donum Dei est,  
Unde vendi non potest.  
(knowledge is a gift from God and should not be sold) 
200, 201
 and developed in the 
writings of Kant, Fichte and Hegel (as will be discussed later in this chapter). 
Notwithstanding this thinking, it is not an overstatement to say that the transfer and 
adaptation of information has been, and continues to be, at the very heart of the 
development of human civilisation - indeed one might ask what is human civilization 
without knowledge? For Bronowski: 
“Man is distinguished from other animals by his imaginative gifts. He makes 
plans, inventions, new discoveries, by putting different talents together; and his 
discoveries become more subtle and more penetrating, as he learns to combine his 
talents in more complex and intimate ways.”
202
 
In the light of this it might be argued, at the very least, that the freedom to use 
information is not one to be interfered with lightly. Accordingly, a restriction of the 
right of others to use knowledge might, at the very least, be seen to be one where: 
a) a particularly high justificatory threshold is required, and  
b) there is a need to be particularly cognisant of not improperly restricting the 
action of third parties.  
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Here the inherent uncertainty in defining the boundaries of a piece of information adds a 
further layer of concern. Such uncertainties (combined with the inherent imperfections 
in any legal mechanism) may give us a high (perhaps unavoidable) probability that any 
mechanism which grants rights of control over information will result in some third 
parties being improperly prevented from doing that which they would otherwise be free 
to do. Is this risk a price too high to pay? That question cannot be addressed within this 
work, but certainly an appreciation of the danger caused by the inherent uncertainty of 
the boundaries to information must be carefully considered when looking at the 
“justificatory equation” for imposing any control over information.  
Notwithstanding any such justificatory equation, it would seem reasonable that the 
formulators of intellectual property rights (and those tasked with making them work) 
should, in any event, be particularly sensitive to the balance of conflicting interests 
between the justifications for granting protection to an intellectual product and the right 
of the broader world to work freely, and ensure that a careful framework of rules (and 
guidance for their interpretation) is in place so as to reduce the danger of improper 
curtailment of third party activity.  
Indeed, support for a clear framework of rules also derives from a closely related 
source. Bingham
203
 identified a requirement that “law is accessible, and so far as 
possible, clear and predictable” as one of his principles underpinning the rule of law. 
Indeed, the importance of clarity and predictability in law has a long history 
204, 205 
and 
has been cited by senior appellate courts in a variety of jurisdictions.
206, 207
  Whatever 
the justification for controlling the use of intellectual products, it is hard to envisage 
why the principle of clarity and predictability in law (and in its application) should not 
apply to understanding the limitations to the scope of an intellectual property right.  
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Accordingly, ensuring that any intellectual property right framework provides a 
mechanism for determining with a reasonable degree of certainty what is (and what is 
not) protected or permitted, is not only of immense practical significance to those 
seeking to operate the law, but is an element in securing the proper rule of law. Of 
course, the inherent uncertainties of defining information do not make providing such a 
“reasonable degree” of certainty easy. However, these inherent uncertainties might be 
argued to place a heavy burden on the formulators and adjudicators of intellectual 
property laws to give due care to questions of scope of protection.  
3.4 High level justifications for the protection of knowledge 
The key high level philosophical justifications for the existence of intellectual property 
rights protecting knowledge (or its expression) are most commonly divided into 
consequentialist claims or deontological approaches.
208, 209, 210, 211
  
Within the first group of justifications positive law is created in an attempt to meet a 
perceived societal need or collection of such needs. As is the case with any 
consequentialist approach, the most contentious question is how we choose (and justify) 
the consequences that should be sought. In relation to the existence of intellectual 
property rights, the most commonly expressed consequentialist goal is a desire to 
incentivise artistic, social and technological development (though this essentially 
utilitarian motivation is often presented as a desire to achieve positive “economic” 
outcomes).
212 , 213
 This is a justification which has been particularly applied to the 
protection of inventions through a patent system.
214, 215, 216
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The deontological approaches are based on natural rights, human rights or other matters 
of “duty”. The natural rights justifications essentially fall into two mains camps:  
i) “labour-desert” based on the concept that we own ourselves and by mixing 
our labour with the world we gain ownership in that we have mixed our 
labour with; and  
ii) rights based on freedom of personality and the extension of individual 
personality. 
It should be stressed, however, that although all intellectual property rights have the key 
similarity in that they seek (to varying degrees) to exclude third parties from engaging 
in certain “intellectual” or commercial activities, the range of subject matter covered by 
intellectual property rights is so broad that certain of the philosophical justifications for 
“intellectual property” often seem to sit more comfortably for some rights than for 
others.  
Advocating a pluralistic approach to the justification of intellectual property, Resnik 
highlights that different rights require different balances of “competing moral values in 
the light of the particular facts and circumstances”.
217
  Mr Justice Laddie (of the High 
Court of England & Wales), in a more Orwellian vein, put it thus:  
“it seems to me to be strongly arguable that not all intellectual property rights are 
equal. Some are more equal than others. It is convenient and conventional to treat 
copyright, designs, topography rights, moral rights, confidential information, 
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Accordingly, we will find in the present analysis that not all the philosophical 
justifications that have been provided to justify the existence of intellectual property 
will necessarily comfortably justify the control of traditional knowledge associated with 
genetic resources (indeed some, arguably do not support it at all), whereas with others 
the struggle is not so great.  
However, before we engage in this exercise we need firstly to address whether the 
application of what could be argued to be essentially “Western” intellectual concepts of 
property, and of the self, are appropriate to the protection of something (traditional 
knowledge) which is are radically different in nature from the usual subject matter of 
Western intellectual property law. As we will see some of the problems with the 
application of Western philosophical approaches arise from the way in which traditional 
knowledge is “developed” (that is in an ad hoc way across generations) and held within 
indigenous groups. These are, however problems, that can be dealt with on a case-by-
case basis and do not (of themselves) necessarily undermine the entire process of 
bringing an “alien” Western philosophy to bear upon this subject matter.
219
  
A greater criticism is that in many cases the ways in which traditional knowledge is 
conceived and respected by indigenous peoples are not founded upon Western notions 
of self and (particularly) of property. 
220 , 221, 222, 223
Notwithstanding this, we have to 
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consider that the positive rights to control genetic resources (and traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources) established within the Protocol (or to be created in 
any other Western mechanism such as the WTO or WIPO) are a function of positive law 
created within a Western legal philosophical framework. Accordingly, there is an 
argument for saying (whether or not such an approach is appropriate or otherwise to the 
subject matter) that such rights need to be assessed on essentially Western philosophical 
terms. This work will assume this to be the case, and will use Western philosophical 
approaches where assessing situations in which those rights will be interacting, and 
conflicting, with third-party intellectual property rights (and concepts of freedom) 
whose justifications are themselves rooted within the Western tradition.  
In any event, critics of the protection of traditional knowledge (perhaps at some time 
hence a pharmaceutical company seeking to avoid a veto over downstream use) are 
likely to root their arguments in the Western philosophical tradition and such criticisms 
are likely most properly countered using the same philosophical paradigm.   
We will see that there are some philosophical approaches, notably restorative justice 
and communitarianism which, though clearly Western concepts, are less commonly 
used to justify intellectual property rights per se, but may have a particular role in the 
justification of rights to control traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources.  
Although generally not one of the “usual” key justifications for intellectual property, 
ideas based on the concept of communitarianism – that communities are entitled to 
rights based on their being a distinct community, have been used as a justification for 
rights in traditional knowledge.
224
 More recently, Munzer has used ideas of 
restorative/corrective justice to justify rights in traditional knowledge.
225
 Accordingly, 
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these justifications will be examined alongside the more “traditional” deontological and 
consequentialist justifications. 
Although ideas of distributive justice have long played a significant part in the debate 
concerning the ownership of property, they have only more recently being applied to 
questions of the rightness of control over ideas – most commonly to examine the 




  This 
work will also therefore look to consider the extent to which distributive justice, 
particularly a Rawlsian maximin analysis, can be applied to the question of scope of 
positive rights in traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources.  
In summary, the key justifications examined in this work are:     
a) Deontological justifications:  
i) Lockean desert-based justification for property  
ii) Kantian authorial personality 
iii) Fichtean right based on  personality 
iv) Hegelian right based on personality 
b) Consequentialist (including utilitarian) justifications:  
i) The incentive to innovate 
ii) The incentive to commercialise 
iii) The incentive to preserve 
iv) Preservation of global health  
c)      Distributive justice 
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d) Communitarian justifications 
e) Restorative/corrective Justice 
3.5 Deontological Justifications  
3.5.1 Lockean desert-based justifications  
3.5.1.1 Locke’s theory of property 
John Locke’s An Essay on Concerning the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil 
Government was published in 1689
229
 (the so-called “Second Treatise” of Locke’s Two 
Treatise of Government). This was in Britain, and elsewhere, a period during which the 
absolute power of monarchs was the subject of fierce debate, to (and beyond) the point 
of revolution. Locke’s views on absolute monarchs, the origins of a sovereign’s 
authority and the need for separation of powers informed much of the thinking of 
revolutionary political philosophers and lawyers thereafter, including those involved in 
drafting the United States Declaration of Independence and Constitution.
230
  
A key element of Locke’s thesis, the justification for the ownership of property in 
private hands, is found at Chapter V (entitled “Of Property”) of the Second Treatise
231
.  
For Ferguson there is an argument that Locke’s theories on property set the course for 
the foundation of a widely distributed private property rights and broad-based 
democracy in the British colonies in North America, Australia, New Zealand and the 
United States.
232
 Locke’s theory of property has also become an important element in 
the academic analysis of the justification for intellectual property rights. Locke’s thesis 
can be summed up as follows: 
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a) At some point in an indeterminate past (but at least before the advent of a 
monetary economy) mankind existed in a “State of Nature” governed by the “Law of 
Nature”; 
b) Within that State of Nature the World and all therein had been granted by God to 
Mankind to be held in common. This combined holding of the resources of the world is 
referred to as “the Common”;    
c) Within this State of Nature the number of humans inhabiting the planet is small 
in comparison to the essentially inexhaustible resources of the Common. The Common 
can provide for all; 
d) To be useful to humans the resources of the Common need to be harvested in 
some way, whether it be foraging, hunting or fishing; 
e) Every man has property in his own person, similarly the labour of his body and 
the work of his hands belong to that person; 
f) When a person removes a resource from the Common he mixes his labour with 
it. That person owns his labour and by mixing it with the resource he joins to the 
resource something which is his own which makes the resource part of his own 
property. 




h) In applying labour to a resource such as to remove a resource from the common 
a “property” is “begun” in the resource. 
i) At the time of removal of the resource from the common there is no requirement 
that there be any consent from the other commoners (essentially the broader 
community) for the “property” to begin; 
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j) For a “property” to begin, however, there is a requirement that there is “enough, 
and as good left in the common for others”. This has come to be known as the “enough 
and as good” proviso; 
k) The removal of the resource cannot be to an extent that would result in the 
spoiling of unused resource.
234
 This has come to be termed the “waste” exception or 
“non-waste” requirement. 
l)  These principles apply not only to fruit, game and other resources, but to the 
land itself. The improvement of untamed land to enhance the resources that can be 
created on it will begin a property in that parcel of land. This accumulation of a right in 
land is subject to the same exceptions as other resources. If the land is unused it returns 




m) It is the application of labour which gives value to something whether it be food, 
resources or land. The greater the application of labour to a thing or land the greater the 
value developed in that thing or land. 
n) Where a man harvests more than he can make use of without the harvest 
decaying, but uses the excess to barter for something else that he needs, or does not 
perish (such as precious metals or diamonds), that would not fall foul of Locke’s waste 
exception. This is beginning of a monetary economy. Locke states:  
“And thus came in the use of Money, some lasting thing that Men might keep 
without spoiling, and by mutual consent Men would take in exchange for the truly 
useful, but perishable Supports of Life.” 
236
 
o) The use of money uncouples the amount of land that a person may properly own 
without breaching the waste exception. Where a man can accumulate wealth through 
accumulation of non-perishables (such as gold, silver or diamonds) then he can 
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accumulate more land than can immediately support his family without “wasting” the 
Common. 
p) Such non-perishables are not of themselves of value, as they do not of 
themselves contribute to feeding, clothing and transporting a man. Their value arrives 
only from the consent of the community.
 237
 
q) As societies developed, the initial ownership of property under the Law of 
Nature, created through the application of labour, became recognised through tacit 
acceptance of the community and eventually formalised through positive laws of an 
organised government. 
It should be stressed that within Locke’s thesis the tacit acceptance of the value of 
imperishable metals or money (and which allows the development of unequal holdings 
without breaching the waste exception) remains separate from the tacit 
acknowledgement of holdings in land. 
If Locke’s theory is to be accepted as correct, in toto, then it has a major implication 
which was identified by Locke himself. Where peoples are considered not to be mixing 
their labour with the land, then the land itself and the natural produce which it creates 
remain part of the Common. If such land is in the Common then it is free to be brought 
into private ownership by the application of labour to it. Even where labour is being 
applied to the land, in the absence of a monetary economy the waste exception would 
apply such that any holding could only be justified if it were small enough to support a 
family without causing waste to the Common. Locke refers a number of times to the 
uncolonised portions of the Americas as an example of a continuation of the State of 
Nature where the land and its resources remain in the Common. Of course, at the time 
of Locke’s writing (1689) the east coast of North America was progressively being 
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Writers such as Shiva
241
 consider Locke’s theories on property to be part of the 
philosophical underpinning to Western ideas justifying the exploitation of “vacant” 
land, a way of thinking which she describes as legitimising colonial exploitation within 
the British Empire and the United States and as a justification for the dispossession of 
indigenous peoples across the globe. Locke was in fact involved with drafting the 
constitution of one British colony (Carolina) and it would seem at least likely that a 
philosophy which would provide direct legitimisation for the British colonists’ 
expropriation of land from indigenous hunter-gatherer peoples was within his 
contemplation.  
Locke’s theory of property has formed the basis of a libertarian, Neo-Lockean school of 
thought. Perhaps foremost amongst these “Neo-Lockeans” is Robert Nozick who argues 
that justice in property holdings relies upon a just initial acquisition of the property 
from the Common and a just chain of transfers thereafter. 
242
 Where a transfer in the 
chain is in some way improper Nozick allows for a “rectification” of title – what Radin 
calls a theory of “corrective justice”. 
243
  
3.5.1.2 The Lockean Justification for Intellectual Property 
The Lockean theory that one can gain property over the Common through the 
application of one’s labour, has been applied to the creation of an exclusive property 
right in ideas – ideas that were (until they were conceived of) in a “Common” of yet to 
be had ideas. By analogy with Locke’s theory of property over tangible goods, here it is 
the application of labour (that is the work done in conceiving the idea) that is sufficient 
to wrest the idea out of the “Lockean Common” and into private ownership. This 
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concept has been looked at considerable length by Hughes
244
 who considers the 
Lockean justification in many ways more appropriate for intangible ideas than for 
tangible property. Hughes believes that the propertizing of ideas under the Lockean 
model can be justified if three propositions can be met. These propositions are: 
a) The production of ideas requires a person’s labour; 
b) These ideas are appropriated from a Lockean Common which is itself not 
significantly devalued by the ideas removal from it (in compliance with the “enough 
and as good” proviso); and 
The ideas can be made property without breaching the non-waste condition. 
Hughes states that Locke’s theory of property can be interpreted in two ways:  
i) Society rewards labour with property on instrumental grounds. Society must 
give a reward or no-one will provide their labour ; or 
ii) On a normative basis, labour should be rewarded with property. 
3.5.1.3 Labour - Avoidance 
Taking the first point, Hughes states that in the Lockean model a person’s handiwork 
becomes their property because the work of an individual’s hands and “the energy, 
consciousness, and control that fuel their labour” is their own. Hughes asks the question 
whether the act of conceiving  ideas can indeed be referred to a “labour” in the Lockean 
sense. Labour is most often thought of as physical “sweat of the brow” activity. Hughes 
suggests that many might suppose that the work of producing ideas is preferable to 
manual labour. However, Hughes suggests that even if this is correct in some cases even 
those working on developing ideas may in fact prefer to be doing something less 
onerous - creation being for most people less fun than recreation. Hughes states: 
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“Although “idea work” is often exhilarating and wonderful, it is something we 
generally have to discipline ourselves to do, like forcing oneself to till the fields or 
work on assembly lines.”
245
 
Hughes refers to this as the “avoidance” view of labour. He suggests that there are two 
distinct strands to this avoidance approach: a normative proposition of Locke’s labour 
theory (the very unpleasantness of labour justifies a reward) and an instrumental 
argument (that no one would perform labour without reward – a position itself based on 
a utilitarian foundation that the product of labour generally enhances the public good). 
Hughes argues that although the instrumental argument is often provided as proof of the 
normative position, and both can coexist, neither in fact requires acceptance of the other 
to be valid.   
Hughes suggests
246
 that Locke had the utilitarian position in mind when he stated that 
“he who appropriates land to himself by his labour, does not lessen but increase the 
common stock of mankind”
247
.  Hughes feels that the instrumental argument has 
dominated case law and judicial announcements and where the normative “labour 
deserves reward” position has emerged, it is as an adjunct to the instrumental position.  
Hughes believes that the wide acceptance of the instrumental argument - that 
developing ideas is sufficiently unattractive that it needs to be encouraged by the reward 
of an intellectual property right, supports the argument that the work done in creating 
ideas is sufficient to meet the Lockean labour requirement.
248
 
3.5.1.4 “Labour-desert” or “value added” theory 
Hughes also examines the “value-added” or “labour desert” interpretation of Locke’s 
labour justification. This approach is not based on the unpleasantness of labour – indeed 
Hughes states that this understanding of property does not, in fact, require an 
understanding of the concept of labour per se. Hughes comments that labour per se, no 
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matter how arduous, could potentially create nothing of value to broader society, or 
something which was only of value to the labourer himself. What is important in the 
value added approach is that the labour expended produces something of value to 
society – something beyond what morality requires the individual to produce.  Hughes 
comments that judicial or legislative statements that fuse the normative and instrumental 
elements of the labour avoidance justification are probably based, unknowingly, on the 
value-added theory. Hughes goes on to say that although the value-added theory is often 
thought to be an instrumentalist approach – inventors/creators will be incentivised to 
add value to the Common provided they have some personal gain, there is a normative 
proposition that such inventors/creators should be rewarded if they have enhanced the 
commonweal, even if personal gain was not what actually incentivised them to enhance 
the Common. 
3.5.1.5 The “enough and as good” requirement 
In Locke’s theory during the early days of the Common it is essentially inexhaustible. 
The acquisition of a part of the Common through the application of labour by one 
family does not in practice remove part of the Common from anyone else, so there is no 
moral reason why the first labourer should not acquire property over the subject of his 
labour – his acquisition is non-competitive.  
In relation to tangible property the period during which a labourer could truly acquire 
property in the Common in a non-competitive manner would be short lived – the 
Common would not have “enough and as good” for very long.  
By propertizing an idea out of the Common of potential ideas is the inventor/creator 
exhausting that Common? Once propertized that particular idea is now outwith that 
Common, but is there an inexhaustible supply of “enough and as good” ideas remaining 
in the Common? Hughes suggests that the idea of the effectively inexhaustible Common 
applies more properly to intangibles than to tangible property. Indeed other than in 
extraordinary circumstances (and even then only for a very short time) the concept of 





3.5.1.6 The “permanent common” 
Notwithstanding this “inexhaustibility”, if one does allow propertization of the ideas 
Common are there certain ideas which should never become propertized?  
Hughes believes that the prevention of private propertization of certain central ideas 
allows intellectual property law avoid the inequitable control of core resources that can 
be present in physical property systems. He states: 
“Even in a vast wilderness, an individual should not be permitted to claim certain 
physical goods as property because their extraction will not leave “as good and as 
many” for the remaining individuals. The “New World” prior to its colonization 
may have been as close to a Lockean common as human history records, yet it is 
easy to make a list of things which the society could not allow to be appropriated 
as private property: the Amazon, St. Lawrence and Ohio Rivers, the Cumberland 
Pass, or the St. George’s Bank fisheries.”
249
 
Hughes considers that there are two broad classes of idea that should not be subject to 
propertization these are his “everyday ideas” and “extraordinary ideas” which he 
mentioned in his overview of what constitutes an intellectual property right. In respect 
of everyday ideas (such as washing the car, taking the dog for a walk) allowing for their 
propertization would breach the “enough and as good” proviso since they are so 
fundamental to everyday existence that their removal from the Common would 
unavoidably deplete the Common. In respect of “extraordinary” ideas Hughes sees these 
as falling into two categories: those which are important because they reveal 
fundamental information about the functioning of the universe (such as mathematical 
concepts and algorithms and scientific discoveries) and those which, although initially 
amenable to property ownership, become with time and use increasingly important to 
the functioning of society and accordingly become “depropertized” – akin perhaps to 
the genericisation of trade marks.  
Hughes sees the spectrum of protectable ideas as sitting between the two extremes of 
common and extraordinary ideas. However, he identifies that ideas related to the two 
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extremes can be protectable. Car washing per se is unprotectable, a new car washer can 
be. Integral calculus per se is unprotectable whereas a new notation to express it can be. 
3.5.1.7 The non-waste condition  
As mentioned above the aspect of Locke’s theory of property which has the most 
logical difficulty is the non-waste condition and the allowance for enhanced land 
holding through the acquisition of non-perishable metals and jewels. Hughes believes 
that many intellectual property systems no not embody, or require, a non-waste 
condition. The core component to his argument is that ideas do not “spoil” in the way 
that natural produce may. He argues that although some may say that ideas are 
perishable (in that stories become old, literature styles become outdated, technologies 
become obsolescent) there is in fact no real deterioration in the idea and the loss is only 
seen against the social background and may (dependent on trends in fashion or 
technology developments) be reversible. 
250
 
Hughes does not believe that the lack of requirement for a non-waste condition is fatal 
to the application of the Lockean theory of property to intellectual property (particularly 
given the rapidity with which Locke moves away from the non-waste condition with the 
advent of  imperishable assets/ monetary economy). Indeed, as was mentioned earlier, 
Hughes believes that the “enough and as good” requirement probably only holds true 
for the concept of a Common of ideas and:  
“That may mean that Locke’s unique theoretical edifice finds it firmest bedrock in 
the common of ideas”
251
 
Although in conclusion Hughes believes that elements of a Lockean argument to justify 
intellectual property are powerful he does not believe that a pure Lockean solution is 
complete. As he states: 
“Those who try to apply Locke to all modern property end up multiplying 
distinctions like pre-Copernican astronomers calculating celestial orbits with their 
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Ptolemaic epicycles. At some point it becomes easier to reorient one’s universe.” 
252
 
3.5.1.8 Post-Hughes Analysis 
Attas
253
 takes a substantially less charitable approach to the Lockean justification than 
Hughes. Attas particularly tackles the question of Locke’s positive method of private 
appropriation. Locke provides in the “mixing” of a labourer’s own labour with the 
Common a “mechanism” by which a previously commonly-owned aspect of the 
Common comes into the private ownership of the labourer.  Attas highlights Nozick’s 
254
 point that even if labour can be “owned” in any real sense why should its mixing 
with the Common allow ownership in an aspect of the common rather than vice versa? 
Attas also quotes Shiffrin who argues against a Lockean basis for intellectual property 
on the grounds that something which originates in our own mind (though “owned” 
whilst an idea in our own heads), cannot be used to control others once it has been 
dissipated into the public domain.
255
  
Attas’ principle focus is, however, on what he terms the “problem of origination”.  
If Locke’s positive method of private appropriation, whereby an individual acquires a 
prima facie exclusive claim to previously commonly held resources, is to operate one 
has to be able to identify with certainty the ideas which are to be appropriated. Attas 
argues that any ideas can be either discoveries, inventions or artistic creations. 
However, regardless of its type, no idea is created in a vacuum. All ideas arise out of the 
societal background of their time. New discoveries rely upon previous discoveries, new 
inventions incorporate previous technology, and artistic creations whether musical, 
dramatic or in the visual arts incorporate styles, patterns and concepts from previous 
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work. One cannot with any absolute certainty determine the “origination” of the idea 
from that which went before. Attas argues that within a formalised intellectual property 
system one can develop mechanisms by which one can determine (for the sake of a 
particular right) where the old ideas stop and where new ideas begin. However, for 
Attas this approach is one of convention not one of natural law.   
Attas also looks at Locke’s third proviso the negative requirement that others’ interests 
would not be harmed by appropriation (whether through the enough and as good 
requirement or the non-waste requirement). Attas’ key argument under the head of 
“non-harm to others” is in relation to what he describes as the “individuation” of ideas. 
The problem relates to defining the boundaries of what you seek to individuate. Attas 
acknowledges that there can be difficulties in defining the boundaries of a tangible 
object. Attas quotes Nozick’s question:  
“If a private astronaut clears a place on Mars, has he mixed his labor with (so that 




However, part of the problem can be addressed by the fact labour is purposive and this 
defines the extent of the object laboured upon. For Attas, however, many discoveries 
and inventions are merely serendipitous and such chance discoveries cannot be defined 
by the purpose of the inventor. Attas’ view is that defining the boundary of an idea is 
more difficult than for tangible property and can be “baffling”. 
257
  
Attas also briefly looks at questions of imitation, parody and inspiration and the 
question of where an idea ends. He is also concerned about the difference between a 
general abstract idea and the specific details that are required to put the general idea into 
practice and the question of whether such specifics are caught within the general.  
However, difficult as these questions are, most troubling for Attas is the question of 
whether ownership of an idea should extend to ownership of an identical idea even 
where such an idea is arrived at independently by a third party (as is the case with 
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patents) what Attas calls a “path-independent extension of the right in the idea”, or 
should allow for free ownership of an independently conceived idea provided there is no 
copying nexus back to the original idea (as is arguably the case with copyright), what 
Attas terms – “a path-dependent extension of the right in the idea”. 
Attas accepts that positive law can handle these types of problems making “reasoned 
and principled justifications for intellectual property in some cases and rejecting it in 
others”
258
 . As with the problem of origination, his argument is that the uncertainty 
leads one to conventional approaches based upon a consequentialist analysis, rather than 
a Lockean natural law justification.   
For Attas, the difficulty with regard to certainty and being able to draw a natural line, is 
enhanced by the “squeeze” between certainty in origination and certainty in 
individuation. He states that for clear origination you need to reject background and 
contributory influences. For clear individuation you have may need to include offshoots 
and derivatives of the ideas. The two positions are in Attas’ view contradictory (a little 
like the classic Gillette squeeze 
259
 in UK patent law between patent validity and claim 
scope mentioned above). Atta states: 
“The dual problems of origination and individuation pose a thorny problem even 
for a conventionalist account. For it appears that the more we are willing to 
recognise the owner as the originator of the idea, brushing aside inputs of 
preceding ideas, the less we are able consistently to recognise offshoots of the 
idea as within it. That is to say, the narrower we individuate the intellectual 
product. For we cannot have it both ways: that the idea owes nothing to its 
predecessors yet its successors are wholly indebted to it.”
260
 
The problems of origination and individuation are significant difficulties for the 
practical application of the Lockean account (as will be seen below when we seek to use 
it in the determination of the justifiable scope of positive rights in traditional knowledge 
                                                          
 
258
 Attas (n 48), 52 
 
259
 Gillette Safety Razor Co v Anglo-American Trading Co Ltd [1913] 30 RPR 465 
 
260




associated with genetic resources). Although Dutfield & Suthersanen are sensitive to 
these problems (stating that Locke’s theory of property might be considered as being 
“too basic and outdated” at its core) they highlight that it does at least serve to identify 
the inherent conflict which sits at the heart of an intellectual property right. They state 
that: 
“since the beginning there have been two competing stakeholders: the labourer 
(inventor, author, investor, entrepreneur) and the “commons” (which can be other 
labourers or competitors within the market or societal welfare sector such as 
health or education). 
Hence, Locke’s theory is useful in urging us to consider the need for the existence 
and maintenance of a “public domain” (as opposed to several private domains) or 
an intellectual commons (as opposed to intellectual property).” 
261
 
3.5.1.9 The Lockean model as applied to Traditional Knowledge 
How might one apply a purely Lockean model to traditional knowledge associated with 
a genetic resource? We might look in the first place to the following scenario: an 
indigenous group uncover (through serendipity or deliberate and iterative “trial and 
error” or a combination of both) a useful characteristic of a particular plant. Such 
information may have been determined within one generation or added to by 
serendipity/trial and error over a series of generations. As Hughes would apply Locke’s 
model, it is the application of “labour” the process of discovering the information 
(which previously resided in the idea Common) which would entitle the group to claim 
rights to control the information.  
Although they approach the question in relation to the creation of artistic works, 
Munzer & Raustiala 
262
 have provided perhaps a systematic (and an almost consistently 
negative) analysis of justifications of intellectual property to the question of traditional 
knowledge. They examine the justification of an intellectual property right in traditional 
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knowledge under the Lockean principle of desert based on labour. They have no 
conceptual objection to a traditional knowledge right residing in a group – for them it is 
open to groups to obtain rights based on a joint contribution. However, they identify a 
problem with a right in traditional knowledge: the original “investigators/creators” are 
“by definition” dead. They question whether (even if such originators were entitled to 
rights commensurate with their labour) it is correct that the originator’s “desert” should 
extend to their distant descendants or unrelated inhabitants of a region who have 
subsequently come to know of the knowledge. Surprisingly, they do not seek to apply 
(or criticise) Nozick’s neo-Lockean entitlement theory approach
263
 that where property 
has been justly acquired (appropriated from the Common) in the past (and where 
subsequent transfers are just) then the claim of title to the property in the present can be 
justified.  
At this point Munzer & Raustiala also consider that where the indigenous group have 
endeavoured to keep a piece of traditional knowledge secret that the group should have 
a right to control access to that information and bring an action for misappropriation for 
a breach of confidentiality but give no real reason why or indeed how such reasoning 
fits into an analysis of a Lockean justification for rights in traditional knowledge. 
Munzer & Raustiala examine the Lockean justification further under the concept of 
“firstness”. They state that firstness, (being the first to make, obtain or occupy the 
property) does not, of itself, provide a strong general or specific justification for 
property rights but does provide a particular justification where “disputes over desert or 
incentives prove very difficult or costly on other grounds”.
264
  
Munzer & Raustiala briefly examine the Lockean case for intellectual property. Munzer 
& Raustiala conclude (without any strong justification) that provided one looks at the 
Lockean Common of future ideas as one which is an “open-access common” rather than 
one in which the idea resources are owned in common, then a firstness argument may 
have merit.  
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Notwithstanding this, Munzer & Raustiala’s principal difficulty with the firstness 
argument is similar to that raised by them in relation to labour desert. Even if firstness 
matters, the current holders of the traditional knowledge were not in fact the first to 
make the discovery (or to individualise the idea out the Common to use the Lockean 
analogy) and Munzer & Raustiala do not see why the descendants should be entitled to 
a right which may be justified only to their remote ancestors. Again, surprisingly, they 
do not seek to apply or criticise Nozick’s just entitlement approach. 
Munzer & Raustiala imagine a situation in which traditional knowledge rights are 
asserted in a centuries old traditional dance and look at the incremental changes in that 
dance with time. Their analysis is as follows: 
i) Perhaps the “originators” of the dance in fact borrowed elements from other long 
lost dances of their ancestors or from other groups. We cannot know; 
ii) Looking at incremental changes may give separate “layered” rights to the 
individual increments, but not to the entirety of the dance; and 
iii) Enquiries into firstness would likely be very fact specific and in fact entirely 
indeterminate in the absence of written records.  
Can such an argument be flawed because it is actually a trans-temporal “group” which 
has progressively developed the dance and it is this “group” which can lay claim to the 
traditional rights rather than the membership of that group from time to time? Whist 
Munzer & Raustiala accept that such a claim may weaken their “remote descendant” 
critique (but do not say why), they revert back to the argument that firstness does not, in 
any case, provide a justification for specific or particular intellectual property rights. 
They also add that the trans- temporal group claim requires an indefinite duration of the 
right in the dance to allow the bundle of rights in the dance to develop and amalgamate. 
However, they believe this is counter to the need to balance private property rights 
against the public interest (which has driven the development of limited durations for 
intellectual property rights) but give no philosophical rationale for why traditional 
knowledge should, or should not, be time limited. 
Munzer & Raustiala’s concern about the difficulty in identifying the source of the 
traditional knowledge right seems to echo Attas’ broader concern about the problem of 
121 
 
origination (and the problem of individuation). However, is their problem actually a 
sub-category of Attas’ broader philosophical concern? Munzer & Raustiala’s concern 
appears predominantly to be in relation to the practical evidential problems envisaged in 
finding the source of the information – there is an argument that their concern would be 
met if substantial written evidence were for whatever reason available. 
Although they do not mention it, Munzer & Raustiala’s observation of the potential 
complexity seen in determining the origin and scope of a particular piece of knowledge 
does seem to provide further evidence in support of Attas’ argument that it is hard to see 
a natural law justification for intellectual property rights in general.  
It would also suggest that Attas’ reasoning can comfortably be extended to a traditional 
knowledge right (which Attas himself did not address) and may suggest that traditional 
knowledge (particularly where the information is of a trans-generational and/or of an 
inseparably amalgamated nature) is an area in which the problems of origination and 
individuation can be particularly difficult – not unlike questions of jointly originated 
artistic works.  
3.5.2 Personality-based Justifications for Intellectual Property 
Broadly speaking there are three related arguments under this head. The first is Kant’s 
limited, but interesting, arguments against pirated books based on “authorial 
personality”. The second is based on Fichte’s ideas of rights based on personality. The 
third is based on Hegel’s broad metaphysical system. Each will be dealt with in turn. 
3.5.3 The Kantian Justification 
3.5.3.1 Kant on property ownership 
As we have seen, the Lockean-desert account for intellectual property rights relies upon 
an extension of Locke’s original views relating to the first ownership of a piece of 
tangible property (land or the produce of land) into claims to ownership over a portion 
of the supposed terra nullius of “as yet to be had ideas”. This account is grounded in 
Locke’s key principle of self-ownership, a self-ownership which serves as the fount of 
ownership of things extrinsic to the self.  
122 
 
Kant’s justification of ownership of property, though similarly deontological, is founded 
on a radically different basis – namely the individual’s innate right to freedom. For 
Kant, the right to ownership of property in things is not an inherent natural law right, 
but is merely derivative upon a person’s inherent right to control his affairs.
265, 266,  267 
Accordingly, in his Metaphysics of Morals of 1797, Kant defines property in this way: 
“...that is rightfully mine...with which I am so connected that another's use of it 
without my consent would wrong me.” 268  
The most direct way in which a person can be connected with something is by physical 
possession, what Kant describes as “sensible” possession. However, if free beings are to 
be able to realize their inherent freedom by using objects for their freely chosen 
purposes one cannot require that they retain physical possession of them at all times. So 
for Kant:  
“...something external would be mine only if I may assume that I would be 
wronged by another even though I am not in possession of it.” 269  
- mere physical possession is not, of itself, sufficient to create ownership of an object. 
The possession required to give effect to individual freedom is “intelligible possession” 
where the owner is deprived by the action of a third party on the owner’s property even 
if the property is spatially separate from the owner and even if the owner is unaware of 
the actions of the third party.  
Of course, having intelligible possession of a particular object requires all other free 
beings to respect that possession and refrain from using that object. The unilateral 
declaration of intelligible possession would impact on the freedom of others and 
                                                          
 
265




 Allen D Rosen, Kant’s Theory of Justice (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1993), 19 
 
267
 Allen W Wood, Kantian Ethics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 2008), 197 
 
268
 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals (1797) 6.245 (in Mary J Gregor (translator & ed) 
Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1996), 401 
 
269




interfere with the universality of the right to freedom. However, universality can be 
maintained if all free beings agree to respect other’s claims to intelligible possession. 
The mutual obligation to respect property rights can only exist within a society – a civil 
condition - which provides a mechanism to acknowledge and police such ownership and 
to determine competing claims. Indeed, for Kant, the creation of a condition in which 
the property is respected and protected is one of the reasons why free individuals are 
obligated to work towards the achievement of a civil state.   
So far the theory addresses how existing claims to ownership are respected. How, 
though, are initial claims to ownership treated? In Chapter 2 of the Metaphysics of 
Morals
270
 Kant describes a stepwise process by which an object comes into the 
ownership of an individual through original acquisition. It is a process consistent with 
his categorisation of sensible and intelligible possession: 
i) Apprehension of an object which belongs to no one (otherwise it would conflict 
with another’s freedom in accordance with universal laws). This apprehension is taking 
possession of the object in space and time – possessio phaenomenon; followed by 
ii) Giving a sign (declaratio) of your possession of this object and of your intention 
to exclude everyone else from it; followed by 
iii) Appropriation (appropriatio) – as the act of the general will of the community 




Empirical possession requires priority in time relative to anyone else who seeks 
possession of it and originality requires a unilateral choice to acquire. 
Under this principle where one has a terra nullius of land the individual is free to seek 
to acquire land. However, this initial acquisition – what Kant refers to as “taking 
control” or occupatio - gives rise only to a “provisional” ownership which requires 
confirmation by the consent of others. Obtaining provisional ownership requires that the 
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acquirer give a signal to the world at large that a claim is being made – be it a “keep 
out” sign or a fence. Crucially, however, the provisional acquirer has to have the 
physical capacity to keep control of the land against others. The turning of provisional 
ownership into a finalised ownership requires broad consensus that you own the 
property – indeed it is only once all have consented to your ownership that it becomes 
truly valid. To reach this stage requires “negotiation” with others supervised and policed 
by those in authority within society. Kant is unclear as to the exact process for resolving 
conflict over disputed claims, but is clear that the parties have a duty to arrive at 
settlements which tend to secure a fully civil condition for society. Alongside this, 




3.5.3.2 Kant and Intellectual Property 
Can this philosophy of ownership be extended to ownership over intangibles such as 
ideas? There is a glaring problem. The key to Kant’s occupatio phase of acquisition is 
that the prospective owner must have the wherewithal to physically defend his 
acquisition against all comers. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter tangible 
objects whether it be land (or the fruit of that land) are rivalrous and physically 
excludable. Intangible things, such as ideas, are just the opposite – in the absence of a 
formal mechanism securing protection - they are non-rivalrous and non-excludable. No 
physical mechanism of acquisition or defence is possible.  
As we have seen Locke’s natural right theory is arguably amenable to a logical leap into 
the realm of the terra nullius of “as yet to be had” ideas – it does not rely on physical 
defence of the acquired property. In contrast, the extension of Kant’s occupatio into this 
sphere is significantly more problematic. Kant himself states that: 
“Original acquisition of an external object of choice is called taking control of it 
(occupatio), and only corporeal things (substances) can be acquired originally”273 
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Indeed, there is further evidence that Kant would never have intended such an extension 
of his account for the acquisition of property into the realm of intangibles.
274
 In 1785, 
Kant published his essay Of the injustice of Counterfeiting Books in which he proposed 
a sui generis right of “authorial” personality. According to Pievatolo,
275
 Kant saw this 
authorial right as a ius personale (a right to compel others to do things) rather than an 
invention of a new ius reale (right in property). In doing so, Kant saw himself as 
following the Roman law tradition in which only tangible objects – res quae tangi 
possunt – are amenable to ownership.  
As Dutfield and Suthersanen highlight, 
276
 at the time of Kant’s writing Of the injustice 
of Counterfeiting Books, the Holy Roman Empire
277
 was a complex mosaic of 
independent states. With no consistent overarching law controlling the printing and 
selling of books the situation was rife for trade across the Empire in pirated books. Kant 
was seeking a justifiable mechanism for preventing this piratic trade. Kant divided a 
book into three theoretical elements: 
i)            a mere physical commodity – bound pages with writing on;  
ii) as a means for conveying thoughts; and 
iii) as a “speech” 
In relation to i) when the purchaser purchases a book she purchases that book and owns 
that object and may dispose of it as she wishes. However, save for lighting fires and 
propping up tables, that book has little value without the input of the author. In relation 
to ii) reprinting of books cannot prevent the original author from conceiving her 
thoughts – ideas cannot be stolen as they are not property. 278  Accordingly neither 
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element i) nor element ii) will give a right to prevent reprinting of books. Indeed, as ius 
reale can only apply to things and not to ideas, the purchaser of a book may reproduce 
the work for themselves as they are merely doing something with their private property.   
To find a justification for preventing commercial reprinting Kant has to invoke a 
separate, ius personale, mechanism. Accordingly, Kant sees a book as a “speech” or an 
“action” by the author – an opera – which in 1785 could only be conveyed to a wider 
audience through the medium of the book. As Dutfield & Suthersanen put it:  
“To Kant, the author retains the opera or speech. It is not a commodity to be sold 
and bought. The book as opus is merely the mute instrument which holds the book 
as opera.” 279 
Why should this focus on the concept of a book as speech matter? Pievatolo puts it thus: 
“To speak in the name of another without his authorization is like engaging in a 
relationship with another without his consent. As personal rights, according to 
Kant, concern relations among free beings, they can arise only from expressed 
agreements. Hence the unauthorised printer is like the unauthorized spokesperson, 
who produces a relation to the author with the public without being entitled to do 
it.” 280 
Clearly Kant in some respects anticipates the ideas of modern copyright in that there is a 
concept of a right in the work which sits separately from the vessel in which the work 
resides (be it a book, magnetic tape or digital format). However, his idea of opera in a 
work is not, as we have seen, a property right. It is arguably a good deal closer to the 
concept of a moral right in a work, but it is more than a right to attribution or a right to 
prevent derogative treatment. Neither, however, does it include a right to prevent 
creation of derivative works (perhaps as it cannot interfere with the creation of ideas). 
Kant’s concept of opera is narrow and does not extend to other art forms.281 In many 
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respects Kant’s thinking in relation to the rights of the publisher bears a closer similarity 
to the concept of unfair competition than to copyright per se.  
For Pievatolo, Kant’s deliberately narrow approach to controlling piracy is consistent 
with his overall philosophy. She concludes her paper 282 by stating that Kant sticks to 
the Roman Law tradition (that ius reale cannot apply to intangibles) not because of 
conservatism, but because of Enlightenment - liberty of speech is an important part of 
the innate right of freedom and cannot be suppressed without suppressing freedom 
itself. 
3.5.3.3 Kant and traditional knowledge 
To what extent can Kant’s ideas on the protection of property, and his limited right to 
authorial personality, assist with the question of the justification for a right to veto use 
of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources?   
Kant’s theory of acquisition of property expressly excludes ownership in intangibles - 
an exclusion which is consistent with his concept of a narrow scope of protection 
offered by a right to authorial personality. Any attempt at application of Kant’s account 
for property to the present question requires us to go back to first principles. Traditional 
knowledge, even traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, and even 
knowledge with the most practical of applications, remains a body of intangible ideas. 
According to Kant there can be no ownership in ideas.  
We might seek to suggest that indigenous peoples have through the use of secrecy, 
social structure and of taboos, sought to exclude third parties from appropriating a 
particular piece of knowledge and in so doing placed a clear declaratio to the world that 
the information was theirs and that they thereby sought to derive “provisional” 
ownership over the information. However, since no possessio phaenomenon is possible 
in respect of an intangible, any attempt to seek such provisional ownership must fail. 
Notwithstanding this failure, can we seek to apply Kant’s concept of “authorial 
personality” to the question? Authorial personality as described in On the injustice of 
Counterfeiting Books is, as we have seen, deliberately limited. It will not create any sort 
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of property in ideas. However, it does argue that anyone who seeks to act as a 
“spokesperson” for an author will require their consent to do so. In On the injustice of 
Counterfeiting Books it is the reprinting of a book – the “retelling” as it were of the 
opera inherent in the original book (without the consent of the author) that is amoral, 
since it creates a relationship between the author and the publisher without the author’s 
consent.  
Can we say that a group of indigenous peoples are in a sense an author? The Kantian 
authorial personality account is strongly reliant on the innate freedom of the individual. 
No matter how close knit, it might be difficult to describe a group of indigenous people 
as a single individual. Of course, the closer knit, and less dispersed the group, the closer 
they may approximate to an individual. However, there will be a continuum of 
closeness of relationships across varying indigenous groups and it is impossible to say 
with any certainty what the requisite “closeness” to create an authorial identity should 
be.  
Even if, for the sake of argument, we assume that a close knit indigenous group can 
have the requisite authorial personality, does unauthorised use of the information 
created by the group within a pharmaceutical research process constitute an 
unauthorised “retelling” of the opera - the “speech” of the indigenous group in the 
information? It is hard to say whether a piece of information can be considered a 
“speech” as such. On the one hand, Kant does not provide us with a de minimis 
definition below which the subject matter of a book is in some way unworthy of being a 
speech. On the other hand, it is hard to envisage that the oral divulgement of a piece of 
information by one or more members of an indigenous group to (say) an ethnobotanist, 
constitutes authorial “speech” in the way that Kant envisaged.  
Assuming, again for the sake of argument, that misuse of a piece of information does 
constitute unauthorised “retelling” of the speech within the information, we need to 
remind ourselves that the mischief which Kant sought address relied upon the presence 
of two (or more) competing publishers, one authorised, the other not. We need also to 
note that Kant’s proposed solution was that the unauthorised publisher would pay 
damages to the authorised publisher. Kant does not propose any form of injunction 
preventing the unauthorised publisher from publishing (enforceable by the author or the 
rightful publisher). Such an approach would seem consistent with Kant’s view that 
129 
 
property rights (giving the right to exclusive use) cannot exist in intangibles. His 
solution, though compensating the rightful publisher, still allows the ideas within the 
work to continue to be disseminated.  
Following Kant’s approach “authorial personality” approach closely (and for the 
moment accepting the many assumptions made above), it might appear that if the 
indigenous group were to give consent to one pharmaceutical company to utilise a piece 
of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, the group would not have a 
power of veto over unauthorised use by a second pharmaceutical company, but the 
authorised user may have a right of compensation from the unauthorised user.  
Do we, though, need these competing “publishers” for Kant’s approach to apply? Is 
there some broader principle within Kant’s approach which will allow us to examine 
misuse in the absence of an authorised “publisher”/user? As discussed above, Kant’s 
theoretical basis for the right to authorial personality relies upon the innate freedom of 
the individual to enter into relationships only with consent and the “relationship” with 
the unauthorised publisher is created by the unauthorised publisher without the author’s 
consent. Kant himself makes a “universal observation”
283
 which includes reference to 
the relationship between the author and his editor. He states: 
“...the editor transacts his business of editor not merely in his own name, but in 
the name of another (namely the author) and without consent cannot transact [it] 
at all.”284 
This highlights the importance which is seen throughout the essay on the “name” of the 
author (which is of course closely linked to the personality of the author). Later in his 
universal observation, Kant clearly expresses that works of art may be imitated and are 
to be seen as distinct from the written word as they are not the “speech” of a named 
author: 
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“But the writing of another is the speech of a person (opera); and whoever 
publishes it can speak to the public only in the name of this other, and say nothing 
more of himself than that the author makes the following speech to the public 
through him.”285  
Crucially Kant allows the production of derivative works as they are no longer the 
speech of the original author: 
“When one in the meantime alters (abridges or augments or retouches) the book 
of another, so that it would now be wrong even to give it out under the name of 
the author of the original; then the retouching in the proper name of the publisher 
is no counterfeit, and therefore not prohibited. For here another author transacts 
through his editor another business than the first, and consequently seizes this in 
his business with the public not a bit; he represents not that author, as speaking 
through him, but another. Likewise, the translation into another language cannot 
be held to be a counterfeit; for it is not the same speech of the author, though the 
thoughts may be exactly the same.” 
The right envisaged by Kant therefore seems to sit more closely to a right to protect of 
goodwill and reputation than one which controls ideas. As is stated above, it is in many 
ways a form of unfair competition provision in favour of named authors.  
Can we apply this general principle to our indigenous group holding traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources? Even assuming a sufficient degree of 
closeness such that the group can be considered an “author”, the information they hold 
seems much closer to mere information than to Kant’s “speech”. Downstream use of 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources is very likely to be divorced 
from the “name” of the indigenous group and in any event much will be akin to the 
derivative works which according to Kant’s account are free to use. 
To conclude, attempting to “shoehorn” the Kantian concept of authorial personality into 
service as a justification for protecting traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources is fraught with difficulties. In fact, the clearest message that we get from 
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Kant’s theory of property, which is consistent with his concept for authorial personality, 
is that ideas cannot ever be prevented from being used. Even Kant’s remedy for breach 
of authorial personality was compensatory rather than a right to veto use. Kant’s 
approach therefore appears to militate against any right veto on the non-consensual use 
of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources.  
3.5.4  The Fichtean Justification 
3.5.4 .1 Fichte and Intellectual Property 
Johan Gottlieb Fichte outlines his justification for the protection of intellectual property 
in his essay The Illegality of the Unauthorised Reprinting of Books, published in 1793 
286
 (eight years after the publishing of Kant’s Of the injustice of Counterfeiting Books). 
Fichte’s philosophy broadly follows that of Kant, in being based on the inherent 
freedom of the individual. However, in looking at the protection of authors he arrives at 
a somewhat different outcome.
287 , 288
 As we have seen, Kant’s justification for 
preventing the unauthorised reprinting of books is based on the relationship between the 
author and the public (and publishers), and the concept that a book incorporates the 
“speech” of the author. Unlike Kant, who rejects outright the idea, Fichte accepts that 
there can be some ownership of intangibles. For Fichte a book consists of the physical, 
tangible elements (paper, bindings &c.) with which a purchaser of the book can do as 
she likes, and separate “non-physical” elements.  
These non-tangible elements can be divided into the following: 
i)            the ideas in the book (the “material” or “content”); and 
ii) the expression of the ideas (the “form”). 
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In relation to the ideas in a book, Fichte believed that once ideas are published by an 
author they are placed into the public domain. Mayeda
289
 gives two reasons why Fichte 
believed this should be the case: 
a) the acquisition of ideas entails no interference with the thoughts or physical 
person of the author; and 
b) in producing a work for public consumption, the author must have wished to 
communicate the ideas and share them with others. 
In marked contrast with this position in relation to ideas, Mayeda goes on to explain that 
in Fichte’s account; 
“The right to appropriate and use the form in which the ideas are expressed is not 
transferred to the purchaser. The form of expression is a creation of the author; it 
is a unique expression of her personality. It follows that any use or appropriation 
of form entails a violation of the personality of the author.”290 
This marked divide in the treatment of an idea per se and the form in which the idea is 
expressed would appear to foreshadow modern copyright law.  
3.5.4 .2 Fichte and traditional knowledge 
Can we apply Fichte’s concept of protection of expression to an indigenous group 
holding traditional knowledge associated with traditional knowledge? Again we have 
got a significant problem (as we had with Kant’s approach) in apportioning a 
personality to a group. However, even assuming a sufficient degree of closeness such 
that the group can be considered an “author” for these purposes, we must stress that the 
traditional knowledge held by the group is much closer to being an idea per se than to 
an expression of that idea.  
As we have seen, Fichte does not have an objection to the protection of ideas based on 
any inherent difficulty with “owning” an intangible (as was the case with Kant) - his 
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exclusion of ideas per se is, to some degree, based on the intention of the author to share 
her ideas with the world. In relation to traditional knowledge held by an indigenous 
group, the question of whether they are seeking/have sought to share such knowledge 
will depend on the circumstances in which the information is divulged. However, the 
difficulty with the protection of ideas per se within Fichte’s account is inherent within 
the way he sees authors connecting with ideas – it is the way in which ideas and their 
connections are communicated to others through words and mental images – how there 
are expressed - which are unique to the author and which give rise to the personality 
right.  
To the extent that the traditional information is held in some form which embodies a 
group expression of the idea, that expression could fall within the ambit of Fichte’s right 
based on personality. However, any downstream use of the information within drug 
discovery is very unlikely to be using any particular “form” in which the information is 
originally held. Any form will likely to have been jettisoned early within the passage of 
the traditional knowledge through the research process and downstream use will likely 
be use of pure information, e.g. “plant A is useful for treating disease X”. It is difficult 
to see how such pure information could be the subject of Fichte’s right protection 
expression. Accordingly Fichte’s approach (as did Kant’s) militates against any right of 
veto over the non-consensual use of traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources.  
3.5.5  The Hegelian Justification  
3.5.5.1 The Hegelian Justification for Property  
Hegel’s Elements of the Philosophy of Right (Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts) 
was published in Berlin in 1821.  This includes his discussion of the role of and 
justification for property rights.  
Hegel’s broader philosophy has attracted substantial criticism. Warburton summarises 
many views thus: 
“That question “What does it mean?” is one that readers of Hegel’s work ask 
themselves a lot. His writing is fiendishly difficult, partly because, like Kant’s, it 
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is mostly expressed in very abstract language and often used terms that he has 
himself invented. No one, perhaps not even Hegel, has understood all of it.”291  
and  
“...Hegel irritated many philosophers. Some philosophers even treated his work as 
an example of the risk of using terms imprecisely. Bertrand Russell came to 
despise it, and A.J. Ayer declared that most of Hegel’s sentences expressed 
nothing at all. For Ayer, Hegel’s writing was no more informative than nonsense 
verse and considerably less appealing.”292  
However, Russell states that: 
“Even if (as I myself believe) almost all Hegel’s doctrines are false, he still retains 
an importance which is not merely historical, as the best representative of a 
certain kind of philosophy which, in others, is less coherent and less 
comprehensive.” 293 
Hughes 294  states that Hegel’s justification for property are rooted in his general 
philosophy – the individual’s will is at the core of an individual’s existence and is 
constantly seeking actuality (Wirklichkeit) and effectiveness in the world. Personality is 
related to the will’s struggle to actualise itself, and a person must translate his freedom 
into an external sphere in order to exist as an “Idea”. Dutfield & Suthersanen summarise 
the property theory thus: 
“Hegel declared that property is the initial and final embodiment of freedom and 
individuality. Indeed, to fail to have a sphere of property in one’s own life is to 
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fail to attain self-conscious knowledge of oneself as a free person. To achieve a 
personality, and to be a person, an individual must control his external and 
internal environment and control his resources. Once again, control (as well as 
actualisation of one’s will) is best achieved by a set of property rights.”295 
For Hughes296 assertion of the self alone is not sufficient to create a property right, any 
claim to property must be acknowledged and approved. Through such acceptance, the 
will’s possession of an object (through “occupation” or “embodiment”) becomes 
property.  Hughes believes that although Hegel seems to support a “first possession” or 
labour theory, this is not what Hegel means by “occupation”. Although the will can only 
occupy something which is a virgin object (or something which has been abandoned) 
this first occupation is, in itself, insufficient. A property right is only retained so long as 
the will in some way manifests itself in the object; The will must continue to want the 
object and is required to continually reaffirm this desire. Accordingly, the property right 
can be lost through a failure to reaffirm, or by active withdrawal. Hughes states that 
although application of “labour” to an object may denote occupation it is not a 
necessary prerequisite – one may equally manifest will in a natural object to which one 
has become emotionally attached.  Hughes further states that use of an object is not a 
requirement for occupation. He also states that marking or imposing a form on an object 
or keeping the object in close spatio-temporal proximity to an individual can all be 
helpful indicia of the individual’s will, but again these are not requirements for 
occupation.  Similarly abandonment of an object depends on the will’s desire to possess 
an object, and does not require external indicia.  
3.5.5.2 The Hegelian Justification for Intellectual Property  
The application of Locke’s property theory to the field of intellectual property requires 
something of a theoretical stretch with the imagining of a “Common” of putative ideas 
and the acquisition of parts of that Common through the application of labour. Although 
Hegel’s concept of property is perhaps not as intuitively easy to grasp as Locke’s, its 
application to the realm of intellectual property (particularly in artistic works) arguably 
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requires something less of an intellectual stretch.  In fact, as Hughes states297 for Hegel 
intellectual property does not need to be justified by analogy to physical property and 
indeed, for Hughes, the analogy to physical property distorts the Hegelian relation 
between personality, mental traits and the will.   
Hegel identifies that people may be hesitant to call intellectual attainments which are 
created by the mind “things”. However, in Paragraph 68 of his Elements of the 
Philosophy of Right, Hegel outlines why intellectual property rights should exist. The 
paragraph is instructive, particularly in the way in which it appreciates the non-rivalrous 
nature of intangible intellectual products: 
“The distinctive quality of intellectual production may, by virtue of the way in 
which it is expressed, be immediately transformed into the external quality of a 
thing, which may then in turn be produced by others. In acquiring it, the new 
owner may thus appropriate the thoughts which it communicates or the technical 
invention which it embodies, and it is this possibility which at times (as with 
literary works) constitutes the sole purpose of such things and their value as 
acquisitions; in addition, the new owner at the same time comes into possession of 
the universal ways and means of so expressing himself and of producing a 
multiplicity of such things.” 
298
 
Hegel notes that the creation of such proprietorship is not “without utility”: 
“The purely negative, but most basic, means of furthering the sciences and arts is 
to protect those who work in them against theft and to provide them, with security 
for their property, just as the earliest and most important means of furthering 
commerce and industry was to protect them against highway robbery.” 
299
 
The Hegelian justification for property and intellectual property rights has been subject 
to criticism. Firstly, we have to appreciate that Hegel was seeking to develop an entire 
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(and distinct) metaphysical system and one arguably needs to be careful not to use 
elements of his philosophy in a “pick-and-mix” manner outwith the context of his 
metaphysic system of the self.  Indeed, Harris states that:  
“Some Hegelian apologists regard it as an impertinence to seek to quarry justice 
reasons at all from Hegel’s writings. Hegel’s aim was to reveal the working out of 
World Spirit through the march of history. Steps in this process should only be 
analysed from within his metaphysical structure.” 300 
However, even assuming that Hegel’s overall metaphysical system is not flawed, and 
that elements are not taken out of context, commentators have identified particular 
difficulties within the Hegelian property theory as it specifically applies to intellectual 
property. There are two key points: the question of alienation of the self and the 
question of what type subject matter is actually covered by Hegel’s concept of 
intellectual property. 
Alienation 
Whereas Hegel believes that one can alienate most “real” property when one no longer 
wishes to occupy it, one of the basic tenets that underlie his philosophy is that one 





and Dutfield & Suthersanen
303
 identify Hegel’s concern in relation to whether this 
inalienability can be applied to intellectual products: does the giving away (or selling) 
of an item which embodies the expression of an idea act as an alienation of the 
ownership of that expression?  
For Dutfield & Suthersanen, 304  the “crux” of  Hegel’s justification for intellectual 
property is given in Paragraph 69 of his Elements of the Philosophy of Right: 
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 “Since the person who acquires such a product
305
 possesses its entire use and 
value if he owns a single copy of it, he is the complete and free owner of it as an 
individual item. But the author of the book or the inventor of the technical device 
remains the owner of the universal ways and means of reproducing such products 
and things, for he has not immediately alienated these universal ways and means 




Here Hegel identifies one of the crucial characteristics of most intellectual property 
(with the exception perhaps of droit de suite or artists’ resale rights) namely that the 
right exists separately from a particular thing incorporating the right. Here also perhaps 
can be seen the beginning of the doctrine of exhaustion of rights (or first sale doctrine), 
namely that in selling a particular item incorporating the right the owner of the right can 
only control the initial sale, but not subsequent sales. 
Subject Matter 
What type of intangible intellectual product is the subject matter of Hegel’ extension of 
the personality? We saw above that neither Fichte, nor Kant, gave justifications for the 
control of information as information per se. Paragraph 68 of Hegel’s Elements of the 
Philosophy of Right (set out above) appears to have a focus on the “expression” of an 
individual as the basis for the existence of the right.  
As Hughes highlights there exists a spectrum of intellectual products that demonstrate 
varying degrees of personality of the author of the work: from (at one end) works of art 
which arguably contain a substantial embodiment of the author’s personality, through to 




Hughes posits that the higher the degree of technical constraint within an object or 
problem, the less opportunity there is for personal expression. Generally speaking an 
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artist is constrained only by her materials and her opportunity for expression is 
accordingly very large.  Hughes believes that at some point the technical constraints 
will become so large that any meaningful expression of the personality is impossible. 
He stresses, however, that even creation of a highly technical intellectual product may 
still provide some limited mode of expression of the personality of the creator – there 
may be many ways to achieve a similar technical end but the creator can choose 
between them, and in doing so expresses her personality. In addition, a creator may 
become known for a particular solution, even if that solution style is acknowledged only 
within a small coterie.  
Hughes points out that this analysis refers only to one variety of expression, namely one 
in which the intellectual work becomes the conduit for the expression personality. He 
points out that another potential Hegelian property claim exists where the creator claims 
the property in order to create (rather than express) a particular persona. Hughes 
believes such a claim has limits – one cannot simply seek to be associated with a thing 
without there being some internal connection. He points out that it is true that certain 
inventors become associated with their inventions (Hughes refers to Doppler, Edison 
and Bell but there are, of course, many others). However, those relationships arise in 
time as a result of the invention, not necessarily due to an initial assertion of 
personality. 
Although his writing is far from clear, Hegel himself seems to give guidance (within 
Paragraph 69) that his concept of property in intangible concepts should extend only to 
the control of ideas which are embodied in a particularly form. He accepts that those 
who are made aware of an idea may themselves be entitled to rights where that idea is 
put into a new form:    
“Besides, the destiny of a product of the intellect is to be apprehended by other 
individuals and appropriated by their representational thinking, memory, thought, 
etc. Hence the mode of expression whereby these individuals in turn make what 
they have learned ... into an alienable thing will always tend to have some 
140 
 
distinctive form, so that they can regard the resources which flow from it as their 
property, and may assert their right to reproduce it.”
308
  
Although the point is by no means clear, it would appear that Hegel’s concept of 
intellectual property (though covering the physical embodiment of technical concepts) 
follows the thinking of Fichte and Kant in not extending to the protection of ideas per 
se.      
3.5.5.3 Hegel and traditional knowledge 
How can we apply Hegel’s justification for intellectual property to an indigenous group 
holding traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources?  
Munzer & Raustiala do not formally address a Hegelian personality-based justifications 
for a right in traditional knowledge. However, they do approach the issue under the head 
“Moral Right of the Community”.
309
  
They consider the question of whether a “moral right” of an indigenous community in 
relation to a piece of traditional knowledge should give rise to an intellectual property 
right in that knowledge. They state that  the concept of moral right (or rights) as arising 
in the civil law tradition and point to the French droit moral and German 
Urheberpersönlichkeitsrecht (“originator’s personality right”) as examples. They state 
that although the rationale for such rights is disputed, most often its basis is said to be 
the idea of personality or personhood developed by Kant, Fichte and Hegel. They also 
highlight that these rights, which include a right of attribution and a right to prevent 
derogatory treatment of a work, are essentially non-economic in nature.  
Munzer & Raustiala  believe that for such moral rights to apply to an indigenous group 
one would have to envisage that that group acted together as an “author” since it is the 
personality (or personhood) of the author which is central to the idea of a moral right. 
They accordingly ask: 
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“In what sense if any could a community have a “personality”? In what sense if 
any could one ascribe “personhood” to a community? Stereotypes are to be 
resisted, in part because they subsume all members of a group under one image. 
We do not say that these questions lack a non-stereotypical answers. However, 
we fail to see a clear path to satisfactory answers.”
310
 
They ask whether the moral right of the community may potentially form the basis of a 
sui generis right of indefinite duration because: 
a) citing Tsosie311, as indigenous peoples face a special threat to their culture they 
should have a right to control “who can tell their stories and who can use their 
designs and symbols”; and 
 
b) since the actual creator and the moment of creation (or fixation) of the 
traditional knowledge cannot be determined no other form of intellectual 
property could be available. 
 
Munzer & Raustiala argue against such a justification.  The moral right argument is 
strongest for them if one can assume that the indigenous people who are claiming the 
right approximate as closely as possible to a single “personality”, for example they lived 
in a tight-knit group in one location and their language, culture and practices remain 
virtually constant. Although they accept that this may exceptionally be the case, they 
argue that in the great majority of situations this situation is disrupted by migration of 
individuals (in and out), intermarriage of individuals from other linguistic/cultural 
groups, and the adoption of external cultural ideas and practices, a process they describe 
as cultural “hybridization” or “blending”. Whilst stating that such hybridisation is in 
general a “good thing” they note that it provides a problem for a traditional knowledge 
based on group personality: 
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 “across the span of history, every cultural group has possessed [traditional 
knowledge]...This raises the question why indigenous people’s [traditional 
knowledge] ought to receive protection that other group’s knowledge lacks”.
312
   
They further argue that although it might be logically consistent to extend indefinite, 
group-related protection to all folklore (wherever it may be found) this would be 
disproportionate. Munzer & Raustiala believe that a proportionate response, based on 
moral right, would be: 
a) divulgation the right to make an item of their traditional knowledge known to 
the world and in this respect “public” but to retain the power to keep that item 
from being used in any way by others – and therefore out of the public domain 
in a different respect; and  
 
b) attribution: the right to prevent attribution of the knowledge to any other group. 
 
Given Munzer & Raustiala’s general opposition to a sui generis positive right in 
traditional knowledge, on other grounds, this does appear to be a major concession. In 
fact, their “divulgation” right looks very close to a positive right in all but name. It is 
strange that they support this because, by their own argument, there remain significant 
problems to attributing a Hegelian (or Kantian, or Fichtean) personality to an 
indigenous group both in terms of the containment of its membership and in temporal 
aspects (when is the personality meant to exist – when the traditional knowledge was 
developed or evolved or “fixed” by contact with the West?).  
Although, the closer knit the body holding the knowledge arguably the stronger a 
personality basis for an intellectual property right in such knowledge, we need to note 
that (as Oguamanam
313
 stresses) the ways in which such knowledge is held is in no way 
uniform. Oguamanam cites Drahos who states: 
“Indigenous peoples have perhaps evolved more complex structures for access 
and use of knowledge than western communities...Some knowledge may be open 
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to all (including non-indigenous people) to use...some knowledge may be open to 
all clan members to use...while other knowledge may only be available to the 




Oguamanam also points to the work of Gupta
315
 who highlights that fact that 
contribution of indigenous community members to innovation and conservation will not 
be equal. 
The problem in apportioning a personality to a group is clearly difficult. However, even 
if we can assume within a particular situation that there is a sufficient degree of 
closeness such that the group can be considered an “author” for the purposes of 
justifying a Hegelian (or Kantian or Fichtean) personality right there is a greater 
problem.  
As was identified above, traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources is 
much closer to being information per se.  There seems no reason then to suggest that 
Hegel’s justification should not encounter the same difficulties as seen with the 
application of Fichte’s justification. If the basis for a right is based upon expression of 
an idea, that justification will fail to support a justification for a right in information per 
se. Accordingly, for this author, Hegel’s approach (as did Kant’s and Fichte’s) militates 
against any right of veto on the non-consensual use of traditional knowledge associated 
with genetic resources where such knowledge is an idea rather than the expression of an 
idea. 
Although he does not address the philosophies of Kant, Fichte or Hegel, it is interesting 
to note that Taubman
316
 envisages that traditional communities can have a “collective” 
personality. For Taubman:  
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“The right of personality includes the entitlement to choose what face is presented 
to the public, unless the public interest trumps private interests; it is a right not to 
have a public personality imposed upon one, but to retain control over one’s 
public identity. In a parallel manner, indigenous communities claim control over 
their collective cultural persona as a form of self determination. ...protection of a 
community’s collectively held [traditional knowledge] and [traditional cultural 
expressions] does not mean simply closing off links with other cultural 
communities or the commercial domain, but about choosing what aspects of the 
collective identity may be used and disseminated beyond the community, and on 
what terms—including the recognition of customary law constraints on the use of 
elements of a community’s cultural identity.”317 
 
For Milius, however, there are some difficulties with this account: 
 
“One of the conceptual problems with such a move is that the essence of 
distinctive characters is their identifiable variable for personhood, and combining 
a large number of them into a collectivity really does not alter the separateness of 
their individual autonomy associated with their individual personhoods. This 
means that the whole cannot be considered the sum of its parts in the gaze of the 
law, but really as various collective superseding qualities of the whole (in this 
case having to do with traditional values and customs) which generally prevail 




To the extent that Taubman’s collective persona applies to the protection of cultural 
expression there very are clear echoes of the thinking of Kant, Fichte and Hegel in 
relation to the protection of the persona. However, Taubman also sees indigenous 
collective personality as encompassing not only the way in which a collective persona, 
or its outward expression, is represented but to the control of traditional knowledge per 
se:    
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“There are external and internal aspects to the sense of violation that arises when 
traditional personality is appropriated. External exploitation of [traditional 
knowledge] and [traditional cultural expressions] is seen as misappropriation—a 
taking, theft or even conversion—of cultural or intellectual property; but it is also 
sensed as intrusion on the community itself.”
319
 
The question of whether “information” as such should be properly considered to be part 
of the collective external persona of an indigenous group remains moot and will vary 
from group to group. There are of course strong echoes here of the “utility through 
control” discussed later in this Chapter. There are also strong echoes of Gibson’s 
communitarian justification discussed below (in which a right to control traditional 
knowledge arises out of the right of a community to manage its affairs). Indeed, if 
Taubman’s collective personality can encompass information per se it might perhaps be 
more properly treated as a part of a communitarian or a utility through control 
justification rather than being seen as within the “rights based on personality” 
philosophy of Kant/Fichte or Hegel. Indeed such a treatment also addresses Milius’s 
concern with regard to the difficulty of pooling individual identities. 
3.6 Human Rights Justifications  
3.6.1 Human Rights Justifications for Intellectual Property in General 
The two major heads set out above, Locke/ labour-desert and rights based in personality 
constitute by far the major deontological justifications for general intellectual property 
rights, at least in terms of analysis and commentary. However, the question of the 
justification for intellectual property within the context of developments in international 
human rights law also needs to be considered. 
Dutfield & Suthersanen
320
 consider three main international human rights documents 
which touch upon intellectual property rights to be: 
a) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) 1948; 
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b) The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(“ICESCR”) 1966; and 
c) The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) 1966.  
Article 27 of the UDHR states that: 
“(1) Everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the 
community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement and its 
benefits. 
(2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and material interests 
resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the 
author.”[emphasis added] 
This is supported by rights to property ownership in Articles 17: 
 “(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with 
others. 
(2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” 
And rights protecting reputation under Article 12: 
“No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. 
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.” 
The UDHR is not a legally binding document, but its provisions were put into legally 
binding form through the ICESCR and ICCPR. As is stated by Dutfield & 
Suthersanen
321
, the ICCPR fails to provide a positive basis for intellectual property 
rights although moral rights are indirectly protected through Article 17 of the ICCPR 
which essentially repeats the wording of Article 12 UDHR.  
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Articles 19(2) and (3) ICCPR provide an indirect acknowledgement of intellectual 
property rights in relation to a proviso to the right to a freedom of expression stating: 
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include 
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless 
of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any 
other media of his choice. 
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with 
it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain 
restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary: 
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), 
or of public health or morals. [emphasis added]. 
Arguably, however, the strongest reference to intellectual property rights comes from 
Article 15 of the ICESCR which follows the provisions of Article 27 UDHR. Article 15 
states that: 
“1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone: 
(a) to take part in cultural life; 
(6) to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications; 
(c) to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from 
any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author. 
2. The steps to be taken by the States Parties to the present Covenant to achieve 
the full realization of this right shall include those necessary for the conservation, 
the development and the diffusion of science and culture. 
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to respect the freedom 
indispensable for scientific research and creative activity. 
148 
 
4. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the benefits to be derived 
from the encouragement and development of international contacts and 
cooperation in the scientific and cultural fields.” [emphasis added] 
In the view of Dutfield & Suthersanen
322
 Article 15 identifies a requirement to balance 
on the one hand the right to access scientific and cultural good with on the other the 
right of authors and inventors to be protected without identifying the legal means by 
which this balance should be achieved. Arguably then the right for authors and 
inventors to have some form of balanced protection is a human right. This would not, 
however, necessarily seem to be the case.  
In November 2005, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Right issued 
its General Comment No. 17 (2005) in relation to Article 15, Paragraph 1 (c), of the 
ICESCR (the “General Comment”). This is a somewhat confusing text. It essentially 
states that whereas human rights are fundamental, as they are inherent to the human 
person as such: 
“intellectual property rights are first and foremost means by which States seek to 
provide incentives for inventiveness and creativity, encourage the dissemination 
of creative and innovative productions, as well as the development of cultural 
identities, and preserve the integrity of scientific, literary and artistic productions 
for the benefit of society as a whole” 
323
 
This is, of course, essentially a restatement of a consequentialist, incentivisation of 
creativity, position. It also states that in contrast to human rights:  
“intellectual property rights are generally of a temporary nature, and can be 
revoked, licensed or assigned to someone else.  While under most intellectual 
property systems, intellectual property rights, often with the exception of moral 
rights, may be allocated, limited in time and scope, traded, amended and even 
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forfeited, human rights are timeless expressions of fundamental entitlements of 
the human person.” 324 
It thereby concludes that: 
“Whereas the human right to benefit from the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from one’s scientific, literary and artistic productions 
safeguards the personal link between authors and their creations and between 
peoples, communities, or other groups and their collective cultural heritage, as 
well as their basic material interests which are necessary to enable authors to 
enjoy an adequate standard of living, intellectual property regimes primarily 
protect business and corporate interests and investments.  Moreover, the scope 
of protection of the moral and material interests of the author provided for by 
article 15, paragraph 1 (c), does not necessarily coincide with what is referred to 
as intellectual property rights under national legislation or international 
agreements. It is therefore important not to equate intellectual property rights 
with the human right recognized in article 15, paragraph 1 (c).”
325
 
The general Comment goes on to give normative guidance to states in terms of giving 
effect to Article 15(10(c). For Dutfield & Suthersanen
326
 it is clear that the concern of 
the Committee was that intellectual property rights had become too closely associated 
with large corporate entities, rather than individual authors/creators. So there is in the 
General Comment support for the moral interests element of the human right (more akin 
perhaps to a Kantian/Fichtean authorial personality). The treatment of the “material” 
interests is less clear, but seems to relate to a right for the author to obtain an adequate 
standard of living:  
“Unlike other human rights, the material interests of authors are not directly 
linked to the personality of the creator, but contribute to the enjoyment of the right 
to an adequate standard of living (Art. 11, para. 1). 
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The term of protection of material interests under article 15, paragraph 1 (c), need 
not extend over the entire lifespan of an author.  Rather, the purpose of enabling 
authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living can also be achieved through 
one-time payments or by vesting an author, for a limited period of time, with the 
exclusive right to exploit his scientific, literary or artistic production.” 
327
 
It would be fair to conclude that the position of intellectual property rights as human 
rights, (with the exception of moral rights for authors to ensure attribution and prevent 
derogative treatment) is far from clear.  
Dutfield & Suthersanen point to the Solemn Declaration adopted at the Centenary 
Assembly of the Berne Union as the only intellectual property treaty that makes 
reference to human rights when it states: 
“...that copyright is based on human rights and justice, as creators of beauty, 
entertainment and learning, deserve that their rights in their creation be recognized 




There are perhaps in this phrase clearer echoes of Hegelian personal “recognition” and 
Lockean reward than to human rights per se. In any event, as Dutfield & Suthersanen 
point out, the status of the Solemn Declaration is legally ambiguous. Dutfield & 
Suthersanen go on to put forward the counter argument that classic intellectual property 
rights (again with the exception of moral rights for authors to ensure attribution and 
prevent derogative treatment) cannot be human rights as they run counter to the social 
and ethical aims of human rights law. Whereas human rights laws do advocate some 
type of “reasonable” reward, that reward can be delivered in alternative ways than 
simply giving the author/inventor monopolistic rights to prevent copying/exploitation. 
Dutfield & Suthersanen point to indigenous peoples’ rights in ancestral knowledge 
(presumably to benefit sharing) as an example of such an alternative approach.  
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3.6.2 Human Rights and Intellectual Property Rights in Traditional Knowledge 
In September 2007 the General Assembly on the United Nations adopted the UN 
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP”). Although this 
Declaration broadly addresses the rights of indigenous people, there are three articles 
(11, 24 and 31) of specific relevance to the question of traditional knowledge (and 
related genetic resources):   
Article 11 
"Indigenous peoples have the right to practise and revitalize their cultural 
traditions and customs. This includes the right to maintain, protect and develop 
the past, present and future manifestations of their cultures, such as archaeological 
and historical sites, artefacts, designs, ceremonies, technologies and visual and 
performing arts and literature." 
"States shall provide redress through effective mechanisms, which may include 
restitution, developed in conjunction with indigenous peoples, with respect to 
their cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken without their free, 
prior and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs." 
[emphasis added] 
Article 24 
"Indigenous peoples have the right to their traditional medicines and to maintain 
their health practices, including the conservation of their vital medicinal plants, 
animals and minerals..." 
Article 31 
"Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their 
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as 
well as the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including 
human and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of 
fauna and flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games 
and visual and performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control, 
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protect and develop their intellectual property over such cultural heritage, 
traditional knowledge, and traditional cultural expressions." [emphasis added] 
"In conjunction with indigenous peoples, States shall take effective measures to 
recognize and protect the exercise of these rights." 
Article 38 also provides that States shall take appropriate measures, including 
legislation, to achieve the ends of UNDRIP. However, UNDRIP gives no specific detail 
on how these broad ends should be achieved.  
Whereas Article 15(1)(c) ICESCR (in the light of the interpretation provided by the 
General Comment) would seem to exclude intellectual property rights as being a basic 
human right, Article 11 and Article 31 arguably go further in establishing some right to 
control traditional knowledge per se and intellectual property in that traditional 
knowledge (in Article 31). However, the nature of that “control” within Article 31 is 
unclear: it certainly does not expressly extend to an absolute veto over third party non-
consensual use (and with it injunctive relief).  
Somewhat more clarity is provided by Article 11, which establishes that there should be 
“effective” redress which “may include restitution”. What does “restitution” mean in 
this context? 
In relation to tangible property (including land) one would imagine that “restitution” 
reasonably means the restoration of property misappropriated without free, informed 
prior consent. However, in relation to intangible property such a return cannot be 
affected. One then has to ask whether in such circumstances compensation in lieu of 
restitution could constitute “effective redress”. Crucially, UNDRIP itself makes no 
express mention (anywhere) of whether the right to “free, informed prior consent” also 
gives rise to a right to veto future, or ongoing, third party use. However, working from 
first principles, if UNDRIP entitles me (as a minimum) to restitution of misappropriated 
tangible property that restitution would, by virtue of the rivalrous nature of the use of 
tangible property) of necessity prevent use of that property by the misappropriator. In 
the light of this, it would seem strange that the appropriate redress in relation to 
intangible property would not similarly prevent use of that property by third parties – 
i.e. a veto.   
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Given the import placed upon preservation and revitalisation of indigenous culture 
within UNDRIP one has to ask why intangible property should be disadvantaged 
relative to tangible property simply by dint of the non-rivalrous nature of its use.  
However, this rather simplistic analysis is complicated by the fact that Article 28 of 
UNDRIP (which relates to the misappropriation without free, prior and informed 
consent of indigenous lands, territories and resources) has specific reference to the 
award of “just, fair and equitable compensation” when restitution is not possible. This 
compensation should “take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in quality, 
size and legal status or of monetary compensation or other appropriate redress”.
329
 One 
might ask: If monetary compensation is appropriate address for misappropriation of real 
property, why should that not be suitable redress for intangible property? We might also 
ask how much we should read into the absence of compensation wording within Article 
11. 
Although not specifically focussing on Article 11, Sargent 
330
 has recently highlighted 
the difficulties and uncertainties which have been created by the lack of clear language 
within UNDRIP with regard to free, prior and informed consent and the creation of veto 
rights. She points to the work of the International Law Association Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples Committee (2006 - 2012)
331
 which concludes that UNDRIP create some veto 
rights in relation to some Articles but not in relation to others. However, in relation to 
Articles 10, 11, 28 and 29 the ILA committee conclude that:  
“such a [veto] right seems to exist with respect to measures of relocation of 
indigenous peoples from their lands or territories, measures resulting in the taking 
of indigenous peoples’ cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property  or 
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lands, territories and resources, as well as measures of storage or disposal of 
hazardous materials in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples.”
332
 
However, no reasoning is given for this position is given. The view that UNDRIP 
creates veto rights is not universal. The permanent mission of Canada to the United 
Nations has stated that Canada does not interpret free, prior and informed consent as 
providing indigenous peoples with a veto
333
 Sargent concludes that the ILA Final 
Report gives no “detailed clarity on when FPIC is required to be used, or what it means- 
consult, consent or more – in any given situation.”
334
 
Broadly speaking then, we cannot be clear whether UNDRIP envisages a veto right to 




 highlights, UNDRIP is not legally binding upon the members of the UN. 
Of course many UN members are signatories of the Protocol and UNDRIP is expressly 
“noted” in the preamble to the Protocol and Article 4(3) of the Protocol expressly states 
that it should “be implemented in a mutually supportive manner with other international 
instruments relevant” to the Protocol.  
However, as has been noted by Morgera et al.
336
 if UNDRIP is limited to providing 
compensatory relief this would appear to have been exceeded by the access and benefit 
sharing requirements of the Protocol.    
3.7 Consequentialist Justifications for Intellectual Property 
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The consequentialist justifications for intellectual property tend to be those most 
commonly expressed by intellectual property practitioners, judges and politicians and in 
the preambles to intellectual property legislation, whilst (for Merges): 






Such justifications for intellectual property generally start from the broadly utilitarian 
perspective that intellectual creativity and innovation per se, and the betterment of 
society though the resultant enhanced intellectual and economic wealth that arises from 
these activities and their commercialisation, are things which enhance the “greater 
happiness of society”.  This enhancement is to be achieved through the adoption of 
policies which encourage and support the creation of intellectual products. Moore
339
 
sums up the theory in the following terms: 
i) society in general ought to attain an optimum of social utility; 
ii) as part of this aim, society should seek to optimise the amount of intellectual 
works being produced; 
iii) a necessary condition for promoting the creation of valuable intellectual 
works is granting limited rights of ownership to authors and inventors;  
iv) without certain guarantees as to the control of production of copies, authors 
and inventors might not engage in producing intellectual works; 
v) although the success of such policies cannot be ensured’ failure is inevitable 
if those who incur no investment costs can seize and reproduce the 
intellectual effort of others; and therefore 
vi) adoption of systems of protection (such as copyright, patent, and trade 
secret) yields an optimal production of intellectual production, and a 
corresponding optimal amount of social utility.  
Shiffrin states that the consequentialist justification argument: 
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“contends that intellectual property protections must be given to creators in 
order to give them the incentive to create their work...In theory that incentive 
operates to stimulate creation of some work by promising the power to prevent 
other similar works from being produced or distributed.” 
340
 
In fact, the consequentialist argument could be said to rely on two related, but distinct, 
incentives: the incentive to innovate and the incentive to commercialise.  
Such incentives-based approaches are closely linked to economic approaches to the 
analysis of intellectual property. Broadly speaking these approaches seek to determine 
conditions in which markets operate at optimal efficiency.
341
  
3.7.1 Criticisms of Incentives-based Justifications for Intellectual Property 
The criticisms of the incentives-based justifications are wide ranging and the 
commentary here will be kept deliberately brief to allow focus on how this justification 
relates to the protection of traditional knowledge.  
The first key criticism is that market efficiency approaches are based upon a too 
simplistic notion that the efficiency of the market is the principal desirable outcome of 
set of positive laws. Even where one takes a purely Benthamite approach, that is 
assuming that the enhancement of the total utility of a society is key (without reference 
to the distribution of social utility within that society), the utilitarian support for the 
desire to achieve an efficient market is based upon a simplistic “efficient economy leads 
to more and better goods leads to more general happiness” causal chain.  As will be 
discussed below, even this approach takes little account of any Millian “quality” of 
utility concerns.
342
 Where one rejects a total utility approach and places importance on 
problems of distribution, and demands of personal liberty, such a simplistic equation 
becomes still less viable.
343, 344
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The second key criticism is that we cannot actually tell that providing intellectual 
property rights does actually serve to incentivise innovation. Moore
345
 suggests that 
empirical questions about the costs and benefits of intellectual property in encouraging 
innovation and its commercialisation are difficult to determine and have not been 
conclusive. Shriffrin
346
 expresses further concerns that one cannot actually know 
whether the works incented under the law are superior in some respect (perhaps quantity 





 have gone further in their criticism, arguing that a 
proliferation of intellectual property rights creates a tragedy of the “anti-commons” 
which has the effect of stifling the very innovation and commercialisation that it was 
intended (under the consequentialist account) to be incentivised.  
Within this criticism is the argument that inventors will invent in any case, even in the 
absence of incentives. Shiffrin
352
 points out that many authors/inventors will be driven 
to create works (even in the absence of any formal incentivisation through intellectual 
property rights) through a desire to develop, inter alia, their art, reputation and for the 
general good of society. She argues that to justify a “strong” intellectual property 
regime the incentives argument must advance beyond what she calls: 
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“the modest claim that creators need the funding available from intellectual 
property rights to recoup creation and labour costs; and that given the ability of 
competitors to make cheap copies, the funds creators need may exceed what 
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3.7.2 Consequentialist Arguments for a Positive Right in Traditional Knowledge  
3.7.2.1 The “Incentive to Innovate” Argument  
For Munzer & Raustiala 
354
 indigenous people may require a right to prevent others 
from using the traditional knowledge without providing compensation, but for Munzer 
& Raustiala this (and presumably any stronger right) cannot be defended on the basis of 
an incentive to innovate since no incentive in the form of intellectual property rights 
was required for extant traditional knowledge to be developed:  
“The innovation has already occurred: at most we might use incentives to justify 
possible incremental improvements to existing [traditional knowledge]” 
355
 
Such a criticism relies on a very static view of the development of traditional 
knowledge. In contrast Dutfield & Suthersanen 
356
 suggest that such ongoing innovation 
in traditional knowledge is a live and ongoing process. Indeed Mazzocchi refers to this 
ongoing evolution of traditional knowledge as “traditional science”. 
357
 
However, Munzer & Raustiala add that the more an indigenous group looks to innovate 
some piece of shared knowledge, the less “traditional” that knowledge appears.  If a 
group (or an individual) do develop some new aspect of the traditional knowledge such 
information would, they argue, be justified protection on the basis of innovation, and 
indeed, such a development may well be the valid subject matter of an existing, 
“classical” form of intellectual property. For them, however, that new innovation should 
not form the basis for a sui generis right in traditional knowledge.  
3.7.2.2 The “Incentive to Commercialise” Argument 
Munzer & Raustiala contrast the incentive to commercialise from that to innovate. For 
them this incentive to commercialise justification is not subject to the “innovation has 
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already happened” criticism that they directed at the incentive to innovate ground. Any 
incentive to commercialise is directed at taking an existing piece of traditional 
knowledge and encouraging its commercial exploitation with the aim of bringing the 
information to a wider market and stimulating investment. Munzer & Raustiala believe 
that this “consequentialist argument has some force” but point out the following 
limitations: 
i) It is not a justification for protection of traditional knowledge that the 
indigenous group seek to retain within their group for example sacred 
knowledge; 
ii) “any plausible extent of legal protection will not include indefinite duration” 
(although no reason is given for this); and 
iii) “unless the extent of legal protection is exquisitely calibrated, and unless 
indigenous peoples know the extent of that protection- each of which is 
difficult to secure- they may well under-invest or over-invest in 
commercializing their [traditional knowledge]”.
358
  
Munzer & Raustiala point out that any such over-investment would be problematic for 
indigenous peoples as it would lead them to spend resource that they do not have. For 
example they may become embroiled in unsuccessful enforcement activities which 
could lead “rent-dissipation” of the value of the intellectual asset (once it was realised 
that the key element of the asset was free to use). They may also become involved in 
“rent-seeking” activities such as lobbying government for preferential treatment. 
3.7.2.3 Other Utilitarian and Quasi-Utilitarian Approaches - “Stability” 
Munzer & Raustiala point to a utilitarian justification for property rights based on a 
desire to ensure “stability, security of expectations and the smooth functioning of society 
and the economy”
359
 and examine whether such this utilitarian model provides a 
justification for intellectual property right in indigenous traditional knowledge. They 
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cite the WIPO Composite Study on the Protection of Traditional Knowledge
360
 as an 
example of such an argument. The composite study states:  
“a clear, transparent and effective system of TK protection increases legal security 
and predictability to the benefit not only of TK holders, but also of society as a 
whole, including firms and research institutions who are potential partners of TK 
holders.  These benefits go beyond the promotion of innovation as such, given the 
argument that IP forms of protection of TK are unnecessary since the innovation 
will have taken place without IP protection.” 
361
 
Munzer & Raustiala agree that stability and certainty are desirable as a general aim, but 
state that having such a desire does not, of itself, inform how one particularly achieves 
that aim through the formulation of positive laws. They state (somewhat mischievously 
in this author’s view) that certainty could equally be arrived at through an 
announcement that no rights existed in traditional knowledge. Although that may well 
be correct, such a position would, of course, completely ignore any other justification 
for the existence of such rights. 
Under this head (though it could perhaps more properly be discussed under the 
“Incentive to Commercialise” head) Munzer & Raustiala further cite the Composite 
Study where it states:  
“A third potential rationale for IP protection of TK concerns economic 
development and poverty alleviation:  if the communities so wished, the 
formalization and recording of traditional communities’ intangible assets would 
transform them into capital, thus facilitating the establishment of commercial 
ventures within traditional communities.  Many traditional communities that live 
in apparent poverty are actually rich in knowledge — but their knowledge, not 
being the subject of formal property titles, is prone to commercial 
misappropriation by others.  Furthermore, once recognized through titles, TK 
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could be used as collateral security for giving traditional communities facilitated 
access to credit.” 
362
 
As stated above, Munzer & Raustiala have some sympathy with a utilitarian 
justification for a right in traditional knowledge based on an incentive to commercialise, 
but highlight that the traditional knowledge as capital argument relies on “sanguine, 
perhaps heroic, empirical assumptions about which IP right will turn out to be 
valuable” 
363
 and highlight that a great deal of intellectual property is, in fact, worth 
very little. 
3.7.2.4 Preservation of culture  
Although they do not it put as such, Munzer & Raustiala’s “stability” head may actually 
be pointing to a further, broader, utilitarian argument for a positive right in traditional 
knowledge namely preventing an impoverishment of Mills’ “greater happiness”. 
Dutfield & Suthersanen 
364
 and Dutfield 
365
 in looking at traditional knowledge as an 
emerging right, propose that a positive traditional knowledge right would improve the 
lives of the traditional knowledge holders and communities. They point to the fact that 
many examples of traditional activity are in decline, and many modes of traditional 
cultural expression are being lost. 
366
 One might argue that from a utilitarian prospective 
an incentive not to lose is equivalent to an incentive to gain. An incentive to 
“commercialise” and make a financial gain from existing traditional knowledge could 
potentially serve as an incentive to retain knowledge and cultural forms that would 
otherwise not be valued and would potentially be lost in wake of the spread of 
“Western” cultural and scientific norms and a market economy. 
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 and Dutfield & Suthersanen 
368
 also point to a potential benefit to the 
national economies in which a particular piece of traditional knowledge originates as 
consequentialist justification for providing a positive right to traditional knowledge. As 
has been discussed in the introduction to this work (and will be further discussed in 
Chapter 4) the contribution of traditional knowledge to pharmaceutical (and food) 
products can be high. Without positive rights this value would not be captured and 
would not enter into the (usually poor) originator economy. They highlight, however, 
that the economic potential of traditional knowledge should not be over-estimated as 
much will have no commercial application at all. 
3.7.2.5 Preservation of the Environment 
Closely linked to the preservation of indigenous culture, Dutfield 
369
 additionally points 
to conservation of the environment from which traditional knowledge originates as a 
further consequentialist justification for providing a positive right to traditional 
knowledge.  
Some traditional knowledge directly relates to methodologies of agricultural or forest 
management. For example, much of what has been considered “virgin” rain forest has 
been actively managed by indigenous peoples over generations including clearance, 
plant selection and planting of “forest gardens”.
370
 If plants and the traditional 
knowledge associated with them are perceived as having potential commercial value 
then the incentive to preserve them and the environment in which they are found may be 
enhanced, particularly in the face of external infrastructure development, mining, 
logging and ranching pressures. 
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3.7.2.6 Exploring “preservation through valorisation” 
This “preservation through valorisation” approach to the maintenance of indigenous 
culture and of the natural environment by giving value to traditional knowledge, (and to 
the genetic resources to which that traditional knowledge relates) requires examination 
in terms of:  
a) what utilitarian goals are served by the policy;  
b) how the positive laws create the desired value; and 
 c) whether that value serves to meet the utilitarian goals identified.   
As we will see, this analysis eventually brings us to a potential “utilitarian paradox” at 
the interface between the preservation of the biodiverse environment and Western 
market economy at which the traditional rights justification operates. 
3.7.2.7 What utilitarian goals are served by the policy? 
The basis of a rule-utilitarian justification is that as a result of a particular policy (or 
positive legal rule) the overall utility of a society is enhanced.
371, 372 
However, it has 
long been a matter for debate amongst utilitarians as to how one might actually seek to 
determine whether that policy has had the desired effect of enhancing overall the utility 
of a society.
373
 Can one really perform a felicific calculus (or calculation of happiness) 
of an entire society? Can one examine with any certainty whether a particular policy has 
had an impact on that calculus?  
Given the complexity of a modern (and even a pre-modern) society, the analysis of the 
impact of policy is, of necessity, more commonly focussed on the effect on the 
perceived mischief to which the policy is directed (and the spill over effects into related 
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areas), rather than looking at the global utility within a society. However, even if one 
were somehow able to quantify the global happiness of a society, we need to ask 
whether it is really the “amount” of happiness in society that is important, or whether 
the quality of happiness is also important.   
The question of what types of happiness should inform a model for living life, and 
whether we are obligated to do more than pursue pleasure for its own sake, has a very 
long history, and formed a key part of the (Stoical and other) criticism of the philosophy 
of Epicurus 
374, 375
and part of the search for the definition of an objective well-being 
within a eudaimonic life. 
376, 377
  The question of difference in quality of social utility 
was rapidly identified by utilitarians and Bentham’s broad definition of happiness 
378
 
was challenged by Mill who held that “higher” forms of happiness, arising from 
intellectual achievements, gave greater utility than “baser” forms. Mill famously stated:  
“It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be 
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a 
different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. 




   
Progressive as Mill was for his time, this approach does reflect something of a high-
Victorian view of culture, and of the world. However, even if one does not follow such 
a strict Millian approach, the idea that there are differing qualities of happiness/utility 
does not seem unreasonable, and is certainly reflected in our own experience of life. 
However, in looking at such questions of quality of utility one is immediately 
confronted by substantial problems of subjectivity. We all have our own personal 
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interests, values and concerns: one women’s happiness cannot simply be another’s 
(although Harris has argued that there are some fundamental things which all (non-
pathological) humans perceive as important to happiness and contribute to what should 
universally be accepted as a good life 
380





 view that one can specify the “primary goods” which are necessary pre-
conditions for wellbeing).  
Even if one could advance beyond this problem of subjectivity, how might you even 
arrive at an objective calculation of any difference in utility? As Blackburn states:  
“...although we might judge that this year’s holiday was better than last year’s, 
we are not apt to think it makes sense to say it was twice as good, or that it 




Accordingly, when engaging in any utilitarian analysis we need to acknowledge 
throughout the problems posed by quantity, quality, subjectivity and lack of objective 
calculation. 
Perhaps the simplest utilitarian account for preservation of traditional knowledge is that 
the existence of such knowledge provides a social utility in itself in that it is part of the 
“patrimony of mankind”. Although Mill argued that high Western art (say 
Michelangelo’s painting of the vault of the Sistine Chapel or a Bach violin concerto) 
generated significant utility, he accepted that utility could be found in the appreciation 
of a broad range of achievements: 
“A cultivated mind – I do not mean a philosopher, but any mind to which the 
fountains of knowledge have been opened, and which has been taught in any 
tolerable degree, to exercise its faculties – finds sources of inexhaustible interest 
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in all that surrounds it; in the objects of nature, the achievements of art, the 
imaginations of poetry, the incidents of history, the ways of mankind, past and 
present, and their prospects in the future.” 
384
 [emphasis added].   
Whether Mill’s concept of human achievement would have, in fact, extended to 
traditional knowledge per se (rather than the utility generated by the Western scholarly 
examination of it) is unclear, but it would in the current century seem perverse not to 
extend a Millian utility to the art, forms of living, and knowledge of indigenous peoples 
(even where that knowledge cannot be readily defined as “artistic” according to Western 
mores). 
To this contribution to the utility of all mankind might also be added a more particular 
sense of “happiness” which arises where a society of indigenous peoples are free to live 
a life which allows them to feel spiritually fulfilled by following their traditional 
religious beliefs and customary norms. This narrower utilitarian goal is naturally 
specific to a smaller group that that of all mankind. Of course, where one is pursuing a 
“greatest happiness for the greatest number” rule-utilitarianism, one will encounter 
difficulties in promoting a specific utility for one group in conflict with a broader utility 
for a greater number. One is possibly left here attempting to balance the “narrow” 
enhanced social utility of an indigenous group “living in peace” to enjoy their 
traditional knowledge against a potential enhanced utility of a broader society brought 
about through (say) infrastructure development leading to rainforest destruction. Such 
conflicts are not easily resolved but do highlight the importance of determining the set 
of utilities that are intended to be produced (or at least incentivised) by one’s proposed 
positive law. 
The discussion above focuses of the quality of happiness. This debate can be taken 
further into the question of whether “happiness” alone is a sufficient determinant for 
governing consequentialist policy. There is a long and rich history in philosophy in 
assessing whether the true determinant of utility should be the broader “well-being” of 
individuals. 
385
 The question extends further into what determines what constitutes well-
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being – for example an idea of objective eudaimonic human flourishing
386
 or a more 
subjective test?  
One might consider that “wellbeing” is a less subjective marker than mere “happiness” 
and that this relative objectivity could allow one to reduce well-being or welfare into 
something which is empirically measureable and amenable to the arithmetic balancing 
of summed welfare measures.  
Recently Derclaye and Taylor 
387 
have suggested that the rule-utilitarian justification for 
intellectual property has been misapplied by the Chicago “law and economics” school 
such that an enhancement in societal wealth (as evinced by such economic markers as 
Gross Domestic Product) acts as the sole proxy for greater societal well-being - a flawed 
process which serves to ignore wider concepts of human well-being. They suggest 
388
 
that other “markers” for human well-being should be applied when looking to justify 
intellectual property rights: 
a) Marker 1—Happiness – or more accurately "positive affect";  
b) Marker 2—Health - including all aspects of physical health: not only freedom 
from disease and injury, but also adequate nutrition. It would also include 
mental health;  
c) Marker 3—Life-satisfaction - a complementary notion to happiness: the two are 
combined in the construct of "subjective well-being";  
d) Marker 4—Success in realising central life goals/values - the extent to which a 
person succeeds in securing the things they most care about, whether these be 
goals to which they aspire or aspects of their lives that matter to them;  
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e) Marker 5—Supportive personal relationships including marriage, relationships 
with family members, friendships and even relationships with others such as 
neighbours and work colleagues, insofar as these can be regarded as supportive; 
f) Marker 6—Personal development - the development, improvement and exercise 
of various mental and physical aspects of our natures as human being, including 
the development of intellectual skills and the acquiring of knowledge, typically 
through education;  
g) Marker 7—Leisure -the opportunity to spend time relaxing and to pursue 
interests and activities beyond those required by work, or by the need to secure 
the essentials for human existence;  
h) Marker 8—Adequate income/resources - sufficient resources to enable certain 
other markers of well-being, such as good health (which implies adequate 
nutrition) and achievement of personal goals, to be secured. Those resources, in 
most societies, will typically be in the form of income or wealth but need not 
necessarily be so in all circumstances; 
i) Marker 9—Rewarding employment – predominantly as an enabler of other 
markers (provided that the employment relationship is not abusive). 
389
  
Derclaye and Taylor conclude when applying their “well-being” test to broadly rule-
utilitarian justifications for intellectual property rights that: 
a) from a creator’s and inventor’s perspective, “the current intellectual property 
laws (based on the proxy of income) are generally adequate” and: 
b)  from a user’s perspective such laws “are also in the main adequate”.  
They note, however, that “some adjustments are necessary”. And highlight that: 
“Under a well-being perspective, there are a great number of intellectual 
achievements which should not be protected and certainly those contrary to ordre 
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public and morality would fall in this category. We leave the question whether 
more achievements could fall in this category for another paper.” 
390
 
If we apply Derclaye and Taylor’s “well-being” markers to the indigenous sphere, we 
can see that what is described above as the “narrower” utility of allowing indigenous 
peoples to feel spiritually fulfilled by following their traditional religious beliefs and 
customary norms would seem to particularly echo with Derclaye and Taylor’s Marker 1 
(happiness), Marker 3 (life-satisfaction/"subjective well-being") and Marker 4 (success 
in realising central life goals/values). Although Derclaye and Taylor do not specifically 
highlight indigenous communities within their description of Marker 5 (supportive 
personal relationships), it seems likely that within a close indigenous community this 
marker would be a strong element in an individual’s well being. It is also likely that this 
marker of well-being would be particularly enhanced through the ability of the 
individuals within a group to follow their traditional religious beliefs and customary 
norms.  
However, even such broader markers of “well-being” remain anthropocentric. A further, 
and distinctly separate, utilitarian account is that the preservation of a biodiverse 
environment is a “utility” in itself. Singer 
391
 divides the potential utility of preservation 
of the environment into two values: intrinsic value based upon the value of the thing 
itself, and instrumental value based upon the thing’s ability to contribute to other 
utilitarian ends. It is of course possible that a single thing may have overlapping 
intrinsic and instrumentalist values to varying degrees. However, is important to 
appreciate from where the contributions to overall utility are made – particularly where 
one is seeking to influence that utility through positive law.  For Singer the intrinsic 
value of the preserving the environment can itself take two forms.
392
  
The first of these is that we as humans (today and in the future) are culturally and/or 
spiritually enriched by the act of living within in a biodiverse environment (and hence 
our happiness is enhanced). This enrichment is again a highly subjective appreciation, 
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both as between persons and between cultures. For example modern Western concepts 
of the aesthetics of nature have arguably been shaped by romantic, “Burkean” concepts. 
393
 As with the utility found in enjoyment of traditional knowledge per se, one might 
also posit that indigenous peoples gain a specific utility in the enjoyment of their 
ancestral environment (although as we will see that may be subject to conflicting 
Western-orientated utilities).  
The second intrinsic value is based on the view that we should extend our view of utility 
to encompass not only human “happiness” but a broader, non-anthropocentric, concept 
of environmental well-being (sometimes referred to as “deep ecology”). 
394, 395, 396, 397
 
Outwith these broader (somewhat Millian) concepts, there is a more practical (and 
perhaps more Benthamite) aspect – a biodiverse landscape has instrumental value to 
humans in supporting their other endeavours and even the quality of their existence. In 
some cases this may be through a moderating effect on local (or even global) climate, 
soil and watercourse protection. In others, it may be through the provision of plant 
species which can be used for food, fibres, or as the basis for drug discovery and of 
genetic materials which may form the basis for the development of disease-, pest- or 
drought-resistance. Indeed, this role as a store of genetic resources may also be seen as 
an “insurance policy” against future uncertainty, which would again provide a social 
utility in itself.  As Atkins puts it: 
“One anthropocentric but important concern about the extinction of species is that 
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The degree of “usefulness” (or instrumental value) of a particular biodiverse landscape 
will depend on the landscape in question, and will also vary according to whom the 
landscape is being useful. Global climate effects, and acting as a genetic bank, will be 
useful to a larger population of people, although the effect may seem remote. In 
contrast, local climate effects will be more immediately useful to a narrower group of 
people who actually live within, or next to, the affected landscape.  
We need to note that although such intrinsic and instrumental utilitarian benefits arising 
out of the preservation of a biodiverse environment would arguably be greater within an 
environment which is in something approaching a “pristine” state, often this supposedly 
pristine state is illusory and is in fact the product of long interaction between people and 
nature.  For example, much of what has been considered “virgin” rain forest has been 
actively managed by indigenous peoples over generations including selective clearance, 
plant selection and planting of “forest gardens.” 
399
 Notwithstanding this, indigenously 
managed forests preserve a significant body of indigenous flora 
400
 and are likely always 
to be a greater contributor to the environmental side of our utilitarian “equation” than 
would be the entirely cleared alternative. 
To summarise, we have a number of utilitarian goals which may be served by creating 
value in traditional therapeutic associated with genetic resources: 
1) Spiritual/cultural (“Millian”/intrinsic):  
a) Traditional knowledge is part of the “patrimony of mankind” and provides 
utility its own right; 
b) The spiritual fulfilment of indigenous peoples by following traditional 
religious beliefs and customary norms; 
c) Humans broadly (and indigenous peoples more specifically) are culturally 
and/or spiritually enriched by existing in a biodiverse environment; and 
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d) Utility encompasses not only human “happiness” (anthropocentric 
utilitarianism) but a broader non-anthropocentric concept of the well-being 
of the environment itself. 
2) Practical (“Benthamite”/instrumental): 
a) Biodiversity itself provides utility through its support of other human 
endeavours (through a moderating effect on local (or even global) climate, 
soil and watercourse protection or  the provision of plant species which can 
be used for food, fibres, or as the basis for drug discovery and of genetic 
materials which may form the basis for the development of disease-, pest- or 
drought-resistance); and 
b) An “insurance policy” against future uncertainty (the environment acting as 
a store of potential treatments of plant and animal diseases, pesticides and 
drought-resistance). 
To the extent that any of these utilities do not conflict, might there be an argument for 
conflating these fractionated utilities into a single pooled environmental/cultural utility? 
As early as 1988 the Declaration of Belem (agreed at the First International Congress of 
Ethnobiology in Belém, Brazil) 
401
 stated that there was an “inextricable link between 
cultural and biological diversity”.
402
  One might envisage that there is little potential 
conflict within the class of Millian/intrinsic utilities described above and within the 
class of Benthamite/instrumental utilities. Generally speaking there may also seem little 
scope for conflict between the two classes: third party instrumental “enjoyment” of 
traditional knowledge per se is unlikely to conflict with the intrinsic utilities described 
save (importantly) with an intrinsic “utility through control” of traditional knowledge 
(which is described below).  
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Given this potential conflict, and the likelihood that positive rights/valorisation will 
affect each utility to varying degrees, each utility will examined separately in the 
following analysis (although the potentially close interaction between the preservation 
of the environmental and of traditional knowledge utilities will continue to be 
acknowledged).  
3.7.2.8 The Achievement of utilitarian goals through valorisation 
How then does creating value in traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources achieve the utilitarian goals of preservation of the biodiverse environment or 
of traditional knowledge per se (or a conflation of the two)? How is this value created in 
the first place?  
It is crucial to note that the preservation of the environment (and of culture) relies on the 
behaviour of relevant actors responding to economic factors (including conflicting 
values), whether they be the indigenous peoples themselves, or those external agents 
responsible for making business or planning decisions. However, although some 
economic theories can apply an objective value to a commodity, it has long been 
recognised within economics that for most individual economic actors the determination 
of value (which will drive behaviour) is subjective 
403
 - and this subjective value is 
derived from individual’s perception of the importance of an item. This perceived 
value
404
 of an asset is the function of many factors. These will include desirability 
(based in part on the amount of money that may be made from the asset), ease of resale, 
and, crucially, rarity/accessibility: Taylor states:  
“Valuation is always directed toward a definite quantity of a particular good or 
service. Choices and decisions are not concerned with the whole supply of a 
certain good or service. This marginal orientation was lacking in the classical 
economists' groping with the so-called paradox of value. They were unable to 
resolve the intriguing question of why diamonds had a higher price per unit than 
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water when everyone knew that water was more useful and valuable than 
diamonds. Only through the principle of diminishing marginal utility could this 
conceptual dilemma be eliminated. Each additional unit of a particular good is 
devoted to a use that is less important and urgent than the use to which the 
preceding unit was applied.” 
405
 
If you were dying of thirst in a desert you would clearly value water over a diamond. 
Perception based on situation and relative position is important.  
However, when looking at availability of an asset we need to recognise that since 
intangible property is (as was discussed at the beginning of this chapter) both non-
rivalrous and non-excludable, exclusivity can only be created through the imposition of 
positive law.  
The “classic” intellectual property argument for creating value runs as follows: a 
requirement on third parties that they require prior consent from the rights holder before 
they can use information creates an (artificial) scarcity in the information which 
enhances its commercial value. In the absence of a right to control there may be value to 
third parties in the subject matter but since free-riders will be free to use the subject 
matter as they wish, value will not attach to the information in the hands of its 
originators. However, if we acknowledge that subjective perception is crucial in 
creating value need to understand that value is a more complex concept than merely 
creating artificial scarcity in something. Such a model only works where there is some 
actual or potential use for the information – control over the use of something inherently 
useless is highly unlikely to create any value.  In addition the terms of exclusivity 
established by positive law - such as certainty of definition and ease of enforcement - 
become paramount in determining the subjective value of the right. 
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3.7.2.9 Preservation of the environment 
There are many economic threats to biodiverse environments including logging, mining, 
the clearing of forest for animal pasture, infrastructure projects and the growth of urban 
areas, many of which will be driven by immediate profit motives and economic 
concerns.  
One may be sceptical of the ability of enhanced value of genetic resources and 
traditional knowledge associated with them to successfully counter such immediate 
economic drivers.  One might imagine scenarios where there is a significant 
disconnection between the value of genetic resources and traditional knowledge on the 
one hand, and preservation of the biodiverse environment on the other. Taking (an 
extreme) example, profiting from Western use of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge associated with that knowledge could conceivably occur in the absence of 
the environment from which it originated - perhaps the genetic resource has already 
been collected (and could be propagated elsewhere) and/or the relevant knowledge 
(whether nucleotide sequence, biochemical structure or traditional knowledge) has 
already been already “collected” and preserved – thereby leaving the land upon which 
the genetic resource originated free for other uses to generate monetary profit. This 
admittedly extreme case, highlights that the linkage between genetic resource/traditional 
knowledge value in general and the preservation of the environment is in good part 
based on the promise of as yet unknown (and yet potentially valuable) genetic 
resource/traditional knowledge combinations.   
Unfortunately, much of the promise of genetic resources “in the bush” is just that – a 
promise.  Some genetic benefits may be entirely unknown, others may be directed 
through indigenous knowledge, however full realisation of their true value to Western 
science/commerce may appear a relatively distant probability compared to the near 
certainty of the return to be made from, say, clear-cutting a forest to create animal 
pasture to produce hamburger meat. Even taking account of this probability of failure, 
Western economics and accountancy practice additionally places significantly greater 
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value to profit made today versus profit made tomorrow – simply because of the 
cumulative effect of a rate of return on money invested today. 
406
  
Notwithstanding this scepticism in overall efficacy, the perception amongst all the 
concerned actors of some value in genetic resources and in traditional knowledge 
associated with those resources (created through the existence of a right to control use) 
must be better than no perceived value whatsoever (created through the absence of a 
right to control use). 
3.7.2.10 Preservation of traditional knowledge for its own sake 
Outwith the preservation of the biodiverse environment, we identified a separate 
utilitarian justification for a positive right in traditional knowledge in the preservation of 
traditional knowledge for its own sake (either as part of the “patrimony of mankind” or 
as part of the spiritual life of a specific indigenous people).  
Here one might see the valorisation of traditional knowledge as having a more direct 
effect on preservation in a world where traditional knowledge is threatened by the 
encroachment of Western values. Where traditional knowledge (including that 
associated with genetic resources) can become a source of actual (or potential) wealth 
one could expect the creation of an economic drive which would act towards the 
preservation of the source of that wealth in the face of competing cultural pressures. 
Again, there is an irony that one is using a Western market economic mechanism to 
counter a problem essentially caused by Western market economy.  
Again, we need here to recognise that information can exist away from the environment 
in which it was created even more easily than can a genetic resource. Let us imagine 
that a huge ethnobotanical survey (akin to an emergency archaeological dig) could 
achieve the end of collecting all the relevant indigenous information in an area before it 
was lost. Might that not, in itself, serve the utilitarian goal of preserving part of the 
“patrimony of mankind” more easily than creating a body of rights which will hopefully 
have their eventual effects through value created by market-economic forces?  
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It is here perhaps that taking a somewhat reductionist utilitarian approach might lead us 
astray. Our imaginary survey, even if it could in some way entirely reliably capture all 
the appropriate information, would preserve only one facet of the information. 
Information about genetic resources, no matter how accurate, becomes of mere 
historical interest in the absence of the genetic resource to which it is related. Of course, 
our imaginary survey could potentially be extended to encompass the collection of all 
genetic material related to the traditional information. Would this again serve to fulfil 
our “patrimony of mankind” utilitarian goal without reliance on positive rights? In a 
purely reductionist sense the answer may be “yes”, but again reductionism leads us 
astray. Few people would say that watching animals in a zoo is as spiritually satisfying 
as seeing them in the wild. Similarly, knowing that genetic material is safely preserved 
in the Royal Botanic Gardens Millennium Seed Bank 
407
 or the Svalbard Global Seed 
Vault 
408
 (and is thereby fulfilling a crucial instrumentalist utility), is arguably not as 
spiritually satisfying as knowing that the plants are growing “in the wild”.  
Realistically it makes sense to in this instance to conflate the “patrimony of mankind” 
and “preservation of biodiverse environment” utilitarian goals, rather than treat them as 
separate entities – both elements arguably enhance the other (particularly within 
traditionally managed environments). We can see that our imaginary “perfect” 
ethnobotanical survey is not a substitute for a rights mechanism which aims to preserve 
both elements.  
Notwithstanding its (intrinsic if not instrumentalist) utilitarian “failure”, our imaginary 
ethnobotanical survey is in any case just that – in reality no survey can be wholly truly 
comprehensive. No doubt some captured information and genetic resource is better in 
an emergency situation that no information/genes at all, but it cannot be a substitute for 
the preservation of information and genetic resource in situ in a social environment in 
which information and genes will be preserved.  
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vault/id462220/ (Accessed September 2015) 
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We have, however, identified above an additional utilitarian goal: that traditional 
knowledge is preserved for its own sake as part of the spiritual life of indigenous 
peoples. Clearly here the reductionist approach taken, and criticised, above in relation to 
preservation of the “patrimony” of mankind” is even less sustainable. The spiritual life 
of the indigenous peoples is closely linked to the biodiverse environment, and to the use 
of genetic resources within their social, customary and religious context. It makes even 
less sense to talk here of “data bases” and “gene banks” than it did above – the 
preservation of information here is still more closely linked to the utilitarian goal of 
preservation of the biodiverse environment. It is also here that arguably a Western 
market economy mechanism seems at its most alien.   
3.7.2.10 Utility through “control” 
It is at this point that we should identify that the requirement that prior informed consent 
is required before a third party may use traditional knowledge associated with 
traditional knowledge might not only have its utilitarian benefit through valorisation of 
the information. Such a requirement may also go directly to the “well-being” of 
indigenous peoples (notably Derclaye and Taylor’s Marker 4 -success in realising 
central life goals/values and Marker 5 -supportive personal relationships).  
The requirement for prior informed consent needs to encompass the right to say “no” or 
it is not true consent. This right to exclusively consent to the use of information may, of 
itself, go to spiritual fulfilment of indigenous peoples – for example if their traditional 
religious beliefs and/or customary norms direct that sacred or special information 
should be maintained within the indigenous group. Milius 
409
 describes it thus: 
“the power to maintain control over one's traditional knowledge might confer a 
very real and cultural/spiritual sense of independence and self-reliance where that 
knowledge is used to the benefit of the community. Even where the knowledge is 
held by a small circle of practitioners, those who belong to that community at 
large and who benefit from the particular [traditional knowledge] through 
membership may also feel the real sense of autonomy that group self-reliance 
                                                          
 
409
 Milius (n 318), 198 
180 
 
brings, and in not having to depend on outsiders for their technological knowledge 
and expertise.” 
Although this may be an entirely justifiable basis for having a right to control access, its 
applicability will be case-dependant rather than the broader applicability which applies 
to the valorisation of traditional knowledge. We need also note that, the “utility through 
control” goal is reliant, in the long term at least, on the broader preservation of the 
culture and environment which supports the appropriate traditional religious beliefs 
and/or customary norms. We also need to note that the absolute exercise of a veto over 
use of traditional knowledge in achievement of a “utility through control” goal may in 
certain cases play against the creation of value in that knowledge which might otherwise 
be achieved through consensual commercial exploitation. 
3.7.2.11 A utilitarian paradox?  
On first examination the preservation of a biodiverse environment, and traditional 
knowledge per se, (for all the reasons set out above) would seem to an unarguable 
“good”. However, the actual utilitarian landscape is more complex than can be captured 
in such a simplistic approach.  
A Western market-economy, profit-motivated, ethos (at least in those cases where it 
treats biodiverse landscapes as an expendable, and limitless, resource for exploitation) is 
arguably at odds with many of the pro-biodiversity principles previously outlined. Much 
of the threat to biodiverse environments, the genetic resources within them, and the 
traditional knowledge relating to them, comes from an increasing “Westernisation” of 
the human societies which live on and/or exploit the land on which the biodiverse 
environment in question is found. In a society where the importance of Western 
consumer items/services increases, it is conceivable that things previously considered to 
be part of the “wealth” of the pre-Westernisation society may lose value and 
consequently be lost. It is certainly possible that in a diminution of the value of the “old 
ways”, therapeutic knowledge (particularly that held by a relatively small group of 
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people), cultural expression and language is liable to be lost. Dutfield 
410
 cites the 1997 
IUCN Inter-Commission Task Force on Indigenous Peoples which states that: 
“cultures are dying out faster than the peoples associated with them. It has been 
estimated that half the world’s languages – the storehouses of people’s intellectual 
heritages and the framework for their unique understandings of life – will 
disappear within a century”
411
 
However, if we are to acknowledge that human happiness comes in many forms, we 
need consider that in many respects the Western market economy could, of itself, be 
said to bring an amount, if a different type, of social utility to the overall utilitarian 
calculus.  
It has been argued that pre-Western indigenous existence was arguably always closer to 
the ideas of Hobbes 
412
 than to Rousseau 
413, 414  
(or indeed Marx 
415
). Ferguson has 
described the life of the hunter-gatherer in Hobbesian terms, emphasising the violent 
and competitive nature of that life, and asserts that in many cases where hunter-




This is undoubtedly an oversimplification. The history of the interface between Western 
society and indigenous peoples is beyond the scope of the present work, but we must 
acknowledge that the bringing of indigenous peoples within, or close to, the ambit of 
Western society has been heavily influenced throughout history by war, disease, 
slavery, forced- and unforced- religious conversions, and government policy (whether 
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deliberately hostile, indifferent or guided by a misplaced paternalistic/pastoral concern) 
including change in environmental use, inward migration, and forced resettlement. 
Much of this is not by any means confined to the depths of history – Allen 
417
 reports on 
the efforts of the government of Indonesia to discourage the activities of the kerei 
medicine men of the animist Mentawai peoples living off the coast of Sumatra.  
Even if not deliberately seeking to destroy indigenous society, the approach of many 
Western governments (and of some governments in the global South) has often been to 
discount the utility provided by indigenous ways of life, at the expense of the utility 
provided by a Western-style economy. Indeed, as has been touched upon above, 
Western-style economic theory is predicated on the value of economic development 
today over long-term values such preservation of something (whether traditional 
knowledge or the environment) for the future (even where an allocation of value could 
be made). Singer suggests that application of an accountancy “discount rate” to future 
goods means that:  
“values gained one hundred years hence rank very low in comparison with values 
gained today; and values gained one thousand years in the future scarcely count at 
all” 
418
   
However, although the “advantages” of Western development (whether it be the 
availability of consumer goods or the advent of Western surgery and medicine) can be 
very poorly distributed within developing economies, they do add an element social 
utility which cannot be easily excluded from our felicific calculus for the affected 
community. The impact of Ferguson’s Western “comforts” cannot be easily ignored. 
Here we might look at the move by the Inuit of Arctic Canada from a self-sustaining, 
self-reliant (though highly precarious 
419
), hunter-gatherer communities to one reliant on 
the cash-economy. This occurred, in part, through the abandonment of reliance on dog-
sled teams following the introduction of the snow-mobile or “metal-dog”. Snow-
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mobiles are faster, more powerful, and far more convenient than a dog team.
420
 
However, whereas a dog-team can run on meat obtained from hunting and fishing, 
snow-mobiles run on petroleum products and require new mechanical parts - inevitably 
bringing their users into the cash economy. However, even here we need to 
acknowledge that this abandonment was a process actively encouraged by the Canadian 
government (and supported by other government policies including the settlement of the 
previously nomadic Inuit into fixed towns and villages).
421, 422
  
So when we look to the utilitarian landscape surrounding the preservation of the 
environment we see a complex picture: on one hand we can argue that there is a social 
utility (both instrumental and intrinsic) to be gained from the preservation of the 
biodiverse environment per se, preservation of traditional knowledge per se and 
indigenous ways of life for their own sake; on the other hand we might argue that the 
growth of Western market economy (which appears to threaten the existence of the 
biodiverse environment and forms of indigenous society) provides its own species and 
quantity of utility.  
The question of how one might assesses the quantity, and quality, of these competing 
contributions to the overall calculation of total social utility (and indeed whether the two 
sides of the utilitarian calculation actually conflict one another in all circumstances) is 
again beyond the scope of this study. However, we need to acknowledge the irony 
which sits at the heart of the approach of giving commercial value to traditional 
knowledge as a way of protecting the biodiverse environment - the “incentivisation 
through valorisation” approach seeks to operate through an effect within the Western 
market economic framework, rather than operating within the framework of traditional 
indigenous ways of living.  
There has been substantial criticism of this use of Western market economy-based 
approach - along the lines that such Western methods are unsuited to the protection of 
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something so alien from the market economy as traditional knowledge.
423
 However, in 
contrast to this position, we might argue that since the threat to traditional knowledge 
arises out of Western market economic forces, an approach which affects those forces is 
a pragmatic solution which addresses a broader utilitarian aim. Indeed one might say 
that the valorisation approach addresses both sides of the “environment versus market-
economy” utilitarian conflict identified above. 
3.8 Unjust Enrichment, Misappropriation and Restitution  
Munzer & Raustiala define these concepts in the following way:  
i) Unjust Enrichment is A’s receipt of an economic benefit to B’s detriment 
such that A’s retaining it without paying B would be unfair; 
ii) Misappropriation is an improper or dishonest form of unjust enrichment, as 
distinct from cases where A receives an economic benefit innocently or is 
unaware of the detriment to B; and 
iii) Restitution is, broadly, a basis for A’s liability to B because of unjust 




Munzer & Raustiala again cite the WIPO Composite Study as giving an example of an 
unjust enrichment argument where it states:  
“The fourth rationale for IP-related protection of TK concerns international trade 
relations, ... One general argument for international cooperation on IP protection 
has been that its absence in foreign countries leads to an unfair advantage for local 
manufacturers, since they do not need to compensate the IP right holder, or to 
contribute to the costs of research and development.  Other factors being equal, 
foreign IP right owners will be in disadvantage vis-à-vis their local imitators, and 
therefore the lack of IP protection amounts to non-tariff barriers to trade.  Just as 
this applies to the pharmaceutical, software and entertainment industries, it would 
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apply to IP-related TK and the commercial interests of traditional communities 
that make use of their TK in their economic life, especially when they are seeking 
to trade beyond their community.  Similar considerations apply when TK holders 
see their interests not in direct commercial terms, but in terms of restraining other 
people’s unacceptable commercial practices involving their TK, such as 
misleading or deceptive behavior.” 
425
 
Munzer & Raustiala refer to this as a “quasi-utilitarian” argument which is potentially 
plausible but which is not supported by empirical evidence. However, they perceive the 
argument to be chiefly referring to unjust enrichment of insiders, entities within the 
country in which the traditional knowledge originates.  Although this may be correct in 
part, the key thrust of the argument is actually this: that in the absence of positive 
protection, traditional knowledge suffers the same disadvantages as befall those subject 
matters (for which there are internationally established intellectual rights) where the 
machinery for enforcing those rights are not in place or are in practice ineffectual.  
Essentially the argument is: if you think it is unfair when “Western” rights are not 
respected, is it not similarly unfair for traditional knowledge to (perpetually) suffer the 
same fate?  This is certainly a call to fairness and equal treatment, but it is not perhaps 
entirely the same call to fairness (or is at least a species of that call) upon which an 
equitable right of restitution would be based. 
Munzer & Raustiala simplify the scenario and argument to be as follows: 
i) An indigenous people have a right to their traditional knowledge; 
ii) If not protected, outsiders using that traditional knowledge will obtain unjust 
enrichment to the detriment of the indigenous people; and 
iii) It is unfair to retain full benefit from the improper use without making a 
restitutionary payment to the indigenous people. 
426
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Munzer & Raustiala highlight that determining the quantum of such a royalty is 
difficult. However, that practical difficulty is not the basis of their opposition to this 
argument. They state that even if something is morally appropriate that is not the same 
as what is, or should be, legally appropriate. This, of course, goes to the very heart of 
whether there is a rationale for a positive intellectual property right in traditional 
knowledge. They point to the fact that in some circumstances the balance of other 
values (such as competition) means that innovators are sometimes not rewarded and 
point to some examples of situations where this happens. Their examples 
427
 assume 
that all traditional knowledge is in the form of broad ideas of the type that would not be 
protectable per se under copyright law. They do not address the question of what should 
happen when a piece of traditional knowledge is narrower in scope and applicability, 
such as a specific therapeutic use for a plant extract. 
3.9 Distributive Justice 
According to Spinoza “Justice consists in the habitual rendering to every man his 
lawful due”.
428
 But as, Comte-Sponville 
429
 highlights, we are left with the question as 
to what this lawful due may be – what is my own? – what should it be?  These two 
approaches highlight the core interaction between distributive and corrective 
(commutative) justice. The first establishes how property should be distributed, the 
second how that distribution should be properly maintained in the interactions between 
people.  Gordley 
430
 asserts that within Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics a higher concept 
of human welfare underlies the requirement for both distributive and corrective justice. 
For each person to live in a manner in which their human potentialities are realised 
“society must distribute resources fairly and, having done so, it must maintain the 
distribution”. Because of this requirement for the preservation of fair distribution, 
corrective justice ensures that a person who gains at another’s expense must compensate 
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the loser. For Gordley, this Aristotelian account “underlies the law of property, unjust 
enrichment and tort” – and it is this account which has informed most all Western 






The interface between these two forms of justice is at the heart of questions of control of 
property:  I should have mechanisms to control property – including compensation for 
my loss of property - but only to the extent that my right to that property can be 
supported by a distributive justification – that is a justification as to why I, in particular, 
should have property in a certain thing rather than someone else. In this sense 
deontological arguments for the existence of intellectual property rights are distributive 
justice arguments.  
As we have seen above the “natural rights” justification for ownership of property, and 
by extension intellectual property, is based on the idea that a person has unalienable 
rights which cannot be surrendered within the social contract. Both Locke and Hegel’s 
view of property was essentially dependent on an idea of the person – for Locke the 
inalienable ownership of the self is what allows for ownership of land and goods 
(subject to his provisos) once a person’s labour has been mixed with the material world. 
For Hegel the self is inalienable, and where intellectual products are created which are 
the extension of the self, these are similarly inalienable.   
However, a core feature of the natural rights argument for the existence of an 
intellectual property rights is that they should only be owned by the person who is 
deserving of the right. Indeed, in relation to the Lockean labour-desert theory this is a 
rather circular statement, as it is the desert itself arising from the mixing of labour – 
essentially the self – with something external to the self - which gives rise the right. 
Accordingly, subject to the provisos, the “property” acquired is coterminous with the 
desert. Taking the Lockean analogy further, intellectual property rights should be seen 
from the perspective of an exception to a general freedom to use of the “intellectual 
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 Accordingly, asserting ownership over that part of the intellectual 
commons which you cannot justly claim is improperly removing information from that 
commons. 
In terms of Kantian/Hegelian personality right justifications it is the creation of 
something which is an extension of the personality which gives originates the right – the 
contribution by the personality is key. The corollary of this is that where in individual 
has not created something/made a contribution there can be no justifiable ownership 
and/or moral right to control use.  
Both Lockean-desert and personality right justifications meet an immediate inherent 
counter-argument that there can be no natural right to the ownership of information or 
alternatively takes the form that the information commons cannot ever be enclosed.  
What arises is a tension between a natural right to know 
434
 and rights to intellectual 
liberty 
435
 on the one hand, and a right to property in that which I have created on the 
other. This can either be seen as a limited ownership exception to a broader right to 
intellectual freedom – a “fencing off” of a commons - or as a set of limitations upon the 
conditions in which a natural right can spring into existence from a “vacuum”– though 
the result is essentially the same. However, wherever one starts the argument, the 
crucial factor at the centre of the tension is the concept of contribution. Whether 
reflecting the deontological justifications (or not), the idea that the protection afforded 
by the right can only extend to the contribution made by the potential right holder is the 
bedrock of formal intellectual property laws. 
436
 This focus upon contribution is, of 
course, a core element of the consequentialist incentivisation argument for intellectual 
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property – the putative creators of intellectual products are incentivised to create such 
products by the provision of a “reward” for their efforts.  
A focus on rewarding contribution is arguably a key element to Gordley’s 
437
 fair 
distribution of society’s resources. However, the ability to “contribute” is often tied up 
with the resources that the contributor already possesses – particularly in the field of 
technological developments. What if that initial distribution of resources is unfair – is it 
fair to continue to maintain an unfair status quo ante by offering yet further reward? It 
is here that we need to look to broader questions of distributive justice.  
Rawls
438
 uses a maximum minimorum (“maximin”) gain and loss analysis as an 
heuristic tool to demonstrate why it is that a person in Rawls’s “original position” 
would seek a society in which social and economic inequalities are to be to the greatest 
benefit of the least advantaged members of society – essentially where extremes of 
inequality of wealth are minimised (the “difference principle”).  
The maximin analysis used by Rawls is set out in Table 3.1 
Table 3.1 Rawls’s maximin analysis. (values in 00’s of dollars) 
Circumstances 
Decisions C1 C2 C3 
d1 -7 8 12 
d2 -8 7 14 
d3 5 6 8 
As Rawls notes, this table is not a game of strategy – there is no one to play “against”. 
Instead Rawls has the person in the original position facing a number of potential 
outcomes: circumstances C1 through to C3. The person in the original position, sitting as 
she is behind the “veil of ignorance” cannot know in which of these circumstances she 
will find herself. She can, however, through her decision (dx) as to the ordering of 
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society, select a set of outcomes which in which the worst outcome is better than the 
worst outcomes of all the other strategies. In Rawls’s table the set of options which 
provides this “maximisation of the minimum” is decision d3. Although d2 would provide 
a greater potential upside ($1400) for some, it also provides the greatest downside 
(namely a debt of $800) for others.  
Rawls uses the maximin analysis as a starting point for arriving at his argument that the 
social contract should be built on the principle of liberty, namely that each person is to 
have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basis liberties compatible 
with a similar system of liberty for all, paraphrased as “people must be allowed the 
freedom to pursue the kind of life they would wish to lead provided it does not directly 
or indirectly harm another”. 
439
  
In addition, in following the maximin approach the person in the original position has to 
evaluate any institutional framework as if she was sure that she would become the most 
disadvantaged member of a particular society. This leads Rawls to his “difference 
principle”. This asserts that although such inequalities cannot be avoided, social and 
economic inequalities should be organised such as to give the greatest benefit of the 
least advantaged members of a society. Thus any evaluation of any possible 
institutional framework must start by identifying with the interests of the worst-off 
individual in society. 
440
  
It is crucial to note that Rawls is not requiring the sweeping away of all inequalities 
where such inequalities can be justified on other grounds, provided that such 
inequalities provide conditions in which the absolute (rather than relative) condition of 
the least advantaged in society (C1 in the table above) is enhanced (the minimum is 
maximised). In its purist form, the incentivisation/consequentialist argument for 
intellectual property could meet this requirement. If the provision of a reward for 
inventive efforts directly leads to a broader total enrichment of the entirety of society 
such that the situation of C1 is improved over the situation without such incentivisation 
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then such a policy is not contrary per se to the principles of Rawlsian distributive 
justice. Significant questions, of course, remain as to whether such a policy in fact 
enhances the total wealth of society or whether the wealth so created is so unevenly 
distributed that C1 sees no benefit or so little benefit as to be essentially unappreciable.  
At first blush one might argue that the creation of sui generis rights in genetic resources 
and traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources is a policy which avoids the 
“trickle down” problems of a broad incentivisation policy, and adheres to the difference 
principle by moving directly to enhancing the situation of a group of disadvantaged 
individuals within global society - namely indigenous peoples within the global South. 
However, we need to immediately note that the difference principle does not, of itself, 
create a deontological or consequentialist right - it is a principle to be adhered to in the 
application of other rights, justifications and policy approaches if one is seeking to 
ensure distributive justice. If we are following a Rawlsian approach, we need first to 
seek fundamental justifications for excluding non-consensual use of traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources and then seek to ensure that the application 
of justification serves to maximise the minimum situation for our most disadvantaged 
person “C1”.      
OseiTutu
441
 looks at the justification for a positive intellectual property right in 
traditional knowledge and asks the question whether protecting traditional knowledge 
through a sui generis intangible right would create a more equitable regime from a 
distributive justice perspective.  She states that for many the sui generis right is a 
deontological one based on upon Locke’s labour desert theory. However, she believes 
that such rights can result in an imbalanced intellectual property system which allows 
the intellectual property right to take priority over competing interests and fears for the 
required “retraction” of the public domain to create an exclusive right. She states: 
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“If a sui generis traditional knowledge right is to be created, the broader social 
good served by protecting traditional knowledge as a new form of intellectual 
property right should be very clearly articulated”442  
OseiTutu also suggests that an indefinite, monopoly right for traditional knowledge 
would: 




She concludes that: 
“If the goal of access to affordable knowledge and information is a worthy one, 
then an assessment of traditional knowledge from a distributive justice 
perspective leads to the conclusion that a sui generis intangible property right in 
traditional knowledge may not be the most appropriate response to the problems 
of bio-piracy and misappropriation. The corollary to this position is that the 
international community should be mindful of the need to balance rights and 




However, OseiTutu gives no specific guidance as to how achieve such a balance in 
relation to the scope of a sui generis traditional knowledge right. 
3.11 Restorative/corrective justice (“reparations”) 
Munzer 
445
 has recently proposed a justification for rights in traditional knowledge 
based upon “corrective justice”. He proposes six conditions precedent for such a 
corrective right. The first four he considers “background” conditions. These are: 
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1) Some wrongs must have been committed against an indigenous group, some or 
all of its members, their successors, or both; 
2) The wrongdoers, or their successors, are identifiable as a group, individual 
members of a group, some other entity, or some combination of these; 
3) The wrongs unjustifiably caused harm to an indigenous people, or some of its 
members; and 
4)  Those harmed are identifiable as an indigenous group, or as individual 
members, of an indigenous group, or both. 
Once such injustices have been established, one would then need to consider whether: 
5) No excuse is available such that the wrongdoers or their successors lack a moral 
duty to rectify their wrongs and undo the harm caused; and  
6) Granting intellectual property rights in traditional knowledge in principle would 
be an effective and reasonably efficient means of compensating or restoring 
justice to the indigenous people or its members who have been harmed. 
It is important to note that what is envisaged here is that once a sufficient present (or 
historic) indefensible wrong can be proved then a right to protect traditional knowledge 
will be granted where that provides “effective and reasonably efficient” restorative 
justice. There is no requirement for any specific link between the type of wrong and the 
remedy, nor it would seem, a clear link between the magnitude of the wrong and the 
remedy (other than that the “reasonable” efficiency does not have to be economically 
optimal only not “seriously inefficient”). 
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Munzer himself immediately recognises that the corrective justice of which he speaks is 
not what most would understand as an Aristotelian commutative justice, in which a 
specific wrongdoer directly corrects a specific wrong which that wrongdoer has wrought 
upon a specific wronged individual. For Munzer, such an Aristotelian approach is 
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inappropriate as it is “too rigid to deal with wrongs done by many sorts of wrongdoers 
to many sorts of victims”. 
447
 He states further: 
“in typical situations involving indigenous groups, harmed over many generations 
in many different ways by many different individuals, outsiders of various sorts, 
corporations and nation starts, it would be Procrustean to try to make the remedy 
due to indigenous groups exactly equal to the gains of wrong doers under an 
idealized correlatively-structured system of corrective justice. Given the remedial 
constraints thrown up by these complicated situations, one must make room for 
some constraints of efficiency. If this is rough corrective justice, so be it.” 
448
 
Of course, what Munzer denigrates as “Procrustean” logic and an “idealized 
correlatively-structured system of corrective justice”, namely that legal remedy should 
match the wrong committed and that one should have certainty in the application of the 
law against one, is thought by others to be a core principle of the rule of law. 
449
  
Notwithstanding obvious evidential problems, 
450
 crucial questions remain as to the 
degree of wrong required to support a claim. A key facet in Munzer’s scheme is that 
there no requirement for a clear linkage between the precondition for acquiring a right 
and the right given but we are not told what threshold of wrong needs to be met in the 
first place. Does a combination of smaller wrongdoings have an additive affect and if so 
how should this affect be determined? Crucially (and closely linked) we are not told 
upon what basis Munzer’s defence of a “lack a moral duty to rectify their wrongs and 
undo the harm caused” is to be determined. Is this to be judged against an absolute 
standard of whether the wrongdoer should have reasonably believed they were acting 
inequitably? If so, in relation to historic abuses, is that standard to be determined as at 
the time of commission of the wrongful act or by today’s standards? 
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Assuming that past wrongs of any sort do provide a justification for the creation of a sui 
generis right in traditional knowledge, what type of right is to be considered to be 
appropriate correction? Munzer divides corrective justice into compensatory justice 
(equivalent to money damages at law) and restorative justice (equivalent to injunctive 
relief, restitution and other relief in equity). However, he also sees corrective justice as 
incorporating “reparations” for (predominantly past) wrongs and sees corrective 
reparations as either compensatory or restorative, or both. It is this concept of 
“reparation” which is at the centre of Munzer’s justification for protection of traditional 
knowledge. Accordingly, there seems no reason why such protection could not in 
principle include the grant of an absolute veto (through injunctive relief) alongside the 
award of compensation. Crucially, however, Munzer avoids answering the question as 
to which intellectual property rights in traditional knowledge should be given to 
indigenous peoples in a particular circumstance. He also avoids advocating a set of 
appropriate intellectual property rules. His thrust is that effective compensatory and/or 
restorative elements in relation to misuse of traditional knowledge should form part of 
an appropriate suite of reparations for past wrongs (which may also include land grant, 
healthcare, education and monetary damages) determined on a case by case basis.   
This type of “what seems right at the time” smörgåsbord of remedies approach has the 
undoubted benefit of flexibility, but fails to address the question of third party certainty. 
In addition, the “past wrongs deserve some type of reparation” justification may benefit 
from philosophical simplicity, but is so loose as to provide little concrete basis 
determining the correct balance between the compensatory and/or restorative elements 
of the “reparation” on a case by case basis. Most cases will require determination 
between competing equities. Under Munzer’s reparation justification, a defendant may 
find themselves essentially burdened with the inequities of entirely unrelated third 
parties whose actions were unrelated to the case in question and which occurred in 
distant history. One might imagine here a defendant party who were entirely happy to 
pay compensation for a misappropriation, but maintained that their use was so distal to 
the original information that injunctive relief was inappropriate. Under the reparation 
justification the (perhaps significant) historic abuses of unrelated others could here go 
into the balance of equities. Even if this were the case, we have no sense as to how 
inequities should be weighted as between the current defendant and third party 
wrongdoers on one axis, as between current misappropriation and historic wrongs on 
another axis and as between gravity of wrongs on yet another axis. Of course, such 
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uncertainties make the translation of Munzer’s reparation justification to a set of 
generally applicable principles for broader application exceptionally difficult. 
3.12 A communitarian approach 
In her monograph Community Resources, Gibson 
451
 proposes a communitarian basis 
for positive sui generis rights of control over traditional knowledge. The philosophical 
grounds for the creation of such rights are communitarian and as such are not grounded 
in the utilitarianism/consequentialism, individual natural rights (Lockean or 
Hegelian/Kantian personality right), corrective justice, nor Rawlsian distributive justice. 
Gibson states that: 
“Fundamentally, the concept of community resources recognises obligations to 
cultural diversity and dignity through the acknowledgement of, and respect for, 
traditional and Indigenous communities. According to the model of community 
resources, communities are entitled to manage their resources in observance of 
customary laws, values, and traditional practices.” 
452
 
A claim to community is the basis of the right, but Gibson is highly sensitive to the 
origination/individuation problems inherent in such claim and in the identification of 
resources under that claim. According she sets out the following requirements for a 
claim: 
1) Assertion of community by community – self-recognition will trigger a 
presumption in favour of community; 
2) Assertion of resources by community – recognition of community and claim by 
that community to the knowledge in question will trigger a presumption that the  
knowledge is traditional; 
3) Rebuttal of presumption by competing claim – assertion of community and of 
resources may be rebutted by the parties seeking commercialisation of or access 
to knowledge (on the grounds set out below); and 
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4) Proportionality – the application of equitable principles to determine validity of 
the claim (whether to community or to traditional knowledge).
 453
 
In applying a principle of proportionality Gibson states:  
“In other words, the process [that is the rebuttable claim to community and 
rebuttable presumption to traditional knowledge] will involve a balancing of 
interests according to equitable principles of international law. It is not claimed 
here that equity is the source of the law, but that equitable principles necessarily 
inform the decision as to competing interests.” 
454
 
What type of right is envisaged here – a right to compensation or a right to veto non-
consensual use, or both? Although she does not expressly outline these options, Gibson 
considers a requirement for free and prior informed consent before traditional 
knowledge can be used by others to be “fundamental” to her model and an essential 
element of legitimate use or appropriation. This is, of course, consistent with a right to 
control resources arising out of a claim to community. She states:  
“Communities must be entitled to consent to the use of their knowledge as 
appropriate and under conditions to be determined by the communities and in 
accordance with their customary laws.” 
This absolute right to control would appear to point to a right of veto backed by 
injunctive relief. However, such a right is not absolute. Gibson highlights the fact that 
there may be problems identifying those entitled to grant consent in particular 
circumstances. In such a situation Gibson’s believes: 
“The application of free and prior informed consent within the present model 
would impose a duty upon those seeking to use what they ought reasonably to 
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believe to be a traditional knowledge or natural/genetic resources, to make 
reasonable efforts to ascertain and contact the relevant community.” 
455
  
Where such reasonable efforts have been made and an indigenous community 
subsequently become aware of a misappropriation and enforce their rights, Gibson sees 
there being no damages payable to the community although there may be benefit 
sharing and return of assets “where appropriate”.  
3.13 Conclusions 
We have seen that a number of the philosophical justifications which are ordinarily used 
to support the existence of classical intellectual property rights have been raised in 
support of positive rights in traditional knowledge. However, the translation of those 
justifications into this area highlights some of the inherent problems with certain of 
those justifications. In addition, the distinctive nature of traditional knowledge means 
that many of those justifications are stretched. Certainly, none of the justifications are 
infallible: each approach has problems in its application in certain circumstances. One 
cannot be purist in applying deontological justifications and neither is the 
consequentialist account without its difficulties (particularly in relation to assuredly 
achieving its set goals). 
There would appear to be significant problems with a Lockean, labour desert-based 
justification for a monopolistic intellectual property right in traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources. We have seen that Attas strongly argues against the 
existence of a natural law justification for intellectual property, based on the problems 
of certainty surrounding the “origination” and “individuation” of the subject matter (and 
the “squeeze” between the two). The origin of traditional knowledge is, by its very 
nature, difficult to determine. Even in the (unlikely) presence of concrete evidence 
surrounding its creation, the trans-generational and iterative (and ongoing) nature of the 
creation of traditional knowledge may make it particularly sensitive to Attas’ criticism. 
There are also problems as to why such rights should exist now whereas the 
“inventions”/ “discoveries” incorporated within the knowledge may have made by 
(sometimes very distant) ancestors and questions as to why any such right should have 
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an indeterminate duration. However, as has been stressed by Dutfield & Suthersanen, 
even though the labour-desert account has difficulty in giving particular answers to 
specific questions, it does remind us to examine a right in terms of the balance between 
the desert of an originator and the liberty of the rest of the world.  
From a right based in personality perspective, a key criticism is that it is difficult to 
imagine a personality right sitting comfortably with a potentially diverse group of 
indigenous peoples, particularly within a trans-generational (and potentially multi-site) 
setting. Chief amongst the problems with this account, however, is that Kantian 
authorial personality and Fichtean/Hegelian personality rights do not support the control 
of knowledge per se. 
The “classic” consequentialist justification for intellectual property rights is that through 
providing a reward to creators they incentivise the creation of new “products” of 
intellectual endeavour and further incentivise the commercialisation of such products. 
The exact application of such a justification to a right in traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources is problematic – much of the subject matter of the 
right will be have been already been created so, simply put, its creation cannot be  
incentivised. In contrast, one can potentially see how providing incentives to create 
commercial value in indigenous knowledge would accord with the utilitarian aim, not of 
creating new knowledge, but of preventing the loss of existing knowledge (not only 
from the relevant indigenous group themselves, but from mankind more broadly). If one 
can also argue that creating value in such knowledge also provides an incentive to 
maintain the cultural and ecological environment in which the knowledge resides then 
the utilitarian justification will be further strengthened.  
To this utilitarian account may be added a separate and particular “utility” that comes 
from indigenous peoples controlling their own knowledge in accordance with their 
customary practices.  
Gibson has advanced a separate but related communitarian justification which arises out 
of a claim to community and assures that an identified community should be able to 
control their own information under conditions to be determined by the communities 
and in accordance with their customary laws. This is, however, a right that may be 
tempered by concepts of equity where competing interests are to be evaluated.  
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In his review with Raustiala, Munzer generally found the usual philosophical 
justifications for intellectual property rights to be wanting when applied to the 
protection of traditional knowledge. He has more recently advanced the grant of rights 
to control traditional knowledge as part of a package of broader “reparations” for past 
wrongs committed upon a traditional group. The current work has identified: 
a) the difficulty in translating the “case by case” basis of such a doctrine to 
broader principles for general applicability; and  
b) the problems associated with determining how inequities should be weighted as 
between the current defendant and third party wrongdoers, as between current 
misappropriation and historic wrongs and as between gravity of wrongs; and any 
sense of third party certainty. 
To the extent that underlying philosophical justifications for such rights in traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources can be determined, the question of whether 
the allocation of property which arises out of following those justifications gives rise to 
a fair distribution of property across society still remains.  
Although supportive of human creativity and flourishing, established human rights do 
not create an express right to intellectual property.  The position in respect of 
indigenous peoples has been advanced somewhat by UNDRIP. Article 11 UNDRIP 
enshrines a right to practise and revitalize indigenous cultural traditions and custom. 
However, it does not set a minimum standard in terms of the way in which indigenous 
people’s cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property taken “without their free, 
prior and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs 
provides” will be protected other than that there should be “effective” redress which 
“may include restitution”. Clearly, all rights supported by other justifications should at 
least be compliant with the rights envisaged under UNDRIP.  
To conclude then, although there are uncertainties as to the philosophical support for 
positive rights in traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, the above 
analysis provides a road map of the approaches (and difficulties) which must be 





The landscape of drug discovery 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
“Everything is poisonous, nothing is poisonous, it is all a matter of dose.” 
Claude Bernard Pathologie expérimentale (1872),72 
 
4.1 Introduction 
It was argued in Chapter 1 of this work that if we are to gain insight into the limits of a 
positive right in traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources within the field 
of drug discovery, we need first to understand the process by which drug candidates are 
discovered, and the ways in which such traditional knowledge has entered (and 
continues to enter) the discovery process together with the ways in which it has been 
(and is) used within that process.  It is the aim of this chapter, therefore, to explore the 
topography of the drug discovery process and understand the flow of information within 
it.  
Much of the modern drug discovery process is reliant on an understanding of why it is 
that chemical agents have the biological effect that they do. The first part of this chapter 
will introduce some of the fundamental concepts which underlie the action of drugs and 
why plant, animal and microbially-derived active substances (products of genetic 
expression) have had a major role in drug discovery. The chapter will then look at the 
non-linear and highly iterative nature of drug discovery (and briefly why it is different 
from drug development) and at the processes that might be involved in taking traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources associated with traditional resources 
through to a fully-characterised drug. Having done this, the chapter will then seek to 
determine whether there are any points in the described drug discovery process which 
could be identified as the “crux points” discussed in Chapter 1 – that is points in the 
drug discovery process where the nature of the movement of information is such as may 
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give rise to break in a causation in law analysis of the scope of positive rights in 
tradition knowledge associated with genetic resources. 
4.2 The pharmacological background 
The majority of therapeutic and psychoactive drugs work through action a biologically 
active compound (a “ligand”) at a protein receptor site present on, or within, a cell. The 
receptor sites are present on/in the cell as part of the body’s internal signalling 
mechanism. Biological signals are often mediated through small endogenous ligands 
(whether neurotransmitters, hormones, parahormones, trophins, or other signals) which 
interact with their specific target protein receptor to cause a downstream biochemical 
response. These ligands “bind” to the receptor causing a conformational change in the 
structure of the receptor protein. It is this structural change which elicits the downstream 
biochemical effect, in many cases mediated through switching an enzyme on or off, or 
opening or closing an ion channel through a membrane. 
456,  457
  
To minimise the chances that that the individual signalling systems interfere, the 
receptor sites and ligands in one system often show a high degree of intersystem 
specificity. This has been (rather simplistically) termed the “lock and key” hypothesis 
458
.  Although the analogy serves for present purposes, it is worth noting that the inter-
molecular interaction between the ligand and receptor is in reality more subtle. In 
particular, just because a ligand binds to a receptor does not necessarily mean that the 
receptor will be activated. Different parts of the ligand molecule may be considered as 
carrying more of a “binding” functionality, whereas other parts may be considered as 
carrying more of an “activation” functionality. Again this is a simplification, and in 
many cases the functionalities of parts of the ligand molecule are not clear-cut, or are 
mixed.  
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It is important to appreciate that the molecular “key” of the ligand has a 3-D structure 
and will interact with the 3-D “lock” (perhaps better described as a 3D “pocket”) of the 
receptor.  In many cases the 3-D structure will “mirror” the 3D shape of the pocket but 
other factors are important, particularly the interaction between the electrostatic charge 
of regions of the pocket and key, or the hydrophilic/hydrophobic interactions between 
regions of the pocket and key.  A 3-D representation between a ligand (α-bungarotoxin) 
from a snake (krait) venom and a peptide portion of the acetylcholine receptor (present 
at the neuromuscular junction) gives a flavour of the 3-D nature of this interaction and 




Figure 4.1(from Harel et al.) Three-dimensional surface drawing of the structure of α-
BTX/Hap2 complex, determined by X-ray diffraction. Colour of the α-BTX 
corresponds to the electrostatic charge, with blue positive and red negative. (a) α-
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Relatively small changes in the chemical structure of the ligand can diminish the 
potency of the ligand at the receptor – analogous to altering the shape of the “key”. 
However, some small chemical changes can enhance the potency of the ligand or 
maintain/enhance its binding capability, but restrict the degree to which the ligand 
activates the receptor. A compound which activates a receptor is called an agonist and 
one that which prevents agonists from reaching the “lock” (but without activating the 
receptor themselves) are called antagonists. So-called inverse agonists bind to the 
receptor but elicit an opposite biological effect than would an agonist. 
460
 
The same endogenous ligand may have different effects in different parts of the body. 
These differing effects are usually mediated through sub-types within the same receptor 
“family”. Although these receptors all show affinity for the same endogenous ligand, 
they can be distinguished by differing affinities for (often biologically-derived) 
exogenous ligands.  A classic example is that of the endogenous ligand acetylcholine, 
the first neurotransmitter to be identified (by Dale and Löwi) 
461
. Acetylcholine has 
effects across the body through a variety of signalling systems which are summarised in 
Table 4.1. 
For brevity, the present description of pharmacologically active agents is limited to 
those which have actions at “classic” receptors. Whilst this is true for many such agents, 
it should be noted that many other drugs act through actions as biochemical precursors 
(enzyme substrates), enzyme substrates which prevent enzyme activity (sometimes 
termed “anti-metabolites”), other enzyme inhibitors, ion channel blockers or uptake 
inhibitors or through a direct action on cell membranes or gene expression. However, 
for the present purposes many of the points raised about ligand-target specificity and the 
drug discovery research process remain as true for these agents as for “classic” receptor 
ligands. 
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4.2.1 Therapeutic agents from living organisms  
The basis of much modern pharmacology has been the determination of classes of 
endogenous ligands, their receptor sites and downstream actions followed by the 
development of drugs to mimic the action of the endogenous agonist (or act as 
antagonists or inverse agonists) at specific target sites.  
Throughout the course of evolution of life on Earth, biological organisms have often 
found an evolutionary advantage in producing compounds which have binding effects at 
receptors meant for endogenous signalling ligands in other organisms. 
469
 These 
compounds are, in most cases, not exact copies of the endogenous ligand, but have 
different structures which allow a remarkable specificity and potency at the receptor 
sites (better in many cases than the endogenous ligand). Many compounds have evolved 
as toxins or venoms used in animals for hunting or defence, or used in plants to 
discourage their being eaten (or to elicit a biological response in the animal which is in 
some other way advantageous to the plant). 
470
  
Throughout human history the discovery of the biological effects of mostly plant, and 
some animal, toxins on humans led to the development of the first therapeutic (and 
psychoactive) drugs. Often these were used in the form of plant or animal extracts.  
The ancient Greek word pharmakon can mean both “drug” and “poison”, a mix of 
meanings which underlies the interplay between the toxic effects of some plant- and 
animal-derived ligands and their therapeutic benefits. 
471
 The formal, informal or trial 
and error “study” of plant and animal “poisons” often led to the development of folk 
remedies, or more formalised herbal and traditional medicine systems.  
It was the later systematic investigation of the biological effects of many of the 
biologically-derived exogenous ligands that gave the first (Western-scientific) insight 
into the workings of the body’s internal signalling mechanisms. As was the case for the 
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acetylcholine receptor seen in Table 4.1, many biological receptor sites were 
discovered, (and classified) by using plant-derived drugs. In some cases this was before 
the existence, or nature of, the endogenous ligand was itself understood. 
Although as stated some cases the plant-, or animal-, derived ligands are exquisitely 
specific for, or potent at, the endogenous target receptor, in other cases the plant-, or 
animal-, derived ligands are unspecific (causing undesired side-effects) and/or lack 
desired potency. In both cases there may be a therapeutic requirement to modify the 
performance of the ligand at the receptor.  
It is the task of the medicinal chemist to engineer changes to the plant/animal-derived 
ligand (or the endogenous ligand) to create the desired specificity/potency profile. In the 
past this was often done by getting a “feel” for what changes to the structure of the 
ligand would cause certain changes. This was often founded upon a data-base of 
existing ligands and their known binding at, and downstream effects mediated through, 
the receptor site. As mentioned, the interaction between the ligand and receptor relies on 
a complex interplay between the 3-D shape, electrostatic charge and 
hydrophobic/hydrophilic character of the ligand molecule. Accordingly, understanding 
how changes to chemical structure of a ligand impact upon these elements is not trivial. 
However, increased understanding of the structure of the receptors (through genomic, 
proteomic and glyconomic studies) gives researchers a better understanding of the 
structure of the “lock” and how various aspects of the ligand “key” interact. This has led 
to a further rationalisation of the design of modified ligands. 
472
  
Most endogenous ligands are, in general, relatively small chemical compounds relative 
to the size of the protein receptor site to which they bind. Many plant-, animal- or 
microbe-derived ligands or the chemically modified versions of these (or endogenous) 
ligands developed by medicinal chemists are similarly small and there relatively few 
places on the molecule to make chemical changes. In addition, the “key” part of the 
ligand molecule which interacts with the “lock” needs to have a very particular 3D 
conformation and electrostatic/hydrophobic character and relatively few departures 
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from this template will retain the desired activity. These limitations have meant that the 
developers of pharmaceuticals have found little in the way of protectable intellectual 
property “space” around the ligands.  
In the past two decades, in an attempt to find clear intellectual property space, the 
pharmaceutical industry initiated lead compound identification based on testing 
“random” combinatorial chemistry libraries. In this approach randomly-generated 
compounds were tested in very large numbers against known receptor targets using an 
automatic testing methodology termed “fast-throughput screening”. The idea was that 
by testing a large “galaxy” of compounds many unpredicted, and unpredictable (and 
hopefully therefore patent-protectable) “hits” would be discovered and form the basis 
for new pharmaceutical development. To the disappointment of drug companies (and 
their investors) very few therapeutically useful (and commercially successful) agents 
have been identified using this methodology. 
473
 Part of the explanation for this 
comparative lack of success is that the vast majority of the compounds randomly 
produced by combinatorial chemistry lacked the structural complexity that is seen in 
many biologically-active compounds or were not sufficiently “drug-like”.  
Effective pharmaceutical drugs, and biologically-derived toxins, are required to be 
“bioavailable”. This means that they can be absorbed by the body and distributed within 
the body to the desired target without being excreted or metabolised before they can 
reach that target. Broadly speaking the bioavailability of a compound can be predicted 
from its structure (what is now called “Lipinski’s Rule of Five” 
474
). However, very 
many of the randomly generated compounds developed by combinatorial chemistry 
lacked these chemical characteristics, were not bioavailable, and so were essentially 
useless as a therapeutic drug “lead” - no matter how effectively they bound, activated or 
blocked the receptor. 
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4.2.2 “Bioprospecting”  
The relative failure of random combinatorial chemistry/fast-throughput screening 
approach has led to something of a return to so-called “rational” pharmacology. The 
advances in genomics, proteomics and glyconomics (which allow researchers to better 
understand biological target structure) mentioned above are now increasingly being 
allied to the search for biologically active compounds from flora, fauna and microflora 
(so called “bioprospecting”) to find “novel” ligands for those sites.  
It is possible for a microorganism-, plant- or animal- derived ligand to mimic the 3D 
“key” of an endogenous ligand by recreating a similar 3D structure through a different 
chemical structure than that used by the endogenous ligand. Although that 3D structure 
may itself be broadly predictable, the way in which the biologically-derived ligand 
reproduces that structure need not be so predictable. Herein lies the potential strength of 
“bioprospecting” as a research tool to find “new” therapeutic approaches. Approaches 
that may also give researchers some intellectual property distance from their 
competitors.  
By far the greatest reservoir of biodiversity of the planet (and alongside it a reservoir of 
biological “toxins”) exists in the tropics, particularly (but not exclusively) in the 
equatorial rain forests. However, a tropical rainforest will harbour many thousands of 
plant species and many of those species may have many separate strains. Random 
testing of plant species is possible and has had some success. During the early- to mid- 
1960’s random testing of plant samples conducted by the US Cancer Chemotherapy 
National Service Center resulted in the isolation of the anti-cancer drug taxol from the 
Pacific Yew Taxus brevifolia. 
475
 However such random testing tends to give little 
return on investment. 
476
  
How then could a pharmaceutical researcher looking for new ligands from these 
environments narrow the search? One approach, phylogenetic surveying, is to seek out 
other species of a genus which is already known to yield bioactive or therapeutic agents, 
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remove samples, purify extracts and test them.  A further approach, ecological 
surveying, is to examine plants which occur in similar ecological niches, or have similar 
phenotypic characteristics, to plants which are known to yield bioactive or therapeutic 
agents. However, a further approach, (sometimes referred to as ethnobotanical 
surveying) is to rely upon the knowledge of the indigenous peoples who have lived with 
and used the biological resource, and who have developed, perhaps over generations, an 
understanding of the therapeutic or psychoactive effects of the biological resource. 
477
  





 lists 50 drugs which have been derived from ethnobotanical leads, but suggest 
that this is an underestimate and cites Farnsworth’s estimate 
481
 of such drugs being 
closer to 88. Although impressive, raw numbers do not perhaps give an impression of 
the importance that these drugs have played in the development of Western medicine 
(and for that matter in Western recreational drug use). Cox’s list of 50 includes the well-
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Table 4.2 Some major ethnobotanically-derived medicines (after Cox 
483
) 
Drug Therapeutic use 
aspirin  analgesic, anti-inflammatory 
atropine  pupil dilator 
cocaine  anaesthetic 
codeine  CNS stimulant 
dicoumarol antithrombotic 
digoxin  cardiotonic 
digitoxin  cardiotonic 
ephedrine  bronchodilator 
hyoscamine  antispasmodic 
morphine  analgesic 
physostigmine glaucoma therapy 
pseudoephedrine  decongestant 
quinine  antimalarial 
reserpine  antihypertensive 
scopolamine  anti-motion sickness 
tubocurarine  muscle relaxant 
tetrahydrocannabinol  antiemetic 
theophylline  diuretic 
vinblastine  cancer therapy 
vincristine  cancer therapy 
 
Within the Western pharmaceutical tradition the science of studying drugs arising from 
natural (including plant) sources is known as “pharmacognosy”. This is a science which 
touches on many other areas of study most notably phytochemistry (the study of plant-
derived chemicals) and “ethnobotany”. Phytochemistry is, of course, a broader area of 
study that looking merely at therapeutic ligands. Similarly “ethnobotany”, a term 
originating in 1896 with American botanist John W. Harshberger, 
484
 takes in many 
areas beyond therapeutic plants but can be broadly defined as the study of the 
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interaction between indigenous peoples and plants. 
485
 Ethnobotany is by its nature an 
interdisciplinary field. Balick and Cox suggest that the ideal ethnobotanist is a: 
 “combination anthropologist, archaeologist, botanist, chemist, psychologist, 
ecologist, explorer, folklorist, pharmacologist, and diplomat”.
 486
 
Notwithstanding the success of the ethnobotanical approach, Balick and Cox suggest 
that there has been a degree of prejudice in the Western medical community against it. 
They argue that this may be the result of cultural prejudice during the Western colonial 
period when Western medicine was: 
 “taken as a prime exemplar of the constructive and beneficial effects of European 
rule” and “one of its indisputable claims to legitimacy”.
487
  
They suggest, however, that the use of plants as a source of candidate molecules has 
(re)gained favour due to a) the awareness of the loss of biodiversity, b) the use of fast-
throughput screening to screen plant-derived candidates, and c) a growing appreciation 
of the sophistication of indigenous knowledge systems. In previous work Balick 
488
 has 
highlighted the rapid erosion of ethnobotanical knowledge which is, as he puts it, caught 
between the loss of species and habitat on the one hand and loss of cultural legacy of 
experience on the other. As already mentioned, the relative failure of the random 
screening of combinatorial chemistry libraries will also have had an influence on the 
new focus on plant-derived candidates.
 
 
Of course, not all research leads provided by indigenous traditional knowledge will 
progress in a linear pattern to a marketed drug. In some cases the therapeutically active 
ligand will be new to science and will be used in a new drug in a purified but unchanged 
form. In some cases the plant will be found to contain already known ligands.  In others 
the plant may be screened for a therapeutic indication which is different from the 
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indication suggested by the folk use of the plant. 
489
  Balick and Cox suggest that a plant 
which is bioactive in one respect may serve as a better candidate for other types of 
bioactivity that those which show less bioactivity and point to supporting evidence from 
within the Samoan ethnopharmacopoeia.
490, 491
  
4.2.3 Potential drug discovery pathways 
As set out above, there is a long tradition of indigenous knowledge and Western 
folklore providing the starting point for pharmaceutical development. However, in the 
modern era therapies very rarely take the form of a simple plant extract but are more 
commonly in the form of pure ligand (or ligands) contained within an inert excipient. 
This section looks at the potential pathways by which traditional knowledge can be 
incorporated into a “modern” pharmaceutical. 
The present discussion will assume that a “new” (to pharmaceutical science) therapeutic 
use for a “new” (to pharmaceutical science) genetic resource has been revealed to a 
pharmaceutical research team. What are the potential ways in which the research lead 
provided by this information will inform pharmaceutical development? A (by no means 
comprehensive) overview of the potential pathways by which a piece of genetic material 
or associated piece of traditional knowledge could find their way through the drug 
discovery process was summarised in Figure 1.1 (in Chapter 1). 
It is important to recognise that the progression of steps set out in the figure is not 
necessarily linear, nor in series. Many steps will be performed in parallel. In addition 
many steps will require a series of iterative “feedback loops”. Very often advances in 
one limb of the research process will inform others, as will previously understanding 
from the literature or the research team’s existing “know-how”. Initial testing 
methodologies and extraction techniques may be supplanted by radically different 
techniques depending on parallel developments. 
The “research team” is described here as one entity. However, it should be noted that 
the skill sets required for this work are unlikely to be found within a single team. These 
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skills will range from chemical analysis, classic in vitro and in vivo pharmacology, 
molecular biology, medicinal chemistry, computer (or so-called “in silico” 
492 , 493
) 
modelling, and chemical synthesis, to clinical trials. Only within the largest 
pharmaceutical company would all these skills be found within one organisation. Even 
if that were the case, it is common for elements of the research effort to be contracted 
out to other commercial laboratories or to university-based researchers. It is possible for 
some of the work to be conducted within a public domain environment and here 
research teams might follow leads set by other groups that have been communicated at 
conferences and in research publications. Naturally there is a possibility of a mix of 
these approaches, but where the lead has originated from within a commercial 
organisation concerns over commercial competitors may limit the degree of disclosure 
until full patent protection has been achieved. 
Possible steps in the process are as follows: 
a) Isolation of active constituent(s) from plant material. Extraction techniques may 
depend on the suspected chemical nature of the active constituent (which may be 
informed by information on known ligands at receptors suspected of producing 
the therapeutic effects) 
 
b) In vitro testing of the active constituent against a known in vitro model. The 
choice of model may be dependent upon the purported therapeutic benefit of 
active constituent: 
 
c) In vivo testing of the active constituent against known animal models; 
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e) Determination of the receptor site. This may be a known receptor site, a 
previously unknown sub-type of known receptor family, or a previously 
unknown receptor family; 
 
f) If it is a new sub-type (or new family) of receptor the active constituent may be 
used as a tool to determine distribution of the receptor protein in the body using 





g) If it is a new sub-type or new family of receptor, determination of the protein 
structure of receptor site. This will include gaining an understanding of shape of 
the “pocket” of the receptor and the linkage to a downstream biological process 
(e.g. an enzyme or ion channel);  
 
h) If it is a new sub-type or new family of receptor, comparison with genomic 
libraries to determine the genes coding for the receptor. If the genes coding for 
the receptor can be identified, this may lead to studies to determine the 




i) If it is a new sub-type or new family of receptor, there will likely be studies of 
post-translational modification of the protein. There will also likely be studies of 
the receptor “life-cycle” and systems for up- and down-regulation of the 
receptor; 
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j) Determination of endogenous ligand. If a previously unknown signalling system, 
this may lead to an entirely new understanding of a disease process and 
development of a novel class of therapeutic  interventions and the development 
of new in vivo animal models. This may also lead to an understanding of an 
entirely new family of receptors, the metabolic processes for producing the 
endogenous ligand and how the receptors are controlled and how the 
endogenous ligand is inactivated and/or re-cycled; 
 
 
k) Preparation of simple chemical derivatives of the active component (this will 
include input from the receptor structure studies); 
 
l) The “new” receptor site may also be used as a target in fast-throughput 
screening against known pharmaceutically active ligands or against a library of 
ligands produced by combinatorial chemistry to uncover previously unexpected 




m) An understanding of the genes coding for the receptor may lead to an 
understanding of changes to receptor density/expression in disease states and 
may lead to development of gene therapy to address problems; 
 
n) Genes coding for the enzyme producing the endogenous active can be spliced 
into micro-organisms (recombinant DNA) to produce the enzyme/endogenous 
active; and 
 
o) An understanding of the gene sequence coding for the receptor, or the enzyme 
making the endogenous ligand, may allow for the de novo synthetic production 
of the gene (using DNA synthesis technology) and could eventually be used in 
the development of artificial organisms.  
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In some cases the biological effect mediated by the ligand may not be what is 
therapeutically desired. It may be that the therapeutic effect is mediated through 
interaction with one sub-type of receptor whereas a second effect, a “side-effect” is 
mediated through interaction with another. It may be that at doses higher than those that 
at which the ligand has its beneficial effect there may be other biological effects of the 
ligand at different receptors or in entirely different biochemical systems. The difference 
between the dose at which a ligand has its beneficial effect and the dose at which it 
demonstrates deleterious side-effects is termed the “therapeutic window” for the ligand. 
Some drugs, such as many antibiotics, have a relatively large therapeutic window 
whereas anti-cancer drugs have a very narrow (or essentially no) therapeutic window 
and were it not for the grave effects of the disease the side-effects would not ordinarily 
be tolerated.  
Chemical modification of an exogenous ligand may change the activation/binding 
characteristics and could also potentially change an agonist into an antagonist (or vice 
versa) or an inverse agonist (or a “partial” agonist). Any such change would affect the 
therapeutic benefit to be derived, the side effect profile and with it the therapeutic 
window. The interplay with the receptor itself (termed “pharmacodynamics”) cannot be 
looked at in isolation. Chemical changes will also impact on the bioavailability (the 
adsorption, distribution, metabolism and excretion or “ADME” 
498
) of the ligand.  
Figure 4.2 Schematic diagram of the factors influencing therapeutic efficacy 
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A schematic diagram of the key factors influencing therapeutic efficacy is set out in 
Figure 4.2. 
Knowledge of the structure of the new receptor protein may lead to synthesis of entirely 
novel agonist or antagonists at that receptor which may find use in the original 
therapeutic indication, or as will be seen, in second or further indications or in further 




In some circumstances the genetic resource from which the ligand is purified can be 
difficult to obtain in reliable quantities or the ligand itself may be difficult to extract 
from the genetic resource. In these cases it may be cost-effective to make the ligand 
through synthesis in the laboratory. However, this may not always be straight-forward. 
Some biologically-derived compounds have complex structures which are difficult to 
replicate using “non-biological” synthetic pathways. In addition many biologically-
derived ligands can exist in two (or another multiple of two) “optical” isomers. This 
means that the compound can exist either as a “right-handed” isomer or as a mirror-
image “left-handed” isomer. Although they will share the same atoms their structures 
are different. In many cases one optical isomer can be biologically active whereas the 
other isomer is ineffective.  For example, all of the amino acids used by all life on earth 
are L- isomers; D-isomers of amino acids cannot be used in biological processes. In 
contrast, all the sugars used by all the life on earth are D-isomers, the L-form being 
unused. 
Where compounds are made by enzymatic processes the vast majority of the resultant 
compound will exist as one optical isomer only. Where a compound is made by other 
(non-enzymatic) chemical pathways the synthetic pathway is ordinarily blind to optical 
isomerism and a near 50:50 ratio of each isomer (a so-called “racemic mixture”) will be 
produced. In some cases the racemic mixture will be “deracemated” (separated out) by 
researchers (perhaps using affinity chromatography) to leave only the effective isomer. 
It is important to note that the desired end product of the synthetic pathway is an exact 
copy the biologically-derived ligand. These compounds are termed “biomimetics”. A 
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fully deracemated biomimetic would be chemically and biologically indistinguishable 
from the original ligand of which it was a copy.  
However, it should also be noted that where a copy of a protein is made by splicing the 
gene coding for the protein into a cell, the protein produced may not be an exact copy of 
the original. This is because after proteins are synthesised they undergo a process by 
which sugar groups are attached to the protein. This is called glycosylation (more 
prevalent in eukaryotic cells). The pattern of glycosylation (and other so-called post-
translation modification) will change depending on the type of host-cell. Although the 
biological effect of the resultant copy may be equivalent to that of the original protein, 
the protein cannot be described as an exact copy and therefore the term “biosimilar” 
(sometimes “follow-on biologic”) will be more appropriate.
500
  
Using an entirely synthetic approach to making a ligand may open up new synthetic 
possibilities for making “derivatives” which are not reliant upon using the biologically-
derived ligand as a starting point. Of course, these new ligands may themselves serve as 
a tool for further investigation of the underlying disease mechanisms. 
4.2.5 Drug development 
Much of the discussion set out above deals with what is properly considered drug 
“discovery”. We additionally need to briefly consider the related field of drug 
“development”. 
Given the integrated and iterative nature of research the divide between discovery and 
development can be somewhat unclear. A clearer divide is perhaps between clinical and 
pre-clinical work, although again there is substantial communication and iterative work 
between the two areas during the course of the development of a drug.  
Much of drug “discovery” relates to the identification (through pre-clinical work) of a 
candidate for clinical trials.
 
Many drugs which form the basis of the modern 
pharmacopoeia (or their predecessors) were tested on humans or launched onto the 
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market with little (or no) regulatory supervision and many tragic mistakes were made 
along the way. 
Accordingly, in the modern era before a drug can be marketed in a territory it requires 
“marketing approval” from the appropriate medicines regulatory authority for that 
territory. 
The process by which that approval is granted is exceptionally highly regulated and a 
candidate drug is required to pass a number of distinct hurdles before it can pass on to 
the next stage of the process. Although each regulatory authority will have its own 
criteria for granting approval, there are substantial commonalities (commonly following 
US Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) and/or European practice) and initiatives 
towards consistent approaches (particularly harmonisation within the EU under EU 
Regulations and the practice of the European Medicines Agency, “EMA”).  
For the purposes of this work I will refer to drug “discovery” as pre-clinical research 
which leads to the identification of a potentially useful ligands and “development” as 
both the pre-clinical and clinical research process required to obtain medicines 
regulatory agency marketing approval. 
A brief description of the phases of drug development is set out in Table 4.3. As will be 
seen the pre-clinical phase of drug development deals predominantly with assessment of 
the toxicology profile of the candidate molecule.  
Requiring competitors to engage in a full reproduction of the drug development process 
before they can sell an identical product is perceived to be both wasteful of animal and 
human testing, and to present a very high barrier to entry for competitor products with a 
resultant elevated price payable by health systems. Accordingly, in a number of systems 
generics companies are permitted to obtain marketing authorisation for drugs on the 
back of the regulatory data set provided by the originator company, provided that they 
can be demonstrate that the drug being marketed is the same as that for which 
authorisation has been granted (a so-called “abridged” procedure). However, given the 
cost of assembling a data set, and to provide an incentive to innovate, originator 
companies are commonly provided with a period of data and marketing exclusivity 
during which only they (or their licensees) can rely on the data set. This data exclusivity 
is an important, and valuable, quasi-intellectual property right. 
221 
 
Although the grant of a marketing authorisation will allow a drug to be marketed for a 
particular therapeutic indication, there is in many territories a further hurdle to the 
widespread use of the drug. This is a requirement to pass a “health technology 
assessment” to determine whether, in a particular territory, the public authority funding 
healthcare can justify funding the use of the drug or other therapy (on usually a cost-
effectiveness basis). 
Table 4.3 Phases of Drug Development 
501, 502, 503 
Development Phase Nature 
 
Pre-Clinical Testing Data gathered on genotoxicity, toxicity, oncogenicity, 
reproductive toxicology. 
 
Phase I First in man study. Assessment of tolerability, pharmacokinetics 
and pharmacodynamics in (usually) healthy volunteers. 
 
Phase II First study in patients with the disease to be treated. Assessment 
of tolerability, pharmacokinetics and pharmacodynamics in 
patients. Assessment of optimum dose and side effect profile. 
 
Phase III Assessment of outcomes in patients approximating to the “real-
life” population of patients. Forms a significant part of the data 
portfolio used to gain regulatory approval. 
 
Phase IIIB Phase III style studies which are not intended to form part of the 
regulatory dossier but which will provide further evidence to 
persuade practitioners to use the drug – including evidence of 
cost-benefit, quality of life advantages. 
 
Phase IV  Post-marketing surveillance. Phase III studies cannot hope to 
cover all real-life situations and Phase IV surveillance allows 
for an ongoing assessment of safety and efficacy. 
 
                                                          
 
501
 John Hall, “The drug development process” in Ignazio Di Giovanna and Gareth Hayes (eds), 
Principles of Clinical Research (Wrightson Biomedical Publishing 2001), 1 
 
502
 David R Hutchinson,  How Drugs are Developed, A Practical Guide to Clinical Research (Brook 
Medical Publications 1997), 2 
 
503
 I Hägglöf and Å Holmgreen, “Regulatory Affairs” in HP Rang (ed) Drug Discovery and Development: 




4.2.6 Drug discovery, a linear path?  
As has been described in the earlier parts of this Chapter, there are many paths that can 
be taken by a pharmaceutical research team involved in drug discovery.   
The external perception of drug research is often of a linear process by which a solution 
is inevitably arrived at. This is however rarely the case - the drug discovery process is 
often iterative and there are many parallel steams. Often there are dead-ends where the 
hoped for result, whatever it may be, is not arrived at. Often important discoveries are 
made but they are not taken up. This may be the result of the researcher being outside of 
the scientific “mainstream”, publishing in a less well read language or in an 
inappropriate, or obscure, journal. The process can be influenced by personalities, 
scientific fashion and by commercial concerns. As will be seen, serendipitous 
discoveries, particularly observations of side-effects of existing drugs can play an 
important role. Any sense of linearity may be the result of “hindsight”, an inherent 
“outcome reporting bias” amongst research teams themselves (and the editors of 
scientific journals) against the publication of negative rather than positive results 
504,  505 
or the desire by the media (and drug marketers) to present a coherent and easily 
accessible story of development. Such reporting both in scientific journals and the 
media may give the impression of a certain inevitability to the research outcome which 
is not apparent to those working in the field at the time. However, as a compound enters 
the drug development stages the process, driven by medicines regulatory requirements, 
becomes (as is seen above) somewhat more linear and proscribed (though still beset by 
uncertainty).  
Kubinyi’s diagrammatic representation of the “drug design cycle”
506
 divides into two 
parts.  Part one (reproduced in Figure 4.3) deals with lead structure identification; this is 
a chemical whose structure shows promise as the basis for further examination. As can 
be seen, this process may take its “inspirations” from a wide variety of sources 
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including literature and patent searching, reviews of endogenous and exogenous natural 
ligands (including from bioprospecting), reviews of synthetically produced ligands, and 
the understanding of biological processes underlying the pathological condition. Key to 
the process is screening of the candidate molecule against an in vivo animal model or an 
in vitro molecular target (and very likely both). 






Identification of biological 

















Once a lead structure is identified it is entered into a process of “lead structure 
optimisation”  (part two of Kubinyi’s design cycle; reproduced here in Figure 4.4) in the 
hope of finding a compound which is a drug “candidate”.  
As can be seen this lead structure optimisation is again a highly iterative process 
involving a large number of feedback loops between design of a new derivative, design 
of a new synthetic pathway to produce that derivative, actual chemical synthesis and the 
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biological testing of the new derivatives. A drug candidate is required to be a good deal 
more than a biologically active substance which has the desired effect at a particular 
receptor site – it must have the desired clinical efficacy and additionally meet 
appropriate absorption, distribution, metabolism, excretion and toxicology (side-effect 
profile) requirements in both in vitro tests and animal/human in vivo testing.  Much of 
the final work on taking a candidate to final marketed drug is done within clinical trials 
work (the somewhat more linear process shown at the bottom of Figure 4.4). 




























Key: QSAR: Quantitative structure–activity relationship models
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Although separation into these two phases in the diagrams is helpful to our 
understanding of the overall processes, lead structure identification and optimisation are 
in fact closely linked together with feedback loops between the two, particularly in the 
development of biological testing mechanisms.  
4.3 Looking for crux points – the flow of information and the “dilution” of 
contribution 
The description given above (including the schematics in Figures 4.3 and 4.4) highlights 
the extreme degree of mixing of ideas and concepts in the drug discovery process. Very 
many separate inspirations will be mixed together stimulating the collection of data 
which will itself be fed back into the cycle. As has been stressed, the overall process of 
moving from a piece of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources to a 
lead compound or new marketed drug (or indeed any downstream point on the way to 
these outcomes) involves significant mixing of information such as to cause a “dilution” 
of the original inspiration into a body of other information.  
Notwithstanding this dilution effect, it is clear that if we apply a pure sine qua non 
causation test, all such downstream use flowing from the original inspiration will be 
caused in fact by the information within the original inspiration. However, as has been 
discussed in Chapter 1 of this work, the appropriate test for any situation in which one is 
seeking to determine a legal liability is not one of causation in fact, but one of causation 
in law. 
Although we can seek to “describe” dilution of information in that we can (in a 
particular circumstance) seek to locate the disparate sources of information, determine 
how those pieces of information have come together and have created an outcome, it is 
harder to measure what we might term the degree or “amount” of dilution of a piece of 
information. To do so requires an understanding of what one means by “amount” – the 
test cannot be merely quantitative: Some pieces of information are clearly more 
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“important” that other pieces of information and retain their importance, even where 
they have been quantitatively “swamped” by other data. However, deciding what is 
meant by “important” is an evaluative judgement based one’s frame of reference (which 
may, in part, relate to what one is seeking to achieve with the information).  
If we now imagine that alongside the mixing and dilution of information we see a 
mixing and dilution of “contribution” we see a parallel problem. If we imagine that 
contribution is connected with information then, as we follow the passage of 
information through the system, we can see concomitant flows of “contribution”. As 
with information per se we can describe the sources of contribution, how they have 
come together and the eventual outcome. However, as with the concept of importance 
measuring the “dilution” of contribution cannot be a quantitative exercise but is based 
upon an evaluative determination of what one means by contribution. One might 
simplistically say that contribution should be “based upon” or “linked to” importance, 
but this merely takes us back to what one means by importance and indeed it may be 
difficult to divorce one’s definition of “important” from that of contribution. 
One might argue then, that what we see when we look at the passage of a piece of 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resource through the drug discovery 
process is a “morass” of competing contributions sitting on the back of an entanglement 
of information. There clearly is some form of epistemic dilution going on but how can 
we hope to measure it or categorise it?  
When one examines the topography of drug development, we see that much of drug 
discovery efforts could be described as sequential 
511
 and accumulative. Here the work 
performed by pharmaceutical researchers follows on from (or merely adds to) the core 
epistemic elements provided by the traditional knowledge. There is a substantial 
increase in the volume of additional knowledge, but no matter how much the original 
traditional knowledge is diluted in terms of volume, the underlying nature of the 
contribution made by the traditional knowledge to the downstream product remains 
unchanged.  
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Perhaps if we are to find a putative “crux point” we need to determine a third party 
downstream contribution which affects a “step change” in the nature of the downstream 
product when compared to the original contribution. On examination we find there 
appear few obvious such points.  
It is here that the author turns to the long interface between patent law and the drug 
discovery process for inspiration. As has been stated in Chapter 1, any parallels between 
patent law and putative positive rights in traditional knowledge need to be treated very 
carefully, and it must be stressed that direct analogies with patent law are to be avoided. 
However, patent law has (as will be discussed further in the analysis in Chapter 6) 
particularly had to wrestle with the question of whether newly discovered uses for an 
old thing should be awarded separate patent protection. 
512
 This has come to a notable 
head in addressing the question of whether a second therapeutic use of a known 




This is an area where there to be a distinct clash of conflicting contributions (and an 
arguable “step change” in the nature of the downstream product when compared to the 
original contribution). Accordingly, the current work has taken that problem as an 
inspiration in the identification of the following putative “crux point” in the drug 
development process, namely where an unexpected (“serendipitous”) discovery of a 
new use for a particular genetic resource (or the compounds found in a particular 
genetic resource or their chemical derivatives) is made on the back of the original piece 
of traditional knowledge associated with a genetic resource. 
Having identified such discoveries as a putative crux point, the determination of 
whether that point can be justified as a point at which the chain of causation in law is 
broken can only (as is discussed in Chapter 1) be determined by the application of high 
level philosophical principles which take into account the reasons for the existence of 
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the right in the first place. That analysis is taken forward in the next Chapter. However, 
before moving on to that analysis, this Chapter will conclude by looking more closely at 
the nature and history of serendipitous discoveries within the drug discovery process. 
4.4 The nature of “serendipitous” discoveries of new uses 
Let as assume that our plant-derived ligand has been isolated, purified, and chemically 
characterised. As has been stated, such ligands may have effects on more than one area 
of the body, so leading to undesirable side effects. However, sometimes the “side 
effects” are in some way desirable and here the ligand may become a candidate for 
providing a second therapeutic benefit to an apparently unrelated set of symptoms. This 
is often referred to as a “second medical use” of the compound. However, such second 
uses need not be limited to medicine or, indeed, even to biology. The distinctive 
element in such a step from one part of the research process to the next is that there has 
been an entirely non-obvious, or unexpected, revelation of a new feature (use) of the 
“thing” (for example ligand) obtained from the genetic resource.  
It is crucial to point out immediately that not all steps to a new use will be appear quite 
so momentous. The more one understands about the underlying biological target of a 
ligand, the more that the second use may seem obvious. Figure 4.5 shows this in 
schematic form. By way of example, when one combines our current knowledge of the 
inhibitory effect of acetylsalicylic acid (aspirin) on the activity of cyclooxygenase 
enzymes with our current understanding that the prostaglandins and thromboxanes 
synthesised by cyclooxygenase enzymes have a role both in the mediation of in the 
inflammatory response in injured tissue and in the regulation of blood platelet 
adherence, the “discovery” that aspirin not only serves as an anti-inflammatory but as a 
cardio- and stroke-protective agent may seem trite. However, this understanding of the 
underlying biochemical connection was not at all the situation when the anti-coagulant 
benefits of aspirin were originally uncovered by Craven (see case study below). 
Of course, what happens in practice (and what happened in the case of aspirin –again 
see case study below) is that the discovery of an unexpected second therapeutic benefit 
will initiate research into the biological processes which may underlie the two 




Figure 4.5 Schematic of the nature of serendipitous discoveries in biology 
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For the purposes of the current work, a “serendipitous discovery” of a second use will 
be taken to mean one in which the second use is truly unexpected in the light of the 
current understanding of the underlying biology when the discovery of the second use is 
made. It is accepted that with our increasing understanding of the ways in which ligands 
mediate their effects, such serendipitous discoveries are likely to be much less common 
than was the case in the past.  However, we cannot assume that we have reached an 
“end of history”
515
 with regard to our understanding of biological processes and new 
genetic resource-derived ligands are still leading us to as yet unknown biological 
targets. By way of example we may look to the discovery of the mechanistic target of 
rapamycin (“mTOR”).
516
 This is a protein involved in mammalian intracellular 
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regulation which was only uncovered through research on the immunosuppressant 
effect of the macrocyclic antibiotic, rapamycin. Rapamycin was itself found in the 
Streptomyces hygroscopicus bacterium which was in turn found in prospected soil 
samples found on the Pacific island of Rapa Nui (Easter Island).
517  
There surely yet 
remain many unknown biological mechanisms that may reveal unexpected routes to 
clinical therapy. For example, (and as mentioned in Chapter 2) relatively recent 
developments in epigenetics have overturned scientific dogma in relation to the control 
of expression of the genome. 
518
  
4.5 Case Studies of Serendipitous Discoveries of Second Uses within Drug 
Discovery 
4.5.1 Introduction 
The question posed in relation to serendipitous discoveries of second uses is far from 
theoretical. Such serendipitously discovered uses have been major contributors to the 
development of medical (and other) science. Table 4.4 summarises some examples of 
compounds arising out of research performed on plant-derived drugs and some 
serendipitously-discovered second uses of plant-derived drugs (or their derivatives) 
derived from research on those compounds. 
Sometimes such discoveries have been in relation to the initial plant-derived compound 
– the discovery of the anaesthetic effect of cocaine represents an example of this. 
Occasionally the serendipitously-discovered second use relates to a chemical derivative 
of the initial plant-derived compound, such as the cardio-protective effect of acetyl 
salicylic acid (aspirin). 
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Antipyretic Reduced blood clotting 
(aspirin) 
Cocaine  Erythoxylum 
coca 
(coca)  








Local anaesthetic (cocaine) 


















Pain relief Haloperidol 
 
(anti-psychotic) 
Quinine  Cinchona spp. 
 




















Anti-diabetic Anti-tumour effect 
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 Table compiled from a review of case studies provided in Walter Sneader,  Drug Discovery: the 
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Chemical work related to a plant-derived compound can sometimes uncover previously 
unthought-of compounds with unthought-of uses – Perkin’s discovery of mauveine dye 
whilst tying to synthesise quinine is a truly startling (and world-changing) example of 
this. In the case of the Madagascar (or rosy) periwinkle an unsuspected (anti-tumour) 
effect of compounds found in the plant (vincristine and vinblastine) was discovered 
even though the anti-diabetes research trail stimulated by traditional knowledge relating 
to the plant was unsuccessful. 
The remainder of this Chapter is devoted to abbreviated case studies of four of these 
examples, both by way of illustration and as examples for further analysis within 
Chapter 6. 
4.5.2 Salicin – fever and cardiovascular effects 
The development of naturally-derived salicin into aspirin has been called: 
“the beginning of medicinal chemistry as a science, the optimization of a drug 
through alternating biological testing and chemical modification.” 
520
  
The discovery of aspirin is also interesting as it was essentially discovered through two 
parallel research streams, each looking at different, and unrelated, plants.  
An eighteenth century Oxfordshire clergyman, the Reverend Edward Stone, identified 
the anti-rheumatism and anti-fever effects of the bark of the white willow or Salix alba.  
He was led to study this tree by the bitter taste of its bark (similar to that of the anti-
febrile bark of the South American chinona tree) and by that fact that the tree grew in 
damp conditions which were thought to give rise to fevers. This latter “lead” came out 
of Stone’s application of  the “Doctrine of Signatures”, a long-standing concept in 
which physical or habitat characteristics of a plant which were considered to be 
“similar” to a particular disease or symptom were thought to be “pointing the way” to a 
cure for that disease or symptom. Although he recorded the effects of willow bark 
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extract in a letter to the Royal Society of 1763.
521
 Stone did not personally take his 
discovery any further. 
522
 Although Stone appears to have been unaware of the, fact, 
infusions of Willow bark had in fact long been used against fever in European herbal 
folklore. Willow brew was used by Hippocrates for pain in childbirth and Pliny and 
Galen both suggested it be use against inflammation. 
523
 
Following Stone’s communication to the Royal Society, willow bark extract was used 
as a cheaper substitute for cinchona bark. In 1826 Brugnatelli and Fontana determined 
the active substance in willow bark to be salicin, a compound which was isolated by 
Leroux in 1829.  
 




In 1838, Italian chemist Raffaele Piria working in Italy developed an acid derivative of 
salicin which showed enhanced anti-fever efficacy. He named this derivative salicylic 
acid. The pharmacological effect of willow bark is mediated through salicylic acid, the 
metabolite of the compound salicin which is found in the bark. In 1830 Johann 
Pagenstecher working in Switzerland (independently of the work of Stone) determined 
that an extract of the meadowsweet flower (Spirea ulmaria) would have anti-fever 
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 Again meadowsweet was known within European herbal medicine for its 
pain reducing properties. In 1835 Karl Jakob Löwig (working in Berlin) read of the 
work of Pagenstecher and determined that the active constituent was an acid which he 
named spirsäure from the Linnean name for the meadowsweet plant. This was the same 









Salicylic acid was found to be effective against pain and inflammation. However, due 
(in part) to its acidity, salicylic acid can cause severe irritation to the gastric mucosa 
causing extreme gastric pain. This was a great limitation to its use and eventually 
German chemists Felix Hoffmann and Arthur Eichengrün, working for Bayer AG, 
developed an acetyl derivative of salicylic acid, sodium acetylsalicylate, which avoided 
many of the gastric complications of the original substance. 
529, 530 
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Looking for a name for the new drug, Bayer developed the trade name “Aspirin” from 
its German name acetylspirsäure.  When the history of the development of Aspirin was 
written in 1933, Eichengrün’s significant role in the development of Aspirin was 
excluded due to his Jewish background. His role in testing sodium acetylsalicylate on 
himself and then arranging for clinical trials after Bayer’s pharmacologists had initially 
rejected the compound, was replaced by a story that Hoffmann had tested the new drug 
on his poorly father. 
532
 Aspirin became for many years (until the advent of the other 
non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs, paracetamol and ibuprofen, in the late 50’s and 
early 60’s) one of the first lines of treatment of inflammation.  
Based upon anecdotal observations of bleeding in patients taking aspirin, cardiologist 
Paul Gibson proposed (in a 1948 letter to The Lancet) that salicylates may have a role in 
treating coronary heart disease 
533
 and followed this up in 1949 with publication a 
small-scale study demonstrating a benefit in angina patients. 
534
 This lead was not taken 
up.  
In the late 1940’s California family physician Lawrence Craven made an observation 
that during tonsillectomies and tooth extractions patients who had been used aspirin 
gum pain relief required longer for their bleeding to stop. Without any understanding of 
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the underlying biochemical mechanism, Craven hypothesized aspirin was prolonging 
clotting time and that this effect may be beneficial in preventing coronary heart disease. 
In an uncontrolled study of 400 patients over two years Craven gave “preventative” 
aspirin to patients between 40 and 65. He published his results in a one page letter to a 
local medical journal.
535
  This work was followed up with a further uncontrolled study 
in 8000 patients published in the Mississippi Valley Medical Journal. 
536, 537
 Craven’s 
work received little immediate recognition, perhaps due to the uncontrolled nature of his 
trial and the relative obscurity of its publication. However, the concept of using aspirin 
to prevent cardiovascular disease gained more credibility when Weiss and Aledort 
538
 
working in New York demonstrated that aspirin had an effect of platelet aggregation. 





successfully demonstrated the cardio-protective effects of aspirin. The effect of low-
dose of aspirin as a prophylaxis against stroke and heart attacks is perhaps one of the 
classic examples of a serendipitous “second medical use”. 
Following the Nobel Prize-winning work of a team led by John Vane 
541, 542
 it is now 
understood that aspirin has its anti-inflammatory effect through the irreversible 
inhibition of one of the enzymes (cyclooxygenase) responsible for the synthesis of 
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prostaglandins and thomboxanes (inflammatory mediators which are in part responsible 
for the body’s inflammation response). It is now also understood that as well as being 
inflammatory mediators, prostaglandins and thomboxanes both play a role in the 
platelet aggregation seen in blood clotting 
543
 which explains aspirin’s previously 
surprising effects on the two systems. 
4.5.3 Cocaine – psychoactivity and anaesthetic effect 
Erythoxylum coca and Erythoxylum novogranatense are shrubs which grow of the 
Amazonian slopes of the Andes of Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. The chewing of coca 
leaves has long been practised by the indigenous peoples and is an integral part of 
native culture which continues to the present day.  
The practice was reported in Pedro Cieza de Leon’s Crónica del Perú of 1565 
544
 and 
by Nicholas Monardes in his Historia medicinal de Indias occidentales in 1569. 
545
 
Archaeological evidence suggests that Erythoxylum coca was brought under cultivation 
in the eastern Andes by 5000 BCE. 
546
 Pre-Columbian Andean ceramic figurines have 
been found which look to have a plug in their cheek, and small ceramic containers 
which may be associated with coca chewing and dating from 3000 BCE have been 
found in coastal Ecuador. 
547
 The chewing of coca leaves was well established under the 
Inca empire, but was limited to nobles, priests and the chasquis couriers.
548
 The 
chewing of coca leaves has a mild euphoric effect which in the Andes is used to 
counteract the effects of altitude. 
549, 550
  
                                                          
 
543
 H Tohgi, S Konno, K Tamura, B Kimura and K Kawano, "Effects of low-to-high doses of aspirin on 
platelet aggregability and metabolites of thromboxane A2 and prostacyclin" (1992) 23(10) Stroke 1400 
 
544
 Raviña (n 173), 29 
 
545
Sneader, Drug Discovery: the evolution of modern medicines (n 526), 49 
 
546
 Balick & Cox (n 8), 169 
 
547
 Balick & Cox (n 8), 169 
 
548
 Laws (n 7), 72 
 
549
 John Mitchell Watt, “Magic and Witchcraft in Relation to Plants and Folk Medicine” in Tony Swain 
(ed) Plants in the Development of Modern Medicine (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 




After the Spanish conquest of the Andes, Spanish missionaries attempted to restrict the 
use of coca but Spanish slave owners (and later slave owners in the United States) 
encouraged its use amongst slaves as a way of enhancing productivity. 
551
 In the 1880’s 
Coca leaf became a major component of various “tonics” (famously including Coca-
Cola 
552
) and untested medicines.  
In 1855 Friedrich Gaedchke extracted an active alkaloid from coca leaves and in 1860 
Albert Niemann (at the University of Gottingen) isolated pure crystals of this alkaloid 
from the coca leaf which he named “cocaine”. During this work Niemann had tasted his 









In the mid- to late- 19
th
 century cocaine and coca leaf extract were seen as being nothing 
more than a mild stimulant, much like caffeine found in tea and coffee, and the risk of 
addiction was unsuspected. In the 1880’s Sigmund Freud began investigating how the 
indigenous peoples of the Andes used coca leaves to stave off exhaustion. According to 








 Laws (n 7), 72 
 
552
 Laws (n 7), 73 
 
553
 Sneader, Drug Discovery: the evolution of modern medicines (n 526), 49 
 
554
  By NeuroTIKER. Public Domain. (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Kokain_-_Cocaine.svg) 




DuQuesne and Reeves, 
555
 Freud initially saw cocaine as something of a panacea, and 
invited many of his friends to try it.  However, whilst using cocaine as part of a 
treatment for morphine addiction in a friend, the development of cocaine addiction in 
that friend led to Freud’s rejection of drug therapy for psychiatric disorders. 
556
 
In 1882 Carl Koller, an ophthalmologist working in Vienna, began searching for a way 
in which to conduct eye surgery on patients whilst they were awake. In 1884 Koller’s 
friend Freud invited Koller to work on the stimulant effects of the cocaine alkaloid. 
During this work Freud told Koller that he and others had found that cocaine produced a 
numbing effect on the tongue when taken orally.  Koller was still working in parallel on 
his search for an ophthalmic anaesthetic, and on hearing of cocaine’s numbing effects 
immediately began to test a cocaine solution in the eye of a frog. He moved on to 
testing it on his own eye and that of his colleague with great success. Within months of 
Koller’s paper on the anaesthetic effects of cocaine being delivered at a conference in 
Heidelberg, cocaine was being used as a local anaesthetic for eye surgery and ear, nose 
and throat surgery.
557 , 558 , 559
 This local anaesthetic effect of cocaine acted as the 
stimulant for a broad range of derivatives which have created very effective local 




 Novocaine (an injected local 
anaesthetic for dental surgery),
563 , 564
 lignocaine (or lidocaine),
565 , 566  
mepivacaine, 
ropivacaine and bupivacaine (used for continuous epidural anaesthesia in childbirth). 
567
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These compounds are now understood to have their effect through a prevention and 
conduction of a nerve impulse in the nerve cell membrane. The seminal (and Nobel 
Prize-winning) work on the conduction of the nerve impulse was done by Alan Hodgkin 
and Andrew Huxley in 1952
568 , 569
 and the understanding of the effect of local 
anaesthetics one the nerve action potential was only understood in the 1970’s and early 
1980’s.
570,  571
 However, since this work came later than the discovery of most local 
anaesthetics, that knowledge was unknown to the majority of those involved in the 
history of the development of local anaesthesia and cocaine derivatives. Those workers 
were reliant only on a structure-function correlation gained through the amassed data 
from trial and error studies (some of which correlations would not be widely 
disseminated as much of the work was undertaken within the commercial laboratories 
of pharmaceutical companies).  
4.5.4 Quinine and mauveine 
Malaria has historically been, and still is, one of the most lethal and debilitating 
diseases. It is now known to be caused by a microorganisms of the genus Plasmodium 
(particularly in humans, P. falciparum and P. vivax, while P. ovale, and P. malariae) 
which are transmitted by mosquitoes of the genus Anopheles. These microorganisms 
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mature and reproduce in the liver and blood cells (at different stages of their life cycle) 
causing cell damage and fever. 
572
 
Before any understanding of the cause of the disease or of its mode of transmission, it 
was called in English the ague fever and believed to be transmitted by “bad air” (mal 
aria in Italian) found near swamps and stagnant water (of course, in reality, the breeding 
ground of the Anopheles mosquito). 
573
 
The beginnings of the Western understanding of the bark from which quinine is 
obtained is surrounded by uncertainty.  On one account, it begins with the posting of 
Don Luis Gerónimo Fernández de Cabrera de Bobadilla Cerda y Mendoza, Count of 
Chinchón, as Viceroy of Peru. According to a report by Sebastiano Bado (published in 
1663) in 1638, in Lima, Chinchón’s wife, the Countess of Chinchón, was critically ill 
with malaria and his physician suggested that they use the bark of the quina quina tree 





  After Chinchón’s wife recovered from the fever Bado attributes her as 
bringing the bark of the quina quina tree back to Spain. Although the report of Bado has 
since been put into doubt, 
576
 Linnaeus, believing the story, named the genus of quina 
quina tree, Cinchona, after the Countess (though in the process misspelling her name). 
577
 
However, in 1633 the Augustinian monk, Antonio de la Calancha, recorded the 
properties of the quina quina tree in his The Chronicle of St. Augustine. It appears that 
the Spanish missionaries had been informed of the properties of the bark of the quina 
quina by the indigenous peoples of the “Land of Loxa” (now Ecuador). The Jesuits 
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began to use the quina quina bark for the prophylaxis and treatment of malaria. Cardinal 
Johannes de Lugo, Superior General of the Jesuit Order in Rome, who had family 
connections with Seville (the monopoly trading port with Peru) asked for the so-called 
“Peruvian Bark” to be sent to the (malaria-troubled) Vatican in 1645. In 1655 it was 
used during the Papal convocation and successfully prevented deaths from malaria 
amongst the cardinals. In protestant Europe the quina quina bark powder became 
known as “Jesuit Powder” and although the powder reached England by 1654, Oliver 
Cromwell died of malaria in 1658 having refused to be “Jesuited” by its administration. 
578, 579
 
European science in the late-18
th
 century was looking to isolate specific chemical 
substances from plant extracts. With its clear advantages as an anti-malarial, the quina 
quina bark was a key focus of this effort. In 1820 Joseph Pelletier and Joseph Caventou 





 Since an infusion of quina quina bark was unpleasant to taste and 
varied widely in concentration of active constituent, purified quinine had great 
advantages in terms of patient compliance and control of side-effects over the bark. 
However, quinine itself could not be synthesised and its only source remained 
purification of quina quina bark. Demand for the bark led to substantial supply 
problems and denudation of the native Cinchona species in the Andes.  In an early 
attempt to control genetic resources, the governments of Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru and 
Colombia prohibited the export of Cinchona seeds and plants. However, through 
botanical espionage the European imperial powers developed their own Cinchona 





 Balick and Cox state that: 
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“By 1930 the Dutch plantations in Java produced 22 million pounds of bark, 
yielding 97 percent of the world’s quinine.”
584
 
Difficulties in obtaining the quina quina bark led to a drive to make artificial quinine 
and the effort to produce quinine through a synthetic route had begun in earnest by the 
mid-nineteenth century. However, the task was problematic and in 1853 Louis Pasteur 
had to report his failure to determine the structure of quinine.  
In early 1856, the 18 year old William Henry Perkin was working as the student and 
assistant of August Wilhelm von Hofmann at the Royal College of Chemistry in 
London (now Imperial College) on a project to synthesize quinine. Hofmann sought to 
make the quinine alkaloid by the oxidisation of aniline with potassium dichromate. 
Whilst Hofmann was away in Germany during the Royal College’s Easter vacation, 
Perkin performed one such experiment at the laboratory he had set up in his home in 
Stepney, London. Reacting toluidine (4-methylphenylamine) with chromic acid, Perkin 
was left with a dark sludge which suggested to him that the reaction had been a failure - 
probably due to contaminants in the reagents. He repeated the experiment using aniline 
(phenylamine) and again produced a dark residue. 
585
 On washing the sludge from the 
glassware with ethanol he noticed a vibrant purple colour. Considering this finding not 
to be a part of the quinine project set by Hofmann, Perkin began independent work on 
investigating the purple compound. Working with Pullars dye works in Perth, Scotland, 
to find a suitable mordant, Perkin found his purple compound (which he named aniline 
purple, but which eventually became known as mauveine) to be an effective colour-fast 
dye of silk and applied for a patent for it in mid-1856. 
586
 Up to that date, a strong, 
colour-fast, purple dye, Tyrian purple, could only be obtained from sea snails of the 
family Muricidae, but this was expensive and difficult to obtain (a reason why purple had 
come to be controlled by, and became symbolic of, Roman emperors). 
587
 Despite 
Hofmann’s contrary advice, Perkin and his father built a factory in Greenford, 
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Middlesex (opened in 1859) to commercially (and very successfully) exploit the aniline 
purple dye. 
588
 Interestingly (and perhaps not surprisingly), Hofmann was at this time 
embarking on his own development of violet dyes (which he patented in 1863). 
589
 
Silk dyed with Perkin’s mauveine dye became popularized by Queen Victoria and the 
Empress Eugénie of France. Although the structure of Perkin’s mauve dye was only 
elucidated in 1994, 
590
 Perkin’s use of aniline as a starting point for the manufacture of 
vibrant, colour-fast dyes was very rapidly taken up from the mid-19
th
 century onwards. 
591
 Atkins states: 
“Thus he laid the foundation of all his and much of Britain’s national wealth”.
592
  
Sneader describes Perkin’s discovery as: 
“the single greatest stimulus for the development of organic chemistry” 
593
  
The discovery led to the development, particularly in Germany, of major dye 
manufacturers such as BASF (originally the Badische Anilin- und Soda-Fabrik 
company), 
594
 Bayer, and Höchst. 
595
  
The first systemically used antibiotic drug, the sulphonamide Prontosil, was developed 
from an analine dye within the laboratories of Bayer AG. 
596
 This stimulated further 
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development of antibiotic drugs based on dyes, and many dye companies became, in 
turn, major players in drug discovery. 
597
 In the light of all this, Perkin’s mauve has 
been called (perhaps without undue hyperbole) “the colour which changed the world”. 
598
 
The structure of quinine was eventually determined by Paul Rabe in 1918 
599
 and in 
1944 Robert Woodward and William Doering published details of a de novo route for 
quinine synthesis. 
600
 Since then there have been many improvements of the method for 
synthesis, but extraction from Cinchona bark remains more economically viable.
 601
  
Quinine also served as the initiator of another research trail when Ludwig Knorr, at the 
University of Erlangen, in 1887 and whilst seeking to make a quinoline derivative made 
an antipyretic and analgesic called antipyrine. Antipyrine became the basis of a family 
of pyrazole drugs which were very widely used in pain relief. 
602
 
4.5.5 The vinca alkaloids – anti-tumour effects 
The Madagascar or rosy periwinkle (Catharanthus roseus previously categorised as 
Vinca rosea) is a plant which, though originally indigenous to Madagascar, has long 
been cultivated as an ornamental species across the tropics and sub-tropics. 
603
 Working 
at the University of Western Ontario in 1949, endocrinologist Ralph Noble sought to 
examine the effect of extracts of the rosy periwinkle on rat blood glucose. Noble was 
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inspired to begin this work after he had heard of the folk use in the Caribbean of the 
rosy periwinkle in the treatment of diabetes. Noble received samples of the plant from 
Jamaica, and prepared an extract. Neither oral nor injected administration of that extract 
affected blood glucose levels. However, when injecting the animals with extract, Noble 
found that the rats seemed to suffer from an enhanced level of infection. Investigating 
this further, Noble found that, after an initial enhancement, treated rats showed greatly 
reduced leucocyte levels which seemed to be the result of damage to the bone marrow 
of the animals. 
Given that similar effects were seen with current anti-tumour drugs, Noble wondered 
whether the extract might contain an anti-cancer agent. Working with organic chemist, 
Charles Beer, Noble isolated an active alkaloid, vincristine (originally named 
vincaleukoblastine) from the periwinkle extract which was found to have an inhibitory 
effect on transplanted tumours. This work was reported at the New York Academy of 




Figure 4.10 Structural formula of vinblastine 
605
 
At that meeting Gordon Svoboda from Eli Lilly & Co announced to Noble and Beer that 
a team at Eli Lilly (stimulated by reports of folk use of rosy periwinkle against diabetes 
- but this time in the Philippines) had similarly found that extract of the plant (obtained 
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from within the USA) showed no antidiabetic efficacy. However, Eli Lilly had a general 
pharmacological screening program and an extract from the plant was put through that 
and a beneficial effect was observed when it used against transplanted acute lymphocyte 
leukaemia in mice. 
606, 607, 608, 609





Figure 4.11 Structural formula of vincristine 
611
 
Synthetic chemistry and screening studies at the Institut de Chimie des Substances 
Naturelles at Gif-sur-Yvette, Paris, have since led to the development of two semi-
synthetic analogues of the naturally occurring vinca alkaloids – vindesine and 
vinorelbine which have anti-tumour activity 
612,  613  
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The vinca alkaloids are believed to have their anti-tumour effects by having an effect on 
disruption of cell division through an effect on the tubulin microtubules within the 





                                                          
 
614
 L Wilson, K Anderson, and K Creswell, “On the Mechanism of Action of Vinblastine” (1974) 63  J 
Cell Biol 373a 
 
615
 Richard H Himes, Roderick N Kersey, Irene Heller-Bettinger, and Fred E Samson “Action of the 
Vinca Alkaloids Vincristine, Vinblastine, and Desacetyl Vinblastine Amide on Microtubules in Vitro” 
(1976) 36 Cancer Res 3798 
 
616
 Mary Ann Jordan and Leslie Wilson, “Microtubules as a target for anticancer drugs” (2004) 4 Nature 




Chapter 5  
Application of Philosophical Justifications for Intellectual 
Property to the Serendipitous Discovery of Second Uses  
_____________________________________________________  
 
“What is luck”, he said, “but the ability to exploit accidents?”  
 Jeanette Winterson, The Passion 1987 
 
“Obey the Biblical injunction: Seek and ye shall find.  
But seek not to find that for which ye seek.” 





The analysis of the topography of drug discovery set out in Chapter 4 supported the 
claim that that (notwithstanding significant admixture with other information), there 
always remains a causation in fact thread by which even the most remote downstream 
uses of a piece of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources can be said to 
have taken some advantage of the original “inspiration”. The analysis also showed that 
the majority of the causal chains which run from the “inspiration” provided by a piece 
of traditional knowledge to a marketed drug appear to show no special features which 
might give rise to a break in the a chain of causation in law, the progression commonly 
resembles a smooth continuum involving sequential and accumulative contributions.   
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That analysis did, however, (with inspiration from problems encountered in patent law) 
identify “serendipitous” discoveries of second uses for the resource as a point at which 
the third party downstream contribution may arguably change the nature of the 
downstream product relative the original indigenous contribution and that such 
serendipitous discoveries may act as a putative “crux point” at which the key high level 
justifications for a right in traditional knowledge may be brought to bear.  
It is the aim of this chapter to perform that analysis. 
5.2 Policy options 
To assist with a consistent analysis across each philosophical justification (and in 
coming to a synthesis of the approaches in the Chapter 6) this work will examine to 
what extent (if at all) the findings from each analysis comply with five potential policy 
options in relation to the legal treatment of a serendipitous discovery of a second use 
based on a piece of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources.    
In the Rawlsian maximin analysis set out later in this chapter, the person in Rawls’ 
“original position” is asked to choose between these five policy options or (as they are 
termed there) “decisions”. For consistency, this “decision” terminology (and their 
numbering) is used throughout the entire study.  
These decisions are as follows:  
 in decision d1 it is decided there should be no veto right to traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources at all; 
 in decision d2 it is decided  that there should be a veto right to traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources which extends to all and anything 
which is derived in fact from the original piece of  traditional knowledge, 
without limitation;  
 in decision d3 it is decided that although there should be an access right to 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources it is also decided that 
any such access right should not extend to preventing the use of a product 
arising out of a truly serendipitous discovery (even where such discovery would 
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not in fact have been made without the lead provided by the traditional 
knowledge associated with the genetic resource); 
 in decision d4 it is decided that although there should be an access right to 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources it is also decided that 
any such access right should not extend to preventing the use of a product 
arising out of a truly serendipitous discovery (even where such discovery would 
not in fact have been made without the lead provided by the traditional 
knowledge associated with the genetic resource). However, any such use is 
subject to a compensatory mechanism based on an apportionment determined by 
an assessment of relative contributions; and 
 In decision d5 it is decided that, although there should be an access right to 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, it is also decided that 
any such access right should not extend to preventing any downstream use of a 
product. However, any such use is subject to a compensatory mechanism based 
on an apportionment determined by an assessment of relative contributions. 
 
5.3 Deontological Justifications 
5.3.1The application of Lockean labour-desert theory 
5.3.1.1 Initial considerations: Ownership and temporal scope 
As was stated in Chapter 3, there are some difficult questions to be addressed in relation 
to the application of either labour-desert or personality right approaches to ownership of 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, not least due to the lack of 
certainty of subject matter for the right.  The question of ownership is especially acute 
in light of the trans-generational evolution of traditional knowledge associated with 
genetic resources over a long course of time, with potentially multiple authors and 
influences. 
Similarly, the forward looking individuation and backward looking origination and in-
imitativeness boundaries of any right cannot help but touch on questions of temporal 
scope. Backward looking boundaries need to be examined at the time the protected 
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innovation is made or (more likely for a right in traditional knowledge) when the claim 
to the “innovation” is made. Forward looking boundaries need to be assessed at the time 
the claim is asserted against another or when a third party is seeking to individuate a 
follow-on concept from an inspiration.  
Under Articles 7 and 5 of the Protocol the rights in traditional knowledge associated 
with genetic resources are not time limited (and neither is the restriction on use of 
genetic resources under Articles 6 and 5). Current WIPO proposals for positive rights in 
traditional knowledge 
618
 similarly do not envisage a time limitation. This may appear 
on the face of it highly unusual – the majority of intellectual property rights are time 
limited 
619
 and this time limitation is considered by Hughes 
620
 to part of the “social 
bargain” between the grant of rights to innovators and the preservation of the right of 
others to innovate.  
It is interesting to note that when one examines those time limited rights one realises 
that there is often, and of necessity often has to be, a close link between a temporal 
limitation and certainty of the originator. For example, Article 7(1) of the Berne 
Convention 
621
 requires that signatory states should have a minimum term of copyright 
protection of the life of the author and fifty years after his death. Similarly, Article 7bis 
of that Convention requires that an identical minimum term of protection shall also 
apply in the case of a work of joint authorship, provided that the terms measured from 
the death of the author shall be calculated from the death of the last surviving author.  
As was stated above, the question of “authorship” is acute in light of the trans-
generational evolution of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources. There 
is likely to be no single or identifiable “author” upon which to hang a start point for the 
time limitation of the right. This lack of an identifiable author is problematic from a 






 Those which are not time limited include registered trade marks, rights in passing off and unfair 
competition (all of which are fundamentally orientated toward the protection of trading goodwill) and the 
right to prevent the inequitable disclosure of confidential information. 
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pure natural rights perspective. As we have seen much of the classical natural rights 
account, whether Lockean-desert or based on personality rights, relies on the extension 
of the inalienable freedom of the individual and in our present case that “individual” is 
either lost to history or (more likely) consists of a number of separate individuals (all 
similarly lost to history) who have developed the knowledge over time.  
However, if we are to accept that there is a natural rights justification for a positive right 
in traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, we may have to similarly 
accept that there can be no temporal limitation on the positive right. It is, in fact, 
difficult to see how such a right could function with such a limitation. Such a lack of 
temporal limitation is entirely consistent with looking at the positive right as a right of 
the entire indigenous community. As Gibson argues: 
“...Indigenous and traditional interests in medicinal and agricultural knowledge, 
cultural expressions, stories, dance, and so on, are integral to continuing 
Indigenous and traditional cultures. That significance and relationship to the 
community exists in perpetuity.” 
622
  
As a heuristic tool, the current work will seek to limit the number of variables in the 
overall problem and assume in the Lockean and personality right analyses undertaken 
below that the inherent problems of ownership are resolved. Similarly, with regard to 
the analyses set out below it has been assumed, again as a heuristic tool, that all positive 
rights to control the use of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources are 
without temporal limitation.  
5.3.1.2 The importance of “contribution” 
Let us assume that an indigenous group tell a bioprospector that “plant A is good for 
treating ailment X”. From a Lockean perspective there is an argument that the group has 
a justifiable claim over that which they have contributed, namely that plant A is good 
for treating ailment X. However, does that specific basis allow the indigenous group to 
also have a justifiable claim to general “therapeutic usefulness” which would cover not 
only the treatment of ailment “X” or creation of effect “B” (which was their specific 
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“contribution”) but also to the treatment of ailment “Y”, or even ailment “Z”, or is their 
supportable claim limited only to that which was their original contribution? The 
difference is potentially crucial. 
There is a unifying factor which is entirely central to a Lockean/labour-desert-based 
account of the propertization of intangibles. That is that the right to control the use of 
information is inextricably linked to the contribution being made by the individual 
seeking to claim a right over the information. Contribution here is akin to the “mixing 
of labour” with the commons in Locke’s original account; it is the conception of an idea 
which pulls that idea out of the commons of “yet to be had ideas” and into the 
ownership of the author of the idea. Without contribution it is impossible to see why 
there should be any “reward” or indeed to whom one would give it.  However, although 
there can be no reward without contribution, we are left asking what degree of 
contribution is required for there to be a reward? Here then we see the term 
“contribution” needing to encompass elements of Gibson’s “in-imitativeness”, a sense 
that desert is based on achieving a “worthy” level of originality and non-obviousness 
from what has gone before. We must also examine the contribution of others who are 
using the first idea as an inspiration: at what point does their contribution outweigh the 
contribution of the originators and achieve a sufficient level of in-imitativeness such 
that their development is “worthy”:  
a) of its own protection; and 
 b) to break free of the original idea? 
Within a consequentialist account, where one is seeking to affect a particular outcome 
though imposition of a particular positive law, one can envisage how one might look to 
set appropriate thresholds of in-imitativeness. Although it would undoubtedly be 
extremely difficult in practice, within this approach there is, in theory, a way of 
“titrating” your threshold such as to give the effect (or balance of effects) you wish to 
achieve. One might think here of ongoing debates and case law surrounding the setting 
of an inventive step requirement within patent law, but there are, of course, very many 
more examples.  
In contrast, the setting of a threshold for in-imitativeness within a Lockean account is 
harder, perhaps even impossible. How does one know what degree of contribution 
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should deserve reward? This, of course, echoes Attas’ “uncertainty of 
origination/individuation” attack on the entire natural rights justification for intellectual 
property. 
623
 Although we can immediately acknowledge these potential difficulties, is 
there anything that a Lockean analysis can bring to the current problem? 
As stated above, within the natural rights account we can, at the very least, say that 
without any contribution at all there can be no reward. To what extent can we take this 
very basic proposition to investigate competing claims to contribution? We need to 
know what “claims” are being asserted before we can make judgment upon them. 
To do so we would have to identify, and deconstruct, the “building blocks” of the 
concepts in play - what will be referred to here as the epistemological “elements” of a 
putative contribution. In the present case, the crucial question is to ask: What 
epistemological elements have been contributed by the indigenous holders of the 
information which could give rise to a right to control? What type of “claim” is being 
made by the indigenous group? How would this claim compare with that made by a 
third party discoverer of a serendipitous discovery of a second use?  
Once the epistemological elements have been identified, we will then need to determine 
from whom they have originated. Given the potential complexity of meaning of the 
term “contribution” within the Lockean account, within the analysis set out below 
“contribution” will be used in what is its most basic way – the test applied will be the 
mere independence of contribution of an epistemological element from third party 
contributions of other elements. 
Let us consider the following two scenarios: 
a) The “North versus South Scenario” in which, with respect to the same plant 
“A”, we find that a group of indigenous peoples (the “North” group) have 
identified only that it can treat ailment “X”, whereas another group of 
indigenous people (the “South” group) have identified that it can treat ailment 
“Y” (but do not know of  the effect on “X”); and 
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b) The “North versus West Scenario” (seen at the end of Chapter 4) in which 
Western pharmaceutical company “West” know, on the basis of the traditional 
knowledge divulged by Group North that plant “A” is useful for the treatment 
of ailment “X” and begin working on plant A and extract the previously 
unknown pharmaceutically active compound, “Red”, from it. Red is found to 
have an even more potent effect on ailment “X” than plant “A”. However, 
during the testing of Red in animals an entirely unexpected biological response 
is noted which leads to the investigation of Red as a treatment for ailment “Y”. 
Red becomes a successful (and profitable) drug for the treatment of “Y”.   
The knowledge of North and South can arguably be divided into two epistemological 
elements: 
a) Knowledge of very existence of plant “A” and 
b) Knowledge therapeutic effect of Plant “A”:  
i) in the case of North that it treats ailment “X”; and  
ii) in the case of South that it treats ailment “Y”. 
The knowledge of West arguably consists of three epistemological elements: 
a) Knowledge of existence of plant “A” (knowledge obtained from North); 
b) Knowledge that Plant “A” treats ailment “X” (knowledge obtained from North) 
c) Knowledge that Plant “A” treats ailment “Y” (knowledge discovered by West) 
Assuming, as a heuristic tool, that a right to control information is dependent upon the 
independent contribution of the putative right holder, what would that give us in relation 
to each epistemological element? 
In the North versus South scenario, both North and South have found that Plant A is 
therapeutically valuable. North understand that A can treat X (but not Y) whereas South 
understand that A can treat Y (but not X). In each case, their understanding is 
contingent upon understanding that plant A exists and is therapeutically valuable (which 
has been independently determined by both North and South). However, in both cases 
the scope of their understanding of the whole range of therapeutic effect is partially 
compromised. If their rights are exactly coterminous with their independent contribution 
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then arguably North can control the use of A for treatment of X (but not Y) and South 
can control the use of A for treatment of Y (but not X).  
In the West versus North scenario, only North have independently found that Plant A is 
therapeutically valuable (what will be described as the broad “claim”). North understand 
that A can treat X (but not Y), whereas West understand that A can treat Y (and X).  For 
both North and West, their narrow understanding is contingent upon the understanding 
that plant A exists and is therapeutically valuable (the broad “claim”). However, in 
marked contrast to the North versus South scenario, West’s broader understanding has 
not been independently determined by West, but by North. If North’s rights are 
coterminous with their independent contribution, then North should control West’s use 
of A for treatment of X. 
If West’s rights are coterminous with their independent contribution, then West have in 
fact made no entirely independent contribution – their understanding of the effect of A 
on Y is contingent upon the broad knowledge (the existence and therapeutic usefulness 
of A) determined by North.  
However, North have not independently contributed the understanding that A can treat 
Y - the understanding of the effect of A on Y has been determined by West (even 
though West’s understanding is contingent upon knowledge determined by North). 
The concept of rights being coterminous with independent contribution would seem to 
reasonably solve the North versus South conundrum. However, applied to West versus 
North it leaves us in a state of limbo – although it obviously supports North’s control 
over the use of plant A to treat X, in relation to plant A treating disease Y, West have 
not independently arrived at an understanding that A treats Y. However, importantly, 
neither has North. They have at most made only a part contribution. So on an 
“independently-arrived at” test, North cannot assert control ownership over the use of A 
for Y as they have not contributed the “beneficial effect on Y” element.  
Clearly, using this test gives a very limited outcome: one would only have a right to 
control over all those epistemological elements you have independently conceived (or 
discovered). No broader claims that encompass other narrower epistemological 
elements would be ever be permitted, but neither would any new narrow claims be 
awarded. So if we are going to allow any future claims such a strict test cannot apply. 
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However, going back to Attas’ criticism above, although one can perhaps make such a 
system work, the doing of this (for example by setting thresholds for in-imitativeness) is 
a question of the imposition of positive law, not of natural law. 
5.3.1.3 Types of claim 
If we are to permit North to have a claim over West’s later use of plant A for treatment 
of Y, we need to consider how such a claim would be structured. Such a broader claim 
might be considered to operate in two ways:  
a) as an “inchoate” claim; or 
b) as an “inherent” claim 
5.3.1.4 An “inchoate” claim 
Here we are saying that within North’s original discovery there are in fact two claims. 
One is the narrow claim to the use of plant A for treatment of X. The other is an 
inchoate claim to “use of plant A for other therapeutic purposes which will incorporate 
use of plant A for other therapeutic indications”. The validity of this inchoate claim is 
dependent upon North’s narrower discovery of “the use of plant A for treatment of X” – 
this has to be the case as without the support of the narrower claim there can be no 
claim at all. This inchoate claim is in some way “made whole” at some future date when 
a further discovery is made in relation to plant A.  
Is such an inchoate claim which catches later developments “as and when” they arise 
consistent with a Lockean account of propertization of ideas? Looking at the problem 
by way of analogy to Locke’s “inclosure” of common land, one could imagine that the 
claimant is inclosing one small area (based upon the narrow contribution) from the 
commons. The claimant is also inclosing a larger area which corresponds to the larger 
(though partial) claim. This area may not be so developed as the narrower one – perhaps 
only services and drainage have been put in - but nothing has yet been built. The 
question remains, however, if I come to build a house on the serviced and drained land, 
does the original claimant have an absolute right to bar me from building, or only a 
right to charge me for the provision of services and drainage. If so, how much can he 
charge? One might argue that the charge should be in line with their part contribution, 
but how is that to be determined? Again the Lockean natural rights approach per se 
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desperately struggles to address questions of degree. However, although a justification 
for an absolute bar to downstream use cannot be ruled out, we can see that the idea of a 
partial inchoate claim, justified by a partial contribution and warranting a partial degree 
of compensation is not inherently inconsistent with the Lockean account for rights in 
intellectual property. 
5.3.1.5 An “inherent” claim 
Within an indigenous context, when a plant (or an extract from it) is administered to a 
patient it is possible that the active compound (or compounds) found within the plant 
will (dependent on dose) have all their pharmacological effects to a greater or lesser 
degree. However, only some of these effects, the more obvious ones, may be recognised 
by the indigenous users of the plant. Let us suppose that West’s “serendipitously 
discovered” second medical effect was in fact present throughout the use by North, but 
remained unrecognised. Can, North, the indigenous originators of the “first” medical 
use say that any serendipitously discovered second medical effect was inherently 
disclosed within the first administration, and that this was part of their “contribution”. If 
so, might that, of itself, support a claim to broad ownership that the plant was simply 
“therapeutically” or (still more broadly) “biologically” useful? 
Questions relating to inherency have exercised patent law for decades. 
624
 The crucial 
question has been whether the discovery of a new technical effect in relation to a 
previously known compound should form the basis for a patent to that new technical 
effect, even where that technical effect was inherently present in the previous use of the 
compound, but not recognised.   
Generally speaking, case law in EPC signatory states and the EPO (notably the 
approach of the Enlarged Board of Appeal of the European Patent Office in Mobil 
Friction Reducing Additive G 2/88 625 and Bayer G 6/88 626) and in the US 
627
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the proposition that disclosure of a product for a narrower use does not prevent a patent 
for a later-discovered use, even if the later discovered effect was inherently present in 
the first use. The crucial factor to be considered is whether previous disclosures, or 
patents relating to the compound, have made the “hidden” effect available to the public. 
If so, a patent for the second effect will be invalid for lack of novelty. Mere prior use (in 




The case of Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 
629, 630
 before the United Kingdom House of 
Lords, examined the related question of whether a previously unknown mechanism for 
achieving a known effect was patentable. Here Merrell Dow had discovered that their 
anti-histamine drug, terfenadine, actually mediated its effect through a carboxylic-acid 
metabolite of terfenadine (fexofenadine, produced in the liver of humans), not through 
terfenadine itself as had been previously believed. They sought to patent the acid 
metabolite. The court held that the original terfenadine patent disclosed how to use 
terfenadine, notwithstanding that the mechanism by which this was achieved was 
unknown.  
This approach is consistent with the approach taken in Mobil; the crucial difference 
between this situation in Merrell Dow and that in Mobil is that in Merrell Dow the 
claims in both patents were directed to the same end –the antihistamine effect- rather 
than to a hidden second effect. In Mobil the claims in the patent in suit were directed to 
an entirely different use (friction reduction) as opposed to anti-rust effects. 
Within EPC signatory states, the patentability of products for therapeutic use can appear  
somewhat byzantine. Article 54(4) EPC ensures that one can have a patent to a 
therapeutic or diagnostic use of a known substance or composition provided that such 
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use of the known substance is not already known. In practice this means that the first 
discoverer of the “first medical use” of a compound is entitled to a broad protection for 
the compound. For example S4A(3) UK Patents Act 1977 states: 
“In the case of an invention consisting of a substance or composition for use in 
any such method, the fact that the substance or composition forms part of the 
state of the art shall not prevent the invention from being taken to be new if the 
use of the substance or composition in any such method does not form part of 
the state of the art.” 
UKIPO Manual of Patent Practice states: 
“Section 4A(3) has the effect that a known substance or composition may be 
patented for use in a method of treatment by surgery or therapy or a method of 
diagnosis practised on the human or animal body, provided that its use in any 
such method is new ("first medical use"). That is to say, if a known substance or 
composition not previously used in surgery, therapy or diagnosis is found to be 
useful in treating, say a human disease, or to obtain a specific "therapeutic" 
effect (e.g. analgesic or antibiotic), a patent for the substance or composition for 
use in therapy (unspecified) may be obtained, i.e. the claim need not be limited 
to the specific therapeutic effect; additional claims directed towards more than 
one specific therapeutic effect may be allowed in the same patent application, 
provided of course that they are supported by the description.” [emphasis added] 
So called “second medical use” claims under EPC patent law are also permitted, but 
have received special legislative treatment. This treatment has been driven in very large 
part by the impact of the exclusion (for public policy reasons) of methods of medical 
treatment, surgery and diagnosis from patentability. 
631
 The potential problem was that 
where a second therapeutic effect was identified for a known chemical compound (all 
else in the invention being the same as that which went before) any novelty would 
reside only in a method of treatment, which is specifically excluded under EPC Article 
53(c). This problem exercised many patent offices, and courts, (and led to some 
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 but was eventually dealt with by way of a specific 
legislative allowance
634 , 635 , 636
 (although the effect of claims permitted by such 
allowance remains the subject of recent litigation). 
637, 638
 
Any second (or subsequent) medical use patent (narrowed by “use”) serves its 
commercial purpose either by extending patent protection for the first patentee or by 
allowing a second patentee to have rights (although those rights will be subject to the 
first, broader, patent during its monopoly period). 
5.3.1.6 Inchoate claims versus inherent claims 
Whilst the “inchoate” claim envisaged above may seem to be achieving a similar end to 
the inherent claim by increasing scope of protection, when we look closely we see that 
both claims are achieving that end in distinctly different ways.  
Returning to our Lockean commons analogy, rather than the inchoate claim based on 
part contribution (services and drains) situation seen above, in the inherent claim 
situation our Lockean builder is essentially saying: “I have built some houses over here 
(which I am claiming) but in doing so I have inadvertently built some other (invisible) 
houses over there, of which you (and I) were until now unaware, but which will stop 
you from building your identical (to the invisible houses) houses on that land”.  
If such an approach was acceptable within a Lockean model, one might envisage that it 
would be less amenable to a “payment for services provided solution” and more 
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consistent with creating an absolute bar. However, it seems this approach has 
significantly greater problems than mere questions of degree. It is hard to see that an 
invisible house of which no one (not even the builder) knows can be a contribution 
deserving of reward. 
There are, as is stressed elsewhere, significant problems in reading across from posited 
patent law to a natural rights account, However, looking at European patent law’s 
approach to inherency, we can perhaps say that the approach taken in Mobil and Bayer 
is broadly consistent with the natural rights account for property rights set out above. In 
Mobil the friction reducing effect of the compound (which had originally been used as a 
rust inhibitor) had been unknown, and the “discovery” of this new effect was deemed to 
provide adequate novelty to warrant a new patent. The new understanding was a 
“contribution” and was rewarded with separate protection.  
In marked contrast, the provisions of European patent law which allow broad claims to 
therapeutic use in relation to first medical use claims appear to be inconsistent with 
Lockean natural rights account in that the allowable claim seems broader than 
underlying contribution. 
5.3.1.7 “Fundamental” elements 
We have established above that if North are to have control over use of A to treat 
disease Y they need to have a justifiable claim to the “broader” understanding of the 
general “therapeutic usefulness” of A. Might they argue that the understanding that A 
exists, and is therapeutically valuable, is in some way a fundamental piece of 
information in the calculation which “trumps” other (newly determined) 
epistemological elements? What would such a “fundamental” epistemological element 
look like?  
One approach might be to argue that: a) an epistemological element is fundamental to 
the drug discovery process if further developments would not have happened (or not 
happened in the way they did) without that element, and b) all developments dependent 
on that fundamental epistemological element are subject to control. Applying this 
definition of fundamental to the North versus West scenario, the knowledge of the 
existence and therapeutic usefulness of plant A was undeniably fundamental to West’s 
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discovery (in that it would not have been arrived at but for North’s knowledge) and 
accordingly the new use should be subject to control by North. 
This is, of course, an entirely circular argument – the definition of “fundamental” is 
defined here by what arises out of it – if the distal discovery does not arise out of the 
initial information, then the original information is not fundamental in relation to the 
discovery. It is also, merely, a causation in fact test: all distal use would be subject to 
control – notwithstanding that the originator(s) of the original information could never 
have ever anticipated that distal use. 
The advocate of a total veto over all downstream use (our decision d2) might argue that 
this definition of “fundamental” is correct. However, what we are missing in the 
Lockean account is a reason to say why should be so – an answer to the question: why 
is the fundamental element so fundamental that the contribution of others, no matter 
how significant, cannot be recognised? Again a natural rights account runs into difficult 
problems with determining degree.  
Setting any definition of fundamental can clearly be done through positive law. It is, 
however, in reality the same as setting thresholds for individuation and in-imitativeness 
of a follow-on right and this brings us directly back to the problem of setting the limits 
on the “inchoate” partial claim discussed above.  
 5.3.1.8 “Too-broad” claims and “insufficient” epistemological elements 
An alternative approach to our problem may be to analyse what would constitute “too 
broad” a claim. Let us consider the two following scenarios: 
a) North, thinking to make claims to various plants in their environment, and 
knowing that plant A is without effect, fraudulently claim that plant A treats X 
(when it does not). Whilst investigating the claim pharmaceutical company 
“East” uncover the fact that plant A treats Y. 
b) North, thinking to make claims to various plants in their environment, merely 
make a broad claim that plant A is therapeutically beneficial, but refuse to 
disclose in what way. In fact they do not know whether it is effective, they 
merely make the assertion as part of a “land grab” for rights in knowledge. 
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Following up this broad “lead” pharmaceutical company “Down” uncover that 
plant A does, in fact, successfully treat disease Y. 
In both cases East’s and Down’s discoveries have only been arrived at following 
North’s assertion of a therapeutic benefit of plant A.  Although it seems intuitively 
wrong for North to be able properly assert a right to control over East’s and Down’s use 
of Plant A, why is this so?    
North’s claims in North versus East and North versus Down are fraudulent. Can such 
fraudulent behaviour give rise to a Lockean natural right? Aquinas’ Secunda Secundæ 
of his Summa Theologiæ examines certain virtues and vices in detail. 
639, 640
 At Question 
77 of Secunda Secundæ Aquinas turns his attention to the concept of fraud committed in 
the course of buying and selling. 
641
 He concludes that:  
“Ambrose says (De Offic. iii, 11): "It is manifestly a rule of justice that a good 
man should not depart from the truth, nor inflict an unjust injury on anyone, nor 
have any connection with fraud.” 
A threefold fault may be found pertaining to the thing which is sold. One, in 
respect of the thing's substance: and if the seller be aware of a fault in the thing he 
is selling, he is guilty of a fraudulent sale, so that the sale is rendered unlawful. 
Hence we find it written against certain people (Isaiah 1:22), "Thy silver is turned 
into dross, thy wine is mingled with water": because that which is mixed is 
defective in its substance.” 
642
 
Although North’s fraudulent claim is not based upon fraud within trading per se, we can 
perhaps extrapolate from Aquinas’ thinking that taking fraudulent advantage is not 
permitted within a natural rights account for property. Indeed, Locke himself is keen to 
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stress that an initial acquisition of property in the natural state can occur only where 
such acquisition does not disadvantage the wider community – acquisition can happen 
only where there remains “enough and as good” in the commons for others. It is hard to 
see how a fraudulent acquisition could sit within this community framework.  
There is, however, a further reason why such claims lack a Lockean basis. As discussed 
above the key to the Lockean/labour-desert thesis is that a man may properly acquire 
that which is his desert and no more. Taking a pure desert approach to rights in the 
claimed traditional knowledge in both scenarios, North have not actually made any 
genuine contribution at the time the claim is made.  The claim to therapeutic usefulness 
is not supported by any specific example – it is essentially insufficient to be worthy of 
“reward”.  
As far as North actually know, plant A has no therapeutic benefit. Taking a parallel 
from patent law the claim to therapeutic usefulness might be said to extend beyond the 
scope of the actual invention. 
643
 Although, in each case a genuine contribution is 
eventually arrived at (by East, and Down respectively), this could not have been known, 
or even suspected, before those discoveries were made. 
However, let us look at one further scenario:  
North mistakenly (but honestly) believe that plant A treats X when it fact it does not. 
The effect that North have observed is in fact caused by a mould growing on the plant 
although this is unknown. Following up this mistaken “lead” pharmaceutical company 
“Up” uncover that plant A successfully treats disease Y, an effect which was unknown 
by North. 
Here, there has been no fraud committed – the error is genuine. When we apply a desert 
basis to justify a right to control of downstream use we find ourselves in a position 
where the Lockean analogy becomes somewhat stretched. Although North have not 
actually made the contribution they think they have, they have arguably made a 
contribution - we know that, in their hands at least, plant A is effective against X. Is this 
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mistaken contribution sufficient to justify protection? Arguably it (and other 
permutations of mistaken contribution) are no different from a true understanding that 
“A treats X” so perhaps should be treated no differently. Such an analysis does not, 
however, assist us any further in answering the question as to whether the broader claim 
to “therapeutic usefulness” is justifiable.  
5.3.1.9 Conclusions from a Lockean perspective 
The underlying principle of the Lockean justification for intellectual property can be 
distilled into the statement that the justifiable scope of protection given by a right has to 
be coterminous with the contribution of the person claiming that right. However, what 
that account struggles to tell us what contribution actually means, both the contribution 
of the right holder and the competing contribution of a third party who has developed a 
follow-on concept from (or made a discovery from) the original idea.  
The analysis conducted above would seem to suggest both that: 
a) the idea of an “inherent claim”, in which the unrecognised presence of the 
second use within the first indigenous use provides the basis for a claim over the 
second use once it is made, seems more difficult to support from a Lockean 
perspective; and 
b) there is no inherent conflict with the Lockean justification where one envisages a 
partial inchoate claim based upon a partial contribution and giving rise to a 
partial degree of control.  
However, what this entire analysis really demonstrates is the inherent difficulties the 
Lockean account faces in relation to origination and individuation. We see that setting 
levels of in-imitativeness (particularly in relation to follow-on works) are absolutely 
crucial in terms of establishing scope, but can realistically only be done through the 
imposition of positive law and not in some way “divined” from natural rights.  
No matter how we attempt to analyse things in terms of “inchoate” and “inherent” 
claims, the complete uncertainty surrounding both the meaning of “contribution” and 
ways to compare competing contributions under the Lockean justification means we 
cannot entirely exclude that a partial contribution will warrant an absolute right to veto 
the downstream use arising out of the serendipitous discovery. One might suspect that 
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for this to happen the initial partial contribution would need to be considered so 
“fundamental” as to trump all other subsequent third-party contributions. However, 
under this account we simply have no certainty that an understanding as to the existence 
of a plant with a particular therapeutic effect is appropriately fundamental so to 
supersede all other subsequent contributions such that they are deemed unworthy of 
reward, or indeed otherwise. We are in the dark. 
However, where we have conflicting partial contributions what we can say is that it not 
inconsistent with a Lockean account to dispense with an absolute veto and in its place 
provide permission for the user of the serendipitous (or indeed lesser) discovery to use 
their discovery subject to an acknowledgement of the partial contribution made by the 
holder of the traditional knowledge (perhaps based on compulsory licensing, 
apportionment of reward/compensatory damages).  
So applying the analysis set out above to our policy options d1 to d5 we find that the 
Lockean justification does not appear to support decision d1 (no veto/compensation at 
all).  
We find that neither d4 (limited veto with compensation), nor d5 (no veto but 
compensation) are inconsistent with the Lockean account. However, given the problem 
of defining contribution, the account can give us no concrete guidance as to which of 
those approaches is more justified. With regard to decision d2, again all we can really 
say with any confidence is that the total veto of all downstream is not inconsistent with 
the Lockean model.   
Looking at the question of which approach is more justifiable as between d3 and d4, we 
might intuitively say that the provision of compensation commensurate with degree of 
contribution would appear more fundamentally consistent with a Lockean account than 
not providing any compensation at all. We should note, however, that since the Lockean 
approach cannot give us any absolute guidance as to the definition of contribution, it 
might be difficult to say that a situation in which the degree of contribution was so 
minimal as not to warrant compensation was inconsistent with a Lockean justification. 
Perhaps all we can realistically say is that d4 (limited veto with compensation) seems to 
be closer “in spirit” to Locke’s account of propertization than does d3 (limited veto 
without compensation).  
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These outcomes are summarised in Table 5.1. Up arrows signify support for the 
decision. Down arrows signify lack of support for the decision. Queries denote where 
no clear answer can be drawn. 
Table 5.1 Application of Lockean justification to potential policy options  
Decision Lockean labour-desert  
decision d1:  




(total veto)  
↑ (Not inconsistent) 
decision d3: 
(limited veto) 
↑ (Not inconsistent) 
decision d4: 
(limited veto + 
compensation) 
↑ (Not inconsistent) 
decision d5: 
(no veto, but 
compensation) 
↑ (Not inconsistent) 
 
5.3.2 Rights based on personality 
Although the justification of the right differed somewhat between them, Fichte and 
Hegel argued that a right should exist that protects how ideas are expressed. Kant 
developed a concept that authorial personality should be respected. Crucially, however, 
none of these thinkers proposed that ideas per se should attract such protection. Indeed 
Kant expressly excluded such protection and the exclusion is inherent in Hegel’s and 
Fichte’s justifications for protection.  
In Chapter 3, we saw the difficulty that arose in applying rights based upon personality 
to a situation in which the subject matter for protection had likely been created by 
multiple, unknown and undocumented “authors” across an intergenerational time frame. 
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Even assuming a sufficient degree of closeness such that a relevant indigenous group 
can be considered an “author” for these purposes, the traditional knowledge associated 
with genetic resources held by that group is most likely properly defined as information 
per se rather than as an expression of information. Accordingly, Hegel’s, Kant’s and 
Fichte’s justification of protection of expression alone militates against any right of veto 
of the non-consensual use of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources. 
However, if sufficient authorial “closeness” can be imputed then there is an argument 
that such a group would be at least be entitled to a right of attribution. 
Looking at our potential policy options these justifications support decision d1 (no veto). 
The strength of the prohibition against protection of ideas applies equally to all 
decisions (d2, d3, d4 and d5) in which some type of veto or compensation is permitted.  
These outcomes are summarised in Table 5.2. Up arrows signify support for the 
decision. Down arrows signify lack of support for the decision. Queries denote where 
no clear answer can be drawn. The weighting of support shown is to be considered 






Table 5.2 Application of personality rights theories to potential policy options  
Decision Kantian  Fichtean  Hegelian 
decision d1:  
(no veto) 
↑↑↑ ↑↑↑ ↑↑↑ 
decision d2: 
(total veto)  
↓↓↓ ↓↓↓ ↓↓↓ 
decision d3: 
(limited veto) 
 ↓↓↓ ↓↓↓ ↓↓↓ 
decision d4: 
(limited veto + 
compensation) 
↓↓↓  ↓ ↓↓ ↓↓↓  
decision d5: 
(no veto, but compensation) 
↓↓↓  ↓ ↓↓ ↓↓↓  
 
5.4 Utilitarian goals and the scope of the positive right in traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources  
Chapter 3 of this work outlined a number of utilitarian goals which might potentially be 
served by the existence of positive right in traditional knowledge associated with 
genetic resources. These were broadly: 
a) preservation of a biodiverse environment; 
b) preservation of traditional knowledge for its own sake (broader patrimony of 
mankind); and 
c) “utility through control” – a specific utility for an indigenous group derived 
through the knowledge that they are controlling their own patrimony according 
to traditional laws and cultural norms. 
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5.4.1 The valorisation model 
It was posited in Chapter 3 that the first two identified utilitarian goals outlined above 
would be achieved, in the main, by influencing the behaviour of relevant actors through 
the creation of “value” in the information contained within traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources.  This value would, in turn, be created through an 
artificial scarcity in the information achieved through the imposition of positive law 
limiting use of the information. Here control over information would allow for the 
results of commercial exploitation to be directed to the rights holders (or indeed to also 
licensees under those rights, for example a pharmaceutical company, who would derive 
a commercial advantage over their competitors).  
However, it was acknowledged that:  
a) a “valorisation” model only works where there is some actual or potential use 
for the information – control over the use of something inherently useless is 
highly unlikely to create any value; 
b) value is a more complex concept than merely creating artificial scarcity in 
something; 
c) subjective perception is crucial in creating value; 
d) the terms of exclusivity established by positive law - such as certainty of 
definition and ease of enforcement - become paramount in determining the 
subjective value of the right. 
Given this final point, in particular, it seems reasonable (at first examination) to suggest 
that the scope of a positive right in traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources cannot help but be an important element in determining the degree of 
perception of value of such a right and thereafter the effect on the chosen utilitarian 
goals.  
However, we need to recognise that in this valorisation mechanism we are presented 
with a potentially tenuous causal link between the imposition of rights of control over 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources and the achievement of 
utilitarian goals. That overall link relies on certain actors perceiving sufficient value in 
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traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources such that it drives their 
behaviour towards actions which will promote (or at least support) the utilitarian ends. 
Any stimulus for preservation of the environment also faced significant challenges in 
the light of massive financial drives to “utilise” the environment in destructive ways.  
So going from positive right to environmental/traditional knowledge preservation 
involves many major causation leaps, each leap not without difficulty.  
This creates a number of problems in examining the desirable scope of the positive 
right: 
Firstly, we cannot be certain that the relevant actors’ behaviour will in every case 
actually serve to save a biodiverse environment and/or traditional knowledge per se (or 
indeed some conflation of the two).  
Secondly, given such causal complexity, it is surely unlikely that we could deduce any 
sort of clear linear correlation between perceived value and utilitarian benefit along the 
lines that “increase in value x gives enhancement in utilitarian effect y” and “reduction 
in z value gives reduction in utilitarian effect w”. Still further it is difficult with any 
certainty to say what is the minimal scope of protection that would give rise to the 
requisite increase in value required to affect the desired utilitarian benefits or confirm:  
a) that the perceived value of traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources is maximally optimised by giving it the broadest possible scope to a 
positive right; or 
b) that the broadest possible scope to a positive right in traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources is required to give effect to the utilitarian goals 
of the positive right. 
However, notwithstanding these uncertainties it seems broadly reasonable to suggest 
that the utilitarian goals are probably best served by ensuring that the highest possible 
number, and type, of actors perceive genuine value in genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge.  
The factors feeding into a person’s perception of value are numerous. Such perception 
is, by definition, subjective and will vary from one individual to another, and from one 
cultural group to another. Notwithstanding this, it seems difficult to argue other than 
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that the perception of value will be weakened if it becomes clear that the rights can be 
easily be by-passed. However, would a right holder realistically expect that the right in 
traditional knowledge would extend to extremely remote downstream uses and to what 
degree would excluding such extremely remote uses diminish the perception of value?  
We might intuitively surmise that permitting proximate uses to escape would have a 
more significant effect on perceived value that permitting remote uses to escape. 
However, as we are dealing with perception, there is a substantial subjective element at 
work here and much could be based upon the existing hopes, and prior expectations, of 
the right holder. If I am told (erroneously) that my right will cover everything and I 
subsequently find this not to be the case, the faith and value I place on my right may be 
more impacted than if I am initially given a realistic view of the power of my right. 
Similarly, one might expect that the right holder’s consideration of what she considers 
to be a “fair” scope of protection will similarly impact on perception of value - although 
it is perhaps difficult to divorce a sense of what an individual will consider to be “fair” 
from her initial expectations.  
In other fields of activity significant perceived value is given to rights which do not 
cover “everything”. Newcomers to the field of intellectual property – especially those 
who believe they have some or other “rights”, are often initially disappointed to realise 
just how curtailed those rights are - whether it be due to the inherent limitations of the 
appropriate rights themselves, their statutory exclusions or, especially, by the competing 
rights of others. Many people will, however, readily accept that there has to be a balance 
between the rights allocated to the right holder and the rights which remain with the 
“intellectual commons”. Acknowledgement of this balance does not necessarily 
diminish the perceived value in that which they own. 
At this point the staunch (and single-minded) advocate of consequentialist justifications 
might simply ask why are we worried about minimum scope in any event? Why do we 
not simply give the policy its best chances of success by creating a positive right with 
the broadest possible scope? 
The first point to note here is that we should not immediately assume that the above 
uncertainties are inherently fatal to the underlying utilitarian justification(s) for positive 
protection.  Rule utilitarian justifications for legal policy do not ordinarily rely on a 
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clear linear correlation between policy “cause” and desired “effect”; their aim is toward 
creating a social and/or economic environment which will generally serve to encourage 
the achievement of the goal of the policy. Why then, is more scope of protection not 
automatically better? 
The critics of rule utilitarianism are many. Hart 
644
 (among others, including Rawls 
645
) 
attacks utilitarianism on the basis that it treats humans as a means to an end rather than 
as ends in themselves, highlighting that utilitarianism:  
a) treats humans as having no value as persons in themselves but merely as 
experiencers of pleasure;  
b) treats the pleasure of one individual as being replaceable by the greater 
happiness of the community; and  
c) looks to the enhancement of the overall happiness of society without concern 
for the distribution of that wealth.  
Comte-Sponville
646
 supports the second criticism by putting forward a Kantian view 
that it can never be right to condemn an innocent individual for the maximisation of the 
collective wellbeing.  
To all these criticisms can be added the difficulty of calculating total happiness (or well-
being) of society, the difficulty of assessing what is meant by happiness/well-being, 
how “true” happiness can be separated from “conditioned” happiness, and the difficulty 
in determining that future “pleasures” are indeed result of present policies. 
647
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If we assume that rule utilitarianism is a broadly valid philosophy, might the criticism 
that individuals are disadvantaged for the maximisation of the collective wellbeing be 
met in part by implementing an approach that only the minimum positive laws required 
to achieve the utilitarian aim be put in place, but no more?   If we seek to adopt this 
“balanced” approach in the current problem we would indeed look to find the minimal 
scope of protection that would give us our desired utilitarian outcomes. However, as we 
have seen the uncertainty of a causal connection between value and effect in this case 
militates against our easily determining such a minimal scope.  
How, then, does one then go about “squaring the circle”? Perhaps one approach is to 
look to achieve a balance between a utilitarian “push” in the direction of ever broader 
scope and a deontological push in the other direction. At this point the advocate of 
natural rights might argue that that the logical train set out in the valorisation model is 
overly complex and we might find that the application of Ockham’s lex parsimoniae 
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pushes us further toward a direct examination of a (much more direct) deontological 
account for positive rights in traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources 
than a (tortuous) utilitarian one. However, as we have seen the natural rights account 
fails to give us much clear guidance in terms of justifiable limits to scope.  
The validity of synthesised analyses will be discussed in the next chapter, but it might 
be noted here that if the deontological argument for rights in traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources can be found to be at least not inconsistent with 
achieving utilitarian aims, then this will assist in our reaching a synthesised approached 
which may (partially) satisfy advocates for both rule utilitarianism and deontological 
approaches.  
5.4.2 “Utility through control” 
As was identified in Chapter 3, there is arguably a separate utilitarian goal – a utility 
gained through the control of information feeding into the spiritual life an indigenous 
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group – which is directly served by giving control over access to traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources. Such a goal does not rely on a process of valorisation 
and accordingly does not rely upon a potentially tortuous and/or causally tenuous route 
between positive law and utilitarian goal. The creation of control inherently delivers the 
narrow utility.  
In this situation the greater degree of control is broadly likely to deliver a greater degree 
of “utility”, but again the degree to which it does so will depend on the cultural norms 
of the relevant indigenous peoples. To what extent would those indigenous groups 
believe that their traditional knowledge is being improperly used by truly distal uses? 
Again this will depend on the group in question and the use. It is, however, difficult to 
immediately accommodate the idea of monetary compensation for downstream use (as 
in option d4) within this account. It seems likely that true control envisaged within this 
account means the ability to definitively bring non-consensual use to a stop, rather than 
a right to an award of compensation. 
5.4.3 Conflict between utilitarian goals – global health  
We have seen in the discussion above that the inherent uncertainties seen in the 
valorisation model create significant problems in reliably achieving the stated utilitarian 
goal of preservation of the biodiverse environment and/or traditional knowledge per se 
(or a conflation of the two). That discussion assumed, however, that the attempt to 
achieve such ends was consistent with a broader utilitarian account.  
There is, however, a potential problem with such an assumption and it is this.  If we are 
seeking an enhancement in the greater utility of the greatest number, might not that 
broad utility be better served in the present case by allowing those with the better skill 
and financial resources untrammelled access to traditional knowledge associated with 
genetic resources? If a pharmaceutical company (with those skills and resources) can 
take a take a piece of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources and 
develop it into a product which successfully removes or alleviates a disease state (or its 
symptoms) in a broad population of people that would otherwise not have access to that 
drug, is that not a greater utility for the greater number of persons than its use being 
restricted to a small band of indigenous peoples – notwithstanding that the 
pharmaceutical company will be compensated for its own investment?  
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In contrast, providing a total veto on downstream use would mean that the development 
of a therapy which could benefit all of humanity (or a large part of it) could potentially 
be prevented by the decision of a small group of indigenous people. Here the existence 
of the veto right, which is supposed to bring about one set of utilitarian goals 
(preservation of the environment and traditional knowledge per se) through the creation 
of value in the traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, arguably 
directly counters another type of utility (that of wider human health). 
In addition, as we have seen the causal link between the imposition of veto rights, the 
valorisation of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources and the 
preservation of the environment and indigenous lifestyles is reliant on an uncertain idea 
of “perception of value” in traditional knowledge. In marked contrast, the causal link 
between a piece of traditional knowledge serving as stimulus for drug development drug 
and the final product is arguably more concrete. One might therefore argue that the 
potential, but definite, “negative” impact of the veto rights on the felicific calculus of 
humanity (through inhibiting drug development) is likely to outweigh any “positive” 
utilitarian impact the veto rights may elicit. 
When we look to creating “utility through control” we, of course, see what is perhaps 
the most direct link between the creation of a positive right and a utilitarian goal. 
However, such a goal is still subject to the same overall criticism of utilitarianism and 
the problems raised with regard to competing utilities. Is the happiness of a small group 
of indigenous peoples more important than wider human health?  
Milius touches upon the question thus (but takes the discussion no further): 
“Should one give consideration to the value of utility, it might be more 
instrumentally productive that, for instance, [traditional knowledge] about 
medicinal properties of a specific plant held by its custodians be “shared” with a 
powerful pharmaceutical company that intends to develop a drug out of that 
knowledge. This is of course assuming that the principle of utility favours doing 
good for, or reaching, the greatest number possible. Alternatively, it is true that 
holding this knowledge secret within the community might also be useful to its 
members, or other groups (or perhaps also particular individuals) judged to 
qualify by the community. In terms of numbers however, the principle of utility 
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might suggest the [traditional knowledge] be readily and most efficiently 
transferred to the company.”
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This crucial balance will be returned to below. 
5.4.4 Conclusion and Policy proposals 
How do these arguments apply to our policy proposals d1, d2, d3, d4  and d5? The 
outcomes of the utilitarian analysis above are summarised in Table 5.3  







Global Health for All 
decision d1:  
(no veto, no 
compensation) 
↓↓↓↓ ↓↓↓ ↑↑↑↑ 
decision d2: 
(total veto)  
↑↑↑↑ ↑↑↑ ↓↓↓ 
decision d3: 
(limited veto) 
↑↑   ↑↓ ↑↑ 
decision d4: 
(limited veto + 
compensation) 
↑↑↑  ↑↓ ↑† 
decision d5: 
(no veto, but 
compensation) 
↑ ↓ ↑↑↑† 
† Subject to levels of compensation. 
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Again, up arrows signify support for the decision. Down arrows signify lack of support 
for the decision. Queries denote where no clear answer can be drawn. The weighting of 
support shown is to be considered within a justification, there is no attempt to represent 
weighting as between justifications. 
Clearly decision d1 (no veto, no compensation) does not support the valorisation model 
of achieving the utilitarian aim of preservation of biodiverse environments and/or 
traditional knowledge whereas decisions d2, d3 d4 and d5 do (to varying degrees) support 
it.  
Our first question is to ask to what extent is it important to have a veto to use 
downstream use at all. Is option d5 alone enough to create a perception of value 
sufficient in the minds of the relevant actors to achieve the utilitarian ends of 
preservation of the environment/traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources 
per se or do we need a true, independently exercised, veto of some sort?  
Let us assume that we can determine a reasonable mechanism for determining 
“respective contribution” as between the indigenous group and a downstream user. The 
indigenous holders of the right would receive some compensation and downstream 
users who had made a contribution would gain some recognition in terms of paying less. 
Would that create a sufficient perception of value to affect the behaviour of the relevant 
actors?  
The first impact is likely to be upon the perception of value within an indigenous group. 
Realistically no mechanism for determining “respective contribution” is fool proof - 
even within the most ostensibly transparent determinative mechanism, mistakes are 
made – there is always an element of what we might call “litigation risk”. However, 
within systems where there may be an imbalance of resources and of legal 
representation, potential bias within the determinative mechanism and/or corruption, 
there will likely be a greater perception that such a system cannot be relied upon to 
deliver a just reward. Where a veto is in place there is likely to be a clearer and more 
certain path to achieving value than with a separate determination of contribution. With 
an enforceable veto a third party will need to negotiate compensation through licence 
payments or be unable to use the subject matter of the veto rights. Provided that royalty 
rates are broadly equivalent to that which would be paid under our imaginary 
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compensation regime then a veto regime will likely create more (and more easily 
accessed) value. 
Third party users (potential licensees) will also likely perceive more value in veto rights 
than in a right which gives the right holder a right to compensation (again assuming the 
rates of both to be broadly similar). One advantage of being a licensee (especially an 
exclusive licensee) is that the licensee obtains an advantage over competitors that are 
not licensees. Under option d5, where there is a determination of compensation relative 
to contribution it would likely be open to a number of downstream users to seek 
“permission” to use in return for payment. As well as such a being likely to be 
exceptionally difficult to administer, it would also likely deny the opportunity for the 
degree of exclusivity (and with it value) that potential licensees could see under 
mechanisms which granted a veto of some form. 
We need to look now between those options (d2, d3 and d4) which deliver an element of 
veto. Although the causal complexity between imposition of rights and utilitarian effect 
in the valorisation model cannot convincingly predict the extent to which valorisation 
will actually achieve the utilitarian goals (if at all), taking a simplistic rule-utilitarian 
“more scope is likely to provides more effect” view then d2 is likely to provide a greater 
utilitarian effect than either d3 or d4.  
Certainly the point about the likely perceived value of a veto over a compensatory 
mechanism set out above will apply when comparing option d4 (limited veto + 
compensation) to d2 (total veto). However, as this element is in respect of a second use 
(which may never arise) the difference in perceived value (although likely to be there) 
may not be significant. 
When looking as between the utilitarian efficacy of d3 or d4, we need to ask whether the 
imposition of a requirement for compensation to be paid (d4) enhances the perceived 
value of the subject matter of the rights relative to a situation in which such 
compensation is not required (d3). Of course, the difference in scarcity as between the 
subject matter in the rights in d3 or d4 is marginal and such small differences may have 
little true effect on a perception of value (especially when arraigned against the greater 
economic forces of logging, mining and ranching). However, the requirement to pay 
compensation is likely to have some impact on perception of value within the 
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indigenous group holding the rights. As such there would seem to be an argument to 
prefer d4 over d3. 
Turning now to the global health utility discussed in Chapter 4 we find that d2 (a total 
right to veto) exacerbates the indigenous rights versus global health conflict, whereas 
decision d1 (no veto) arguably removes this conflict entirely. Decision d5 essentially 
provides total freedom to pharmaceutical companies to exploit traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources in return for a payment of compensation. 
Both d3 and d4 might be said to strike something of a balance between valorisation and 
the indigenous rights versus global health conflict, with decision d4 (no total veto but a 
right to compensation commensurate with contribution) perhaps providing the best 
balance. With this option (d4), pharmaceutical companies remain free (in part) to serve 
the needs of global health (subject to paying compensation), whist value as perceived by 
the indigenous rights holders is perhaps marginally enhanced relative to decision d3.  
Of course, the true availability of the traditional knowledge to the furtherance of global 
health goals under options d4 and d5 would, in practice, rely on the level of 
compensation not being such as to render as unworthwile the commercial risk of 
engaging in drug discovery and development. 
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When comparing the five policy decisions against the achievement of “utility through 
control” we of course find that decision d1 (no veto, no compensation) cannot create that 
utility and decision d5 (no veto but compensation) is unlikely to, whereas d2 (total veto) 
clearly would.  
What we cannot easily determine is whether a partial veto as in d3 or d4 would fail to 
meet that “utility through control” goal. To what extent would conceding some control 
of downstream activity affect this utility? This determination will depend on the cultural 
norms and customary practice of the indigenous group in question. It seems likely, 
however, that if absolute control is important this will be a commodity that cannot be 
easy partitioned without destroying the total utility.  
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In deciding between d3 or d4, it is, as discussed above, unlikely that the presence, or 
absence, of compensation would have much of an effect on this utilitarian goal if the 
desire for control is key. Again, however, this is a question which is reliant upon very 
specific cultural norms and customary practice which of the indigenous group in 
question.  
As was the case with the valorisation model, we find that pursuing the “utility through 
control” goal through provision of a total veto on all downstream use (decision d1) is 
potentially completely at odds with the achievement of a “global health” utility. Perhaps 
more so even than with the valorisation model (where the number of beneficiaries could 
be large) we may here find ourselves “weighing” a utility for a potentially small group 
of people (an indigenous group) against the utility of potentially millions of people who 
would have benefitted from the new treatment but who are denied by a veto right. 
However, we cannot always assume that the indigenous group will be small and the 
class of “deprived” patients large. One can certainly envisage a situation in which the 
indigenous group (or even collection of indigenous groups) entitled to control is large 
and the number of deprived patients is small – for example sufferers from a rare 
“orphan” disease.  
Even if we were able to predict the number of persons impacted by a policy, weighing 
competing utilities on the basis of numbers of individuals is inherently flawed. How 
does one compare the upset caused to the member of an indigenous group who has lost 
control of a piece of traditional knowledge concerning a genetic resource with the 
suffering of parents denied a treatment for their child’s cancer?  Even if we look to a 
Derclaye & Taylor-style 
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 assessment of broader well-being versus mere Benthamite 
or Millian “happiness” (which one might imagine would place greater weight upon 
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This brings us back again to the fundamental difficulty with any utilitarian account – 
one cannot realistically measure a societal hedonic calculus and even to attempt to do so  
would require a delineation of which particular society you are measuring – a 
delineation that could be fraught with problems of arbitrary definition and partiality. 
Notwithstanding this inherent difficulty in weighing directly competing utilities, one 
can still seek to assess which policy options tend to the advantage of all utilities. 
Therefore whilst decision d1 (no veto) cannot aid the “utility through control” utility and 
d2 cannot aid the global health utility, and vice versa, the “partial” veto options (d3 and 
d4)  both aid, in part, the global health utility. However, as discussed above, whether a 
partial degree of control if sufficient to meet an indigenous group’s desire to control 
information in accordance with customary norms is unclear but perhaps unlikely. When 
looking as between option d3 and d4, as previously discussed, the presence or absence of 
a requirement for compensation is unlikely to impact upon the “utility through control” 
utility but may impact the global health utility depending on levels of compensation. 
5.5 A Rawlsian Distributive Justice Analysis 
As discussed in Chapter 3, to the extent that underlying philosophical justifications for 
such rights in traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources can be 
determined, the question of whether the allocation of property which arises out of 
following those justifications gives rise to a fair distribution of property across society 
still remains.  The role of a distributive justice approach in the current analysis is to 
determine how, if there is to be such a right, it might it best be arranged to maximise the 
least negative outcome for affected individuals.   
5.5.1 Application of “maximin” analysis to the scope of positive right problem 
Could a Rawlsian original position “maximin” analysis be applied to the current 
question of whether a positive right in traditional knowledge associated with genetic 
resources should extend to cover serendipitous discoveries of second uses? How might 
it work?  
Such a maximin analysis requires determination between certain decisions. Those 




 in decision d1 it is decided there should be no veto right to traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources at all; 
 in decision d2 it is decided  that there should be an veto right to traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources which extends to all and anything 
which is derived in fact from the original piece of  traditional knowledge, 
without limitation;  
 in decision d3 it is decided that although there should be an access right to 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources it is also decided that 
any such access right should not extend to preventing the use of a product 
arising out of a truly serendipitous discovery (even where such discovery would 
not in fact have been made without the lead provided by the traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources);  
 in decision d4 it is decided that although there should be an access right to 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources it is also decided that 
any such access right should not extend to preventing the use of a product 
arising out of a truly serendipitous discovery (even where such discovery would 
not in fact have been made without the lead provided by the traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources). However, any such use is subject 
to a compensatory mechanism based on an apportionment determined by an 
assessment of relative contributions; and 
 In decision d5 it is decided that although there should be an access right to 
traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, it is also decided that 
any such access right should not extend to preventing any downstream use of a 
product. However, any such use is subject to a compensatory mechanism based 
on an apportionment determined by an assessment of relative contributions. 
In terms of possible circumstances, we will assume two separate situations. In Rawls’s 
original maximin analysis 
653
 the person in the “original position” has to imagine herself 
as an individual. In this current analysis she imagines herself as two distinct groups. In 
circumstance C1 the person in the original position finds herself as an indigenous group 
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in possession of the traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources. In 
circumstance C2 the person in the original position finds herself a drug company that are 
seeking to utilise downstream uses inspired by C1’s  traditional knowledge associated 
with genetic resources. 
Of course, being in the original position behind the veil of ignorance, our person cannot 
tell whether she will be fall into circumstance C1 (indigenous group) or C2 (drug 
company). How then would our person in the original position seek to maximise the 
potential minimum?  
The immediate problem in our analysis is that we cannot easily allocate definite 
monetary values to each circumstance. However, although we cannot put monetary 
figures to the outcomes, we might attempt to crudely represent gain and loss table as set 
out in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4 Indigenous group versus drug company maximin analysis 
Circumstances 
Decisions C1  C2  
d1 - ↑↑↑↑ 
d2 ↑↑↑↑ - 
d3 ↑↑ ↑↑ 
d4 ↑↑↑ ↑ 
d5 ↑ ↑↑↑ 
The relative outcomes of decisions d1 and d2 are easy to approximate (occupying as they 
do the extreme positions of the five options). However, in the light of such raw 
approximation, discriminating between the outcomes of decisions d3, d4 and d5 is more 
difficult. 
Taking decision d5 first, here drug company C2 is free to use any downstream use 
inspired by the C1’s knowledge, provided it pays appropriate compensation to C1. It is 
hard to evaluate the relative gain as between C1 and C2 as this will depend on the 
contribution to be paid by C2. However, C2 has a freedom to use any downstream use 
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without being subject to any absolute veto and this is likely a better option for C2 than 
would be options d3 and d4.  
Although under decision d5, C1 is entitled to a compensation stream, determination of 
that stream may be in practice subject to uncertainty (as outlined above) and it would 
not have the strength of negotiating position to arrive at royalty payments (in relation to 
uses up to a serendipitous discovery) as it would have under options d3 and d4. 
Under decision d4 indigenous group C1 are entitled to both absolute control of 
downstream use “up to” the serendipitous discovery and receive compensation for use 
arising out the serendipitous discovery. This is arguably a better outcome for C1 than 
would be decision d3 where C1 are denied any degree of control of use arising out the 
serendipitous discovery.  
In reality (subject to the level of compensation payable to indigenous group C1) the 
difference in loss for C2 as between decisions d3 and d4 may be small relative to the C2’s 
total wealth.  However, d3 clearly ranks as a better decision for C2 than would d4. 
However, what we find in this exercise is that although we might come to a realistic 
assessment of how to rank the various options for each party, it is much harder in an 
abstract situation to assess the relative gains and losses as between C1 and C2. In truth, 
much hangs on how one measures advantage. Without knowing how a determination of 
compensation based on contribution would work in practice, we find ourselves 
essentially unable to say whether that process would provide a better outcome for C1 
than would negotiation of royalties for permissions to use. Accordingly we cannot 
realistically determine as between the “middle” options (d3, d4 and d5) but would likely 
seek to avoid options d1 and d2. 
5.5.2 Criticisms of an original position maximin analysis 
Before we place too much reliance upon any maximin analysis we need to appreciate 
the problems inherent in such analyses.  
Since publication of A Theory of Justice many reasons have been advanced for the 




  One of the chief criticisms is put forward by pharmacologist, philosopher, and game 
theorist, John Harsanyi.
655
  Harsanyi argued that, although it was right to reason from an 
original position, the use of the maximin test was inappropriate as it takes no account of 
the probabilities of the various circumstances arising. Rawls objects to using any 
probabilities in the original position - in the absence of empirical probabilities (which 
are impossible to determine) he rejects the use of subjective or logical probabilities. 
Harsanyi believes this to be wrong. 
In taking no account of the probabilities of the various circumstances occurring, the 
maximin approach forces the person in the original position to take account of extreme, 
but unlikely, events. Harsanyi uses the example of a person in New York who is offered 
two jobs – one dull and badly paid in New York, one fulfilling and well paid in 
Chicago. Although the choice might seem easy, Harsanyi notes that for those engaging 
in a maximin analysis they must consider the possibility (no matter how slim) that the 
New Yorker will die in travelling to the job in Chicago. As death is the worst of the 
possible outcomes available in the gain/loss table, maximising the minimum results in 
the New Yorker taking the dull post in New York. Having no regard for real world 
probabilities the “maximinimizer” will always take the most risk adverse position.  
Harsanyi notes that as a result of Rawls’s maximin approach, and the difference 
principle arising out of it, the person in the original position has to evaluate any 
institutional framework as if she was sure that she would become the poorest member 
of a particular society. 
Of course this approach has appeal in its very simplicity. However, Harsanyi notes that 
this can have strange effects when applied to extreme situations and can result in an 
excessive focus on the situation of one extremely disadvantaged individual to the 
disadvantage of a greater number of members of society. Harsanyi notes in a postscript 
to his paper that Rawls 
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of scale, stating that “maximin is a macro not a micro principle”.
657
  Harsanyi describes 
this as a “singularly inept defense” 
658
 on the basis that although his extreme 
counterexamples refer to small-scale situations, they are readily scaled-up and also, on 
the more fundamental basis, that the basic principles of morality cannot be in some way 
scale-dependent. He asks at what point on the scale should maximin apply and at what 
point should it not?  
Harsanyi is a self-confessed utilitarian. Having stressed the flaws in a maximin analysis, 
he argues that a more appropriate test to apply in when making decision under 
uncertainty is the expected-utility maximization test in which a decision maker cannot 
help but act as if she tried to maximise her expected utility 
659
 computed on the basis of 
some set of subjective probabilities (what she perceives is the likelihood of a particular 
circumstance coming to pass). Harsanyi argues that if the person in the original position 
applies the expected-utility maximization test in which she will weigh up all the 
possibilities and their probabilities, she will arrive at an outcome which not only 
enhances her chances of personally being in a better position when the veil of ignorance 
is removed, but also leads to an overall improvement in wealth of society – essentially a 
rule utilitarian approach.  In addition, such an approach avoids the extreme positions 
seen with the maximin approach.  
For Harsanyi, 
660
 the maximin approaches are most successful when dealing with 
differences in circumstance with similar probabilities of occurrence. This is because 
here the analysis actually begins to resemble that seen using expected-utility 
maximization test. Accordingly, the outcomes of maximin analysis of such 
circumstances are usually consistent with a utilitarian approach.  
In the light of Harsanyi’s criticisms, what criticisms might we level at the maximin 
analysis performed in Table 5.4? Could we perform an expected-utility maximization 
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test on the circumstances set out in that table, and how would that compare to the 
maximin analysis performed? 
As mentioned above, we cannot apportion accurate figures to the gains and losses 
attributable to each decision in each circumstance, but we have an understanding of the 
relative extremes (and that decisions d3 d4 and d5 create outcomes which are positioned 
between two extremes arising in decisions d1 and d2). However, this tells us little in 
itself as to the similarity of this maximin test to an expected-utility maximization test on 
the same facts.  
What can we say about probability of outcomes? We can have no way to determine 
empirical probabilities for the two posited circumstances - we cannot realistically know 
our chance of becoming a pharmaceutical company or an indigenous group. However, 
although there are a large number of pharmaceutical companies there are also a large 
number of indigenous groups, so perhaps the best we can say is that the probabilities are 
not too divergent.  If that is correct, this does not represent one of Harsanyi’s situations 
of extremely divergent probabilities. 
5.5.3 Problems with determination of advantage 
In the maximin analysis set out in Table 5.4, it was stated that much hangs on how one 
measures advantage and whether it is absolute or relative. This is correct. However, it 
will likely be immediately apparent that the greatest difficulty facing the analysis in 
Table 5.4 is that it is attempting to examine relative advantage in a very narrow way 
indeed. It looks merely at advantage derived from having a positive right over 
downstream use of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources and does not 
consider the larger picture.  
Whether one would want (on the removal of the veil of ignorance) to “be” Glaxo 
SmithKline plc or the Mentawai peoples of Indonesia is no doubt a matter of personal 
taste, but there is no doubt that from a monetary position you would be better off being 
Glaxo SmithKline (or even a small trading subsidiary thereof) than the alternative.  
Herein lies the problem of a “narrow” maximin analysis – considering only the 
immediate rights in question it produces a solution which on the face of it appears 
strange. Indeed, one of the extreme “negative” outcomes to be avoided is “being” in the 
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pharmaceutical company C2 under decision d2! From a monetary perspective you would 
more likely in the vast majority of cases want to “be” C2 and avoid “being” C1. We 
might represent this by a great (and constant) preponderance of “up” arrows on a 
revised analysis (see Table 5.5). 
Table 5.5 Indigenous group versus drug company “broader situation” maximin 
analysis 
Circumstances 
Decisions C1 C2 
d1 - ↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑ 
d2 ↑↑↑↑ ↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑ 
d3 ↑↑ ↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑ 
d4 ↑↑↑ ↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑ 
d5 ↑ ↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑↑ 
 
In this case the worst-case scenario (the one you would most want to avoid) is now 
being C1 under d1 (an indigenous group with no positive rights in traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources at all) whereas the situation which “maximises the 
minimum” is now d2 (where any right to veto use extends to preventing all uses 
including those arising out of a truly serendipitous discovery).  
In the Table 5.4 analysis we had great trouble differentiating between the relative gains 
and losses made by either side in decisions d3 and d4 and d5.  By holding the gain on the 
C2 side of the equation as constant (and overwhelming) the relative ranking of the 
different decisions on the C1 side of the equation becomes the important factor.  
Of course, the exercise of holding the advantage to C2 as constant in all cases does not 
necessarily reflect the true situation – C2 will of course be disadvantaged to a degree in 
that it will have to make royalty or compensation payments or indeed decline from 
pursuing a research strategy if consent is not granted. In respect of smaller drug 
companies such payments may well make a significant difference. Even for a large 
company being unable to pursue a research lead could have a major effect.  However, 
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provided we accept the limitations of our assumptions (predominantly that the company 
is permitted to make royalty payments in return for consent to use) this approach does 
allow us to perform a maximin analysis which would otherwise be denied to us.  
Accordingly, (with this proviso) the ranking order of policy choices established in this 
analysis (namely d2, d4, d3, d5, d1) will be taken forward into the analysis in Chapter 5. 
 5.6 A communitarian justification 
As was discussed in Chapter 3, Gibson has advanced a communitarian justification 
which arises out of a claim to community and assures that an identified community 
should be able to control their own information under conditions to be determined by 
the communities and in accordance with their customary laws, values, and traditional 
practices. Although arising from a different philosophical base, it was identified in 
Chapter 3 that this right has some echoes with a right required to achieve a “utility 
through control” goal in which utility for an indigenous group is created (or perhaps 
more accurately preserved) though the control of information in accordance with their 
customary practice.  This is though a right that may be tempered by concepts of equity 
where competing interests are to be evaluated. 
Gibson does not explicitly address the question of the proximal-distal scope of the right. 
She does refer to “extinguishment” of rights, stating: 
“Community custodianship over resources cannot be extinguished by 
subsequent creation of intellectual property rights, according to the concept of 
community resources set out here. Therefore, where a community consents to 
traditional resources being used, the model may require that this in no way 
extinguishes their rights to that knowledge. Therefore, consent in one instance 
will not justify subsequent open access, or delivery into the “public domain” and 
the model may require fresh consent for every use of a particular aspect of 
traditional knowledge. While blanket consent may be easier in its practical 
application, the argument for fresh consent acknowledges the importance of the 
use of knowledge to the decision to grant consent by the community. Blanket 
consent cannot anticipate the many uses to which knowledge may be put once it 
is appropriated in this way. 
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 Nevertheless, this ideal does not preclude the granting of blanket consent where 
appropriate. For instance the conditions and terms of the appropriation and use 
may be qualified in agreements to allow for blanket consent.” 
661
 
According to this account:  
i) The creation of subsequent intellectual property does not extinguish the right 
to knowledge; and 
ii) The granting of consent in relation to one use does not extinguish the 
requirement for users to obtain prior informed consent in relation to a second 
use. 
In relation to point i), it is not clear what “subsequent” means in this respect. Within the 
context of the rest of the paragraph it suggests that where consent has been granted to 
use and that use has led to the creation by others of intellectual property that does not 
lead to a wholesale waiver of the rights of the indigenous peoples to control of the 
knowledge. What it is not saying, in itself, is that all downstream uses are controllable.   
In relation to point ii), depending on the terms of consent granted in relation to the first 
use, it seems unlikely that a use arising out of a serendipitous discovery would be 
considered to fall within the ambit of the first use – almost by definition it could not be 
envisaged as part of the first use. If it is not so envisaged then it would not be a part of 
the informed consent granted by the holders of the knowledge. Although, that might 
seemingly suggest that use of a serendipitous discovery is non-consensual we cannot be 
sure. In her comment about “blanket consent” Gibson certainly envisages that there may 
be many downstream uses. However, we cannot determine whether use of a 
serendipitous discovery (or other distal downstream activity) constitutes use (or should 
constitute use) of the original information. 
We saw in Chapter 3 that Gibson considers a requirement for free and prior informed 
consent before traditional knowledge can be used by others to be “fundamental” to her 
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model and an essential element of legitimate use or appropriation. This suggests that 
Gibson is looking to a right to veto non-consensual use over a right to compensation. 
Gibson of course highlights the role of the relevant indigenous group in consenting to 
the use of their knowledge under conditions to be determined by the communities and in 
accordance with their customary laws. To an extent then the decision over what would 
constitute a downstream activity is to be decided under customary laws. It is unlikely 
that the specific question of control second uses will have been addressed under such 
law, other than a general notion of a desire for absolute control (as was discussed in 
relation to the “utility through control” goal). Again the question of the appropriateness  
of compensation in lieu of control is unlikely to have been addressed under such law. 
Again we may imagine that a desire for absolute control would be deemed more 
appropriate but we cannot be sure of that and such determinations (if any) will of course 
vary from situation to situation.  
Gibson envisages a duty upon those seeking to use what they ought reasonably to 
believe to be a traditional knowledge or natural/genetic resources to make reasonable 
efforts to ascertain and contact the relevant community to obtain consent to use of the 
knowledge. We again have to ask whether use of a serendipitous discovery constitutes 
use (or should constitute use) of the original information which triggers such duty. 
Again this account gives us no clear guidance in this respect. 
Turning to the policy options, d1, d2, d3, d4 and d5 we see that Gibson’s communitarian 
justification strongly opposes d1 (no veto, compensation). It would also seem to oppose 
option d5 (no veto but with compensation).  However, as between options d2, d3 and d4 





5.7 Restorative/corrective justice (“reparations”) 
As discussed in Chapter 3, Munzer has recently proposed the grant of rights to control 
traditional knowledge as part of a package of broader “reparations” for past wrongs 
committed upon a traditional group.
662
  
Munzer essentially sets out a simple philosophy that as wrongs have been committed 
they should be repaired and that a grant of rights to control traditional knowledge could 
form a part of a suite of appropriate reparations. Munzer establishes a set of conditions 
precedent to be met before a claim to reparations can be made. However, it is crucial to 
note that determination of damage (wrong) and requirements for repair are to be 
determined on a case by case basis. Also, there is no requirement, whatsoever, for any 
specific link between the type of wrong and the remedy, nor necessarily a clear link 
between the magnitude of the wrong and the remedy. 
663
 We cannot determine what 
right is appropriate in the light of the wrong. Of course, if the “wrong” happens to be a 
particular example of misappropriation of genetic resource and associated traditional 
knowledge the broad remedy may be more easily determined, if not its detail. 
Given this smörgåsbord approach, there seems to be no reason in principle why the 
protection to be granted cannot include the grant of an absolute veto (through injunctive 
relief) alongside the award of compensation. However, Munzer deliberately avoids 
advocating a specific set of intellectual property rules. Munzer anticipates that a defence 
may be available where the potential defendant “lacks a moral duty to rectify the 
wrongs and undo the harm caused”. 
664
 This seems entirely at odds with the concept of a 
broad award of reparations for past acts unconnected with current activities, or parties. 
We are not given a sense of what equitable conduct might give rise to this “defence”. 
Might extremely distal downstream use of traditional knowledge associated with 
genetic resource fall within this sphere of equity? We simply cannot say. 
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Overall, such uncertainties, and inherent case-by-case specificity, make the translation 
of Munzer’s reparation justification to a set of generally applicable principles for 
broader application exceptionally difficult. 
One might imagine that Munzer’s broad desire of reparation for past wrong may weigh 
into other assessments of equitable considerations between putative indigenous right 
holders in traditional knowledge associated with genetic resource and those looking to 
develop follow-on concepts. However, even if philosophically valid, the uncertainty in 
Munzer’s proposal (teamed with its inherent case-by-case specificity of application) 
makes it impossible to know how much “weight” should be allocated. 
5.8 Human Rights Justifications  
In Chapter 3 we saw that UNDRIP Article 11 embodies a right to practise and revitalize 
indigenous cultural traditions and customs and provides that indigenous people’s 
cultural, intellectual, religious and spiritual property should not be taken “without their 
free, prior and informed consent or in violation of their laws, traditions and customs 
provides”. However, it does not do more than establish that there should be “effective” 
redress which “may include restitution”. We also saw that Article 31 provides that 
indigenous peoples specifically have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop 
their knowledge of the properties of fauna and flora. Neither Articles give any 
indication as to the proper scope of those rights in relation to downstream use. 
As previously stated, although UNDRIP does not establish a binding set of laws, it 
would seem appropriate that we determine whether rights in traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources supported by other justifications are at least compliant 
with the rights envisaged under UNDRIP. This is not easy. As has been discussed in 
Chapter 3 UNDRIP provides no guidance as to what “effective redress” (which “may 
include restitution”) and “control” mean in this context and particularly whether a veto 
is envisaged. On the analysis provided in Chapter 3 we can, however, say that 
howsoever the wording of Article 11 is interpreted, compensation for misappropriation 
is likely to be the minimum redress envisaged. The minimum redress available under 
Article 31 remains entirely unclear.  
Examining the four policy options, d1, d2, d3 d4 and d5, we see that option d1 (no right 
whatsoever) is not compliant with UNDRIP which envisages some control. However, as 
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to distinguishing between options d2, d3 d4 and d5 we have little guidance – d2, d3 d4  are 
all remedies greater than compensation for misappropriation, whereas d5 could be 
argued to reflect the minimum compensation envisaged within UNDRIP. 
5.9 Conclusions 
The key outcomes from the above analysis are set out below. As can be seen different 
philosophical justifications have generated differing outcomes (see Table 6.1 in Chapter 
6). The discussion of how (if at all) those outcomes can be synthesised is addressed in 
the following chapter.  
5.9.1 Utilitarianism  
There are significant problems in linking valorisation of traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources with the identified utilitarian aims of enhancement of 
biodiversity and preservation of traditional culture (or a conflation of both). Within the 
utilitarian account there is also a serious conflict between granting indigenous peoples 
an absolute veto over all third party use of traditional knowledge associated with 
genetic resources and the enhancement of global health for all. The “utility through 
control” utility has the possible advantage of a short causal link between the creation of 
the right and the creation of utility, but suffers from uncertainty due to variation in the 
type of control required under customary law from indigenous group to group. If giving 
rise to a total veto, it also is likely to conflict with the global health for all utility. 
5.9.2 Natural Rights 
A Lockean labour-desert natural right to ownership of knowledge broadly supports a 
right based upon contribution rather than no right at all (decision d1). 
Neither d2 (total veto) nor d3 (limit veto) nor d4 (limited veto with compensation) nor d5 
(no veto but compensation) are inconsistent with the Lockean account. However, given 
the problem of defining contribution, the account can give us no concrete guidance as to 
which of those four approaches is more justified.  
Looking at the question of which approach is more justifiable as between d3 and d4, we 
might intuitively say that, as between the two, provision of compensation commensurate 
with degree of contribution would appear more fundamentally consistent with a 
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Lockean account than not providing any compensation at all. We should note, however, 
that since the Lockean approach cannot give us any absolute guidance as to the 
definition of contribution, it might be difficult to say that a situation where the degree of 
contribution was so minimal as not to warrant compensation was inconsistent with a 
Lockean justification. 
Realistically all we can conclude is that all options other than d1 are consistent with a 
labour-desert account. 
Rights based upon personality such as those proposed by Kant, Fichte and Hegel are not 
supportive of any positive right to control ideas. 
5.9.3  Rawlsian maximin  
Provided one looks at the proportionate advantage to each side of each of the proposed 
decisions (essentially applying the difference principle) decision d2 (an absolute veto on 
all downstream use) is the situation the person in the original position would choose as 
maximising the minimum. The order of “least-worst” options seen on that maximin 
analysis is d2, d4, d3, d5, d1.  
5.9.4 Communitarian justification 
The communitarian account suggests that indigenous peoples should have a significant 
degree of control over information which is their community resource.  Such doctrine 
would appear to exclude decision d1.  However, there is little explicit guidance from this 
doctrine as to whether very distal uses, including uses arising out of serendipitous 
discoveries should be considered as use of the traditional knowledge. 
5.9.5 Restorative/corrective justice (“reparations”) 
The uncertainties, and inherent case-by-case specificity, make the translation of 
Munzer’s reparation justification to a set of generally applicable principles for broader 




Compensation for misappropriation is likely to be the minimum redress envisaged under 
UNDRIP. Option d1 (no right whatsoever) is not compliant with UNDRIP which 
envisages some degree of control. However, in distinguishing between options d2, d3, d4 
and d5, UNDRIP gives us little guidance as all are remedies greater than (or in the case 







Chapter 6  
Synthesis of Findings & Further Analysis 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
“Poetry is the synthesis of hyacinths and biscuits.” 
Carl Sandburg Good Morning, America (1928) 
 
6.1 Introduction 
As we have seen from Chapter 5 of this work, the results of the application of the 
various philosophical justifications to our question of whether a right to prevent third 
party use of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources should extend to 
coverage of serendipitous discoveries of second uses are wide ranging and, in some 
cases, directly contradictory.  
Table 6.1(on the next page) is an attempt to present the answers derived from each 
approach within a single matrix.  
As with the other results tables seen in Chapter 5, up arrows signify support for the 
decision. Down arrows signify lack of support for the decision. Queries denote where 
no clear answer can be drawn. Again the weighting of support shown is to be 
considered within a justification; there is no attempt in this matrix to represent 






Table 6.1 Summary Matrix of Results from Various Approaches 
Decision 

























decision d1:  
(no veto, no 
compensation) 
↓↓↓↓ ↓↓↓ ↑↑↑ ↓↓ ↑↑↑ ↑↑↑ ↑↑↑ ↓ ↓↓↓ ↓↓↓ ↓↓↓ 
decision d2: 
(total veto)  
↑↑↑↑ ↑↑↑ ↓↓↓ ↑ ↓↓↓ ↓↓↓ ↓↓↓ ↑↑↑↑ ? ? ↑ 
decision d3: 
(limited veto) 
↑↑   ↑↓ ↑↑ ↑ ↓↓↓ ↓↓↓ ↓↓↓ ↑↑ ? ? ↑ 
decision d4: 
(limited veto + 
compensation) 
↑↑ ↑ ↑↓ ↑† ↑ ↓↓↓ ↓↓↓ ↓↓↓ ↑↑↑ ? ? ↑ 
decision d5: 
(no veto but 
compensation) 
↑ ↓ ↑↑↑† ↑ ↓↓↓ ↓↓↓ ↓↓↓ ↑ ↓↓ ? ↑ 
 




6.2 How might we achieve synthesis? 
Looking at these findings we are immediately presented with a problem: How are we to 
come to any synthesis of these results? One approach may be to simply read across the 
table to find which decision finds the least contradiction across the application of 
justifications. Arriving at such a “least contradictory” outcome has clear strengths, it 
sets the framework for further examination and helps us to focus on key points of 
conflict. However, such an approach treats all justifications as being of equal validity 
and all of equal applicability. We need an approach which though maintaining 
simplicity is more nuanced and which takes into account an assessment of applicability 
of justification. 
We also have a deeper problem. Many of the underlying justifications outlined here are 
philosophically incompatible.  However, as was previously stated, it is not the aim of 
this study to reconcile widely differing philosophical justifications – for example to 
demonstrate the inherent primacy of utilitarianism over natural rights theories, or indeed 
vice versa. How then might we go about a synthesis whilst avoiding this high level 
conflict? Naturally, such a question is not unique to our current problem and approaches 
to examining such potentially conflicting inputs has long exercised legal theorists. The 
key approaches can be summarised as “overlapping consensus” and “incompletely 
theorized agreements”. 
In A Theory of Justice, Rawls 
665
 suggests that within a nearly just society there is no 
need for strict consensus of views on a political conception of justice, merely a 
sufficient “overlapping consensus”. For Rawls the overlapping need not be perfect:  
“Both sides must believe that however much their conceptions of justice differ, 
their views support the same judgment in the situation at hand, and would do so 
even if even if their respective positions be interchanged.” 
666
  
Rawls subsequently developed this concept 
667, 668
 and highlighted that within a stable 
society the adherents of different views did not merely a get along together in a “modus 
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vivendi” founded upon each group primarily pursuing their own interest (which was 
itself served by not disturbing the “treaty” with the other side) but by having sufficient 
genuine “shared ground” or “public reason” notwithstanding their differing 
philosophical starting points. It is this possession of shared ground that gives the 
overlapping consensus its stability and security.
669
 It does not unravel as might a merely 
pragmatic treaty arrangement between opposing groups within society.   
Rawls’ overlapping consensus is a means by which individuals can find true agreement 
at higher levels of theoretical abstraction when agreements about certain particulars are 
untenable.
670
 It has been described as depending 
“in effect, on there being a morally significant core of commitments common to 




Crucially the existence of disagreement about some lower level particulars does not of 
necessity destroy the higher level consensus.   
Together with Posner 
672, 673
 Sunstein argues for a different approach to legal reasoning  
which minimises the reliance upon philosophical theory. He describes three classes of 
“incompletely theorized agreements”: 
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i) incompletely theorized agreements on a general principle. Such agreements 
are incompletely theorized in the sense that people who accept the principle 
need not agree on what it entails in particular cases. The agreement is 
incompletely theorized in the sense that it is incompletely specified; 
ii) agreement on a mid-level principle, but disagreement about the more general 
theory that accounts for it and about outcomes in particular cases; and 
iii) incompletely theorized agreements on particular outcomes (who wins and 
who loses a case), accompanied by agreements on the low-level principles 
that account for them. Such low-level principles include the “ordinary 
material of legal doctrine” that have ambiguous relations to high-level 
theories, and that are compatible with more than one such high-level theory. 
674, 675, 676
 
Sunstein suggests that where people diverge on some (relatively) high level proposition 
they may be able to agree if they lower the level of abstraction. 
677
 Common agreement 
on legal problems can be arrived at by seeking an “incompletely theorized agreement” 
by looking to an level of theory (low- to mid- to high-) on which you can find 
convergence/common ground and incompletely theorising (essentially “agreeing to 
disagree”) about those higher-level areas on which you disagree. This approach is 
arguably the “inverse” of Rawls’ “overlapping consensus” approach.
678
   
The approach means that instead of creating a broad theory concerning the law ahead of 
its application, Sunstein’s incompletely theorized agreements allow resolutions to 
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evolve by way of “casuistical judgments at the point of application”. 
679
 It is essentially 
a bottom-up, as opposed to Rawls’ “top down”, approach. One way of achieving such 
casuistical judgments is through the use of analogical reasoning in which the case in 




This approach has been greatly criticised 
681
 and chief amongst these critics is Dworkin. 
682
  His concern is essentially that legal decision makers should not be shy of using 
theory as guidance. For Dworkin, Sunstein and Posner’s reliance on “pragmatism” and 
Sunstein’s “theoretically modest” approach to problem solving, encourage (and allow) 
an avoidance of theory.  
In truth Sunstein’s position may not be entirely contrary to that of Dworkin, indeed as 
highlighted by Dworkin, 
683
 Sunstein has stated that: 
“some cases cannot be decided at all without introducing a fair amount of theory. 
Moreover, some cases cannot be decided well without theory. If a good theory is 
available and if judges can be persuaded that the theory is good, there should be 
no taboo on its judicial acceptance.” 
684
  
Of course, that relies on there being a sole, obvious and incontrovertible “good” theory 
and not a contradiction of a number of difficult to reconcile theories. 
In relation to our current question, it is hard to see how one might apply Sunstein’s 
“theoretically modest” approach. As was discussed in Chapter 3, where one is seeking 
to limit third-party use of an idea the only guide we can find as to the extent of such 
control can be the theoretical justification(s) for creating (or not creating) such control. 
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If we avoid such theoretical guidance we might arrive at the imposition of essentially 
arbitrary limits, or the misapplication of precedent from other laws (such as patent law) 
which although they might appear superficially similar, are different both in terms of 
history, subject matter of protection and underlying theoretical justification.  
Rawls was describing a “shared ground” approach in terms of the broader governance 
of society, rather than in relation to the determination of a particular (low-level) legal 
problem. However, he does allow us not to be inhibited by inherent high-level 
philosophical conflicts. If we can find agreement in the low-level application of 
conflicting higher level theories we need not be concerned that the justifications 
originate from different philosophical places. The reconciliation of conflicting low-level 
applications is altogether more difficult, even if those may not, of necessity, destroy a 
higher level consensus in other respects. 
Taking his inspiration from Rawls’s overlapping consensus approach, Merges 
685
 
accepts a theoretical pluralism of high level (what he refers to as “foundational”) 
principles. He sees utilitarian, deontological and other accounts as giving rise to a 
shared body of “mid-level” principles which are equally valid whichever high level 
justification you consider the more supportable. As he puts it: 
“Midlevel principles provide our common space, our place of engagement. They 
are like a musical score, allowing us all to play together, even if we disagree about 
the deep wellsprings or ultimate significance of our shared performance, our 
common musical practice. The midlevel principles allow us to be tolerant about 
questions of ultimate importance. In my theory, the conceptual hierarchy includes 
a ground floor that is airy and capacious. There is room at the bottom.” 
686
 
Merges proposes four such mid-level principles: 
(i) efficiency – enhancement of the efficiency of an economy;  
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(ii) non-removal – information and ideas in the public domain must not be 
taken away or privatised;  
(iii) proportionality – the scope of an IP right ought be commensurate with 
the magnitude of the contribution underlying the right; and  
(iv) dignity – the dignity interest can be thought of as an invisible string that 
connects individual creators with their works, and that survives even a 
formal act of legal alienation. 
In further support of a midlevel approach Merges states: 
“The more systemic view supplied by Rawls’s way of thinking can get us out of 
the unproductive and often divisive trap of thinking that each individual rule of IP 
must balance out perfectly. Rawls’s approach frees us from this excessively 
internalist perspective and ought to be embraced for that reason alone.”
687
 
Merges (himself a previous advocate of the law and economics school) has separately 
stated that: 
“I have come to believe that utilitarian foundations are inadequate in the IP field. 
The data required by a comprehensive utilitarian perspective are simply not in 
evidence in this field -- at least not yet. Put simply, I do not think we can say with 
the requisite degree of certainty that IP systems create net positive social welfare. 
Yet I still had the intuition that IP rights are a valuable social institution. Which is 
what led me to search for alternate foundations. Hence Part I of [Justifying 
Intellectual Property], in which I describe foundational commitments growing out 
of the ideas of Locke, Kant and Rawls. These deontic conceptions provide a better 
set of foundational commitments for the IP field, in my view. Others of course 
disagree, which is why the midlevel principles are so important as a shared policy 
language for those with divergent foundational commitments.”
688
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However, as might be anticipated, Merges’ approach has put the mid-level “cat” 
amongst the theoretical “pigeons”.  Masur has described Merges’ work as: 
“one of the most sweeping, significant, and brilliant books about intellectual 
property to be published in years”.689  
In marked contrast, Blankfein-Tabachnick has recently criticised Merges midlevel 
approach as “untenable”. 
690 
Blankfein-Tabachnick contends that: 
 
“[Merges’] midlevel principles conflict with important liberal “foundational” 
accounts of property, thereby calling into question the justificatory force such 
principles might hold. Moreover, contrary to Professor Robert P. Merges’ view, 
different foundational principles, whether maximizing wealth, net aggregate 
value, or the position of the least well-off, will yield different substantive 
outcomes in IP cases. Accordingly ... any project conjoining this set of midlevel 
principles with maximizing distributive principles cannot be sustained. A 
sophisticated understanding of IP, its theory, and crucially its legal doctrine and 
practice, does not, and should not, include midlevel principles understood to be 
consistent with such variously competing foundations.” 
691
 
Whilst, broadly speaking, concepts of non-removal, proportionality and dignity (the 
former two demonstrating a distinctly Lockean “flavour” 
692
 and the latter obvious 
echoes coming from Kantian/Fichtean rights based in personhood) would seem 
relatively uncontroversial, Merges’ continued adherence to elements of a utilitarian 
model (in his efficiency mid-level principle) remains counter to those for whom such a 
utilitarian approach is fundamentally flawed. 
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Perhaps there is some suspicion of the seemingly “Damascene conversion” of such a 
previously staunch advocate of the law and economics school. Masur states it is akin to 
seeing Richard Posner: 
 “arguing that contract and tort law are fundamentally grounded in theories of 
fairness and distributive justice”. 693 
Merges himself has defended the presence of economic efficiency within his midlevel 
principles thus:  
“The only question that needs to be answered is whether a body of IP law can be 
envisioned that is consistent with these systems of philosophical thought. If so, the 
foundational question has been successfully answered. Then it's on to the 
operational level - designing actual institutions and rules to implement a workable 
IP system. In my view this is where the efficiency principle comes into play: one 
important design principle for IP law is and should be getting from our IP system 
the greatest social benefit at the lowest net cost (as best we can estimate these 
values). Efficiency is an operational (midlevel) principle, in other words. It does 
not (and in my view cannot) justify the existence of the field. But it can serve us 
well in crafting the detailed operations of the field -- once we decide, consistent 




Citing Merges’ attempt at this reconciliation of these deontological and utilitarian 
approaches, Fromer 
695
 has recently highlighted that the utilitarian economic incentive 
to invent provided by patent law also provides “expressive incentives” to inventors to 
develop their personality through invention (although she ignores the fact Kant, Fichte 
and Hegel were not supportive of control over ideas per se).  
                                                          
 
693
 Jonathan Masur, “Jonathan Masur on Rob Merges' “Justifying Intellectual Property”:The New 
Institutional Philosophy of Rob Merges” (2013)  
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/jonathan-masur-rober-merges-justifying-intellectual-property 
(Accessed September 2015), 1 
 
694
 Merges, “Midlevel Principles: Response to Jonathan Masur” (n 688), para 9 
 
695




The validity (or otherwise) of Merges’ mid-level principles (particularly the presence of 
a utilitarian account within those principles) remains to be determined by the academic 
community and no doubt the finding of a Rawlsian “shared ground” will continue to 
stimulate a vigorous ongoing debate.  
Accordingly, the present study adopts a conservative analytical approach which might 
be described as seeking a “least contradiction”, but with giving due concern for 
theoretical conflict. Closer to the approach of Rawls than Sunstein, it seeks to find what 
common consensus there is between the outcomes suggested by different philosophical 
justifications. However, if these clash it seeks to give appropriate weight to the 
appropriateness and suitability to the justifications in conflict to the situation under 
examination. This approach is in line with the pluralistic account advocated by Resnik 
696
 (mentioned above) which acknowledges that the analysis of different intellectual 
property rights requires differing assessments of competing moral values in the light of 
the particular facts and circumstances which affect that right. It is also consistent with 
the pluralistic approach appealing to concepts of “utility, autonomy, privacy and 
justice” advocated by Milius.
697
 
6.3 A synthesis  
Our first step in this examination is to look at the relevance of the natural rights 
justifications. The rights based upon personality (following the philosophies of Kant, 
Fichte and Hegel) all fail to support a veto/compensation right on the basis that ideas 
per se (as opposed to the protection of expression or of a right to attribution) cannot be 
the proper subject matter of such a right.  
When looking at our other natural rights head, we also saw that significant arguments 
have been raised as to whether the problems of origination/individuation are so severe 
within a natural rights account as to entirely undermine application of a Lockean labour-
desert justification. Even if a Lockean account does give us an underlying foundation 
for the existence of a right (and reminds us of the important of balancing the rights of 
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claimants to intellectual property with those of “commoners”) its application in 
particulars is greatly limited by the origination/individuation problems, notably in 
questions of degree.   
If, as a heuristic tool, we accept at this stage that any protection offered in respect of 
ideas per se has to be the result of positive (as opposed to natural) law, then we are left 
looking at the non-natural rights justifications. Table 6.2 summarises the results seen in 
Table 6.1 but excludes the natural rights justifications. 
















decision d1:  
(no veto) 
↓↓↓↓ ↓↓↓ ↑↑↑ ↓ ↓↓↓ ↓↓↓ ↓↓↓ 
decision d2: 
(total veto)  
↑↑↑↑ ↑↑↑ ↓↓↓ ↑↑↑↑ ? ? ↑ 
decision d3: 
(limited veto) 
↑↑   ↑↓ ↑↑ ↑↑ ? ? ↑ 
decision d4: 
(limited veto + 
compensation) 





↑ ↓ ↑↑↑† ↑ ↓↓ ? ↑ 
 † Subject to levels of compensation 
Looking across the remaining justifications, we find that none of the approaches (save 
for the utilitarian global health justification in respect of vetoes alone) favour a 
complete absence of veto/right to compensation. So a maximum consistency approach 
suggests that we are looking toward some type of veto/ right to compensation.  
Examining the four types of veto/right to compensation in play: decision d2 (total veto), 
decision d3 (limited veto), decision d4 (limited veto with compensation) and decision d5 
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(no veto but compensation), we saw that our Rawlsian maximin analysis most favoured 
a total veto (d2), followed by d4 (limited veto + compensation), followed by decision d3 
(limited veto), followed by d5 (no veto but compensation).  
We also saw that none of these decisions are entirely inconsistent with the achievement 
of utilitarian goals through valorisation of traditional knowledge, UNDRIP or the 
communitarian justification.  
Broadly speaking, Munzer’s reparations approach favours control. However, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, the uncertainties surrounding the reparation justification are so 
great as to really be of no assistance in the current analysis. 
Although it was more consistent with a global health utility than any of the veto options, 
it was argued that option d5 (no veto but compensation) was unlikely to create the same 
perception of value amongst relevant actors as would a veto (provided that the 
compensation provided under the determinant mechanism was broadly equivalent to 
royalties that would be paid under a licence) as the absence of a veto mechanism would 
preclude the creation of exclusive licensees who could rely upon their competitors being 
excluded from the market. 
Of all the veto options, d4 (limited veto + compensation) and decision d3 (limited veto) 
would appear on first examination to be more consistent with the preservation of global 
health utilitarian justification. Both approaches allow pharmaceutical companies to use 
a serendipitous discovery without absolute hindrance. If we consider the global health 
utilitarian justification to be an important determinant, this leaves us with a choice 
between d4 (limited veto with compensation) and decision d3 (limited veto without 
compensation). Of these two choices decision d4 (limited veto with compensation) is 
more strongly supported by the Rawlsian maximin analysis.  
The question of whether d4 is more likely to provide value to traditional knowledge than 
d3 (limited veto without compensation) is somewhat more moot. As was discussed in 
Chapter 3, the mechanism by which the creation of value in traditional knowledge 
achieves the utilitarian goals of preservation of the environment/traditional knowledge 
(or a conflation of the two) is most likely to be through the subjective perception of 
some economic value in the knowledge amongst all the actors (both indigenous and 
third party)  involved in a situation in which the preservation of the environment and/or 
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traditional knowledge is pitted against development which might lead to the destruction 
or diminution of the environment/traditional knowledge.  
As was also stated in Chapter 3, notwithstanding a scepticism in relation to the overall 
efficacy of a valorisation model, the perception amongst all the concerned actors of 
some value in genetic resources and in traditional knowledge associated with those 
resources (created through the existence of a right to control use) must be better than no 
perceived value whatsoever (created through the absence of a right to control use). As 
between option d4 and d3 then, the requirement to pay compensation is likely to have 
little effect on value as perceived by third parties, but is likely to have an impact on 
perception of value within the indigenous group holding the rights. As such there would 
seem to be an argument here to prefer d4 over d3. 
In relation to achieving a “utility through control” utilitarian goal, it was argued in 
Chapter 5 that this goal was most likely to be achieved through a total veto (option d2) 
whereas options d4 (limited veto + compensation) and decision d3 (limited veto only)  
may or may not achieve this utility depending on the indigenous group concerned. This 
utility was unlikely to be achieved (or achieved only minimally) through option d5. 
As was also discussed in Chapter 5, seeking a resolution of the conflict between the 
“utility through control” and “global health” utilities is exceptionally difficult. Those 
options which are likely to fulfil the goal of “utility through control” will work against 
the global health utility and vice versa. This conflict certainly highlights the difficulties 
(and perhaps the potential futility) in attempting to compare and rank such differing 
utilities.    
Earlier in this analysis we the excluded the Lockean labour-desert justification due to 
inherent uncertainties of origination and individuation. However, in formulating a 
positive law we may at least seek some consistency with natural law principles where 
we can. This may be particularly true where we are looking at rights based on 
contribution – as we have seen the concept of contribution is fundamental to all positive 
intellectual property laws and it seems not unreasonable to apply a contribution 
requirement to a positive law relating to the protection of traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources. That said, however, perhaps all we can safely say 
from our labour-desert analysis is that all options, other than d1 (no veto/compensation), 
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are consistent with a labour-desert account. Not a contribution which takes us 
particularly far. 
So, overall, in applying a “least contradiction” analysis we find that decision d4 (limited 
veto with compensation) would might seem to give us the least contradictions across 
most analyses. However, if we re-examine the non-natural law justifications in Table 
6.2, we find that this is arguably a strange result. In fact all the justifications favour (or 
are least consistent with) option d2 – a total veto - save alone for the “global health” 
utility. We must therefore ask ourselves to what extent the global health utility would 
truly be undermined by the existence of an absolute veto on all downstream use.  
The veto envisaged in d2 does give an absolute right for an indigenous group to prevent 
any downstream use of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources, 
notwithstanding that the use may considered by many to be very distal to the original 
understanding.  There is no doubt that in this case (d2) one cannot entirely rule out a 
situation in which a new (perhaps serendipitously discovered) treatment may be denied 
to the world by an indigenous group choosing to exercise their right of veto absolutely 
(or seeking to licence the right at a royalty level which was not viable for licensees). 
However, although this is entirely possible, we might ask whether it is likely. The 
exercise of an absolute veto without the grant of a licence would likely mean that the 
indigenous group would be unlikely to enjoy any economic benefit sharing of the fruits 
of the downstream exploitation of the information. One might imagine that the drive to 
partake in benefits of being a licensor would be strong. However, such a drive is likely 
to be based upon a Western-economic perspective. It is entirely possible to imagine a 
situation in which absolute control is deemed by a group to be more important than such 
benefits. Simply put, without further work, we cannot say what would be the actual 
likelihood of a new drug being denied to the global population. However, if one were to 
pursue the total veto policy proposal this always have to remain a possibility.  
We must also note that it is significantly in the broader interest of the global 
pharmaceutical industry that the great reserve of biologically active compounds which 
are to be found in the flora, fauna, fungi and bacteria of biodiverse environments are 
preserved and can be located. If it is more likely that a total veto will more strongly 
serve the protection of our ways of accessing such compounds, then the risk of an 
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occasional absolute veto might be outweighed by the overall instrumental utility of the 
preservation of such knowledge and the relevant environment/genetic resources.  At this 
point we simply do not know. This is point which will be returned to in the Conclusions 
section of this work at Chapter 7. 
That brings us back again to the question of whether a total veto serves to create a 
greater perception of value in the appropriate traditional knowledge than would option 
d4 (limited veto plus compensation). Here one might argue that the majority of the 
perceived value in the knowledge is created by the control of the first use rather than 
any downstream second (or subsequent) use which may, or may not, arise. However, as 
was highlighted in the valorisation model analysis, where one is seeking to create an 
optimum perception of value there is significant merit in a simple to understand and 
simple to administer system. Again, this is a point to which we will be returning in the 
concluding chapter (Chapter 7).  
6.4 The workability of a limited veto  
As mentioned looking over the entire picture, option d4 would appear to meet many of 
the requirements for a justifiable “consensus” position. In practice, however, whether it 
represents such a “consensus” (or indeed is at all workable) might depend upon the 
details of how the normative concept was brought into positive law.  
There are two crucial questions which need to be addressed in this regard: 
a) If the compensatory mechanism is based on an apportionment determined by an 
assessment of relative contributions, how do we assess those relative 
contributions? 
b) What is a truly serendipitous discovery? 
As we will see, both questions are (very) closely related. 
6.4.1 Assessment of “contribution”  
Questions of “contribution” in intellectual property law have most commonly focussed 
upon the determination of the degree to which an infringer’s use of an infringing 
concept or product has contributed to the infringer’s overall profits and the extent 
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therefore to which infringer need account for those profits to the intellectual property 
right holder. 
698, 699
 In this respect, much of the work of the courts has been to assess 
contributory causes to profits made. 
700, 701, 702, 703
 Attention has similarly been paid to 
assessment of royalty rates within non-voluntary patent licensing. Mechanisms for 
determining such rates exist 
704 , 705 , 706
 and similar principles as exist in the 
apportionment of an account of profits are applied in a non-voluntary patent licensing 
context where the patent in question covers part of a complex object.
707
  
All these approaches are essentially based on apportionment of commercial value and 
do not (it is argued here) assist in our present investigation. We need to recognise that 
the assessment of contribution which is important in relation to options d4 and d5 does 
not relate to the splitting of profits between infringing and non-infringing activities but 
to an assessment, in a particular situation, of the various epistemic elements of the 
“discovery” which have been brought by the contributing parties. This question is 
arguably much closer to the question of determination of the in-imitativeness of a 
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follow-on concept in the light of the concepts that have gone before, than it is to the 
splitting of profits or commercial value.  
In relation to patents, the question of in-imitativeness is structured as whether the new 
right is novel or inventive and is (in relation to both tests) set as a binary “yes or no” in 
the light of prior art and (sometimes) the common general knowledge. What patent 
offices do not do (and indeed are not required to do) is determine whether a new patent 
application is made up of, say, 95% “old” contribution and 5% “new” contribution.  
Indeed, in much patent practice and case law, great efforts are made to simplify the 
process by the use of formulaic tests which seek to narrow down that which the claimed 
invention will be tested against. 
708, 709
 For an extreme example, in the EPO inventive 
step is assessed using a highly formulaic “problem-solution” 
710
 test based upon 
selection of a single closest piece of prior art  
711
 and determination of an “objective 
technical problem” 
712
 posed by that prior art which the claimed invention successfully 
solves.  
We saw in our analysis of the Lockean labour-desert justification in Chapter 5 that the 
crucial question was what constituted a “contribution”. That thorny question remains 
where one is looking to create an apportionment based on contribution. Of course, if our 
grounds for creating the right are based on positive (rather than natural) law it is always 
open to law makers to arrive at positive law solution. However, in reality the 
formulation of a mechanism to fairly balance contribution to a discovery is fraught with 
difficulty. On what basis might we determine that one part of a discovery is more 
important than another? Do we/how do we factor in the effluxion of time? Are newer 
contributions to be given weighting over older contributions?  
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In addition, we have assumed that the determination would be between two parties: the 
indigenous group and the serendipitous “discoverer”, but there may be many partial 
contributions by others which could greatly complicate our (already difficult) bipartite 
determination. 
What is common to these questions is that they refer to relative contribution made in 
relation to a serendipitous discovery. Therefore, in many ways we actually find that 
these questions bring us back to the core question of what constitutes a “true” 
serendipitous discovery? 
6.5 Serendipity and “Retrospective Obviousness”  
In Chapter 4, it was highlighted that where a serendipitous discovery has been made, the 
crucial element is that there has been an entirely non-obvious, or unexpected, revelation 
of a new feature (use) of the “thing” (for example ligand) obtained from the genetic 
resource to which the traditional knowledge relates.  
Accordingly, when examining the policy options (d1 to d5) earlier in this work we 
defined a “serendipitous discovery” of a second use to mean a discovery in which the 
second use is truly unexpected in the light of the current understanding of the 
underlying biology when the discovery of the second use is made. 
However, it was also highlighted in Chapter 4 that not all steps to a new use will appear 
so momentous; some second uses may be reached (without a serendipitous leap) 
through a step-wise process in which researchers progressively understand more about 
the underlying biological target of a ligand. It was also stated that, even though a 
serendipitous discovery will appear unexpected at the time that it is made, as soon as 
the discovery of an unexpected second therapeutic benefit has been made, it will initiate 
research into the biological processes underlying the two apparently different (but in 
fact linked) therapeutic effects. This further work might be said to eventually render the 
discovery retrospectively obvious (just as such work performed ahead of the discovery 
could render if prospectively obvious). 
Of course, retrospective obviousness would seem to be oxymoronic. When we ask 
whether something is obvious we are inherently asking whether it is obvious at the time 
the question is being asked of us. We may debate what materials and other 
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understandings we might compare a discovery with, but all the materials and 
understandings to hand can have only been created in the past. 
This focus on the date upon which a question is asked is a fundamental element within 
existing intellectual property laws. Notably the priority date of a patent application (and 
what is knowledge is within the state of the art at that date) are critical to determining 
the novelty 
713
 and inventiveness 
714
 of a patent. The requirement that patent novelty and 
obviousness be determined at a certain date stems from the fact that patents are 
registered rights which have to be applied for and which have a fixed monopoly period 
– in one sense they have to have a start date otherwise they would not have an end date.  
As previously mentioned (see Chapter 5.3.1.1, above) , most intellectual property rights 
have an end date, a “self-defined expiration, a built-in sunset” is for Hughes 
715
 what 
enhances the social neutrality of intellectual property rights. Limiting the term of 
protection balances the negative of denying of others an opportunity to use the subject 
matter of the right and in the long-term allows for an expansion of the common weal.  
The start date within patent law is central to the determination of the “contribution” 
made by the invention and of whether it is deserving of patent protection at the date it is 
applied for. The requirement of a start date also “cements” what is claimed. Most patent 
laws contain strict rules as to post-application amendment 
716
 and the addition during 
prosecution of “added-matter” which does not form a part of the original application. 
717
  
The UK Court of Appeal’s invalidation Pfizer’s patent surrounding the effect of  cyclic-
guanosine monophosphate (cGMP) - specific phosphodiesterase (PDE) Type 5 
inhibitors (including sildenafil citrate (Viagra)) on erectile dysfunction, presents an 
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excellent example of a “surprising” second therapeutic use rendered obvious by prior 
publication of the understanding of the underlying biological mechanism. 
718, 719
   
During a study examining the effect of sildenafil on angina pectoris (affected through a 
dilatation effect on cardiac blood vessels), it was observed that the drug had a “second” 
effect on penile erectile tissue. Such a discovery could have been seen as a non-obvious 
serendipitous discovery. Indeed Pfizer, the sponsors of the study, certainly felt so and, 
after further work, filed a patent for the effect of the drug on erectile dysfunction. 
However, ahead of this filing a group led by Snyder at Johns Hopkins University had 
been examining the effect of nitric oxide (NO) on the relaxation of blood vessels. The 
group suspected that NO was a neurotransmitter responsible for the regulation of 
smooth muscle tone in the wall of blood vessels. During their studies they discovered 
that nitric oxide synthase (NOS, the enzyme which catalyses the production of NO) is 
found in localised concentrations in the erectile material of the penis. Given that the 
inhibition of NOS also inhibited penile erections, Snyder’s group suggested that the 
release of NO in penile erectile tissue is responsible for causing penile erections.
720
  As 
it was also understood that NO mediated its effect on vascular smooth through cGMP, it 
was a short step to understand that an inhibitor of cGMP inactivation (such as sildenafil) 
would have an stimulatory impact on blood flow in erectile tissue. 
721, 722  
The Pfizer case demonstrates that timing is crucial.  
As has been discussed above (at 5.3.1.1) the way in which traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources is created and held is such that it is difficult to see 
how a right to control its use can have a fixed duration. This lack of fixed duration may 
pose a distinct (and unique) challenge in relation to the assessment of in-imitativeness 
of follow-on developments. 
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Let us consider then the situation in which we have a subsisting right to control 
downstream use of an idea which has an infinite temporal duration. We are immediately 
forced to ask at what point in time we should determine that any new downstream 
development of that idea is “non-obvious” in the light of that right.  
When the new discovery of a second use is made (say the effect of plant A on disease Y 
in our North versus West scenario) at time α, it may seem to be unexpected (or 
serendipitous). Now let us imagine that research work is being done in parallel which 
uncovers that A has its effect of disease X through physiological mechanism “P”. This 
work also uncovers that disease Y is also caused through mechanism P. We are now at 
time β. Had the finding of the effect of A on Y been made after time β then it is unlikely 
that the finding would be a non-obvious discovery – indeed it would most likely be 
considered the natural consequence of the effect of A on joint physiological process P 
(just as was the case for Pfizer with sildenafil as discussed above).  
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If we assume that the discovery of the joint effect through mechanism P is inevitable we 
might ask ourselves this: Is the appearance of “serendipity” merely an artefact of the 
time at which we have chosen to test it? Although we cannot know with certainty when 
it will be determined, we do know that with enough time the entire biological benefit of 
A will be uncovered – all of which can trace its causal “inspiration” from the awareness 
that A can treat disease X.  
So with a right with a duration in perpetuity, could not the indigenous group holding 
that right at a date well beyond that upon which the serendipitous discovery was made 
say “now we understand that your discovery and ours are linked through common 
biology and accordingly we now seek to claim absolute control over your new 
downstream use”? 
To stop such a claim being successful one would have to envisage that the making of a 
third party serendipitous discovery of a second use would in some way “cement” the 
claim of the indigenous group such that, even were the serendipitous discovery to 
subsequently become obvious, the indigenous group’s claim against the serendipitous 
discoverer (or perhaps other third parties using that discovery) would be barred.  
In truth the workings of such a bar could be complex. We would also still be left asking 
what degree of discovery would be required to “cement” the indigenous claim. Would 
the bar work in favour of the serendipitous discover alone, or also in favour of other 
third parties using that discovery? How would the bar work in relation to subsequent 
serendipitous discoveries? Would that subsequent serendipitous discoverer benefit from 
a new bar to the indigenous claim? What would constitute such a subsequent 
serendipitous discovery in the light both of the original traditional knowledge and the 
first serendipitous discovery and the work on biological mechanism triggered by that 
discovery?  
However, as was discussed above, such complexities can be solved through the 
formulation of positive law, but we need to consider what philosophical justification can 
be made for such a bar to/cementation of the indigenous claim in the first place – 
essentially why is serendipity special? 
Although it is framed in a different way, this question is essentially just the same as that 
addressed earlier in this work and analysed in relation to policy options d1 to d5 above.  
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Restricting the scope of the indigenous claim beyond a serendipitous discovery is 
arguably the same as seeking a bar to /cementation of the claim upon the making of a 
serendipitous discovery. Accordingly, the conflicting justifications that we have seen in 
relation to policy options d1 to d5 remain the same. We are essentially left again with the 
fundamental conflict we have seen between (on the one hand) a promotion of global 
health utility and (on the other hand) the other analysed (non-natural law) justifications.  
Looking at the overall utilitarian considerations, one might perhaps suggest that the 
creation of a bar on the indigenous claim could create an incentive for researchers to 
search for serendipitous discoveries (perhaps through the testing of newly discovered 
ligands against a range of biological targets). However, one might consider that 
pharmaceutical companies are provided with more than sufficient incentive to 
investigate the effects of ligands through existing patent systems, without requiring 
enhancement of such incentive through a limitation of indigenous rights.  
Paradoxically, such a bar might (in theory at least) encourage a certain ignorance as to 
the underlying physiology of a ligand which was subject to an indigenous right to 
control. The less you know about the underlying biology, the more likely a discovery 
will be “serendipitous”. However, whether a drive to avoid an ongoing indigenous right 
would seriously influence such investigation (which would be crucial to the 
development of the first use of the ligand as a therapeutic agent) is highly questionable. 
Indeed the “search” for serendipitous discoveries would be likely to unavoidably throw 
“unwelcome” light upon underlying biological mechanisms in any event. 
So, as regard non-natural law justifications we would appear to be in much the same 
place as we were with our initial consideration of policy options d1 to d5.   
We might, however, ask whether giving the positive right (of whatever type) an infinite 
temporal duration has a complicating impact on the labour-desert justification for the 
right. In Chapter 5 we discussed the different treatments of “inchoate” and “inherent” 
claims, concluding that a labour-desert analysis was broadly supportive of an inchoate 
claim and with it a partial veto (even if the exact details of degree of contribution were 
difficult, perhaps impossible, to pin down) and perhaps less supportive of an inherent 
claim. However, overall it was concluded that the uncertainties of the labour-desert 
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account were such as to provide us with little concrete guidance other than that a 
positive right of some sort was supported.  
In looking at a right of control with infinite duration we do have one factor which is 
likely to be constant throughout and that is the initial contribution made by the 
indigenous group – the discovery of an effect of the genetic resource which was 
deserving of a right to control. It is that contribution which should be compared to the 
chain of new third party discoveries which are made during the (infinite) duration of the 
right. Each new discovery, in effect, creates a new contribution which is to be tested 
against the original. If we are seeking to determine whether there should be a bar to an 
ongoing claim, we need to ask whether there is a degree of third party contribution 
which is of sufficient merit to warrant that bar.  
That contribution would need to be significant enough to somehow “stand above” the 
mass of smaller steps, such that even though the same place was reached (the 
understanding of a second use) the step was itself great enough to break the chain. Here, 
of course, the labour desert account fails us – we are looking again at questions of 
degree. Of course, determining such differential contribution (practically, and 
theoretically, difficult to determine in any event) would continually change with time as 
incremental developments were made rendering an ongoing assessment essentially 
impossible in any event. 
However, stepping back from such difficulties one might ask oneself, if the same “total” 
of third party contribution is reached (the understanding of a second use) should it really 
matter whether it is reached by way of a series of small steps, or by one larger one?  
From this point we might ask is it the nature of the second use which provides grounds 
for a break in causation, rather than how that second use is arrived at?  
6.6 “Coincidental” second uses 
Looking at the question of scope from the perspective of a right of “infinite” duration 
also gives us a further insight which was not quite so apparent in our previous analysis.  
We envisaged above that, with sufficient time, it would inevitably become obvious that 
the fact that A’s effect of X and on Y was mediated through joint physiological 
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mechanism P and that accordingly in the long life of the right to control downstream use 
what might have initially appeared to be “serendipity” would actually be an artefact of 
the time at which the discovery was considered. However, the appearance of 
“retrospective obviousness” in that analysis is entirely reliant upon a shared underlying 
physiological mechanism.  
How though might we consider the position where a serendipitously discovered second 
use is unrelated to a shared underlying physiological mechanism? Perkin’s discovery of 
mauveine whilst attempting to synthesise quinine provides an ideal example for 
analysis.  
 





Figure 6.3 Structural formula of Mauveine B 
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Although Perkin would not have attempted the oxidisation of aniline with potassium 
dichromate but for an attempt to synthesise quinine, his discovery of mauveine was 
clearly an accident. It could have easily happened in a different context by someone 
looking for an entirely different end result. Perkin’s finding was in no way reliant upon 
the biological properties of quinine. In addition, as can be seen in Figures 6.2 and 6.3, 
mauveine
725
 is not a chemical derivative of quinine. 
726
 
As has been discussed, the discovery of mauveine was the stimulus for the growth of 
the synthetic dyes industry which in due course led to the development of antibiotics 
(such as the sulphonamide Prontosil) based on synthetic dyes. However, the 
biochemical mechanism by which those compounds have their antibiotic effect (as an 
antimetabolite which competes within the bacterial cell with para-aminobenzoic acid 
for incorporation into folic acid) 
727
 is entirely unrelated to the way in which it is likely 
that quinine has its pharmacological effect (through a plasmodium-selective inhibition 
of haematin biocrystallization) 
728
. Further, the biological target of quinine (the 
eukaryotic malaria-causing plasmodium 
729
) is taxonomically entirely unrelated to the 
prokaryotic bacterial target of antibiotics. So, although there is a true causation in fact 
link between the understanding of the indigenous peoples of the Andes that the bark of 
the quina quina tree has fever-controlling properties, the use of mauveine dye, and the 
use of the sulphonamides to treat bacterial infection, one cannot say that either of those 
downstream uses is inevitably derived from the use of quinine as an anti-malarial. Nor 
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indeed were such uses inherently present within the original indigenous understanding 
of the use of quina quina bark.  
It was mentioned above that the question of whether the “cementation” of the 
indigenous claim is appropriate will come down to a determination of the issues 
discussed in relation to policy options d1 to d5 - notably the question of a preservation of 
global health utility versus other justifications.  
However, whatever may be the outcome of that analysis, we need to ask whether the 
imposition of a bar (or not) should apply only where the first use and second use arising 
out of the traditional knowledge inspiration are biologically linked.  
Realistically, it seems difficult to argue that a “mauveine-like” second use (which is 
neither inevitably derived from the original knowledge nor was inherently present 
within the original indigenous understanding) should ever be subject to downstream 
control. It is hard to see that any of the justifications for a positive protection in 
indigenous knowledge could justify control over this type of non-inevitable downstream 
uses. Crucially, looking to the utilitarian account, it seems difficult to argue that their 
exclusion would lead to a diminution in the perceived value of traditional knowledge 
associated with traditional knowledge. 
However, as we have established, mauveine is an entirely different compound to 
quinine. What might the situation be where we have a non-biologically linked second 
use of quinine itself? Let us imagine quinine is found to have a rust inhibiting effect in 
diesel fuel. It seems entirely unlikely that such an effect would be related to its 
biological effect(s) and more likely that it is a purely accidental, unrelated effect. Again 
there would be a causal linkage in fact back to the indigenous knowledge of the 
properties of the quina quina tree. However, it is highly unlikely that the rust inhibiting 
effect of quinine was inherent in the original indigenous use of the bark. Could the 
discovery of the rust-inhibiting effect be said to be an inevitable consequence of the 
original understanding?  
Unlike Perkin’s discovery of mauveine, this is not a situation which could have as 
equally happened without a knowledge quinine. However, notwithstanding the duration 
of the positive right, it seems difficult to see a point at which the rust inhibiting effect 
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would ever be retrospectively obvious in relation to an underlying mechanism, or that 
the effect would inevitably be reached.  
Again, from a utilitarian perspective it would seem difficult to argue that the exclusion 
of this type of non-inevitable downstream use from coverage of a positive right would 
realistically lead to a diminution in the perceived value of traditional knowledge 
associated with traditional knowledge. 
However, even if we accept that such uses should be excluded from a right of 
veto/compensation, we are left with a difficult question of how to determine whether a 
second use is coincidental or is, in fact, related to a underlying shared physiological 
mechanism.  
We could fairly obviously determine at the time that the discovery was made that the 
discovery of mauveine was in no way an inevitable result of understanding that the 
quina quina tree had fever reducing properties. As stated, one could have come to an 
understanding of the structure of quinine, or of its biological effect, without ever having 
reacted aniline with potassium dichromate, and indeed one could have thought to react 
aniline with potassium dichromate without seeking to synthesise quinine. Their 
connection is entirely coincidental. This obviousness of coincidental connection is 
arguably true for our imagined rust inhibiting effect of quinine - it would one imagines 
be relatively easy to demonstrate that the effect had no biological basis (unless the effect 
was on organisms living within the diesel fuel!). 
However, at the time the discovery of a second use is made it is not always immediately 
apparent that there is no ground for assuming physiological linkage. In the early 1990’s 
it was discovered that quinine serves as a way of increasing the sensitivity of certain 
cancer cells to cytotoxic therapy. 
730
 It might be that this effect is mediated through a 
common physiological pathway as the inhibition of haematin biocrystallization seen in 
the effect of quinine on plasmodium, or not. It appears that ATP–dependent transporters 
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may have a role in multidrug resistance in cancer 
731  
and that antimalarial drugs have an 
effect on such transporters,
 732 
but the linkage is far from proven.
  
Quinine provides a yet further example of this type of complexity.  There is some 
evidence for a mild effect of quinine on muscle cramps 
733
 which could potentially be 
caused by a direct effect of the compound on membrane excitability in neurons and 
muscle cells.
734
 Again the linkage to a underlying mechanism for haematin 
biocrystallization (the anti-malarial mechanism) or an effect on ATP–dependent 
transporters is currently unclear. 
As was highlighted in Chapters 1 and 4, many biologically active ligands have been 
honed by millions of years of evolution to be exquisitely specific for biological 
mechanisms. It might seem unlikely then that a biologically-active ligand would evolve 
specificity for two entirely separate biological systems. Indeed, the more complex the 
structure of the ligand and the more specific its interaction with its target receptor, the 
more likely it might seem for this to be true. One might then argue that, on balance, one 
might be safe in most situations to assume that two apparently separate biological uses 
are actually mediated through the same mechanism – even when one does not yet know 
what that mechanism is. However, there can be no certainty that such an assumption is 
correct in all situations. 
How do we resolve this problem of determination? In relation to use of a ligand (or 
derivative of a ligand) which is the subject matter of the traditional knowledge then 
arguably the onus should be upon the discoverer of the second use to demonstrate that 
the mechanism of action was different from the biological mechanism underlying the 
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use originally uncovered by the indigenous rights holders. That the onus should 
reasonably lie with the third party discoverer is based upon the time, difficulty, skill-set 
and background knowledge required to demonstrate a shared biological mechanism. 
This brings us to a further, perhaps more difficult, question. How should we treat the 
Rosy Periwinkle case? In the Rosy Periwinkle case study described in Chapter 4, the 
original stimulus to explore the extract of the plant was a folk understanding that an 
infusion of the plant would treat diabetes. However, the clinical effects of the vinca 
alkaloid drugs used in therapy today, vincristine and vinblastine (and their derivatives), 
are as anti-cancer drugs (an effect mediated through an inhibition of cell division in 
rapidly dividing cells), not as anti-diabetes agents. If Rosy Periwinkle extract does has 
an effect on diabetes and given our current knowledge, it is hard to imagine how there is 
a shared underlying mechanism which links an anti-diabetes effect with the effect 
vincristine and vinblastine have on cell division. Indeed, it would seem more likely that 
the plant would mediate its antidiabetic effect through one or more of the other 130 or 
so alkaloids now understood to be present in the plant. 
735
 
Putting to one side the difficulties and appropriateness of obtaining consent to use in 
this particular case, 
736
 if we could assume that an indigenous group could have made a 
valid claim to a diabetes efficacy, it would have by no means been apparent at the time 
when vincristine and vinblastine were discovered that the effects were unrelated. 
Indeed, what would Lilly have needed to demonstrate? Perhaps once the effects of 
vincristine and vinblastine on tubulin and mitotic spindles were recognised (in the 
1970’s) it may have become apparent that the effects were likely unrelated. However, 
one would have to entirely exclude this biochemical effect from the benefits provided in 
relation to diabetes. It is hard to prove a negative in any event, and exceptionally 
difficult in an environment such as drug discovery - absence of evidence is not evidence 
of absence.  
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This chapter has covered a significant amount of, often difficult, ground. Details of the 
conclusions reached in this chapter are set out in Chapter 7 (at 7.3, 7.4 and 7.5) and to 
avoid repetition they will not be reiterated here. However, there are some points which 
are worth highlighting. As is discussed at the beginning of this chapter, achieving a 
synthesis of competing justifications is inherently difficult. However, the performance 
of the exercise does help shape a structured appreciation all the aspects which need to 
be brought to mind when looking to shape policy decisions. Notably, here the exercise 
brings us to a focus upon competing utilities as a key area for further theoretical and 
practical consideration. This synthetic approach has also, in the current case, taken us to 
consider a deeper analysis of the workability of the “least conflicting” policy decision 
which in itself brings us back to a deeper analysis of the meaning of second uses and of 
serendipity.  
Perhaps the most surprising outcome of that further analysis is the complicating impact 
of the nature of a right to control knowledge which is of unlimited temporal duration. 
As has been discussed above, one can make out arguments for why a right to control 
traditional knowledge has to be of unlimited duration. However, it may yet be that it is 
that unlimited temporal scope (within a right to control information) which is one of the 
more theoretically radical, and difficult, elements of the new rights.  
The next chapter seeks to bring together the conclusions of each section of this work 








“Property is not the natural and obvious and 
inevitable concept that most people think it is.” 
Robert A. Heinlein Stranger in a Strange Land (1961) 
 
7.1 Introduction – aims of the work 
Highlighting the origins of the concept of prior informed consent within the field of 
medical ethics, Dutfield has suggested that the “stretching” of that concept from 
medical ethics into the area of misappropriation of genetic resources and traditional 
knowledge of has been done “without sufficiently thinking through the practicalities, 
without much theoretical refection and without necessary consideration of political 
economy”
737
  He goes on to cite Burns’ warning on the probability of unintended 
outcomes: 
“The best-laid schemes o’ mice an’ men, Gang aft agley,” 
738
  
It has been the aim of the current work to investigate one such underexplored (and 
crucial) practicality (the justifiable downstream scope of a sui generis positive right to 
control downstream use of traditional knowledge associated with genetic resource 
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within the context of drug discovery) and to redress the paucity of theoretical refection 
in relation to that area.  
We saw in Chapter 2 of this work that what seems to be missing from the “positive” 
rights in relation to “traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources” under the 
Protocol is any principle or guidance for determining a balance which combines fair 
protection for the traditional knowledge/genetic resources rights holders with a 
reasonable degree of legal certainty for third parties. Where such knowledge serves as a 
research “lead” for further development, the Protocol gives no clear guidance as to how 
far that knowledge can have a “reach through effect” into new scientific discoveries or 
at what stage would a downstream researcher be considered “free” of the traditional 
knowledge right. 
Chapter 2 also concludes that although traditional knowledge associated with a genetic 
resource is a species of information, it is of an unrelated type to the informational 
component of a genetic resource. Traditional knowledge associated with a genetic 
resource (though it may serve as a gateway to their study) is not related to, and stands 
separate from, DNA or epigenetics (or indeed biochemicals produced through the 
expression of the genome of a resource). Accordingly, arguments which are applied to 
extend the definition of a genetic resource cannot properly be used to extend the 
definition of traditional knowledge associated with a genetic resource. Equally, 
however, the definition of a genetic resource does not delimit the meaning or scope of 
traditional knowledge associated with a genetic resource and, in principle, the 
downstream scope of a right to control such traditional knowledge cannot be curtailed 
by considerations which would apply in relation to genetic “information”. In this respect 
the traditional knowledge associated with a genetic resource is a broader, and less 
proscribed, concept than the genetic information held within the resource. 
Although the uncertainty of the Protocol acted as a stimulus for the current work, the 
question of what is a justifiable scope for such a right is broader than can be answered 
by an examination of the Protocol itself (or indeed of any other extant or proposed 
positive right). As was discussed in Chapter 3, the inherent non-rivalrous and non-
excludable nature of knowledge is such that its use can only be controlled through the 
imposition of positive law. However, for the limits of the scope of that positive law to 
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be justifiable they must be supported by the philosophical reasons for the existence of 
that right.  
In Chapter 4, this work went on to empirically examine the processes by which new 
drugs (or new uses for old drugs) are discovered. A key finding of that empirical study 
is the many ways by which an original piece of traditional knowledge can be admixed to 
a greater body of existing information regarding a clinical problem, and that there may 
be further admixture to the original information of discoveries derived from it and 
subsequent admixture to other, “parallel”, information which is not derived from it. The 
study also found that these processes may themselves go through several feedback 
iterations and that, overall, the original information within the traditional knowledge 
may become significantly “diluted” by other information before a useful drug is arrived 
at. It was also noted that any such downstream discovery based on the inspiration of a 
piece of traditional knowledge will always be causally linked in fact to the original 
inspiration. However, (as was further discussed in Chapter 6 of this work), although one 
can correctly envisage the drug discovery process as chains of causation with flows of 
information, one can also envisage it as a field of inputs of competing contributions 
which are concomitant with those flows of information. Here with increasing admixture 
of information, the information arising from the contributions of the indigenous 
originators is progressively diluted within a morass of competing contributions sitting 
on the back of an entanglement of information. 
The examination of the topography of drug development in this work also revealed that 
many drug discovery efforts could be described as sequential and accumulative. Here 
(although there is a substantial increase in the volume of additional knowledge) the 
underlying nature of the contribution made by the traditional knowledge to the 
downstream product arguably remains unchanged.  
Taking inspiration from long interface between patent law and the drug discovery 
process for inspiration, this work identified the unexpected (“serendipitous”) discovery 
of a new use for a particular genetic resource (or the compounds found in a particular 
genetic resource or their chemical derivatives) as a putative “crux point” at which a 
third party downstream contribution affects a “step change” in the nature of the 
downstream product, when compared to the original contribution. 
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Some case studies highlighting the types of serendipitous discoveries which have been 
made in drug discovery processes (inspired by or derived from genetic resources) were 
described. These were: 
a) The discovery by Paul Gibson and Lawrence Craven of the blood thinning (and 
with it cardio- and cerebro-protective) effects of aspirin; 
b) The discovery by Carl Koller of the local anaesthetic effects of cocaine; 
c) The discovery by William Perkin of the aniline dye, mauveine, whilst attempting 
to synthesise quinine (its stimulus of the aniline dye business and its in turn 
leading to the discovery of sulphonamide antibiotics); and 
d) The discovery by Ralph Noble (and others) of the anti-tumour effects of vinca 
alkaloids extracted from the Rosy periwinkle.  
Taking a serendipitous discovery to mean one where the second use is non-obvious at 
the time the discovery is made, in Chapter 5 of this a number of potential policy 
decisions in respect of the scope of a veto surrounding such discoveries were tested 
against the philosophical justifications for the existence of a positive right in traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources. 
7.2 Application of philosophical justifications 
In applying the philosophical justifications, significant difficulties were encountered in 
relation to the application of natural rights justifications. It was argued that rights based 
in personality do not support a positive right to control knowledge per se.  
Although application of a Lockean labour-desert right to supported some form of 
positive right (as opposed to no right at all), inherent problems with determination of 
origination and individuation arising out of the uncertainty of the meaning of 
“contribution” meant that, in the end, little concrete guidance could be determined in 
terms of justifiable downstream scope.  
Within the consequentialist account, three key utilitarian goals were identified:  




b) the preservation of the environment within which the genetic resources 
associated with the relevant knowledge are found; and  
c) an inherent utility in directly controlling the knowledge ( termed “utility 
through control”).  
It was posited that these first two goals (or a conflation of both) might be achieved 
through creating a perceived value in the minds of relevant actors (although it was 
acknowledged that there causal certainties in this regard). It was argued that the greatest 
likelihood of perceived value was through granting a veto right which extended to all 
downstream use. It was also argued that the “utility through control” goal would be 
achieved without the need for creating value and again the likelihood of achieving that 
utility was enhanced by providing a veto which covered all downstream use.  
However, it was noted that, within the broader utilitarian account, the granting of veto 
rights over traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources could conflict with 
the potential enhancement of “global health” which would be provided by allowing 
pharmaceutical companies freedom to use their resources and expertise to develop drugs 
without hindrance. 
Looking at the application of a right from the perspective of distributive justice, it was 
found that provided one looks at the proportionate advantage to each side of each of the 
proposed decisions (essentially applying the difference principle) the granting of an 
absolute veto on all downstream use is the situation the person in the original position 
would choose as maximising the minimum – that is avoiding the worst outcome.  
It was noted that the communitarian account for positive rights over traditional 
knowledge suggests that indigenous peoples should have a significant degree of control 
over information which is their community resource. However, it was found that there is 
little explicit guidance from this doctrine as to whether very distal uses, including uses 




In respect of the restorative/corrective justice account recently proposed by Munzer,
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it was found that the uncertainties (and inherent case-by-case specificity) make the 
translation this reparation justification to a set of generally applicable principles for 
broader application exceptionally difficult. 
In relation to the application of UNDRIP, it was found that compensation for 
misappropriation is likely to be the minimum redress envisaged under that Declaration. 
Accordingly, any positive right which delivers this or more will be compliant  with 
UNDRIP. However, UNDRIP gives no guidance in terms of determining the 
downstream scope of such a right. 
7.3 Synthesis  
Chapter 6 examined the potential options for using “mid-level” techniques to achieve 
synthesis of our potentially conflicting philosophical justifications. It was concluded 
that Sunstein’s “theoretically modest” approaches were inappropriate when all we could 
realistically use to determine a justifiable scope was theory. Although Merges’ 
application of Rawls’ overlapping consensus approach was examined, since this 
approach is untried a somewhat more conservative “least contradiction” (teamed with a 
ready appreciation of the applicability and relevance of a particular theory) analysis was 
undertaken.   
It was found that the policy option tested which demonstrated the least contradiction 
across all justifications was a veto on downstream use which did not extend beyond the 
making of a serendipitous discovery but which involved a mechanism under which the 
indigenous holders were compensated for third party use of the serendipitous discovery 
on the basis of comparative contribution (termed in this work option d4) 
Although option d4 does represent a least contradiction approach, when one re-examines 
the non-natural law justifications employed in this work it was found that all those 
justifications favoured (or are least consistent with) a total veto on downstream use - 
save alone for what was identified as the “global health” utility. This particular conflict 
will be addressed further below.  
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7.4 What is serendipity? 
In Chapter 6 having identified the “limited veto plus compensation” policy option as 
that being least conflicting across the justifications employed, the workability of that 
option was analysed. The key question arrived upon was how should we determine what 
a “serendipitous discovery” actually is.  
In examining this point it was identified that the way in which traditional knowledge 
associated with genetic resources is created, and held, is such that it is difficult to see 
how a right to control its use can have a fixed duration. It was also identified that this 
lack of fixed duration may pose a distinct (and unique) challenge in relation to the 
assessment of in-imitativeness of follow-on developments. The situation was considered 
in which we have a subsisting right to control downstream use of an idea which has an 
infinite temporal duration. We are here immediately forced to ask at what point in time 
should we determine that any new downstream development of that idea is “non-
obvious” in the light of that right. 
Chapter 6 went on to establish that given this infinite temporal duration, if an 
indigenous claim to a positive right was to be limited to a serendipitous discovery then a 
bar to an ongoing claim would have to be put into place on the making of a 
serendipitous discovery. However, it was argued that the philosophical grounds for 
establishing a bar were, in fact, the same as those analysed in respect of scope.   
However, we are left here a logical lacuna (or perhaps more correctly a “whirlpool”). 
These grounds cannot realistically tell us how to define a serendipitous discovery. Each 
new third party discovery creates a new contribution which is to be tested against the 
original contribution of the indigenous people claiming the right. If we are seeking to 
determine whether there should be a bar to an ongoing claim we need to ask whether 
there is a degree of third party contribution which is of sufficient merit to warrant that 
bar. That contribution would need to be significant enough to stand above the mass of 
smaller steps such that even though the same final epistemological “place” was reached 
(the understanding of a second use) the step was itself great enough to break the chain. 
It was argued that here the labour desert account (again) fails us – we are looking at 
questions of degree. 
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However perhaps the hardest observation to reconcile in determining a meaning of 
serendipitous second use is this. If the same “total” amount of third party contribution is 
reached (the understanding of a second use) should it (where one has a right of control 
of unlimited duration) really matter whether it is reached by way of a series of small 
steps or by one larger one?  
In addition, determining differential contribution (theoretically difficult to determine in 
any event) would continually change with time as incremental developments were made 
rendering an ongoing assessment essentially impossible in any event. 
Perhaps the most surprising outcome of the analysis of the meaning of serendipity is the 
complicating impact of the nature of a right to control knowledge which is of unlimited 
temporal duration. As has been discussed above, it may yet be that it is that unlimited 
temporal scope within a right to control information which is one of the more radical 
elements of the new rights. Clearly this is an area that may reward further theoretical 
investigation.  
7.5 Coincidental discoveries 
If we assume that determining what is meant by a “serendipitous” discovery is 
essentially impossible, we need to ask whether the nature of the second use gives us 
grounds for a break in causation, rather than how that second use is arrived at?  
Chapter 6 went on to examine this question. Of course the key to this question is 
determining what a second use is in this context.  
It was argued that coincidental discoveries (such as the discovery of mauveine by 
William Perkin whilst seeking to synthesise quinine where the finding could have as 
easily happened without a connection to quinine and could not have been inevitably 
arrived at) should not be considered second uses covered by a right to control 
downstream use. It was also argued that uses which were unrelated to any “claimed” 
biological effect of the genetic resource (such as an unrelated physical effect) should be 
excluded as these would not be inevitably arrived at when examining the biological 
effect. Of course, if the original knowledge related to a physical property the analysis 
would be different. 
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However, it was argued that the question of whether different biological effects should 
be considered to be different uses is difficult. It was pointed out that what appear 
initially to be second uses can turn out to be linked through a common physiological 
mechanism. It might be argued that such second uses are essentially the same as the first 
as (in the fullness of time) they would inevitably be arrived at. However, at the time 
such a second use was uncovered this would not be apparent and indeed one would 
require a significant amount of scientific research to disprove the linkages.  
Chapter 6 then went on to examine how one might deal with the rosy periwinkle – vinca 
alkaloid case. Here it was suggested that the originally disclosed anti-diabetic effect (if 
present) was probably mediated through a different alkaloid present in the plant rather 
than vincristine and vinblastine which mediated the plant’s anti- tumour effects. It was 
also pointed out that such an assumption could only be made in the light significant 
study into the alkaloids of the plant and their biological effects. 
7.6 Overall Conclusions 
The leitmotif of this work is the complexity of the drug discovery process. A significant 
part of this work has been an attempt bringing that complexity within the bounds of 
analysis. Indeed, the key contribution of this work has been to investigate the interface 
between the complexity of the drug discovery process and a right to control traditional 
knowledge associated with genetic resources, and to identify and analyse a number of 
further theoretical, and practical, complexities which arise from the creation of 
workable and philosophically-justifiable policy options at that interface.   
Envisaging the drug discovery process as one of epistemic dilution with a concomitant 
conflict of contribution does appear to provide us with a lens to see (at least on a larger 
scale) potential points where we might further analyse the justifiable downstream scope 
of a positive right in traditional knowledge associated with genetic resources.  However, 
when we come to analyse the question on a smaller scale we find that the inherent 
uncertainties (in both origination and individuation) of the contribution-based natural 
rights model for the existence of rights to control intangible intellectual products leaves 
us with significant inherent uncertainties. 
The synthesis exercise performed in Chapter 6 arrives at a preferred putative policy 
optioned where the right of veto extends as far as the making of a serendipitous 
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discovery of a second use for a product of a genetic resource. In respect of the second 
use under this policy option the right holder has no veto but has a right to be 
compensated according to their “contribution”. However, as was discussed in the latter 
parts of Chapter 6, this solution (option d4) leads us to face a number of significant 
practical and/or theoretical difficulties.  
These will include:  
a) determining a definition of “serendipitous discovery”; 
b)  determining a definition of a “second use”; 
c) determining how one would go about compensating a party on the basis of their 
“contribution”; 
d) determining what “contribution” means; 
e) assuring a contributing party that the determinant mechanism for compensating 
contribution was fair, transparent, and followed due process; 
f) assuring a contributing party that the determinant mechanism for compensating 
contribution would provide as reliable compensation as a negotiated royalty for 
granting permission to use; 
g) ensuring that a compensatory mechanism in some way mitigated the negative 
effects on potential licensees denied an opportunity for an exclusivity advantage 
over competitors; 
h) determining whether a second use is (or is not) actually linked to the first use 
through a shared physiological mechanism; and  
i) determining whether a second use is mediated (or is not mediated) through a 
second ligand present in the genetic resource. 
Some of these problems can, of course, be addressed through the imposition of positive 
law. However, some solutions are likely to be arbitrary as the application of natural 
rights contribution-based approaches are (as has been seen) very difficult. 
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Even if such solutions can be arrived at to the operation of the d4 option, the evidential 
and administrative burden in determining questions of contribution and such points as 
whether a second use is (or is not) actually linked to the first use through a shared 
physiological mechanism or determining whether a second use is mediated (or is not 
mediated) through a second ligand present in the genetic resource is likely to be 
extremely onerous.  
The analysis throughout this work suggests that simplicity both in the operation of a 
positive right (and in the message which is received by relevant actors) enhances 
perceived value which has greater likely efficacy (though no certainty) in achieving the 
utilitarian goals of the right of preservation of the traditional knowledge and the 
environment in which the genetic resource is found. Complexity in operation (notably in 
the examination of whether or not the “new” biological effects seen on a serendipitous 
discovery are physiologically related to the original indigenous “claim” or otherwise) is 
likely to work counter to the consequentialist justification for this option.   
From a Rawlsian “difference principle” perspective, it is highly likely that a 
pharmaceutical company will possess greater legal and scientific expertise to argue its 
position relative to an indigenous group. Complexity of operation of the right (again 
particularly is the assessment of evidential questions) will likely advantage the 
pharmaceutical researchers relative to the indigenous actors.  
7.6.1 A simpler solution?  
In the light of the problems seen with the partial veto option and the “failure” of a 
contribution-desert model when looking at smaller-scale problems, we might ask again, 
is there justification for a broad, simpler, right to control any downstream use which 
uses a non-coincidental (effectively biologically-mediated) use?  
Given the inherent problems we have seen with the natural rights accounts, the question 
of whether such a broad scope is justifiable falls back on the utilitarian account and 
(arguably) its compliance at least with other non-natural rights accounts.  
From a utilitarian perspective we noted in Chapter 6 that (but for the question of a 
global health utility, to which we will return) there existed a justification for a total veto 
over downstream use. It is worth noting that coverage of all biological effects arising 
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out of genetic resource gives us a simplicity in operation which works in support of the 
valorisation model. It seems unlikely in this regard that the exclusion of “co-incidental 
effects” – essentially those which were unrelated to the biological effects of the genetic 
resource - would have an impact upon perceived value. In any event, such co-incidental 
effects are likely to be rare.  
Outside of the valorisation model, a veto right to control all downstream biological uses 
of a genetic resource (based upon traditional knowledge associated with that genetic 
resource) also directly meets the goal of “utility through control”. 
In relation to the other non-consequentialist accounts (communitarian, “Munzerian” 
reparations or UNDRIP) there seems is no reason why such a broader right would be 
excluded. Using the Rawlsian maximin analysis used above, the broader a right given to 
the indigenous group the better the right complies with the difference principle. As 
mentioned above simplicity of operation and reduced evidential burdens also supports 
the difference principle. 
If one does want to look to a contribution-reward justification for such a right, the 
argument here may be that the indigenous people’s contribution which warrants a 
positive right is simply the opening the “gateway” into the biology of the genetic 
resource. However, as we have seen the application of such a model outside of broad 
sweeping statements (whilst acting as a useful reminder to consider conflicting parties) 
is difficult to apply. 
7.6.2 Indigenous culture, the environment, and spiritual happiness vs. global 
healthcare – a squeeze? 
The performance of the synthetic analysis in Chapter 6 brings us to a focus upon 
competing utilities as a key area for further theoretical and practical consideration.  
Overall we appear to be “squeezed” on that analysis between the great complexities of 
operating a veto option which does not cover serendipitously discovered second uses 
(but which, in part, ameliorates the global healthcare utility concerns identified) and a 
total veto which avoids complexity and looks to meet the utilitarian justification of 
preservation of traditional knowledge, genetic resources, and the environment in which 
they are found, but which runs counter to allowing pharmaceutical companies to freely 
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develop pharmaceuticals for the benefit of global health without the risk of imposition 
of a veto on their activity. 
In considering this squeeze, we firstly need to note (as was discussed in Chapter 6) that 
not all rights to a total vetoes would be exercised absolutely. It is possible that many 
total vetoes would be used to ensure the receipt of royalties for permission to use, so 
(subject to royalty rates) not significantly limiting the activities of pharmaceutical 
companies. However, we simply do not know to what extent this would happen. What 
we certainly can say is that if a total right to veto all downstream biological use does 
exist, we will also have to accept the possibility that an indigenous group will choose to 
veto a potentially important therapeutic product. 
Given we have here conflicting consequentialist goals, we may arguably arrive at a 
better understanding of the justificatory balance between our competing policy options 
if we had a better sense of the degree to which the conflicting policy options might 
actually achieve their aims, or interfere with the achievement of the aims of the 
conflicting policy. The empirical assessment of these competing risks and probabilities 
is outwith the scope of the current work but further work in that respect may aid our 
determination of whether such a broad veto over downstream use would be justifiable.  
Crucial here might be an empirical understanding of the likelihood that indigenous 
groups would seek to apply an absolute veto rather than follow a licensing route, which 
may, in turn, reflect the degree to which they value an absolute restriction over the use 
of their knowledge over its commercialisation. 
One further approach to investigating this dilemma might be to examine to particular 
exceptions in relation to public access to medicines and major global health crises 
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and such examination would again form the basis for further research. 
However, when looking any such question we always need to recall that the argument 
essentially boils down to this: Is indigenous traditional knowledge sufficiently at risk of 
extinction that it is worth the risk of potential restriction over drug discovery and 
development activity? 
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 For discussion of mechanisms to provide public access to medicines (notably the interface between 
public health policy and TRIPs obligations) see Duncan Matthews, Intellectual Property, Human Rights 
& Development: The Role of NGOs and Social Movements (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham 2011), 15 
346 
 
Perhaps we should conclude this work with this observation: Millions of years of 
evolution have honed compounds within all forms of life on Earth which have 
astoundingly exquisite selectivity and potency in biological systems. They are 
remarkably useful tools. As highlighted by Atkins,
741
 the extinction of species 
potentially extinguishes our sources of new molecular tools. Similarly, the extinction of 
indigenous knowledge potentially extinguishes our ability to locate such new molecular 
tools. If such tools disappear they are unlikely ever to be regained.  
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